Friday, October 4, 2019



  1. What is “Intentionality” properly?

 

 

 

Image result for husserl

This is connected to the section of Husserl with which Heidegger took great interest, where the description of a sentence is given. Something along the lines of what follows is in question. The sentence says, for instance, the bird flies. But, then, it says, look there, at the opening of the wings. Look at how the air flows beneath the wings. The bird soars. There! There! He reaches the heavens! And so on. 


So far as the sentence, which speaks, is the source of the great thing, of reason, it is of interest. But, but that way, we follow the path recommended of old. We start with what we know, and go towards what is more unclear. 
 

What matters in Intention is this: It is said in the world (Speech happens in the world). Thus, what matters is, it is not a question of language understood as a matter of significance or semantics. Language is a matter of an event in the world. Language is like the animal’s call. It simply moves the things there. What “things?” Even when we speak of animals, we already run with something that is told to us. Told to us by language. In this sense, one must consider that language is primary. Why? Because it is not something inside, that tells about something “physical.” It is already the sound that draws all things into possibility. It is already something out there. 

 

Intentionality, though, only poses for us a question. It says, noise is out there, the animal signal is out there. It is no mere talking to ourselves in the head. 



Everything, then, hangs on this, in the way Language speaks, can it bring us to something more than mere talk? Here everything hangs on entering language. Otherwise, after all, language would remain only mere “talk.” 


Our first attempt should be this: To bring Cassirer and Husserl. For Cassirer is where language has been grasped most solidly out of the primordial, or, better, from what pushes back to the primordial. Husserl, however, sees something more simple. Speech is phenomena. 

 

Intentionality is prior to “nature.”
Speech as language is prior to “nature.”

The first hint is this: Nature is what comes forth of itself. It poses a contrast to what holds still in metaphysic. What is "prior" is still floating prior to the question of Augustine, to the observation of Augustine!

In all such thinking the question whether the thing is even intelligible comes in. As in the question about the Kantian “noumenal.” Is the noumenal even intelligible? Is it intelligible to speak of something that is not even a possibility? Namely, the event. If the event were only a possibility, it would be a development out of what is already gripping us. 

Why does time remain only thinkable in a direction if time itself is nowhere given? Time is no more clearly given than is this “noumenal” which is not even thinkable, not even intelligible. [One must object, but isn't time thinkable and intelligible, and so to the possibility of what is thought in the thinking of "event?"] The very intelligibility of the intelligible comes into question. Everyone knows so many things that they don’t know. That is how it looks. A notion already noticed, of course, by Augustine. Totalized by Kant with his Categorical Imperative because he assumes all acts, everything caused by human choice, can be raised to clarity in principles. One acts, but doesn't raise it to consciousness. But, it would come into the regions of metaphysics if one did. You merely think, but you don’t yet think “onticly.” 

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