Regimes of Humanism, Regimes of Individuality 





 

 

Primeval passion, the sphere of Interests. The phrase “the passions of the tide” means that the tides take no action. Action is the mixture of the soul and the body. The popular or general opinion, in its frenzied inexactitude, doesn’t often enough distinguish action from mere movement. Napoleon sits on his horse, perhaps he unscabbars his long arched sword and thereby produces a semaphore. Perhaps Napoleon never fought at all in hand to hand battle or duel. Perhaps he never had a physical fight of any kind. What is an action? What is a deed? Because the human being lives in the storms of (truth as) correctness (this should not be confused, and by no means identified simply, with the temporally local phenomena of "political correctness"), it lives in a chain of thousands of years of overlapping thinking. Ideas of the dead, not only dead humans, but of dead circumstances and landmasses perhaps exerting their telluric forces, constantly overwhelm philosophical interests. The philosophical interest is truth. Yet, what does it mean that truth has become an interest, that reason has become a passion? The legal system of most countries retain the philosophic meaning of action, as in the phrase “Accessory after the fact.” Action is the older sense of the word fact. A legal fact, to be determined by a jury, as a non-scientific matter, as something which is not a matter of the science of law, involves asking how the mind links to what is done. A treacherous Borgias prince gives his guest a poisoned chalice. The unjust act (unjust fact) is made possible because of his knowing that it is poisoned. Implying that the significance or "relevancy" is woven into the mere material motion. A woman, according to the contemporary vision out of the mere social mass of the society, perhaps becomes “politicized” when she has a child because she must see to the interest of the “future” which has the business of being a danger for her own. But, on the other hand, the essence of man as man is supposedly reason which finds its right environing in the political world which makes freedom form necessity possible and so thought possible in idleness which is the aim of the highest human essence. Thus freedom from the labor demanded by a lack of mastery of the environment. Yet, reason is only availability of the intuited essences; in simpler terms it is what speech does in allowing one to speak about. Perhaps then man is the being with the interest of being the “head of a household” and controlling the “purse strings” and protecting what is his? The so-called thumos type or the object of the studies of Fukuyama in exact social science study. The question of the countries holding their own among the other countries is analogous to that of the question of the political man with his badges and money, his demand for pride or superiority, and, on the other side, the philosopher with his reason and his significance or truth and his claim to the superiority of truth and god or "rationality" as the Atheist god, to contest. 

Movement of the individual in the conventions of the current centuries.

The pathos of a “theory” of life (anti-dating Nietzsche) judges by moments of a lived-experience that takes its form in the drama of the individual. This is then the measure of the being, this and this happened and it was worth experiencing and these experiences go on throughout life and thus life is significant. Such mere “subjective” individualism must have a god to protect it, a god of reason such as that that came to light in the French Revolution (the struggle of the amour soi to assert itself as amour propre must find some tribunal to save off the mere reversion to barbarism, not to say the strange and problematic "state of nature"). If this God were summed in a word he would be “Equality” (thus the Truth of the Hegelian Absolute is averred in the human heart, and a rejection of simple Christianity (rather than its developed forms which stray from th mere "to the world what is the worlds, to me what is mine": ergo, the "aristocracy of nature" is evaded, of the judgement at death and not in this world of the personalities in their inner significance as spirits] is effected on some views). All are equal, later it becomes necessary to notice the principle of Equality, as the Truth of the world which if it is obeyed will draw mankind to bliss, is not so easily “worked pure” by the precedents of the jurists and the people in their Natural Right as what is Essential (e.g., the gay marriage issue) over the course of a century and many revolutions. The principle or God, which is eternal, which reason finds, must guard the mere living beings with their Erlebnis (because of the threat of barbarism). Thereby Nietsche would be totally bastardized and made to agree with the accidental grotesque world of concessions to reality (because in Nietzsche "Life" has a principle within it that decides on what is deed or significant as what is "life-giving lie"). 

 

Humanism: To make Reason God. Reason, what grasps the principle around which a discipline is founded and sustained. For instance, health makes the establishment of a diploma in medicine and research into what restores health significant or meaningful. Health itself is only available to reason as a principle. The means to health refer back to health, to the principle. But, health is only what is grasped as health rather than illness by the human “subject” with its so-called reason or ability to hold “abstractions” before itself in the soul, or the higher part of the soul. Then Equality is supposed to be to the whole, to all that exists, what health is to the body and reason comes to hold sway as a God. It degenerates so far as the principle undergoes the pathos of its continual catharsis and reemergence. In the sacrifice of one estimation of its predicated essence to another, in the burning of what one worships and the worshiping of what one had formerly burned. For example that American Southerners burned Integration, but now more and more worship it amidst various still visible resistances. 

 

Humanism: That decisions over fate are moved from the natural to the deliberate. So that all people from one country, because they speak one language, have numerous things in common, but that among them some will show inclination to work with mechanical things and go into a training in waste management, through an inner inclination. That inner inclinations be viewed as the most important thing. That all financial barriers, that a child with an inclination would be prevented from following it because the family needs them to earn a wage, are to be overcome. 

 

Humanism: The reorganization of all human achievement which gives the Deed or the Action a new significance. The greatest deed, to become an Individual. Thus the inner wellspring of mere motion, the “motive”, is the “Individualized” soul. 

 

On the other hand this Humanism is the shadow of a radical materialism in the form of Science or the sciences. “An elite is tempted by Russian neo-Marxism not so much because of its humanitarian gospel as because of its vision of a totalitarian civilization linked to the cosmic powers of matter.” The sacrifice of beings in the Russian Futurism and the subject matter of Boris Groys, the downgoing of the sun, and the nihilism which resets in order to build from a black null. The well-known Nazi “mysticism” which is really a “cosmic power” cult of "planetary criminals." The liberalism which flattens this and comes to speak of “consciousness” as an effective experimentally available limit state of material. Thus the deification of the essence of Reason as sheer availability. The human become the being that has for its specific differentia Availability (or presence).  

 

The Individual: That which is isolated by the economic machine and forced into universal gladiatorial contests of the most vulgar kind. The removal of the human being as a reasonable being under a principle which is the path to bliss or “happiness,” to what is the same as health to the whole. 

 

The Individual: The inner being without a soul, which is now the subject and not the possessor of the “knowledge as power.” Originally, the “knowledge as power” was a force against the environment of an animal gifted with reason. But, when the animal became a Material “consciousness” (no longer seriously recognizing a distinction between environment or surrounding world and itself) the “knowledge as power” was turned against it and began to menace it. 

 

The Individual: According to the Contract Theory notion an entity called a “rights bearing Individual” replaced the subject who was a duty bound possession of a king. When this notion became absurd to the rising middle classes, and it was asked, can the king of France sell one of his subjects to the King of England, the new regime was brought in. Undeveloped in America, with only Empirical institution, and more thoughtfully in France, with a Civic Religion of Equality (and Atheistic "rationality"). But, in what does the change actually consist? In effect the American has the duty to follow the laws. Thus duty still exists. The office of the Right bearer, is that of Law Obeyer. Long consideration produces the conviction that the Social Contract so-called Legal Fiction is much less radical than it presents itself. True, the Individual is supposed to live in Society and so in the gladiatorial contest where it is an isolate being and not part of a civic culture. And yet the civic culture goes on being imposed, but simply without an explicit admission of its obligating title. Thus a certain destructive clash exists between the State as referee over the gladiatorial world, and the Civic Culture imposition.  

 

 

In going over these  subject matters continually the “guiding aim” is to draw the whole into view as the rule of the past that lives on so as to remove the comfortable relaxation in what is already decided and effective everywhere. Only then can we begin to ask why Reason itself must become not “consciousness”, but rather being. And just how our leading question will unfold: Is the genetic power of the Phenomenology which still speaks from the Essence of Availability set aside in the “guiding aim” of the Truth of Being? 

 

 

Again, as the Methodos thinks, it comes to ask more profoundly about the “Truth of Being” in its founding. How can anything be founded that is not subject to the Metaphysics of Presence at all? Even Heidegger. Someone who has a possibility, someone who knows what to do with a shoelace, because they are that kind of being, already has, say, the standing future of tying a shoe. The Megarians make this sharper by pointing, ultimately, to the claim to an essential difference in this. Because accidents might prevent someone with a skill to carry it out in action and complete it perfectly in its end. A drunken contractor may fail to make of his raw materials the two by fours he needs. The failure to fabricate what is needed for the building could happen for n number of accidental reasons. Thus the ground of the energia, that place form which the standing possibilities come forward, is set over and against the supposed accidents. Yet, common sense sees the reliability of numerous skills in their possibility. In considering this as a field of competency of thinking that has come to pervade the human being as a correctness can we ever not treat our thinking as the actualizing or the deed of grasping what is available in order to decompose the mystery of dunamis and energia, of the coming to be of the possibility and the actus purus? In such reflections that go more closely to the base of the being question, is there supposed to be a moment when the End of Metaphysics is already overcome, when the leap to the another beginning is not present in the availability of the research? We must consider this again more accurately in what follows, out of Husserl and (Phenomenological) Consciousness (of the “encounter”) question [keeping in mind that Phenomenological consciousness has nothing to do with experimentally efficacious consciousness under a Liberalist Materialism of the so-called sciences].

Notions of a Platonic Logic (as prior to the Laws of Thought removed by Husserl after Schopenhauer brought the final one to frame as “necessary reason” [of Leibniz] become will) 

 

 

 

Truth as correctness (which we must never confuse with Anglo-conceptions such as “correspondence” or justification) is a phenomenological subject matter. A description which is a carrying out of what is properly substantive research. What it describes, as the combination of tattered threads, in the large, is the characteristic manner in which things said come into the general opinion as a power over human life, which is always a mysterious power. In saying this, we risk going beyond the simple description of someone who says what they do not have before them as, for instance, a memory or experience or any other envisaging along with the words that say what is seen. In the general opinion the earth moves around the sun. But, what is most often seen is not like that at all. We have all seen pictures of the sun in the way the popular idea comes to us as an authoritative (which means not only what lays down from outside, but, as much, what one freely draws towards [in the vulgar culture such talk is even called "conspiracy theory" as if it had to do with interested persons seeking some pleasure or the pleasure of power itself enjoyed in the absence of any witness) statement. Sherlock Holmes is said, in the first  adventure in which he appears, not to know of the Copernican system. He readily takes Watson’s word, as an educated man of sense, only saying that it doesn’t concern him. Thus, some things could plausibly be said to circulate without ever being at all envisaged, and these are correct truths. They may include all manner of historical trivialities and events of individuals who will be utterly forgotten even while they are still alive, as is the case with the billions. 

 

The standard physics can as well represent this correct truth as a geocentric system. It doesn’t need to appeal to the daily sense of individual observation at all to bring about efficacious results. Truth as correctness describes a manner of forgetfulness of beings in that the correctness takes on the reliance or pistis of the phenomena. Truth as correctness is a manner of phenomena just as is everything, specifically, that of the way words take on a life apart from the intentionality of the communion with things. 

 

The reliance on a “logic” is the same movement pushed further away from community of “identity” with the beings spoken of. A genuine, or, Platonic logos, can be logical as strict keeping with the beings. 

 

Plato logos and a correspondingly strictly-made-conscious logic is not a representation of a proposition. It is Intentionality. The word cup is used to say cup. It tells. The question of philosophy is whether the positive “is” of the “cup is there” is not set along with the negative “is”. The quality of the honor which leads Dostoevsky to speak of a “trial by slap in the face” is felt as an exeliencey (arete) but it is not to be taken as a judgment. It is out of the spontaneous sense of those who belong, say to the time when the “new courts” were cropping up in Russia to avenge physical offence of a petty kind without the need to duel, that the excellency is there or not there. Thus it is prior to a valuing or a judgment. Which, one can always bring in later, in order to consciously modify one’s ownmost intentionality. 

 

We can bring in the “multiculturalism” of Dugin (not as a Dugin scholar or as one with any serious knowledge of Dugin's works, but allowing Dugin to stand merely as a figure of our thinking and a rubric [I must add that it is contemptable that in the Western press the word "mystic" is meant as a depreciatory slander, as in the repellent article in the "Huffington Post," and we repudiate such shallow talk utterly and without qualification (everything destructive of human seriousness flairs up, a divagation towards living death a prophesy of treachery, and evil, and we oppose it to the death (so far as we speak of Dugin, it is from the view of absolute correspondence of aim in everything essential]) So far as in the spontaneous support of my life I regard forced activity, for instance, as unjust, I do not “value” but just as I see a cup and say “the cup” the logos tells from what is there. I find in intentionality what is ownmost and not a choice. The choice is the political moment, decision. I can pull out of the spontaneous ground of my being and “judge” otherwise. Much of Dostoevsky's conflict over the violated dignity of the underground man is past sorge properly. In sorge Heidegger pulls back from Nietzsche and Schaupneauer where pain and will are two sides of decision as political primordiality. Pain is the passive side of active decision. Pain is to “suffer” in the widest sense. To “suffer something to pass.” To undergo. 

 

Sorge already speaks of the vague field of intentionality out of which Political Dasein comes to modify itself and to bring the “ought” to the blind tradition, such that active Dasein begins to habitually will its "oughts." The fundamental steering of the ethnos by the spirit of truth as correctness moves with the rising power to spirit, and ultimately to the spirit of the “ought”. Spontaneity is Kant’s and Nietzsche's retreat from decision, but in substantive research it is seen to be sorge (Sorgen) of what concerns (which must be regarded as neither active nor passive). The total destruction of the Ethnos which Dugin struggles amidst the it-will-be-for-it-”ought”-to-be also tends towards another “ought” which gives Dugin his existential character as the challenging of a counter “ought”. 

 

In this the “multiculturalism” shows itself because a Tyrannical Liberalism of the "Harm Principle," as a unitary view is set along another unitary view. That of a Pluralism of Ethnoi, as an “ought”. The awareness of the whole distinguishes the system from a pure Ethnos. Because of these matters (because they come to inform, but then, to corrupt as well) Heidegger and the German world as a whole was compelled to grasp the Phenomenological research from the position of being which is not within a world. This claim to the opening of the world in the Da-Sein has to show that it can behind the clearing of the Da and of the corresponding Cartesian soul which is its community in truth as unconcealment, as a coming across what is to be remembered, to another truth, that of being. Not to the pragmatic or the truth about what is available to be used. Therefore we must show that this is possible as a field of research and avoid all false pluralism. Unitary views owe their existence to the supposed necessity of self defense, which, in a certain sense, is the very Greek essence. The very Metaphysics of presence, the Western being as such, is defensive and not free in its first inception into being (it seeks to find in what is a resource, an available thing, and later techne as such, to defend itself: Which may perhaps mean that the victory over the environment was always mistaken, in that it always, of inner necessity, tended towards the conquering, also, in power as knowledge, of the inner core of the, thus, metaphysically present "human" (and so: Kurzweil Musk, and so on]). 

The Journey to the Guiding Aim of Being

The Greek sense of truth which came down to Plato (to “Socrates” in the Platonic works) seems to be a pronouncement of an admonition to remember what had happened. So that the night world, with fire washing over the filthy and sinewy arms of a Spartan soldier, might be recalled when asked about. Yet, better, the fur of some shrewd and man-killing brute in the forest of Artemis, the butcher who welcomes blood as dew drops in the dawn, at the primordial gate, is meant to hold back from the waters of Lethe. She prefers the waters of the divine ichor or blood to the black water of Lethe that reflects only the hazy forms of un-faced shapes on its passing ripples. Something that was asked about, instead of sliding into oblivion, was remembered. The notion of sight is discriminated by Socrates, and comes apart and is doubled into eyes and eyes of the soul. The work with the name Heidegger analyzes Husserl’s account of “categorial intuition” as still part of what has come down to Husserl of the human deposit. This deposit permeates all human things and is not to be regarded as something obvious or, as knowledge transmitted only from teachers to students. It is what everyone “grows” into when they find themselves being. Heidegger speaks of the “analogy with the senses”. Husserl does not, according to this view, grasp that nothing is something for categorial intuition. Nothing is a phenomenon of the categorial intuition. It is part of the "something as something" structure of language. A predictable which can be true or not true. The possibility of it not being true is due to something as something structure itself which is part of daily life and controls daily life. Daily life is impossible without being able to discriminate the true from the false. Human beings might be conceived to survive in an anarchy of confusion over the true and the not true, not knowing if sleep is necessary or not, if this or that thing is food in the sense of something that brings nutrients and maintains health, and in every basic sense of common dealing where one takes truth for granted. This (something) is food (something). Everything might disappear, and no longer be remembered, and the human being itself would disappear. Thus the curious saying of Aristotle who remarked about the ancients that they constantly had the anxiety that being would go away. 

Truth in Heidegger is not truth about the remembered images. Even if to maintain a world they have their place. In this sense of going back to the open where the images show up, it is said that Heidegger is prior to consciousness in his “guiding aim.” Things soak into being as they reflect the light in colors and come to be for truth as what is not forgotten. The open field is Da, and the beings showing themselves Sein. In this sense the Da or the open field, is the mystical ground of “not being” which itself can not be said rightly. The mystical ground of not being is the obstruction to Event. It is the place of energia or the Godhead where the store of what must be is held forever. For example, that the things that have happened, can not not have happened. Or the long discussion from the middle ages to Frege and Russell which conserves logic as a Cartesian prelapsarian wonder: as what first is pulled out of the chest of man to make woman or unthinking flesh. Geist is vastly more powerful with the anglo-sphere than it was in the German because the German mind was permeated with the truth of Geist, with the knowledge of being in it. Thus in being reactionary, in drawing towards the worn out truism of the triangle which must have three sides, it was revolutionary because it most of all held the whole of the world as it had made itself before itself. Whereas the imbecile Anglo-sphere (where there is no philosophy, cf. Arendt's letter to Jaspers) only in its most brilliant representatives, but never as a world, came to grasp its own unconscious workings and remained, as still today, absorbed in hallucinations and all forms or derangement concerning the daily dealings which no longer operated under the power of intellect, but were stupidly still dreamed to by the world. Of course the alien forces of the experimental science moving within the forces of the field of the opening overran and constantly forced a minimal awareness of the true situation onto these beings. Sometimes in the form of bizarre irregularities such as the addition of “dark matter” or the issue of the “nothing” that was not accountable in terms of the rigour of a physics tied to the current ability to make measurements. Because the world, that which is visible or conscious and remembered, issuing from the obstructive field of the opening, suppress, as by popular opinion and common sense, the true situation. The situation, which, the super subtle genius of a few could still grasp, but which, as a world, as what was a field of opening, went under with the war and survived only in its isolated children such as Heidegger, Marcuse, Arendt, Strauss and many others who no longer had a world to support the spontaneous life of their being. 

The guiding aim of Husserl and that of Heidegger is our main issue. Both these come from the German field prepared by Kant and Leibniz and Nietzsche and others. Later on by Brentano, Cassiere and Dilthey and many others. 

Simple problems: 1. The guiding aims are products of worlds (“cultures” in something murkily like the sense in which culture is brought out as, not only prior to, but simply effacing of, nature, in Boas, and the sense of culture as civilization in Spengler, and the “multiculturalism” of Dugin who is the most subtle and powerful representative of this thinking today). However, a descent from a world is impossible so far as a “guiding aim” speaks from being. Because being is prior to the Da and the Sein, or to the Open field and the knowing in it of its world. 

2. If a “guiding aim” is strictly a term that claims descent from the thought of being it can not be said of Husserl’s Phenomenology. However, Heidegger owes its formation to this Phenomenology. Again: The claim of a genetic efficacy must be removed in a pure historical account of a world with respect to the “guiding aim” of being. In other words, it can’t be said that “being” is something that “knows better” than did the last part of the unfolding of a historial world as the conscious unfolding of the Open Field of thought (cf. Was Heist Denken). 

3. Howsofar must one proceeding this far learn the throwing away of names? Because in the Greek thinking names go with faces, and the face of the world. The throwing away of names means that we speak about what is a matter for daily life, and then abstract, for instance by speaking of human beings, and not only thinking of what was seen, into the world of meditation or abstraction. Thus we meditate on the abstracted thing as a thinking. The two name different things, meditating on the abstraction is the problem of whether certain froms of intelligence bring us benefits, but it is also what is thought in the sense that all issuing into consciousness from the Open Field is thought. But, not all is meditation in abstraction from what is seen and is to be remembered. How is a Phenomenology which knows that the “two suns” that of the immediate vision, a small image in the sky, and that of reason, the large body at a distance, both are different datum issuing from an unknown region? The nothing of the pure black of the intellect, as though everything with color were removed but consciousness still envisaged, is remembered and set alongside the Open Field. This nothing is no psychological nothing, it is a natural nothing viewed by the psyche, except the psyche can no longer be what sees only in the inner region, but it is as much the eyes and ears in a sense-deprivation chamber. However, this chamber is the universe that is “nothing moving faster than light” (In the thoughtless explanation given by the popular physicists to the lay public concerning the account of cosmic expansion of the “heat event”.) These examples concerning physics are unnecessary, but only illustrative, concerning the major themes. What is established belongs to thought, what thought, as what grasps what issues from the Field of the Open, and this in turn is what belongs to being.    

4. 

The book edited by Strauss, which includes a part on Heidegger that is not written by Strauss. There the simple claim that Heidegger must be putting forward a claim to “know better” than the earlier thinkers is put forward. This claim, however, is not a claim which Strauss in his considered thinking can aver. For the issue is more subtle. However, it seems inescapable that the “guiding aim” of Heidegger must in some way claim a “higher” ground. This is at least so from the point of view of its survival as a teaching in the world. Even though it must say that being as such can not be regarded this way. On the other hand, Phenomenology, which we will now leave off as treating as a guiding aim, never claims to issue from being. It claims, rather, to issue from the overcoming of logic in its connection to history, and the problem of the impossibility of induction (which the older Russel recognizes before fleeing philosophy, surrendering his claim to the reality of logic (ergo, admitting its status as mere form of "math" [which no longer has any serious meaning outside its immediate efficacy for experiment (& "world" of daily "dealing")], and entering politics with the enthusiasm of a death-bed convert to religion) and the existence only of “special cases”, that is of things which happen only once and thus can not be regarded as being built up from. The whole of the phenomenal world is singular rather than particular under a universal. Inclusive also of the thinking of particularity under universality, even with respect to mathematical units (whose status as [consciously abstracted] part of the intellect itself is thought in the singularity of a “special case”, namely that of the unrepeatable whole. We remain well aware of the modern interpretation of the made-thing, the Tatsache or fact in connection to the repeatability of experiment and corporate (cf. Quine) or collective human experience which brings within a world credence to the collection of knowledge under the apparatus of an epistemological (in the vague British sense) oversight throughout the generations of the techne art (or so-called “sciences”).

The Return of the Genetic Circle in a Question about the status of the “guiding aims” in Heidegger and Husserl 

 

Heidegger claims that Husserl thinks, for in thinking all is thinking, in what follows when philosophy ends, there is only grasping what has been thought, on the basis of an “analogy” on sense data. This means that first the Greeks pour into the being that is Dasein the thought of action. Action is what acts on the things. So that the eyes act on the colors that are the surface of the things. If this action acts, it acts on what is acted on. And the action of the senses (which at the end of Philosophy are gathered around what is most cogent for our natural Dasein, namely touch, “corpuscularity”, solidity, up which, the crooked monster Schopenhauer says “all the senses refer to touch.” and this natural Dasein is what does not yet raise its eyes to Dasein. Which is not a clear saying except that it means, which has not yet lived these 24 centuries and seen to our own time what is seen in Husserl and Heidegger [though not fully accepted in Strauss. And, perhaps, utterly rejected in Heisenberg.]) act on what is. Thus what is come to sight as what is sighted by the activity of the senses. So, in coming to sight, the colors that mark the surface of all things seen, are said to be conscious. Thus, available to the activity of the being that acts with its senses. 

 

So, what Heidegger says is that Husserl still retains a part of the notion of the Metaphysic of availability. Availability to the being that acts. The color that marks the surface of some thing. Thus, that which bound the thing as its “surface.” But, if one has only the surface, it is not sufficient to the reality. Reality mean the basis from which knowledge might spring. Reality, however, is still held to in Heidegger, because Heidegger says Dasein is that world sharing being which has the world that the other Dasein have. 

 

It is not necessary in thinking beings, then to think surfaces. Heidegger then says, the colour is as much being as the being that is supposed to be the being (substance) of the coloured being.

 

What exercises us, though, is this: Is such analysis under the “guiding aim” of Phenomenology that performs the ultimate doubt? How is this thought? Is the whole of the analysis under the doubt, or, only the phenomena? The phenomena names the whole of our beings, everything. 

 

When Heidegger denies consciousness in the sense of what first glimpses the color of a thing, he posits. Does he posit within phenomenological doubt? This is the genetic circle. 

 

Here, there is something that comes to light, anything at all, the whole of what we know, everything. This is phenomena. Then it is said, already, being of the kind to sit, we are sitters. As though something were set back behind the phenomena. Or, already, before the house which is for dwelling, we are dwellers. we make houses, because we already wanted to live there, because we are the kind of beings that are like that. what does a beetle care for living in a house? It is no dweller. The “opening” is not mere “space” in the sense of dimension. Or, a place where there can be dimensions. Rather, it is what is ready to receive the one that is open. when something is there in the “open” it is then, only then, conscious. 

 

However, does Heidegger than, from within the possibility of the Phenomenology, posit? What is open is itself full of content only in its fullness as what come to be grasped. And then the content is “ontic.” The prior ground is firing outside presence. So it is not available to conscious. 

 

Now we see what is in question: Where is this Phenomena, and where is this posting as mere posting. Both positive and phenomena are phenomena of an absolute doubt.

1. What is “Intentionality” properly?

 

 

 

This is connected to the section of Husserl with which Heidegger took great interest, where the description of a sentence is given. Something along the lines of what follows is in question. The sentence says, for instance, the bird flies. But, then, it says, look there, at the opening of the wings. Look at how the air flows beneath the wings. The bird soars. There! There! He reaches the heavens! And so on. 

So far as the sentence, which speaks, is the source of the great thing, of reason, it is of interest. But, but that way, we follow the path recommended of old. We start with what we know, and go towards what is more unclear. 
 

What matters in Intention is this: It is said in the world (Speech happens in the world). Thus, what matters is, it is not a question of language understood as a matter of significance or semantics. Language is a matter of an event in the world. Language is like the animal’s call. It simply moves the things there. What “things?” Even when we speak of animals, we already run with something that is told to us. Told to us by language. In this sense, one must consider that language is primary. Why? Because it is not something inside, that tells about something “physical.” It is already the sound that draws all things into possibility. It is already something out there. 

 

Intentionality, though, only poses for us a question. It says, noise is out there, the animal signal is out there. It is no mere talking to ourselves in the head. 

Everything, then, hangs on this, in the way Language speaks, can it bring us to something more than mere talk? Here everything hangs on entering language. Otherwise, after all, language would remain only mere “talk.” 

Our first attempt should be this: To bring Cassirer and Husserl. For Cassirer is where language has been grasped most solidly out of the primordial, or, better, from what pushes back to the primordial. Husserl, however, sees something more simple. Speech is phenomena. 

 

Intentionality is prior to “nature.”

Speech as language is prior to “nature.”

The first hint is this: Nature is what comes forth of itself. It poses a contrast to what holds still in metaphysic. What is "prior" is still floating prior to the question of Augustine, to the observation of Augustine!

In all such thinking the question whether the thing is even intelligible comes in. As in the question about the Kantian “noumenal.” Is the noumenal even intelligible? Is it intelligible to speak of something that is not even a possibility? Namely, the event. If the event were only a possibility, it would be a development out of what is already gripping us. 

Why does time remain only thinkable in a direction if time itself is nowhere given? Time is no more clearly given than is this “noumenal” which is not even thinkable, not even intelligible. [One must object, but isn't time thinkable and intelligible, and so to the possibility of what is thought in the thinking of "event?"] The very intelligibility of the intelligible comes into question. Everyone knows so many things that they don’t know. That is how it looks. A notion already noticed, of course, by Augustine. Totalized by Kant with his Categorical Imperative because he assumes all acts, everything caused by human choice, can be raised to clarity in principles. One acts, but doesn't raise it to consciousness. But, it would come into the regions of metaphysics if one did. You merely think, but you don’t yet think “onticly.” 

A Review of the Difficulties out of the Ground of Common Sense 

The question about how to represent history, so called history, is superficial when compared to the question of how we are to grasp time in its essence. History means primarily the history of the nation, its battles and the transformation of economic arrangements, its conception of rights, of the meaning of the legal person, of citizens and subjects, duties, self-sacrifice, the place of liberty, and various other metaphysical issues of knowledge which always become stale when divorced from the living interest of the people. The history of a country, in our own time, is at war with the history of the world. The consideration, known for 24 centuries, thought through constantly by a few, of the distinction between the country and the world, between the interests of the country and the universal law of reason, of nature’s logos, raged for the longest time within hidden minds, hovering at the cusp of public attention. Often men were suppressed or burned from speaking too nosily on this score, or ,too rashly. Considering that even Millennia ago a hundred years was felt as a long time (as still now despite all the clamor about the transformation of the mental effects of our lived time experiences among those who regard themselves a mental aristocracy), it has been a ponderously huge span of time since these things have been present to the most thoughtful. And yet, since the dawning of cosmic nihilism, since the beginning of the scientific age, where science means not the product of reason, but rather technique, external experiment, the region that excludes moral investigation, such discussions can only be considered from a sub-rational, and, increasingly, an irrational vantage (which was to some extent always true in the political sphere, but not in the University. Not in the highest intellectual authority; however little its force was felt in actual affairs). That which was to be universal, the reason in nature, faded out.    

Husserl who was a mathematician of the first rank, and schooled in physics, diagnosed the difficulty under the word, natural science has become a science of nature. The science of nature is one meaning of the sense in which, after the longest spell of propagandizing, the Enlightenment was compelled to admit that its premises were not self evident. The question went away, because it was impossible to turn back to reason, to philosophy and rational religion, and de facto it was settled that no moral standards were possible (said in the sense of the theoretical discussions which much later on became the Hart Fuller debates and such-like, ergo the turn to the so-called Positive law [which, true, had always been the great power in practice, but in the minds of human being's was constantly weighed against a rigorously developed, and not merely anarchical and insane, conception of Justice). The most intelligent people grasped this in Germany, the full force of the crises, already around the year 1900. Thus WWI was followed by the greatest period of freedom ever known to human beings during the Weimar, the doctrines of Hegel, still rational, were replaced with those of von Gierke and the like, a theory of the people and their "natural law" was adduced, since sheer desperate moral chaos was only confounded by a strange sense of teetering on the creative zenith the collapse of 29' was all the more a shock. (After the Second War, as with the question of cancer caused by tobacco, long raised in Germany, the issue was suppressed by the non-rational, non-deliberative, non-Liberal in any serious sense, American political-corporate forces (as described in Schmitt), and partly by American stupidity and unconsciousness, partly because the war was understood sensibly as an economic catastrophe. Yet, conscious understanding of a matter never destroys its essence or reality which remains no matter what view is taken of it, as with the cancer question. [This implies that the datum of the intellect have a real status in a new and as yet at the time unthought way, this was thought through by Nietzsche, but long partly hidden behind the works of Weber, the great Simmel, and the like.]) The so called axioms of the Science of Nature were at least two-fold. On the one side, the ultimate theory of inertia. Stemming from Galileo, and still in control of the field of physics, places an imaginary vacuum, something that one has never encountered, at the center of a theoretical grasping of the universe. Because this requires many breaks with reasonableness, for instance the claim that “nothing is faster than the speed of light,” which plays on the distinction between the inertial frame of reference, the calculable field of matter which resists or moves freely, and a conceptual nothing, which nonetheless seems necessary in the light of the theory of the "heat event’s" ("Big Bang") expansion. Necessary not to the science of physics, because there whatever can not be measured does not exist, but to human reason. Because there, with reason, it is inconceivable that the universe could have expanded to the size it has, within the limits of the speed of energy moving through the vacuum. All this posits a fictionalism. 

On the other hand, there is a deeper objection, which is not everywhere understood. It stems from Kant’s synthesis of the problems raised by Hume concerning causality and the traditional view of the intellect. This view was taken up by Schopenhauer, who replaced causality with his famous world “Will”. For 22 centuries the discussion of the human soul, with its senses (actions/capacities of the eyes, ears, etc.), its urges, and its intellect, with all the happenings which go under the name “anthropology,” which meant the logos, the reason, or the serious discussion of Anthropos, the human being, and psychology, the careful study of the soul, with words or with reason, reason being a specific feature of speech, that which grasps ideas or kinds of things, trees, iron ore, wolves, thoughts, continues unabated. Sometime after the year 1800, as the technological “science,” tecnhe, in contradistinction to the “queen of the sciences,” Philosophy, and to Theology, the science from which the moral law must ultimately be derived, there arises an empty concept (when understood in its technical meaning, which, is never for the most part grasped in any precision, such that Chalmers often gives some older, say Descartes, thinker, utterly absurdly, as its origin.), consciousness. One can speak about all manner of problems with respect to the soul, but with respect to consciousness nothing can be said with respect to its content. Theoretically it is the sin qua non of experience. There can be an experience without push carts, without clouds, without the sea, without vision, without any thing which might follow the definite article, and so forth. There can be no experience that doesn't also have consciousness. [What is "also" supposed to mean here?]

Because Kant works from what is reasonable, from reason, he never posits this empty so-called epistemological condition. He speaks of space, and he speaks of time. He says, also, though in theory the question of causality is difficult to maintain, it is unreasonable to give the issue a great weight. Since, though, there is the bare logical consistency of the denial of causality, an event need not have a cause, nothing is inconsistent in an event, which would otherwise by an effect, which were spontaneous and came out of nothing. In creativity properly so-being. So far as consciousness is taken in the experimental sense of techne, of what everyone calls science, it names something that exists so far as it is effective. Therefore it is worth observing that such a concept excludes the grasping of creativity. Creativity is not a matter of the law of reactions, of things that either exert force, or move in the vacuum according to the ideal thinking of the concept of inertia. Talk of consciousness, as an abiotic being, remains within the region of Techne. It has no moral content. Which means, at the same time, no human content. So far as the human is not understood as measurable quantity of mass or a system of entropic energy. If the human is supposed to mean an animal with speech, reason/logic, it is excluded from the region in which the consciousness concept moves. Therefore, the discussion of the analytical philosophers, Chalmers on the one side, Dennnett on the other, remains sterile with respect to philosophy in any serious sense. On the other hand, if philosophy is genuinely over, and has become “science,” e.g., the unhuman, techne, the alien, it is worth noting that the doctrine of creativity must be regarded as a subjective fiction. So far as the human being is subjective, all its experiences are fictions. Or, merely subjective. It might be asked, how can such a being have a science at all? It is because, of the one hand, logic in the sense of Frege and Russel, where it means not reason, but mathematical logic, is simply taken on faith. Thus, again, the problem of authority of the so-called axioms. 

Mathematical perfection is no different at all in the most complex mathematical effort, in that which only through the most lengthy and superhuman study one might grasp, than in the simplest. So far as bare arithmetic, the number one, is grasped as perfectly equal to another one, in the intellect, we have the basis of all mathematical thinking. The perfection of the objects of the intellect. A triangle, in this sense, is never perfectly manifest. This means that the human intellect is made the standard of the science. Thus, human subjectivity is made the standard. The inner human workings. Once the doctrine of the soul is knocked down, the justification for holding this region, where imagination, envisaging a triangle, and conception, thinking of the three sided object as such, must come from its efficacy in estimation of happenings. Estimation means prediction in the modern sense. So far as the intellect, a subjective field, generates efficacious imaginings and concepts, it is deemed useful. It is useful, though merely subjective. What counts as objective is the sense data. Howsofar is a conception of sense data theoretically valid once there is no contrast with urges and intellect? A bare empiricism differs from Philosophic empiricism, as was know to the tradition for 22 centuries. A bare empiricism has no logical meaning (logical, that is, for reason which has layed down to itself certain limiting determinations as rules). Because each object is unique as given in experience. No oak is exactly as an other oak. Nothing can be “built up” scientifically. The meaning of the logical induction from the tradition was that the thing pointed to, the “singular” being, was the object of the intellect which discovered in the singular patterns. That I find that of all the Redwoods I see, they each grow toward die Himmel, towards the sky or heavens. The crowns of the trees become, then, part of a structure of “particulars,” that is, particulars under universals. The tree I can point to is the thing of the senses only, but it is subsumed under the scientific datum of the intellect in its pattern finding capacity. Thus something that is true in the past, now, and in the future is rescued from the destructive decay of time. The river of time soaks into its body and melts all the Redwoods, all the stuff of the senses, but the intellect has saved something for its Metaphysics. It’s as simple as that. 

When Russel says, Heidegger has confused his logical “nothing,” with a psychological “nothing.” He makes one of his typical thoughtless remarks. Russel, who was an intelligent man and thought through many problems with quite exemplary clarity, never thought through the basic foundation of the modern technical scientific development. He rejected Kant already before the turn of the century just when the Marburg school had raised him to his new glory! Russel simply ignores the difficulties in the English style, as denoted by Macaulay, who, in another connection says that the English always ignore “asymmetries” when it is covenant so to do. This attitude, it must be said, for good or ill, is impossible for the German. One may think, true, of Pushkin's Hermann, and pity the German his agitation over mere trifles, which, from the perspective of daily life have little meaning, or, seemingly little meaning. Yet, is nihilism a trifle? Is the inability, self confessed, by all quarters, of the leading power in the whole of human life, namely science to distinguish good from evil, a trifle? It is, rather, a crisis unparalleled in the human development. It is nearly impossible to credit Dugin with such foolish utopianism with respect to the overcoming of the spirit of cosmic nihilism. Yet, on the other hand, a choice had to be taken to enter the contest. 

Heidegger says that what is lacking is the spirit that can see the crisis for crisis, that is, can even admit the existence of a crisis. It is true that Heidegger himself, his teacher Husserl, Leo Strauss, and quite a few others did admit this crisis, but who today does? One might suppose Dugin himself. However, his powers of philosophy are less than his powers of faith, if one might say so, if this is so. Here we must again attempt the path that was taken by Husserl. The crucial decay in the time of Husserl is that of psychology. Psychology becomes, at length, after passing through the stage of Associationalism, into mere experimental, thus, “scientific,” what, study of the soul? A ridiculous absurdity. A study of the rational animal carried out without rationality. Or, as it is said, with the so-called notorious “instrumental rationality.” Instrumental might as well read nihilistic. 

From the point of view of Nietsche where does the doctrine of the overcoming of nihilism come in? For Nietzsche Nihilism is said in another manner. His sense is that though man’s essence, his reason, is still intact, its datum is arising out of the abyss of the will. And this abyss of the will is but one logos among 1001. There is no so-called subjectivity, because Nietzsche begins with the critique of causality. With the ground of rejection of the specific ordering of the causal things, for instance that one can not merely say because day follows night that night caused day, an investigation of causality, confusing to common sense, opens up. It is solved by the standard of predictability (estimation of the changing things, in a non-theoretical sense, ergo not under the strict "science"). This standard, while powerful, is never satisfying to the most intelligent investigators, most of all to Schopenhauer who demolishes it as if in his sleep. So far as what counts is prediction, prediction of the repeatable “fact,” the factical means that the will to repeat a given experiment is the “cause” of the so-called fact. Since whatever is not yet a fact of technological art is merely a historical “singular.” Whatever is singular can not be the feature of a science. Because it is unfolded in past, in the present, in future. It is what according to Thomas, and, to Agathon before him, what marks the limits of God’s power. Even God can not make something once produced, produced in the past, unproduced. This doctrine, in accord with reason, nonetheless, from the point of view of bare intelligibility is imperfect. It is intelligible, as many common entertainments demonstrate hourly, to consider the erasure of some person born in the past through making them not born. The so-called “Mandela effect” conceptualizes an intermediary case, of something partially or imperfectly unproduced. 

The region of intelligibility is more comprehensive than the region of what is reasonable. One can think the reproduction of a past being being caused by the omnipotent God, but the God limited by rationality, can not accomplish this. The Catholic God (ratio ordinata), thus, is the same as the Secular God, so far as the Secular God is said in the phrase “the regularity of nature.” It is a God that is limited by the reasonable. Thus reality and the thinkable differ. However, the analytic philosophical tradition, which is the water bearer of the nihilistic science, in positing such conditions does not speak from reason but from subjectivity. This is so so far as we think theoretically. On the other hand, it is not so that in our ordinary thinking, someone who announces themselves to be an Orthodox Jew, or a holder on the Progressive faith of an inchoate and unthought through Enlightenment “Humanism,” somehow avoided the authority of the sciences. Here, the second meaning of authority is invoked. It is what draws the being of the human being to it of the human’s own accord. It is authority because it makes sense, because it is trusted, because it accords with the human soul. In this sense we come towards the region of Technological Essence. Of what fires within the human, and, is the human. Thus, Dasein is alien to itself, and dismisses itself in its core. What brews in the soul of Dasein is self alienation, in the repudiation of its own essence. Of reason. However, since reason is long forgotten, what thinks? 

In this connection, in connection to the “soul of Dasein,” which can not be said in the manner of a Platonic psychology, or, indeed, of the tradition as the tradition understood itself, must be said in the manner of the Historical Consciousness. Consciousness means awareness. But, there is bare awareness which merely repeats certain catch phrases, and there is again and again approaching the essence of the manner of being in which this awareness comes to hold sway. Even the sense in which everyone knows that certain matters become moss grown, and merely are said, and no longer grasped, is itself a trope that may be in error.

We must then approach the question of what is to be understood by the soul after Phenomenology is born out of the repudiation of any possible psychology. We must regain the possibility to follow the footsteps of Husserl and his student from the exact historical motivation. To again see in Plato Phenomenology, which is an overlay on recollected memory as a speaking to the ancients. 

The questions to be raised are: What is “Intentionality” properly? 

How does the issue of the sequence of approach in the grasp of being, allegedly grasped on an “analogy” with the senses, come to the thinking of the “Truth of Being?”

Howsofar does the Technological Essence hold sway in the Sophia of the soul of Dasein? 

  

Where there can be no soul of Dasein in the sense of a thing apart from beings, of the bodily being, the bodily being is no longer thought as “accident” over and against essence. Since the “eyes of the soul” of Dasein do not snatch things up from the region of the accidents. Therefore, what is induction become in this region of being? Is Being a region, or are regions only said in connection to Metaphysics of availability?