Friday, September 27, 2019

       Notes in Passing, Husserl/Heidegger and Dugin


The question raised in the Phenomenology of Time, in the section after Brentano is deemed to have failed, brings out that the modes of time are nowhere given. This is raised in Heidegger in Basic Concepts, showing the connection of the issues. In the latter text, the issue is the discovery of possibility in what is supposed to be available presence or what is now (distinguished from what could be, and what is already gone). These all come under the head, the truth of being. Ergo, the truth of time. 


Editorial comments on the appearances of Dugin’s Culture Project (which don’t presume to be a close philosophic confrontation)
Dugin’s multiculturalism is absurd on the face of it, because it simply ignores the question of the tradition as what is the decay. The tradition as planetary science. Tradition is supposed to be what is no longer, because one has come into a period of decay. Thus, the call to rescue the tradition for human beings. However, from what is more advanced, the new order, traditional names something undeveloped. Aristotelian physics becomes Galilean and mathematical physics. From the point of view of the tradition, the latter is decay. The Western tradition becomes the authority of the sciences. The Catholics expose this by going on as if they were still in charge. They speak of the sciences as something that could help human beings as a part of the rationality or nous of human beings as made present in the Catholic teaching. Catholicism, from the point of view of the highest authority in intellectual life, modern science, is what was sloughed off through Protestantism and Enlightenment. The Thomistic synthesis, becomes the Secular university teaching. This teaching takes over the world as the most powerful intellectual authority. Thus, Dugin must show why the tradition is not still alive in the current most powerful intellectual authority. What else is the tradition supposed to name? 
In one sense, the tradition can not be destroyed, it is whatever now holds sway. In another sense, it names the raising up of the intellectual ground of nous, overthrown by epsteme (as in René Guénon). It’s absurd to speak of a raising up which ignores the History of Being. As though the ground of being could return to a former position. So far as the question is of an overcoming (which is a vague expression which could be, with latitude, translated, synthizing with) of universal European Science, this is a question not only of intellectual authority, but of the holding sway of Technological Essence. Of the taking of being to be a presence that is infinitely alien and must be constantly fought by human beings (even to the point of the use of aloneness, as set aside from environmental or external natural suppression), routinized by the art of experiment, and in this manner brought into service of the abyssal will. 
The position of nous as the reason of nature means that reason is what can not be persuaded, what does not allow itself to be persuaded, because it is eternal logos. Nous, in the Chritological sense of eternal logos, of divine reason, chills all flesh. The rain wind of eternal nous, as Christ, is never to be persuaded by circumstances. It is the necessity of a mode of time which stands as a meaning of being. The rationalistic grasp of nature’s reason, becomes anous as a demiurge. Thus, it can never be said that each one has their tradition. Since each would only be a demi-being. What the supra-rational points to can’t stand in the multiculturalism. The whole scheme has about it the odor of practicality, of what is good because it is accomplishment. What is an accomplishment is good, and, thereby practical. The holy is not visible in the good, in nous. In speaking from a secret sense of the holy, a motivation, the multiculturalism of Dugin is a whole, it is comprehensive. It is not true multiculturalism. It is Spenglerism.

Tuesday, September 24, 2019

Formal Clarifications Concerning Truth & Editorial Comments on the Current Situation 



Alethea is the technical term which separates accidents from appearances. Behind or beneath the appearance, which itself conceals, there is truth or knowledge of the essence.  

Alethea is the envisaging of available beings. Life has beings available to it. 

Alethea is the term found in the ancient texts, which, among the classicists, is translated to mean unconcealment. Truth as correctness thinks former times, from what is now available, according to available recollected memory. 


Truth as uncovering of essences comes down to Nietzsche. It implies an underlying unity: availability is spilt by the early Greeks. Phenomena become accidents. “Keine moralischen phänomene; sondern nur eine moralische Interpretation gewisser 

Phenomena (eine Irrtümliche Interpretation!) “ There are no moral accidents, but only a moral significance of the available beings (a false significance).  


You took health (which transfers its meaning to "the good") to be your guideline. The availability of the theoria, the pure presence of health. Which allowed you to build the practical knowledge of the physician. But, health was never really your purpose, the proof is that the whole has no purpose. The theoretical binding of all species is a myth, available in the meaning of being or common sense. Common sense is a historical concept. And, so, accidental.


Nietzsche says: You were preoccupied with accidents and subordinating them to your uses, and thereby you utterly forgot that the meaning of your aloneness was that it has no meaning. The tacit belief in the future of the idea, of the species, reigns in everything. As a metaphysical binding, a truth not of being, but of the saying of what beings are :more being or less being beings.


Heidegger says, however, this takes being to be something available. To be life. 


The question here is this: Is the word “the Truth of Being” not in the service of life? Not something manifestly available? Life asks, in the Theaetetus, which of the available beings is the most being (the question which reaches its apotheosis in Thomas, the Good is full being, the Sacred Heart, and eros draws to it, and it is surrounded by mere shadow), and excludes the dream from the upper ranks. The intellect is the most real so far as it becomes nous. Episteme and nous are vaguely given by Plato and Aristotle. They are the upper parts of the phuske. Maths (the young must have them to enter the academy as the lowest prerequisite) are the lower part, episteme, given more simply and available even to the young. Maturity belongs to nous, to reasonableness of which maths are utterly excluded. The modern development, through three hundred years of propaganda, succeeded in overthrowing nous in favour of episteme. 


Husserl gives, however, lets availability take full and open ground on significance. All is available, none is more significant. What is the status of the addition of the claim that availability can be dispensed with? and where is it supposed to come from? If a technical meaning is given to the distinction between being as availability, and being simple, it drives us into the concept. From out of what is correct we are supposed to sense being as what is only this time or unrepeatable. However, this is just as much, this sense or “play,” the play which is more than the mere seriousness of investigation into what is, a part of the availability. Thusly the difficulty becomes a question which takes its reasonableness form an appeal to the special genius for the pursuit. This, however, is clearly reasonable, in every human pursuit, there are better and worse people at it. 


What is given in Zizek is false. The ontological difference is not maintained on the basis that the meaning of being in the world in the sense of the tacit meaning of being, the holy, is always already there. This is even the whole sense of Husserl’s waiting to see the changes in common sense. The question is rather, how does it happen? How is it thought or maintained.

Zizek's account (Less Than Nothing), basically picked up out of a text book, is not even really correct, let alone does it see the difficulty. It doesn't bring out the range between vague formal saying and thinking at all.

Lack of philosophic sense which simply jams everything together without considering the most exactness which is appropriate to the matter. In the vague sense, there is no difference between the Husserlian position, which speaks of the change at the level of common sense, and the Heideggerian, which speaks of “the meaning of being.”


We have a truth of phenomenological envisaging, which goes with availability or presence. In this sense the text with the name Heidegger implies that Husserl should be classed with Max Scheler and even with von Hildebrand as a seeker after the moral datum. In any case, a metaphysician, as a builder of the true science of being however understood. (All the questions
of being, whether it is whole or whether nothing is, whether it is many, or alone, are about being as availability, the question of how such a formula as “being as availability” is to be grasped has no bearing, it will always be as something present or available to life.) Thus, the question rages, how is phenomenology itself confused with Life? As though Husserl were Nietzsche? 


The question must be shown in pressure. And therefore as philosophical work, which Zizek was never capable of. And not as a literature of rehearsing positions. The difference is given in looking at a page of Zizek, and looking at a page of Heidegger. Any page will do. 


It’s not that, from outside Heidegger, we use words that critique Heidegger, but instead, we critique ourselves, as belonging to the teaching. It shows our attitude that we say, perhaps we only boast to belong. That this could be a boast implies our view of the teaching. We believe ourselves to belong to it. If words from outside a teaching are used, that understand that teaching as something to be discredited and exposed, for instance, this is our attitude toward Zizek, generally speaking, then the teaching must appear an alien mediocrity and irritant. However, when there is critique from within, as for a thousand years we find amidst the theologians, the most serious questions become possible, from within the charmed circle of toadstools, so to say. The table d'hôte of the Scholastics, now seemingly narrow, however offered a vast world of the so-called informal fallacies, which are now everywhere become meaningless and a nuisance destructive of the public ability to think, to those who belonged to that world and had a real use and almost were necessary to them. What is destructive to one regime is necessary to another. The ability to reach being, rather than the spell of the worlds, in the modern and well-known historical awareness. It can never be settled on the basis of a metaphysical approach. On the other hand, the political approach, which appeals to the black logos, of the sciences, is best given by Searle, who says simply, these and these problems come to be forgotten utterly at a given moment, and no one bothers with them anymore. This realist attitude is the most powerful, and corresponds to the belief that the sciences are the measure of intelligence and to nihilism. The thinkers come into war with the old guard, the philosophers of metaphysics, with one foot in the middle ages though Kant.  I conclude that therefore Dugin must be understood as the most radical of Leftists. Since the others are playing a backward and rump action.

Friday, September 20, 2019

Investigation into the Truth of the matter of the Phenomenology of Dasein (or, continued investigation into the controversial thesis: Phenomenology and the Ontological Difference are the same.) 

 Image result for Philip Ursprung



Seminar in Zähringen 1973

The point of departure is a letter from Jean Beaufret, in which two questions are raised:

1) To what extent can it be said that there is no question of Being in Husserl?

2) In what sense is Heidegger able to call his analysis of environment  ʺessential gainʺ [Being and Time] and yet claim elsewhere that it ʺremains of subordinate significance.ʺ 

With what right does Heidegger understand Husserl under a different standard than himself? 

According to Heidegger the investigation of being-in-the-world is a “concrete” way into the “guiding aim” supplied by the “question of the meaning of being,” which becomes later the question of the “truth of being,” and must be understood as of “subordinate significance” (or, more simply, in this context, that of the context set by the "guiding aim"). 

The parallel in Husserl is the Phenomenology understood as the Cartesian radical doubt, which then makes no step to build up, but remains with the radical doubt. Therefore the concrete investigation of the status of the “categorial intuition" is of “subordinate significance.”

The claim that for Husserl the exclusion of “consciousness,” was an “absolute scandal” is a mere biographical comment. 


Dasein is, according to Heidegger, to split the cogito from the sum. He says that the ergo, according both to himself and to Descartes, can not be a “therefore” in the sense of a inference requiring a judgment. 


The problem arises, from where is Da-sein grasped? From Phenomenology of the doubt. 


How else would the question be answered? From the concept? If it is grasped from the concept then it is grasped under a thinking of a region where the noumenal is distinguished from the phenomenological in the Greek sense (not in the modern or Husserlian sense). To be clear, in the Husserlian sense, the concept is itself a phenomenon. 


How is Phenomenology understood in Heidegger? 

Heidegger claims that Plato, in his manner of understanding language, of not excluding words, but leaving them as phenomena, thinks phenomenologically.  Heidegger says, further, that for the Greeks the hypothesis must be understood as the reverse of a “working assumption” which points to a correct outcome, to a part of a Fictionalism. Rather, it is a thinking into the principle of phusis when grasped ratioanlistically, but when taken truly it is basis on which all else depends. Truly in what sense? This must be answered. It remains to be said that this hypothesis, according to Heidegger, is the phenomenological in Plato, in the examination of the Parmenidean hypothesis “one is the many” or beings are. 
The very possibility of the hypothesis is a ground of Phenomenology which doesn’t stay with the sheer doubt, but adds a content concerning the truth or meaning. This is complicated by the particular elaboration of the investigation by the Xenos in the Sophist dialogue. 
In the Basic Concepts book we enter this basis, and speak of the Ontological Difference at length. However, under what approach of understanding? So, when the details are given, are we entering a “concrete” avenue, which is of “subordinate significance?” Which must be understood according to the whole of Heidegger? Or, only to the guiding question into “the truth of being?” How is it possible to exclude the biographical? Can we exclude it in Husserl, and then regard the “absolute scandal” as of vital significance, and not of “subordinate significance,” but in Heidegger must we nonetheless exclude the biographical?
It is possible to object that the views qua philosophical guidance to the philosophic content are not biographical. 
We have the question of three regimes of truth. Truth as correctness which Husserl sets aside along with the Rules of Thought, identity and so on. Truth as aletheia as understood by Heidegger, and thereby as “envisaging,” such that truth is any manner in which the beings are envisaged, e.g., in hearing what a word says, in imagining what a word says in a picture in the mind, in conceptualizing what a word says, in the mind without an image, in seeing the things in nature. All forms of truth as envisaging (this does not mean that the list is exhaustive). Finally, however, Heidegger speaks of a truth that overcomes, or is “no longer a metaphysical question.” 
It may be objected that the second and the third truths are the same. The third is mentioned in the course of answering the question of Jean Beaufret.
 What is thought in the question about the “consciousness?” This is arrived at through a circuit of thinking. I have an intellect. The intellect hangs outside time in another region. The accidents are in nature. The form is grasped by the intellect. The form belongs to the region outside time. Husserl places it with the accidents. The eternal region of mind and the region of nature blend together. Husserl speaks of the “Uberschuss.” Heidegger claims this is done on an “analogy” with sensual vision. He claims further that the form is thought of as the being of the being. The form is thus thought as the object of the “phenomenological subject.” Now we expose it more clearly, consciousness has meant the phenomenological ego. However, from where was this ego thought except from the Phenomenological itself, from the radical doubt? Husserl says himself, the phenomenological ego posits no solipsism. There is no radical “I,” as in Stirner or Nietsche (ipsissimosity "ownmostness"). 
The position of Dasein is reached from a series of steps. 
It may be objected, however, that the steps are of “subordinate significance.”
The “positing” of the hypothesis (thought in the Greek way, not in the reverse manner, in the modern way) as a point of Phenomenology presupposes the Phenomenological advancement. 
It may be objected that no standard for correct reasoning is anywhere given. Such a standard, that of envisaging, and through investigation letting others envisage, is not susceptible of refutation. 
What is shown is that so far as the matters of “subordinate significance” are subordinated, they can not be used to argue against the “guiding aim” or aims, which differ in Husserl and Heidegger, and yet don’t differ. 
I leave off at this point mentioning that the critique of the exclusion of biography becomes pertinent within the ambit of these considerations.