The Question of Evil (as the enemies) in the Light of Dugin’s Multiculturalism
The systematic treatment of evil is crudely visible in the Liberal logoi, the Apollonian, Habermas, and the Dionysian, Zizek. In the former, evil is what the discourse rationality which appeals to man as man, to the soul, excludes by its nature. In the later it is given by the formula of the intolerance of the intolerant, such that the Schmittean view holds sway and everything is crudely obvious. For Habermas there are no enemies, and evil does not exist. However, for Zizek, who is part of the same world, the enemies are the intolerant by the standard of a reflective doxographic modification which has behind it the higher entertainment of theory which serves to keep the so-called individual in self-improving intoxication. Man is higher than the ape, doxographicaly undeniable (or, at last for Zizek in the view of the various Nietzschean considerations which pass into the region of entertainment or are passed off as doing so), n number of entertaining theoretical considerations which show the system of ideas in which the doxa stands and belongs to the sphere of spiritual privacy corresponding to the grand "Theorie der Bildung des Menschen," which has long since degenerated into a universalistic Bildungsbürgertum remains within the Liberal system. At the base an Earth Logos in the form of a “science” of imaginary motion and “facts” which hovers over the Technological Essence and takes the place of an ethnos, because of generations of breeding into the people through compulsory mass education the spirit of the art of experiment.
There can, properly, be no evil for the Liberal order, since it ceases at its core to require an ethical system in any but an academic sense. It no longer involves human beings properly. From the point of view of the Earth Logos the “facts” are neutral, and real. The “values” are still visible in the Dionysian and Apollonian logoi, but only as what is not properly real. The abiotic flow of the “facts” from out of the Liberal order is then supposedly contrasted with the power of the substantial return to being on which the Orthodox world envelops itself in utter struggle. This struggle can not be passed off as “spiritual” as if it had to do with the higher entertainment or with the requirements of a world view such as the Catholic System. It hovers in a morass of forces near the narrow gate of the beings' issuance out of the primordial gate. Thus it is not clear how Dugin’s existentialism, appealing to acts of the will, to choosing to be Russian, grounds its first flashing over the fields of the people's life.
In a certain sense in Dugin’s system the appeal to the geopolitical can only be read as an Apollonian light from within the Orthodox Fate. Everything appears as grounded in something ultimate which must impose its evil and its good. But, perhaps it has only good. Thus, suppressing the more sophisticated dualistic principle of the Manichee, it only finds what is itself and what is insufficiently itself. These vague considerations contain the question: Who is Dugin? this question can only be asked from the ground of being. The ground of being is only in the Dasein of each one. Even though there is no logos of identity in the sense of the principle of identity that makes the question, how do each of the cultures remain the same such that each is a culture?, each being the same, identical, in its status of being, being a culture, is not the question, for there is no identity of what is the same outside the laws of thought, but rather what the words say, each is a culture, are free of the demands of a dialogic of rules binding the practice of discussion. Free, not because these rules are formally disavowed, but because the direct practice of the philosophic work is at work through the things said without the Laws of Thought.
Therefore, perhaps one must conclude that Dugin is adrift in what can not be refuted. He would take a rope to himself with which he would hang himself if he didn’t outstrip the petty demands of the entertainment of the spirit and the more authoritative demands of the requirements of Heidegger on thinking beings. Because thinking beings are drawn towards the thinking of being by the History of Being this issues a flashing light into the souls of the thinkers which determines their posture. It remains to be seen howsofar the Technological Essence is binding on this saying of “who” out of being. The strange absurdity of the situation is the visible result of the movement of nature into autonomy which collapses so far as autonomy is read as natural and nature as Anthropocene. In this sense Marx becomes Heidegger because Husserl has overcome all forms of individuation, both the bodily and the spiritual.