The peculiar question of heimatloses in the light of the Anaximander Fragment

The general stupidity prevents proper study of Anaximander. However, this might be overcome.
Only through making a decision to attempt to overcome it, can one enter into the overcoming.
Only through making a decision to attempt to overcome it, can one enter into the overcoming.
It’s difficult, at least at first, to say anything without slipping into the most errant stupidity. The attitude
and factors that work against research are "public", but this "public" is not curtailed in
any compartment or region, but essencing as though being.
and factors that work against research are "public", but this "public" is not curtailed in
any compartment or region, but essencing as though being.
The greatest problems arise from the problem that phenomenology itself is a holding back of
what it wants to reach. It’s clear that if the sun appears in the sky one can not arrive at the sun
by going to the appearance in the sky. The appearance never is at a distance, but is already as it is.
The appearance is given in being. However, the science that finds appearances in being already
making a demand. It demands that the appearance in some sense be an appearance. If someone
were to say that for the sense which senses a movement in our stomach, but also that which lets it
be known that our foot has kicked a wall, the real place of the sun is available, so far as the sun, like
anything, might be touched with this inmost sense, never mind one would be burnt long before the
approach was consummated, but only consider it in principle that distance is phenomenologically
meaningless, for this sense is always in the same place, it is yet so that phenomenology imposes
an accusation on the life of whoever is involved in asking where the sun is.
what it wants to reach. It’s clear that if the sun appears in the sky one can not arrive at the sun
by going to the appearance in the sky. The appearance never is at a distance, but is already as it is.
The appearance is given in being. However, the science that finds appearances in being already
making a demand. It demands that the appearance in some sense be an appearance. If someone
were to say that for the sense which senses a movement in our stomach, but also that which lets it
be known that our foot has kicked a wall, the real place of the sun is available, so far as the sun, like
anything, might be touched with this inmost sense, never mind one would be burnt long before the
approach was consummated, but only consider it in principle that distance is phenomenologically
meaningless, for this sense is always in the same place, it is yet so that phenomenology imposes
an accusation on the life of whoever is involved in asking where the sun is.
If I regard all that exists to be under the moon, and Artemis holds sway, many years will pass,
and then I will die, and my life has passed underneath the moon alongside all that exists.
Phenomenologically speaking this can neither be true or false. No standard can ever show
all that is is not what was under the moon as appearance. Appearances aren't the kind of thing
that can be contraindicated. Putting this aside, we read Anaximander not as a phenomenologist,
and not under the sway of the Greek concept of appearances which are not truth, rather as though
phenomenology were itself taken up phenomenologically. Because phenomenology is available,
because we have it at our disposal, it is metaphysical. It is a god. If everything were born out of its
womb, as with Gia, it would remain a god. As a science of sciences it whispers of the overcoming
of the stupidities of thought that describe beings that can never refrain from technological thinking.
The technological thinking is with these beings like the sense of a brute when it comes across a
human being. It has a sense that “evaluates” which can never be accounted for by the mere eyes.
Or as a European fears a snake or rat. It’s meaningless to say that this is “evolution” at work, as if
we wanted to set up a workshop and show “how to” evolve a being with this or that “evaluation”
ready-made. Since the whole procedure of thinking according to bringing about a “how to” is itself
a stroke of ready-made evaluation. And this in turn is mere appearance of all that is said. The
animal that knows its predator is like a man who knows the world according to his stupidity,
technological thinking is the appearance of this thinking. But, if the god, phenomenology,
overcame this, and showed this thinking to stand alongside others, it would yet be another
apparent god. The withholding structure of a phenomenology is positively metaphysical.
These metaphysical, though powerful in positing itself, doesn’t reach a phenomenology of
phenomenology, but resides in the End or Gathering of Metaphysics as the final confrontation
of metaphysics as what withholds a fateful drawing towards.
and then I will die, and my life has passed underneath the moon alongside all that exists.
Phenomenologically speaking this can neither be true or false. No standard can ever show
all that is is not what was under the moon as appearance. Appearances aren't the kind of thing
that can be contraindicated. Putting this aside, we read Anaximander not as a phenomenologist,
and not under the sway of the Greek concept of appearances which are not truth, rather as though
phenomenology were itself taken up phenomenologically. Because phenomenology is available,
because we have it at our disposal, it is metaphysical. It is a god. If everything were born out of its
womb, as with Gia, it would remain a god. As a science of sciences it whispers of the overcoming
of the stupidities of thought that describe beings that can never refrain from technological thinking.
The technological thinking is with these beings like the sense of a brute when it comes across a
human being. It has a sense that “evaluates” which can never be accounted for by the mere eyes.
Or as a European fears a snake or rat. It’s meaningless to say that this is “evolution” at work, as if
we wanted to set up a workshop and show “how to” evolve a being with this or that “evaluation”
ready-made. Since the whole procedure of thinking according to bringing about a “how to” is itself
a stroke of ready-made evaluation. And this in turn is mere appearance of all that is said. The
animal that knows its predator is like a man who knows the world according to his stupidity,
technological thinking is the appearance of this thinking. But, if the god, phenomenology,
overcame this, and showed this thinking to stand alongside others, it would yet be another
apparent god. The withholding structure of a phenomenology is positively metaphysical.
These metaphysical, though powerful in positing itself, doesn’t reach a phenomenology of
phenomenology, but resides in the End or Gathering of Metaphysics as the final confrontation
of metaphysics as what withholds a fateful drawing towards.
[The myriad of “plausible” opinions of historical classicists concerning the right “interpretation”,
and the peculiar standard of their experience and knowledge, of the corresponding cogency
standards, ever complex, has, to be sure, no bearing on what follows. This doesn’t mean at all
that we merely use Anaximander’s word. Instead we speak to him, and this can only happen
when phenomenology has first opened our ears to being.]
and the peculiar standard of their experience and knowledge, of the corresponding cogency
standards, ever complex, has, to be sure, no bearing on what follows. This doesn’t mean at all
that we merely use Anaximander’s word. Instead we speak to him, and this can only happen
when phenomenology has first opened our ears to being.]
ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών·
διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν
διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν
But where things have their origin, there too their passing away occurs according to necessity;
for they pay recompense and penalty to one another for their recklessness, according to firmly
established time. Heidegger version
for they pay recompense and penalty to one another for their recklessness, according to firmly
established time. Heidegger version
Woher die Dinge ihre Entstehung haben, dorthin müssen sie auch zu Grunde gehen,
nach der Nothwendigkeit; denn sie müssen Buße zahlen und für ihre Ungerechtigkeiten
gerichtet werden, gemäß der Ordnung der Zeit. Nietzsche version
nach der Nothwendigkeit; denn sie müssen Buße zahlen und für ihre Ungerechtigkeiten
gerichtet werden, gemäß der Ordnung der Zeit. Nietzsche version
But, what is this guilt? Ungerechtigkeiten, ἀδικίας. Breaking from the path.
Origin γένεσίς, still being οὖσι, φθορὰν ruin, γίνεσθαι birth, χρεών necessity,
what rules, δίκην after the manner of mortals, in the steps of mortals, ἀδικίας wrongdoing,
Schuld, guilt,
what rules, δίκην after the manner of mortals, in the steps of mortals, ἀδικίας wrongdoing,
Schuld, guilt,
A χρόνου τάξιν, a taxis of the chronological
Where the things still originate, according by what must, for it is like that amidst the paying
of one to the other, time is a prison. Broder version
of one to the other, time is a prison. Broder version
Let us think how metaphysics fails us when we speak to Anaximander, and listen to his word.
In the first place each element is available to us, if I know of health, I as yet know nothing of the
art of the doctor. Yet, the availability of health, as health, must be for the art of the physician to
get underway. This availability has then another sense, if I know of availability, I know of not only
the availability of sleep, of a red pine tree, of money, but also of the good. But, if the good is the
very availability of availability, as what is wholly useless, I do not know yet availability as what is
appearance. Of course, appearance here, is the appearance of what is envisaged as theoria
and so is almost wisdom and truth. It's clear what is thinkable here, that truth moves from the
available to what is where all things “still originate”.
In the first place each element is available to us, if I know of health, I as yet know nothing of the
art of the doctor. Yet, the availability of health, as health, must be for the art of the physician to
get underway. This availability has then another sense, if I know of availability, I know of not only
the availability of sleep, of a red pine tree, of money, but also of the good. But, if the good is the
very availability of availability, as what is wholly useless, I do not know yet availability as what is
appearance. Of course, appearance here, is the appearance of what is envisaged as theoria
and so is almost wisdom and truth. It's clear what is thinkable here, that truth moves from the
available to what is where all things “still originate”.
Now is this still an availability? To be sure, but it covers the appearances of Husserl.
Where the a priori intuition is no longer a mere invisible time and place alongside the
marshaled emperia of the visible. According to Kant what is caused is caused because
the a priori must have it. Thus he says the reverse of Hume, that what is, the fictive,
merely is a guess in time (a “hypothesis”, the principle of "causality” [European
science par excellence, fiction!]). According to Schopenhauer what matters is the
appearance of the “holding to be” of cause. Schopenhauer speaks of the night which follows the day, and no one holds this to be a cause.
Merely because the one follows the other. It appears, in former times, that if, in the street,
a man should come across some acquaintance, accidentally, no one can attribute to this
anything but chance. Vortuna is in power, but this is, the moderns say, a woman who can
become a conquest, nature is delivered to regularity under the fictive designs.
But, the fictive dynamics come into the world, the persona of the beings, and have a
certain life in appearance. This cause appears unlike Anaximander’s word, because,
when taken formally, it admits of no learning. It is, but it admits of no learning.
If it admitted of any learning, then that learning would be art, and set alongside natus, or
what is by birth. In the arts this “paying of one to the other” still blows forth.
It seems here we have access to a thinking which is not Greek, and that means
not human. Heidegger speaks of Dasein as what is human, but, this is said extrinsically,
and not spelled out in minute detail. It is clear that, taken in the terms of the history of
ideas the animal, the human, becomes transcendental, “a consciousness”,
thus “access” to everything, but here it is not “access”, thus Husserl overcomes
mere consciousness, yet, Heidegger still regards the looking to the appearances
as what has an in itself as a manner of access to the things that are to be seized
upon as what is in some sense availability.
Where the a priori intuition is no longer a mere invisible time and place alongside the
marshaled emperia of the visible. According to Kant what is caused is caused because
the a priori must have it. Thus he says the reverse of Hume, that what is, the fictive,
merely is a guess in time (a “hypothesis”, the principle of "causality” [European
science par excellence, fiction!]). According to Schopenhauer what matters is the
appearance of the “holding to be” of cause. Schopenhauer speaks of the night which follows the day, and no one holds this to be a cause.
Merely because the one follows the other. It appears, in former times, that if, in the street,
a man should come across some acquaintance, accidentally, no one can attribute to this
anything but chance. Vortuna is in power, but this is, the moderns say, a woman who can
become a conquest, nature is delivered to regularity under the fictive designs.
But, the fictive dynamics come into the world, the persona of the beings, and have a
certain life in appearance. This cause appears unlike Anaximander’s word, because,
when taken formally, it admits of no learning. It is, but it admits of no learning.
If it admitted of any learning, then that learning would be art, and set alongside natus, or
what is by birth. In the arts this “paying of one to the other” still blows forth.
It seems here we have access to a thinking which is not Greek, and that means
not human. Heidegger speaks of Dasein as what is human, but, this is said extrinsically,
and not spelled out in minute detail. It is clear that, taken in the terms of the history of
ideas the animal, the human, becomes transcendental, “a consciousness”,
thus “access” to everything, but here it is not “access”, thus Husserl overcomes
mere consciousness, yet, Heidegger still regards the looking to the appearances
as what has an in itself as a manner of access to the things that are to be seized
upon as what is in some sense availability.
However, this reflection must remain stillborn for a time.