Thursday, May 30, 2019

The Primordial character of Pseudos (ψεῦδος) and the corresponding Question 
(pertaining to the root subject matter: Hericlitus, Parmenides, Anaximander) 

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The “concept” of pseudos overlooks Western man. The word tells his life how to be. This is a 
basic word. Whoever “hates the lie in the soul” is the philosopher, but in recent times the “soul"
has come into question, and under withering attack. As late as Aristotle it still seemed 
necessary to rescue a knowledge of “psuke” from the abyss out of which it issues by means 
of pinning it to the living fastness of “bios”, life. Aristotle held that life and the soul were the same 
and this determination came down over the millennia to the moderns who destroyed it deeming 
it an error from which man must be emancipated. The genealogies of various “errors” belong 
to the past as does the prehistory of the genus mollusk to which the  common snail belongs. 
Histories and genealogies are supposed to be true. This implies the existence of the past. 
A curious claim.

Everyone knows what a lie is. In English there exists the rare form “truthing”, the parallel to lying. 
Why has this form so rare, has it come along and then fallen away? Such matters are 
difficult to answer for. Perhaps they admit of some answer among those scientists which 
concern themselves with a theory of linguistic drift or some such field. Such theories arrive late. 
Even worse, they themselves altr the habits of the general speaker and so are part of the 
“experiment”. Language itself long precedes any theory of grammar or prescriptive usage any 
corresponding molestation of the human power to discover flowers in language which correspond 
to what is learned when one sees how language “works”. All students of Greek classical antiquity 
know that “pseudos” is not exactly to be identified with the modern notion of the lie. It does not 
speak only of a deliberate deception but as much of error. Unsinn is nonsense, but sin is 
meant to by error so far as God is understood as the measure of a sense-speaking sanity.

It’s impossible to accurately fix the date of the homeric utterances of the archaic period preceding the 
citizen states of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Even if it is granted that a man called Homer 
originated the epic song the centuries of rhapsodic or troubadour recitation and the corresponding 
alterations of the work prior to its written form embarrass any attempt to chronological exactitude 
concerning passages of interest. Only a mantic art capable to read the bones of birds in flight, 
in the gleam of the wings of the bird on the open ocean, could “resume” the song of Homer in the 
way it was lived by the souls of the early ones. From the “homeric” age we have formulations such 
as: to say one thing to his own heart, and another to men. Which shows that the lie was known 
“conceptually” with clarity, but not given a word which avoids the round aboutness of the formulation. 
One thinks of such cases as the lack of superlatives in ancient languages which force 
formulations such as “king of kings” and “the most high”, rather than highest which have 
so contributed to the most stately non-rhetorical prose of the King James Bible with its 
curious fascination.

Two difficulties suggest themselves: One: What “pseudos” says is already “conceptually”, in ordinary 
understanding, outstripped by archaic man who has defeated the limits of his language and what it 
says to him through the formulas of circumlocution which circle about from soul to outer speech. 
A macaque monkey can deceive by making the sound that indicates predator when no predators are 
about and then running out of hiding to snatch up some food which have confronted their hungry eyes. 
It remains in such an example to show how this could be deception without man who knows what 
deception is. Perhaps the theory that animals are useful to be compared to human beings is itself 
an error like that of deriving a statement of what the animal is from the thought: it is a human being,  
but, without reason or speech. Such a thinking is already too philosophic for modern biology which is 
merely descriptive and deals with organisms and not at all with beings. Yet, biology, as the speaking 
about the “life world” already presupposes a “theory” of teleology which is confusing in every respect. 
The worst, but for that reason most clear example of the confusion is easily Richard Dawkins 
who wrote his book The Selfish Gene under the belief that man had to revolt against the selfish gene, 
by means of culture. Thusly he radically misunderstood the claims of biology (true, later, this was 
claimed to be a “metaphor”, which it surely was not, except in the sense that genes can not litearlally 
be "selfish"), since, like humans, they are only "behavior": ergo: a double confusion). 
Dawkins confusion is that of two metaphysical regimes: “Animals and objects obey natural laws because they cannot avoid it: they are not 
conscious, and so they are unable to rebel.” (Isiah Berlin on the Enlightenment view). 
Galileo says thusly, concerning the appearance of the sun to move in places and all times to the mere animal in the human being, 
to the senses:  “They have by sheer force of intellect done such violence to their own senses as to 
prefer what reason told them over that which sense experience plainly showed them to be the case.” 
Dawkins’ confusion is well understandable (at bottom it refers to the question concerning causality 
and reason in their millennial clarification which was the signal failure of Western or Christian existence 
which Dawkins is a great representative of the faliure). To this day he continues to claim that playing 
about with the genome is an immoral manner of attempting social change. But, thought according to 
the sciences, there is, indeed, nothing else. “Culture” and “intellect” can not, as Dawkins believed, be held to be 
capable to “rebel” against the “selfish gene”. Instead, on the revised version, the genes are 
“altruistic”, a wholly meaningless and useless notion of modernity which stands in for the radical 
confusion of the sense in which there is supposed to be anything like a science in the modern science. 
The word “science” is not really contrasted with something like physical doing, but rather, it means 
the reverse of sheer confusion. Physical action itself is asymptotic in its possibility, such that in forty 
thousand years more twists and turns of it will still be forthcoming, therefore, knowledge must 
only refer to what in some way is of moment. The bearing of the so-called physical discoveries 
on man as man are already prefigured in the shift from a natural history to a “biology” around 
the time of the first war. However, we have gone away from our topic. Which is truth and falsehood. 
Amidst sheer confusion neither speak to us. And, most of all, neither has a “physical” face in the 
physiognomy of the things. Perhaps they are supposed to belong to the “intellect”? But this is 
only a “part” of the ancient “theory” of souls…

In order to rest ourselves from the difficulties, the crazed passion for emancipation from clarity, we put 
several questions to the work called Heidegger. Three ways seem possible in research. Following with 
exactness a text which we assume is worth our time. Following the common opinion which shows 
everywhere in usage, e.g., “science”, and that means what everyone knows it to mean. Three, 
we can attempt idiosyncratic descriptions out of our own powers, under the assumption that we 
ourselves may have the power to see in a way as yet under explored, e.g., in the Case of Carl Jung 
where it is clear that much of what he had the eyes to see, though available to many, was long 
eschewed or authoritatively forgon by the coercions of the West the bearing of the West’s 
presuppositions not being susceptible, however, to mere amendment by some assumed “East” 
which completes the whole.

We will ask then, in the posts to come (along with our continuing questions into Parmenides and Heraclitus): 
What is the importance of the eyes meeting the world  in Heidegger? Is Heidegger’s word that Anaximander 
first “raised his eyes” a counter concept to the Christian and the biological concept of man as a 
genealogical primordial origin orientation? If the pseudos is linked in some way to truth then what does 
it mean for us that Anaximander was already within the decline of the pseudos, where it was already a 
confused notion, between lie and falsehood? How does the being immersed in “being as time”, the 
clamoring forth of the call which is not mere movement of beings but, rather the elucidating power 
that lets beings in their movement mean (and that means: come to the attention of man as what is 
available), stand beside the letting of the eyes to raise and to meet the beings?

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