Tuesday, May 14, 2019

Short Abortive Consideration in Preparation for a Genuine Approach to what Pertains to Indication as a Prelude

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Laïcité may be profitably understood as idiocy, since the proper meaning of idiot is the layman in the 
sense of one without training to a public office. The training of a public office must be according to an 
authority or traditional model (even if this model or tradition orders a “constant revision” or “criticism” 
or a “thinking for oneself” or some manner of “disciplined disobedience”). Therefore secularism, 
on the whole, moves between duty (ergo, office), and liberty (ergo, idiocy). Idiocy takes its positive 
force in the sense idiosyncratic or “particular”, “very particular” is a phrase in current currency. No 
refutation is anylonger possible in thought, but what “in thought” means is brought into crude contest 
with the possibilities of what language can say to human beings (in the text that has the rubric "Heidegger"
attached to it, there is the dream and the outer thing as what is unequivocal as being in either case). In 
this manner we touch on the issue of indication, and indication is thereby never far from the problem 
of the human essence which is language (whether language speaks for humans, or tells them is at issue).

The chief duty conceived of in modern societies, which means all countries on the face of the earth, 
is to serve the European science. Intelligence tests which aim at producing good science, produce 
accidentally all the chief power players on the planet (capable to do their will by means of other 
human beings). These tests have no moral content, since they are vert-frei. True, in the long run, 
the notion of value-free science, as we touched on in our last post, is untenable and gives way to 
the circle of the abyss, and the other side of the abyss, which is being. Each human being is found 
alone, and thus can only move the others from within this flow, which is most of all, for us, the flow 
of what language can say to the human being. At the same time we are supposed to be answering 
the question, what is indication?

In Aristotle prior to what is spiritual or scientific, the inner world of the eternal, for instance where 
it is true that the part is smaller than the whole, or where geometry and arithmetic happen for the 
young, or where, for the mature, after the age of fifty, it is allowed that the highest things, the idea 
of the good for example, may be contemplated, is the region of what one can point to. This region 
is not comprehended by the logos. The Greek word for horse is "alogos". Likely because the early 
Greeks expected this animal, which is so human in many ways, to speak to them, and it didn’t. 
Logos comprehends all the thinking of Aristotle explicitly and the leading statement of this is the 
so-called First Philosophy, the laws of thought, identity, contradiction, excluded middle. Our first 
hint then is that we are drawing back before Aristotle, into the discussions of the Platonic Socrates. 
For Aristotle, pointing to something is the manner in which one reaches the primary substance 
rather than the substance of the particular under the universal. “This one” is also “a” tree, and as a 
particular tree, it is thought spirituality within the scientific mind, nous, as what is eternal, as a tree. 
Ergo, in speaking of the indication it is clear that we attempt to reach Heraclitus and Parmenides. 
On the one hand there is in Parmenides the statement that in Heidegger is supposed to be positive: 
the “not being is”, which opens the concept of being and brings us to the notion that came along 
again only at the end of the West, for instance in Spengler (this is said deliberately because in 
Spengler there is constant rebirth (newness properly, not "re"), and the "West" names only a period of Western history viewd in 
the Heideggerian sense, from "Renaissance" to the year 1900 or so, "Faustianism"). It is being as possibility. And being as 
becoming. The obstruction of possibility is the not being of the beings in the field of becoming 
which is as much with the beings as with the nothing, but phenomenologically one goes from 
one to the other. This is a jacket. On the other hand, the lived accident of the becoming of the 
jacket as jacket. 

On the one side, we must consider Parmenides, being is, and on the other, Heraclitus, it flows. 
But it is a difficult approach because our eyes are faded and see in what is said in the last 
sentence a statement about things that are in the sense of universals. We all the time think 
there is a kind of thing that is stated by Parmenides, it is there waiting all the time to be engaged 
with in its particularity, and the same with the "lens" or idea which is always offered by the 
name Heraclitus and with respect to his flowing of fire that is "overcome" with his student 
who can not "even once" light upon what is shown in its light. We are reminded by the 
student of the modern problem of sense data, which if it is hopelessly unique in each vision, 
not subsumed under "kinds", such as human beings or things, or grey stuff, or flat surfaces, 
and so on, slips into unintelligibility at the point of Locke. Only to be revived by the notion of 
the "subject" which is a kind of ready-made lens on reality. What is the indication doing, 
trying to enter into the thinking through that gets us to what has become habitual in all 
thinking? The anguished creases in the face of Occidental thought perhaps still find too 
much art in the history of the order received out of the past, but bringing the past to 
ourselves is then wanted. This is a confrontation point with Nietzsche, because Nietzsche 
lets the past be all powerful in its, already has been. In its, one can not rebel against me.

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