Wednesday, May 8, 2019

Emblematic Musing Pertaining to the World Circumstance as a Confusion

(No attempt will be made, essentially, hitherto, to conform to norms of intelligibility with respect not 
only to the impossibility of decades of propedeutics for the ordinary reader, but also it is assumed 
what is to be said is unlikely to be visible in itself as the world of all comes forth in the way it does, 
showing what it does, in such a way as to prohibit the greater part of communication of its being 
so far as one learns the respect of detail and nuance which proves at length to fulfill and compress 
the whole and to be the whole in the chief respect, this, in its way, is self contradictory to the limited 
extend that what contradiction is is not held in being in any other way than what else is said, is 
wavering and changing, and that the philosophies of communication, so late of birth, as 
in Habermas, themselves signal the end of collective thinking (as it were, negatively). Dugin 
speaks here of the unawoken Russians who do not yet have a "Russian philosophy", the 
German thinking, one must observe, is of recent date and can hardly, though we think in its 
reserved flow that we reserve in reserving it, it was razed after Goethe (being spawned in the age of Leibniz) and sunk in Heidegger, 
and in it Americanism in Strauss ourselves it is hardly a Western thinking, but in the unfolding 
of politics, the world of the polis vis-a-vis philosophy, e.g., science, in completion it was "fact/value" 
and this, no longer remembered dissolution, now retires in its mysterious memory which can be 
looked upon by ever fewer and never shown in its spontaneous circumstance of inner support.)

Image result for kandahar ruins

Supposing that the philosophy of uberhaupt (of over-head or standing reserve), vulgar Kantianism, 
is the same as technological essence, this means strictly that there remains an implicit 
comprehensive god (or actus purus) which captivates in the thinking of being as a region of 
artifacts that are range in importance from indifferent to awesome. In Kant there is no removal 
of the Good, True, and Beautiful into the leveled notion of “value”, and a corresponding region of 
“fact”. The opinions about all things are in clear play in daily life though they are governed by the 
authority of a world circumstance where all are scientists in the vulgar sense of the 
European Science, of the storing “overhead” of repeatable acts out of the stock of all acts 
which are denatured and regarded as vert-frei so long as they remain in the university, but 
are set to the opinions or the vulgar existentialism so far as they come into the planetary 
everyday world. Therefore, the teaching that “science” happens in the world is misleading 
since the opinions concerning the status of scientific acts (repeatable acts, facts) in its 
theoretical basis relies on various opinions which themselves refer in their own basis back 
to notions about the essence of the world uberhaupt or all things. 

What is written is reasoning in the older sense of logos, which only means a discussion with oneself, 
reasoning, and can refer only to the human reflection: "The sense of right and wrong . . . is so delicate, 
so fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, 
so impressionable by education, so biassed by pride and passion, so unsteady in its course, 
that in the struggle for existence amid the various exercises and triumphs of the human intellect, 
the sense is at once the highest of all teachers yet the least luminous" Cardinal Newman, 
"Letter to the Duke of Norfolk" 

Though a complex of inexact phenomena are here meant under the old tag of dialectic and 
reasoning, such as the issue of the “ego arbiter” or the “gods” in the Euthyphro, and the general 
sense of the rationality meant by “right reason” in the post-thomistic literature until well after the 
time of Hobbes. In a word, “reasoning well”. Reasoning well stands in the inexact region of daily 
dealing and is supported by humans. Such that the more intelligent have better claim to deal in it, 
no matter that here and there attempts are made to present the foolish as intelligent that general 
simple objectivity (said vulgarly, inexactly, vernacularly) of intelligence is everywhere granted by history, by the flow of events, and as 
much by those who deny it as those who see it. However, in seeing personality, in seeing the 
things granted by nature and developed in history, one sees but another layer of datum in the 
primary world-object of opinion. The opinions and the world-object are fundamentally the same. 
For example, some see a “chess board”, while others see a piece flat surface or some such, 
but on the whole, in this sense, the entire colocation of beings can not be distinguished at first 
hand in the mode of “natural” as over and against “artifactual” (or “made” thing). Obviously this 
distinction can be made empirically, in life, but it is not possible to make it in the flow of history 
which is real being. It is something added to the flow. In the flow of being one awakens already 
amidst the “things” without the distinction nature/convention/artifact. Yet, here, the point is that the 
world essence, the technological essence, is something grown into in a way that is aside from 
the manner of building up from the flow of the world circumstance one finds oneself one day 
having raised one’s eyes to. The authority of the Technological Essence is never taxonomically 
present or available as datum one can learn out of something like experience, but it always is 
the experience itself as a mysterious presupposition of what it all is and in each case. It doesn’t 
matter at all that one denies this, as by claiming various “philisophic” commitments. One often 
holds beliefs about oneself and the world that are ill fit to the world circumstance such as one 
who would deny that events in distant regions of the globe effect the most disparate quarters 
and that the compression of world thinking is long ago formed a planetary thinking which 
outstrips all localities. This is clear in Dugin, who posits an existential Russianness, a “chosen” 
Russianness, in conformity to the vulgar existentialism which is everywhere in power. 

The Russian saying that in all jokes there is “only a little bit of a joke” applies to the old joke about 
the existentialist who like a senile man asks, who am I, where do I live, and so on. At the same time 
the obvious authority, for it is authority, of the method of the European Science, which hangs about 
in history, i.e., which is no science at all! (which has no reach into nous, or intellect in the sense 
of the eternal region of the stars and the inner spirit, which nowhere is even understood, and 
therefore simply does not exist, though as recently as in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche its slipping 
away was felt as a all-obliterating end [ a de-truthing of all things and the slamming down of Western, 
the only, ascent: at length the realization of the "cultures" Boas, Benidict and so forth]), 
strictly speaking there is only the flow which never repeats.  But, by opinion of a “pragmatism” there is method in science, and therefore what is “repeatable” 
by the inexact standards of daily dealing thrown back into the rigours of “science” with no basis in 
truth which it has not so much dispensed with but no longer comprehends as it has been as if 
swallowed by the earth. The pragmatism can never be practical in any serious sense because 
what is practical means what is good, what we accomplish in action. An action that is bad is not 
practical. The “science”, science in the vulgar sense, that is not practical is not even a activity in 
any discernible sense, it is sheer accidental movment without center unless the vulgar opinion 
support it through lethargy of inheritance of captivated character or ethos. Everything swirls in the 
void of confusion for anyone who is not satisfied with formula, but, also, for anyone who begins to 
move from difficulty to difficulty in the empirical flow.

The impossibility, due to something like a “bounded rationality” is not the essential difficulty, 

since any decision based on perfect knowledge is nonetheless only to be considered good, 
according to a living natural law, so far as it is the blind aspiration of current opinions out of the 
flow history which is not contrastable with the scientific, but science as it is vulgarly called is 
this history as the style of the uberhaupt and thereby obnubulates its own coming forth. The 
rule, when modified, say a change in the rules of the bishop in chess, may hide chess, say 
if the bishop is now a piece that can not move, if the old rule of the diagonal were forgotten 
chess might never be again found, indicating the being of chess as apart from the rule 
because of the need to externalize the thing in the diagonal which is a physical spatial movement.
Ergo, the right and the left, in physical space, which is external, allow also for the diagonal. 
In this sense one comes across the diagonal movement of things. And therefore the hangining 
away of the rules and the things is impossible (It doesn't intrest us here 
to speak of "fundemental physics", not only because of lack of power to bring the system of 
physics, devoid of the arbitrariness of the "right and left" into the flow of history [this not effecting 
this here is not cogent) its overall authority as the engine of new "successes" into the flow], but also this is not the place  
to listen to that subject matter. The very knowing of what is external is by rules 
of intelligibility which name the outside as what is and in it are uncovered in the flow all things. 
Yet, in this one sees only the malleability of the genetic circle which always flows out in other 
manners of slicing being into the lighting of the manifold. As though, for instance, in throwing 
the “rule” of comprehensibility of conditioned response into the erasure of the "unconditioned” 
or natural response, that is conditioned by evolution and not in the vision of the now living, 
one would again see the transformations of what is flow and only seek refuge in the being of 
their flow as the being of what is flowing, but not of what the flow might be in potentia, and the 
“might be”, expanding the thought of being, as in the Sophist of Plato with the “not being” which 
is, the thinking of being too shows a tendency to be inexact though a scientific, in the proper 
sense of investigation, life might follow it in being with it and perhaps thereby teach itself being 
(which could never ba potential), but adventure.

No comments:

Post a Comment