Thursday, May 30, 2019

The Primordial character of Pseudos (ψεῦδος) and the corresponding Question 
(pertaining to the root subject matter: Hericlitus, Parmenides, Anaximander) 

 Image result for fassbinder room

The “concept” of pseudos overlooks Western man. The word tells his life how to be. This is a 
basic word. Whoever “hates the lie in the soul” is the philosopher, but in recent times the “soul"
has come into question, and under withering attack. As late as Aristotle it still seemed 
necessary to rescue a knowledge of “psuke” from the abyss out of which it issues by means 
of pinning it to the living fastness of “bios”, life. Aristotle held that life and the soul were the same 
and this determination came down over the millennia to the moderns who destroyed it deeming 
it an error from which man must be emancipated. The genealogies of various “errors” belong 
to the past as does the prehistory of the genus mollusk to which the  common snail belongs. 
Histories and genealogies are supposed to be true. This implies the existence of the past. 
A curious claim.

Everyone knows what a lie is. In English there exists the rare form “truthing”, the parallel to lying. 
Why has this form so rare, has it come along and then fallen away? Such matters are 
difficult to answer for. Perhaps they admit of some answer among those scientists which 
concern themselves with a theory of linguistic drift or some such field. Such theories arrive late. 
Even worse, they themselves altr the habits of the general speaker and so are part of the 
“experiment”. Language itself long precedes any theory of grammar or prescriptive usage any 
corresponding molestation of the human power to discover flowers in language which correspond 
to what is learned when one sees how language “works”. All students of Greek classical antiquity 
know that “pseudos” is not exactly to be identified with the modern notion of the lie. It does not 
speak only of a deliberate deception but as much of error. Unsinn is nonsense, but sin is 
meant to by error so far as God is understood as the measure of a sense-speaking sanity.

It’s impossible to accurately fix the date of the homeric utterances of the archaic period preceding the 
citizen states of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Even if it is granted that a man called Homer 
originated the epic song the centuries of rhapsodic or troubadour recitation and the corresponding 
alterations of the work prior to its written form embarrass any attempt to chronological exactitude 
concerning passages of interest. Only a mantic art capable to read the bones of birds in flight, 
in the gleam of the wings of the bird on the open ocean, could “resume” the song of Homer in the 
way it was lived by the souls of the early ones. From the “homeric” age we have formulations such 
as: to say one thing to his own heart, and another to men. Which shows that the lie was known 
“conceptually” with clarity, but not given a word which avoids the round aboutness of the formulation. 
One thinks of such cases as the lack of superlatives in ancient languages which force 
formulations such as “king of kings” and “the most high”, rather than highest which have 
so contributed to the most stately non-rhetorical prose of the King James Bible with its 
curious fascination.

Two difficulties suggest themselves: One: What “pseudos” says is already “conceptually”, in ordinary 
understanding, outstripped by archaic man who has defeated the limits of his language and what it 
says to him through the formulas of circumlocution which circle about from soul to outer speech. 
A macaque monkey can deceive by making the sound that indicates predator when no predators are 
about and then running out of hiding to snatch up some food which have confronted their hungry eyes. 
It remains in such an example to show how this could be deception without man who knows what 
deception is. Perhaps the theory that animals are useful to be compared to human beings is itself 
an error like that of deriving a statement of what the animal is from the thought: it is a human being,  
but, without reason or speech. Such a thinking is already too philosophic for modern biology which is 
merely descriptive and deals with organisms and not at all with beings. Yet, biology, as the speaking 
about the “life world” already presupposes a “theory” of teleology which is confusing in every respect. 
The worst, but for that reason most clear example of the confusion is easily Richard Dawkins 
who wrote his book The Selfish Gene under the belief that man had to revolt against the selfish gene, 
by means of culture. Thusly he radically misunderstood the claims of biology (true, later, this was 
claimed to be a “metaphor”, which it surely was not, except in the sense that genes can not litearlally 
be "selfish"), since, like humans, they are only "behavior": ergo: a double confusion). 
Dawkins confusion is that of two metaphysical regimes: “Animals and objects obey natural laws because they cannot avoid it: they are not 
conscious, and so they are unable to rebel.” (Isiah Berlin on the Enlightenment view). 
Galileo says thusly, concerning the appearance of the sun to move in places and all times to the mere animal in the human being, 
to the senses:  “They have by sheer force of intellect done such violence to their own senses as to 
prefer what reason told them over that which sense experience plainly showed them to be the case.” 
Dawkins’ confusion is well understandable (at bottom it refers to the question concerning causality 
and reason in their millennial clarification which was the signal failure of Western or Christian existence 
which Dawkins is a great representative of the faliure). To this day he continues to claim that playing 
about with the genome is an immoral manner of attempting social change. But, thought according to 
the sciences, there is, indeed, nothing else. “Culture” and “intellect” can not, as Dawkins believed, be held to be 
capable to “rebel” against the “selfish gene”. Instead, on the revised version, the genes are 
“altruistic”, a wholly meaningless and useless notion of modernity which stands in for the radical 
confusion of the sense in which there is supposed to be anything like a science in the modern science. 
The word “science” is not really contrasted with something like physical doing, but rather, it means 
the reverse of sheer confusion. Physical action itself is asymptotic in its possibility, such that in forty 
thousand years more twists and turns of it will still be forthcoming, therefore, knowledge must 
only refer to what in some way is of moment. The bearing of the so-called physical discoveries 
on man as man are already prefigured in the shift from a natural history to a “biology” around 
the time of the first war. However, we have gone away from our topic. Which is truth and falsehood. 
Amidst sheer confusion neither speak to us. And, most of all, neither has a “physical” face in the 
physiognomy of the things. Perhaps they are supposed to belong to the “intellect”? But this is 
only a “part” of the ancient “theory” of souls…

In order to rest ourselves from the difficulties, the crazed passion for emancipation from clarity, we put 
several questions to the work called Heidegger. Three ways seem possible in research. Following with 
exactness a text which we assume is worth our time. Following the common opinion which shows 
everywhere in usage, e.g., “science”, and that means what everyone knows it to mean. Three, 
we can attempt idiosyncratic descriptions out of our own powers, under the assumption that we 
ourselves may have the power to see in a way as yet under explored, e.g., in the Case of Carl Jung 
where it is clear that much of what he had the eyes to see, though available to many, was long 
eschewed or authoritatively forgon by the coercions of the West the bearing of the West’s 
presuppositions not being susceptible, however, to mere amendment by some assumed “East” 
which completes the whole.

We will ask then, in the posts to come (along with our continuing questions into Parmenides and Heraclitus): 
What is the importance of the eyes meeting the world  in Heidegger? Is Heidegger’s word that Anaximander 
first “raised his eyes” a counter concept to the Christian and the biological concept of man as a 
genealogical primordial origin orientation? If the pseudos is linked in some way to truth then what does 
it mean for us that Anaximander was already within the decline of the pseudos, where it was already a 
confused notion, between lie and falsehood? How does the being immersed in “being as time”, the 
clamoring forth of the call which is not mere movement of beings but, rather the elucidating power 
that lets beings in their movement mean (and that means: come to the attention of man as what is 
available), stand beside the letting of the eyes to raise and to meet the beings?

Tuesday, May 21, 2019

What is formal indication supposed to grasp? Hericlitus and Paramenides on the way to Axanimander.
Related image
We must review the historical movement in order to see our own ground, the colours or surfaces which 
have lost their strength, since language is no longer able to speak to us (and this means: “the forgetfulness 
of being”).

Scientific investigation ad hominem has fallen into utter disuse. Discussion based on 
the principle that one can not refute he who does not grant the premise. The medieval  
researche colective de la veritas, collective research into the truth, which allowed the 
constellation of various key possibilities for indicating disagreement in discussion to 
have a positive and useful place in research and genuine disputation, where the 
thing under dispute was grasped in the eternal region of science, have in our own 
time become tools for polemicists. For example that it is possible to accuse someone 
of (a) fallacy with the scientifically meaningless aim of discrediting them 
(or “the argument”, as though arguments had some existence outside of speech 
[here we move towards, not sophistry in the modern sense, but in the sense that 
Derrida tried to reinvigorate, the sense where we are as yet prior to a system of 
Laws of Thought, such as contradiction and the rest]), rather than with the aim of 
pointing to the exact place where the understanding of the participants deviates. 
Under the principle that each one strives to understand the same thing in the same way. 
This principle points to the eternal undifferentiated realty of the actual or formal. In 
contradistinction to the differentiation which is made clear by the example that no 
one can eat for another, thus, the body and the region of things alongside or thrown 
into things “ob-jects”, is separate but the research of the spiritual region of science 
searches for what is undivided. Only if we begin to indicate this manner of thinking 
to ourselves can we see the complete reversal affected by the revolution of Galileo, 
the first of the mathematical physicists (mathematical in the new sense of an "Archimedean lever"). 
Galileo broke from the Aristotelian scientific physics which was concerned with natures or forms, or actuality. Newton 
remained ambivalent about the existence of nature in the Galiliain system 
which he took up. Galileo shifted the focus from formal or natural consideration 
to the consideration of movement. Movement became the only nature or form, 
heterogeneous and totalizing. The focus was now on the object, and any unified 
understanding was merely words. Math ceased to name anything scientific, 
but rather named words or rules which could be held in the minds of mathematicians, 
but which mattered only because of their ability to let human minds and hands take 
over the objects. The old science pointed to a region higher than the mineral, the 
plant, and the animal, to the human and towards the gods. This view implies the 
reality of the order of nature. So far as there is no nature, but only essence 
(that which is intuited or perceived) the old science can no longer hold. However, 
the old science pointed towards the gods, or the right judgment about matters of the 
highest concern, the good, true, and beautiful (ergo, the practical as what is worth doing, 
action as such). Indication, nonetheless, still remains in some sense worth noticing in the region of the 
Socratic dialectic, or the ad hominem, where reason or meaning is the primary arbiter.

All discussion tends towards scientific discussion, or towards noise. In scientific 
discussion indication is most alive. The extremest possibility of scientific discussion, 
in or according to the work with the name Heidegger, is that which is according 
to formal indication. Formal can also read actual. The actual is what matters. It is 
accomplishment. The clarity sought in modern discussion 
is a species of indication, but it is not the kind that matters most. Descartes understands 
whatever is clearly understood as indicated. That one has fingernails on one’s hand. 
In formal indication it is not clarity that is at all sought. Rather, it is that we mean to 
indicate within the investigation in such a way as to remain in the investigation even 
when the subject matter is at its most unclear. To keep one’s grip held on what is 
most unclear, but which draws the investigator towards the subject matter. It is in 
thinking with Heraclitus and Parmenides that we want to let formal indication in its 
exercise begin to take hold.

Simple indication, as a indication of the direction of formal indication. Simple indication 
concerns the strict ad hominem, or the human essence, ergo, reason. It is strict in 
that it speaks what is genuinely visible to the one doing the research, and never 
tries to pass off some “argument” as its own investigatory ground or remembrance. 
It is remembrance of the being of beings. But, not of the being of being (of the meaning 
of being). Heidegger, who follows Descartes and Husserl, finds in the summum genus, 
in the “sum” of the Cartesian subject, being with the ready interpretation: object for 
human science (object here not in the sense of Galilean/European science (that is, 
of motion), but in the sense of availability or presence, something for humans). He 
says, why an object or thing available? He investigates the meaning of being, rather 
than practices the science of being. Formal indication is no longer scientific, but it is 
more difficult because it must hold its own without an object. Reason is also called 
logos or speech. Whether it is higher, in the order of nature, than mineral and animal, 
no longer concerns us. We only attempt to describe what can be grasped in indication.

Simple indication. If I draw a line on the sidewalk in white chalk and stand at one terminus 
of that line, and someone at the other, we are opposite. How far is opposite in this case 
exactly as in the case of rest and motion? We indicate the sense in which any talk of the 
literal is strange. Is not motion literally the opposite of rest? Is this where we get the meaning? 
Or, did we get it from standing face to face on either side of the line? How do they come into 
play here, when are they no longer clear? When Kant wants us to adjust the thing to the 
human substance in his “Copernican revolution”, where intuition is a kind of perception, 
does he speak literally of perception? How is there perception without what is to be 
synthesized, namely the concept? Some affair is already a matter of opposition, literally, 
without the synthesized concept, the opposite? Husserl says here, the concept is already 
with the thing intuited, and no “synthesis” is to be effected. This way of indicating is prior 
to simple indication, but, is it only prior from the perspective of, who, ourselves? Historical 
subjects? We must remain aware of the genetic difficulty when we approach Heraclitus 
and Parmenides, who we use in our own fashion.

If said of the ground under foot, it is “at rest” speaks literally. Is it at rest?  by which I ask you, 
is it not that during an earthquake the ground is not at rest? The ground moves or is not at 
rest now, and now there is no earthquake. What if right now we were on the moon? Would 
you still say the earth is at rest? No, I would say it is moving. Such contradiction, when 
elicited ad hominem, is remembrance. Socrates is wrongly understood with respect to 
the Meno example. It is worth mentioning that all of us today are like Meno in that we 
crave false sophistication. What Socrates demonstrates is very simple. He shows that 
mere repetition of the thing the master says is to be distinguished from understanding 
what one says, namely, remembering. Ergo, he shows the way new understanding 
fountains up from the earth as if the liquification of the ground occurred. The slave 
genuinely understands that he was in error, and thought he grasped what he hadn’t. 
Here we indicate something of the subject matter of simple indication. The region of 
daily opinion opens us towards this indication, where opinion is a ground, and it liquifies. 
In such indication, perhaps, we merely go on forever, liquid, at “risk”, nomadic, and so on. 
Formal indication claims not to merely wonder. It strikes at the ground of being.

In a certain sense a genetic difficulty prevents an exhaustive investigation of the approach 
which would summarize (or actually trace) our position vis-à-vis Anaximander. Descartes who speaks of three 
substances, extended, intelligent, and that of deity, is taken up by Spinoza who mostly 
is concerned with the question of clarity. Clarity is itself insufficient with respect to 
ethical considerations though it points towards the inclusion of the earth into philosophy. 
The earth meaning the phenomena. In the Timaeus the question whether everything could 
be a dream is, indeed, considered, but on the basis of a question about the remembrance 
of the genuine ground of knowledge, of truth. So far as the true, the good, justice, love 
and the like are considered, the tradition never comes to a theory of knowledge. Now we 
enter into a peroration or excursus which should serve as an illustration of the degradation 
of scientific speech in the current period. We take here the issue of the dawn of the 
epistemological age, the age when the phenomena come into question with respect 
to their status as it pertains to the human being which is no longer taken as a being, 
but as epistemology itself.

Epistemology, taken merely extrinsically, that is, historically (empirical-clock-chronologicaly), comes along sometime after 
Kant. This is a signal that one who wants to speak scientifically should be anxious not to 
mistakenly project the current thinking onto the past. So far as one does not assume from 
the outset that the current state of human beings is the perfection, or at least the 
unqualified improvement, of the past, this manner of dealing with the discussion is not a 
classicist’s interest in preserving the possibility of correctly constructing a notional construal 
of the mind of the past human, but rather it is the point of snatching back the intellectual vigour of the 
history that is ourselves form the radical decadence, liquidity, “risk”, nomadism, at length, 
in its highest form, living dangerously (and this last seduction is the greatest from the 
scientific perspective of the work with the name Heidegger). Epistemology seems already 
to exist in Kant so far as Kant attempted to fit things to man, and the issue named already 
comes into being. However, Kant himself had no epistemology, but rather produced the 
conditions for it. Indications which would point to this more exactly lay outside our current 
ambit (in this post). Supposing, however, one would merely says, epistemology, and that 
means a “theory of knowledge”. Would it not be the most dogmatic and obdurate stand 
which would refuse the student of the West the possibility to find in Aristotle an
epistemology in this sense, and in Plato? Yet, in Plato and Aristotle theory, theoria
names a part of the whole of the cosmos, it names the region where we are to find what 
is unitary rather than what is differentiated. Indeed, Plato carried out investigations into 
knowledge, but he had no theory of knowledge. Theory, in the modern sense, names 
something opposed to, nay, even opposite?, practice. And yet, what does practice 
even mean here, it no longer means the practical, for the practical is the act that is 
useful in some way, acts destructive of ourselves are not practical. The more a discussion 
attempts to set up umbrella terms such as “theory of knowledge” and let all manner of 
things loosely sit under them, the more it becomes inconceivable that it could deserve to 
be scientific. These considerations are never exhausted on the basis of setting out rules 
about what terms can and can not be used, but they are a matter of the sensitivity to the 
matter under question which can never be settled by a cheap recourse to final clarity about 
method. Such matters as are here considered could easily be ramified indefinitely and so 
might comprehend the most unsystematic or empirical heap of reflections, but instead we follow 
the claim to essentiality which leads to Heraclitus and Parmenides.

Heraclitus does not concern himself with the problem of perception or intuition. Therefore in 
Heraclitus we must not think of nature and natures, but can we even think of essences? 
We are already in this respect “prior” to Husserl. Husserl wants the essences to be datum 
about being taken as what is available to man for research (though, never in the crude 
sense of a research into technology, nor even in a moral sense so far as he would identify 
the manner of shaping conscience or phronesis.) Husserl here looks like a giant, wearing a 
silver crown, who would walk from star to star. This walk would perhaps extend for millennia. 
Such is the science of Phenomenology. Against this, as it were, not in opposition to it, but 
as what moves deeper into it, Heidegger claims not to have had his head turned by the 
Milky Way above, but to retain with Da-sein. It is Heidegger in which we find the 
essentialness of Heraclitus in this respect as a guidepost and subject matter.

We understand then, as Heraclitus, a panoceanic current, the ocean river, in which there is 
the conservation of the current which is grasped as being only when the source place and 
the termination are known, such that whoever knows only of the source place, does not yet 
grasp the being of the ocean flow. Parmenides, we understand, in opposition to this, to say 
that one can speak of no past, and of no future of the being which is also not being. That it 
is also not being means that the not being is part of being such that it is not something 
like a being that can be snatched away from being. Being and not being are one. 
Heraclitus can not appeal to the fuel, what stands behind us, namely the future, as what 
if one only knows of it, only of the future, one will not have grasped it. One is supposed to 
also know of what stands ahead, namely the past, in order that one should grasp the 
flame as such. Parmenides says, this future, is it the possible?, dunamis?, but in 
Parmenides such conceptual modifications are not yet, but they are therein prepared, 
can not stand as what is “two”, or what is “three”.

We shall pursue this matter more concretely in what follows, how what flickers and gleams 
on the ocean stream is supposed to stand beside what is one and is nothing and being, 
and how this is supposed to help us grasp formal indication. We are asking about formal 
indication by means of reaching beyond the being of beings, and into the subject matter 
of the being of being which is the question of the meaning of being or truth. Truth, and 
that means the deprivation of concealment. We are supposed to be moving towards