The Systems (of Thought) as Ergon (or, the systematic philosophies or wisdoms of Friedrich Nietzsche and of Leo Strauss)
Q: What is Reason?, we continue in the path of our leading question, its subject matter is our “authority”

“Ideas are stronger than all empercial forces.” Husserl
Nihilism! Nihilism! Nothing else but its springing forth in a weak light of a dying star is of
moment. The dying of the star would mean utter captivation and loss of human sight.
Perhaps, however, some say, the loss of human sight is the most gravid kairotic moment. In
this atmosphere: namely, of teche as what invigilates upon the sea lanes, the reaching of
money-making into every region of the system, the erasure of all particularity, of the
commercial-finance complex thats needs are seen to by the race of universal ontological
cybernetic supremacy in its contest of escalating innovations, the echo of reason, that we
might still ask, as we are, What is reason?, is still present in the third cave.
Systematic under the general claim that Nietzsche is not systematic, following his
own comment, is said at times to mean “aphoristic” (or even "aesopic"), but many thinkers have made
aphorisms without failing to be systematic. Nietzsche, it seems, meant that unlike the
scholastics, who were compelled to comment on each of the cardinal subject matter in
their candidate master’s master work, were then meant to speak on subject matter they
had no adequate relationship with, e.g., the unmusical must speak of music, and thus
emphasizing his systematic teaching that one must belong to the gods, as in
the Euthyphro, as Euthyphro himself did, in the historical development, and not
to “God”, for “god is dead”. The “Vornehmheit” or heights of grandeur, what Wagner,
in his noise, fails to grasp, for he is all-too-conscious with his Gesamtkunstwerk, with
the sociability of the conscience in the failure to heighten being, in the bustle that
is “boring” (as Hegel calls it, that is, not in the Heideggerian sense: but, rather, for it
is in the dimension of a “science” of diversity all of a stamp), the look of what springs
out for Rausch is beyond any schema of mere actuality (as pure act). Heidegger
too grasps this when he says: the kalon is what is “unconstrained favouring”.
However, the break is in this: Kant, the “beautiful and the sublime”, Nietzsche,
“the noble and the drunken”.
own comment, is said at times to mean “aphoristic” (or even "aesopic"), but many thinkers have made
aphorisms without failing to be systematic. Nietzsche, it seems, meant that unlike the
scholastics, who were compelled to comment on each of the cardinal subject matter in
their candidate master’s master work, were then meant to speak on subject matter they
had no adequate relationship with, e.g., the unmusical must speak of music, and thus
emphasizing his systematic teaching that one must belong to the gods, as in
the Euthyphro, as Euthyphro himself did, in the historical development, and not
to “God”, for “god is dead”. The “Vornehmheit” or heights of grandeur, what Wagner,
in his noise, fails to grasp, for he is all-too-conscious with his Gesamtkunstwerk, with
the sociability of the conscience in the failure to heighten being, in the bustle that
is “boring” (as Hegel calls it, that is, not in the Heideggerian sense: but, rather, for it
is in the dimension of a “science” of diversity all of a stamp), the look of what springs
out for Rausch is beyond any schema of mere actuality (as pure act). Heidegger
too grasps this when he says: the kalon is what is “unconstrained favouring”.
However, the break is in this: Kant, the “beautiful and the sublime”, Nietzsche,
“the noble and the drunken”.
Living in a poorly lit blotch of intelligibility the first cave, that of the intelligibility gripping to
sight in unscrutinized (without, only in the “without”, is there Socratic scrutiny) opinion as
the first cave. Which falls further into the historical accrual of opinions about opinion in the
life of Western (now planetary) blocs of being, once European as what was mediterranean,
as the peoples about the “anno domini” of a centre of time as where one is.
The system of the “gods” and “prejudice” (that is, “the noble” or “grandeaur” as drunken
passion and the geistishist moment of the will as “philosophy") thought by Nietzsche is not
polemically thought. It is not reached conceptually as with Schmitt, e.g., as “society” is set
against “state” as polemical in its origin and than, in our own time, ceases to make sense
as the “government [state] is a necessary evil” (with the Americans and their contemporary
misunderstanding of their own system = of nihilism as Capitalism). Prejudice is not a
polemical concept as is his “anti-slave” “anti-christianity”. Neither does Nietzsche think as
with Hegel, in absolute geist as an undergoing that is already woven in as presupposition of
the thinking and which can not be set aside. This is an ergon, for it is lived in the thinking
and livable by others. Ergo, the title, Nietzsche, of the system, is of the ergon of “prejudice”
as the take over of man’s essence.
The work of Strauss is to draw all thought to the level of Plato, both Jerusalem and Athens
are forms of the rational; “different kinds of rationality” (but, not as with Nietzsche, waring
with History to establish a record that plays forever and then ‘from the beginning’.)
Whoever thinks through the whole of Strauss thinks being between two geniuses, namely
Plato and Strauss. Strauss “historian of philosophy” is overcome in the ergon Strauss =
thus the rescuing of Strauss from the abyss of the history of being!
The contemporaneous is the point of the greatest illumination of the beings blindness in the sense of
“captivation” (Heidegger). Captivation is a way of speaking of “the animal” in a vague aisthesis,
sense life, plus the possibility of bare recollection of a distant place and setting the will on it, going to
the former place “animus revertendi” belongs to the soul of the beast according to the Roman law
and to truth, as it were (it is observed in all times and places). The crow can solve simple problems,
and birds can make nests. Such is captivation and its leaking out of its own shallow basin into the
gleam of being.
meant to be in the caves, this third cave of reason, as: what is reason (asked out of the history of
being, out of the each is being and the emphases on the beings in their being as which is more and
less being takes on a tone wholly unknown to the advance of experience to reflection in Aristotle; the
“more being” is but the existential emphasis)? The number “mysticism” (pseudo-mysticism as
looking on in the region of the psuke or “imagining” as what today is called “abstraction”) worked out
between the Egyptian priests and the Pythagoreans (“Thus the mathematical sciences originated in
the neighborhood of Egypt, because there the priestly class was allowed leisure.” Aristotle, “Plato is a
Pythagorean”, Aristotle) comes down through the Catholics, through, for instance the obsession of
(simply to be understood as one of the larger links amidst the plenum of the pseudo-mystical thinking)
Kepler with the Platonic forms, Leibnitz at the end of the thinking with the monads, this mysticism, as
what is said in connection to scholasticism (i.e., conscious “rational Christianity" as the origin of
secularism = "sceince" as rationality , as pseudo "utopia" and tacit progress thrown into the
"fox" and "wolf" = American left and right, of the universal "state" = commercial system of
a "selfish" "president" of the "Americans", e.g. as a part of the planetary commercial activity that requires,
as Adam Smith already observed, no country but wherever money can be made/or, better: spent) into the “contemporaneity”;
planetary rule of the universal commercial-financial bloc, presents itself as
“evil”: “materialism” as the elusiveness of total acquisitiveness of the “individual” (a
common mistake: in the past there were duty-bound individuals, with the social contract, right-bearing
individuals: the emphasis on the “individual” in current debates is a misleading aberration). This is an
impediment to genuine reason, the idea of combat as it still stands in Dugin, for example. It lacks what
Heidegger, the ergon, teaches. The freedom of thinking being is aimed at in the struggling thought: as
“letting be”. Struggling is not seeking the “sieg” or the cheep “un-heil” of secularist worn down, ergo
almost wholly captivated, utopia.