Wednesday, November 6, 2019




Conserving the possibility to think the genuine inception for a prolonged instant thus attempting to supply the true force of event: The Concept of Being 


 

 

The traditional concept of the concept is something that the imagination is unable to picture. The traditional example is given in the Port Royal Logic and refers to Augustine. The Concept of the Concept refers to a moment in the History of Being when imagination was thought as within the region of psuke, and not in the region of phusis. This description still holds for whoever thinks phenomenologically. In phenomenology the regions have no preference in terms of the evaluation of knowledge (as in the Theaetetus). In this sense when it is said that Being is not a concept something misleading is said. It is a concept. Only the concept of the concept is now phenomenological. So the region from which it is thought is no longer evaluated. No attempt is made to found knowledge. The truth of being is no knowledge or science. 

 

We say, the “guiding aim” and thus Phenomenology is no longer an “encounter” of a phenomenological knowing and what it knows. The position raised by Heidegger reminds of the statement of Jung. We continue to dream while awake in the unconscious. Jung says, also, the unconscious is really unconscious. It’s clear that any concept of the unconscious is analogous in its closeness to being to the Sophist question, “is not-being?” Therefore, we may think the not being and the unconscious. If the instants “forget” what energia as not-being is always bringing to them the dream chaos is the energia. 

 

The solidity of concrete, for instance, is already in the concrete as seen. We anticipate the potential. Is there something analogous in language which anticipates even without memory of an experience? So far as language is cerebellum environmental or motor based it is not correctness as what is apart from the discussion of words about words. In some sense this is the bare meaning of the conception of Husserl’s so-called intentionality. The retreat into the basic language which is phenomenological active prior to a discussion of words about words. However, everyone is distant from this, because of compulsory primary education. Because of introspective reflection. The motor primary language linked to being is not being, but in its essence like the not-being and the unconscious. It is a “essence”, conceptualized as a sort of energia with no nature. Which means that a house, for example, is a house, but that it might not remain a house. Because the ground of the event, for example, allows the second table of Edington to flow into it and take it over until it becomes a “dwelling machine”. Until it becomes what is the temporary station of the ungrounded worker, of the rent payer, of the owner who could be moved by the state. Of the one guided away from themselves so that they could improve their animal flesh and make themselves into something else because they are not the animal with the divine spark of reason but the sheer availability of the imaginary space-time to an experimentally available consciousness which is the cybernetic movement of what “persuades”, that is, of what manipulates. To manipulate is to persuade without conscience knowledge. Since there is no soul or psuke, this consciousness can not be persuaded. It is not even rationally conscious at all. Its consciousness is only of the “scientific house”. Only the being still with a subjective offense against this space-time still plays about with natural things as if it were an animal with a special advantage over the other animals. 

 

The concept of being, which is no longer a concept, but can be thought of as a concept. Where does the change happen? This grasping must be conserved in the flow of being. Heidegger says, I stand back and bow before one who will come… (step back in front of one who is not here, and I bow a millennium ahead of him,.) Thus, he implies, being is real. The History of Being is real. It goes on. In this sense, one can see that unlike the Eastern thinking Heidegger lets being be. And this is important to see when one thinks through this that is new to thought (thus, unlike wisdom, we say: something can be new to thought, thus, the Event). Heidegger does not hold, that which has been can not be undone. Because he does not hold with the principle of identity. Happiness, which was once Beatitude, which was once Eudaimonia, has it retained anything of its first emergence? Perhaps something. There is no man as man. Man is no longer the rational animal. Not an animal at all. What was learned of Plato, will no longer count. Perhaps there can be no learning in this sense, learning about an essence, that of man as man, and his morals. We must begin to think being, while as yet referring back to the flow of the concrete world, into reason as the reasonable. It may be asked, why refer always to the objections of common sense and the reasonable? Since one does not want to surrender to the forces of mere talking about talking. Just as it is also so that one does not give way to the authority of the atheistic god with its Laws of Nature as eternal Energia or Actus Purus. Instead we remember, not-being is. The unconscious is dreaming while awake. 

Monday, November 4, 2019


Remarks in Passing on our understanding of the Moral and Intellectual conceptions as historical relics and correctness (in some connection to Isaiah Berlin). On whether life is useless. 


Image result for count kuki heidegger
 

 

The question What is the significance of life on earth? is given in the formation of Law (through the art of Political Philosophy) and the direction of the advancement of the experimental sciences (or, the decision about how much resources will be allotted to each).  The question then becomes concrete.

 

We are grateful to Dugin for reawakening the interest in Guenon, his book The Crisis of the Modern World agrees with our own view to the extent that it grasps the transformation of the higher, nous or reason, to the lower, calculative episteme, as a comprehensive transformation of the human being, in his sense as a ruination and destruction of the intellect unparalleled in the human development. What interests us in Guenon is his genuine grasp of an inkling of the full force of the older thinking, now lost. That the going down of the tradition is the going down of an Earth. Earth is said of ethnos, but World of the Political community.



In parallel the Zizek position denies this attitude of destruction wholly, though in a certain sense Zizek, though he does not sense the Aristotelian world (as does Guenon), but wholly moves in its destruction in Kant and Hegel, as he expresses it quite beautifully by reference to Vertigo, to the rings of the felled giant Redwood “here I was born and here I died,” ergo, between Kant and Hegel, his attitude is that the cosmos is favorably disposed to man and must yield even though various difficulties present themselves. Nietzsche and Bakunin take the view, in contradistinction to this, that the significance of life is in life without end or favored home. Thus these views, never understanding either being nor religion and faith in Dugin's sense, are species of a Catholicism. The sense of a Herder, of a being at home as being like oneself, which in some sense even taints Heidegger, is repudiated in Zizek for universal norms as absolutes. Herder does not hold with supremacism, as of some veiled menace of a neo-Nazi "88," but with the each to their own to the fullest. This position, however, is impossible when the search for Truth of Being is taken seriously. The problems raised by Schmitt must show their grimace as in the "Idealism" of Samanth Power, in the spirit of the Valkyries, which strives constantly towards the elimination of evil, of enemy, with an undying will (concealed by lovely manners).  




The Catholic “will to power” shows straightforwardly through Sam Harris. Philosophy or “science” is supposed to be able to answer the question, What is the true way to live? The answer must be universal in character. Various verbal questions which can be raised as objections are not much interesting and, even less interesting is whether Harris himself knows what he is (or what peculiar taint of history he embodies). 
 
‘But if they want to suffer…’
‘A man may want to rape a woman. Are we to allow it because he wants to? Suffering is wrong.’
‘And you suffer all the time,’ the priest commented, watching the sour Indian face behind the candle-light.’


Graham Greene, The Power and the Glory   
 
This example shows the difference between relativism, as in Comte, Mill and the Utilitarian vision, and the Historical Consciousness properly. Of course, true, the Harm Principle comes in in the example of rape. But, on the Kantian view, it comes in as much in the example of suffering. Since each one is like each other, and harming oneself is no different than harming another. 
 
Happyness. No. 
Leiden leiden, Kreuz Kreuz. (Suffering suffering, the cross the cross.) ― Martin Luther
 
There is a thread, running from Athenian Eudaimonia, to Catholic Beatitude, to American Happiness. In this sense, one must ask: Does anything remain? Or, rather, has the ground changed sufficiently that nothing remains in the “idea”. 
 
The Utilitarian so-called Relativism sees each society as approximating towards what is most conducive towards cozy self-preservation. 
 
Our view is that: In Pinker there is an example of total lack of Aristotelian phusis or “origin.” He reads Locke as a Marxist who speaks of “blank slate” babies who take their form through rearing in the sense of class upbringing. Thus he tends towards the cheap commonplace amongst the Leftists: Plato, the Aristocrat. With the addendum, though, not all aristocrats are bad since there are “class traitors”. 
 
All this is totally alien to Locke and has nothing to do with his concept of the tabla rasa. which was directed at the art of reasoning or the formation of the discrimination of moral opinion and knowledge. 
 
In the same style Adam Smith is usually wholly misread. Since Smith (natural value) still lived in the atmosphere of Aristotelian reason. In a certain sense, something of the spirit of the “scientific” table, of Edington, so-called, is always read back into the Aristotelian world where there is no such nature. No experimental “science” “nature”, which is really a name for technological enframement (i.e., “nature” as an imaginary “space-time”/ "Gestell" as totalizing non-rational availability). 
 
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Ishah Berlin says Hitler’s “values did not coincide with ours” and we therefore “had a right to go to war with him”. He doesn’t say: They were wrong (“universal”) values. 
 
Berlin admits that the category of human disappears at the edges. Those who we can not understand in any reasonable sense are not human. 
 
An implication of this is what follows: A discourse must be addressed to the friends of the truth if it is to be serious. To those who take pleasure in truth (rather than in interest or passion). A written discourse may be read by anyone, for thousands of years. It may be read by those who are not human. The ones who aren't human will not be friends of the truth. (The issue of bare intelligibility as against reasonableness is key here.) 
 
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Heidegger: Being. Said negatively this means that one can not approve Guenon simply. Something is gained in the destruction of the West by the technological “science” or, what says the same thing, the transformation of the Western tradition into nihilism (on the one side, the impossibility of the question why prolong human existence?, on the other, mere “Life” as experiencing of the life-giving lies). Being says, not a telos, when stated negatively. Thus being is not origin or nature. Not the favoured world. The favoured world, the world of Aristotle, implies the nihilist world, it does not take an interest in us. The, “science” as “neutral”. To have a phusis is to be caused, since it a peculiarity, an essence, as what has a “mature” state. What grows to maturity has a purpose. To be, by contrast, is no cause or answer to the “why”. life is still full of the “why”. It differs only in that it denies that god can ever find man. For Harris, god must be capable to find a man. There must be favouring in the cosmos.

Thursday, October 31, 2019


 

Regimes of Humanism, Regimes of Individuality 

Image result for alexander dugin



 

 

Primeval passion, the sphere of Interests. The phrase “the passions of the tide” means that the tides take no action. Action is the mixture of the soul and the body. The popular or general opinion, in its frenzied inexactitude, doesn’t often enough distinguish action from mere movement. Napoleon sits on his horse, perhaps he unscabbars his long arched sword and thereby produces a semaphore. Perhaps Napoleon never fought at all in hand to hand battle or duel. Perhaps he never had a physical fight of any kind. What is an action? What is a deed? Because the human being lives in the storms of (truth as) correctness (this should not be confused, and by no means identified simply, with the temporally local phenomena of "political correctness"), it lives in a chain of thousands of years of overlapping thinking. Ideas of the dead, not only dead humans, but of dead circumstances and landmasses perhaps exerting their telluric forces, constantly overwhelm philosophical interests. The philosophical interest is truth. Yet, what does it mean that truth has become an interest, that reason has become a passion? The legal system of most countries retain the philosophic meaning of action, as in the phrase “Accessory after the fact.” Action is the older sense of the word fact. A legal fact, to be determined by a jury, as a non-scientific matter, as something which is not a matter of the science of law, involves asking how the mind links to what is done. A treacherous Borgias prince gives his guest a poisoned chalice. The unjust act (unjust fact) is made possible because of his knowing that it is poisoned. Implying that the significance or "relevancy" is woven into the mere material motion. A woman, according to the contemporary vision out of the mere social mass of the society, perhaps becomes “politicized” when she has a child because she must see to the interest of the “future” which has the business of being a danger for her own. But, on the other hand, the essence of man as man is supposedly reason which finds its right environing in the political world which makes freedom form necessity possible and so thought possible in idleness which is the aim of the highest human essence. Thus freedom from the labor demanded by a lack of mastery of the environment. Yet, reason is only availability of the intuited essences; in simpler terms it is what speech does in allowing one to speak about. Perhaps then man is the being with the interest of being the “head of a household” and controlling the “purse strings” and protecting what is his? The so-called thumos type or the object of the studies of Fukuyama in exact social science study. The question of the countries holding their own among the other countries is analogous to that of the question of the political man with his badges and money, his demand for pride or superiority, and, on the other side, the philosopher with his reason and his significance or truth and his claim to the superiority of truth and god or "rationality" as the Atheist god, to contest. 


Movement of the individual in the conventions of the current centuries.

The pathos of a “theory” of life (anti-dating Nietzsche) judges by moments of a lived-experience that takes its form in the drama of the individual. This is then the measure of the being, this and this happened and it was worth experiencing and these experiences go on throughout life and thus life is significant. Such mere “subjective” individualism must have a god to protect it, a god of reason such as that that came to light in the French Revolution (the struggle of the amour soi to assert itself as amour propre must find some tribunal to save off the mere reversion to barbarism, not to say the strange and problematic "state of nature"). If this God were summed in a word he would be “Equality” (thus the Truth of the Hegelian Absolute is averred in the human heart, and a rejection of simple Christianity (rather than its developed forms which stray from th mere "to the world what is the worlds, to me what is mine": ergo, the "aristocracy of nature" is evaded, of the judgement at death and not in this world of the personalities in their inner significance as spirits] is effected on some views). All are equal, later it becomes necessary to notice the principle of Equality, as the Truth of the world which if it is obeyed will draw mankind to bliss, is not so easily “worked pure” by the precedents of the jurists and the people in their Natural Right as what is Essential (e.g., the gay marriage issue) over the course of a century and many revolutions. The principle or God, which is eternal, which reason finds, must guard the mere living beings with their Erlebnis (because of the threat of barbarism). Thereby Nietsche would be totally bastardized and made to agree with the accidental grotesque world of concessions to reality (because in Nietzsche "Life" has a principle within it that decides on what is deed or significant as what is "life-giving lie"). 

 

Humanism: To make Reason God. Reason, what grasps the principle around which a discipline is founded and sustained. For instance, health makes the establishment of a diploma in medicine and research into what restores health significant or meaningful. Health itself is only available to reason as a principle. The means to health refer back to health, to the principle. But, health is only what is grasped as health rather than illness by the human “subject” with its so-called reason or ability to hold “abstractions” before itself in the soul, or the higher part of the soul. Then Equality is supposed to be to the whole, to all that exists, what health is to the body and reason comes to hold sway as a God. It degenerates so far as the principle undergoes the pathos of its continual catharsis and reemergence. In the sacrifice of one estimation of its predicated essence to another, in the burning of what one worships and the worshiping of what one had formerly burned. For example that American Southerners burned Integration, but now more and more worship it amidst various still visible resistances. 

 

Humanism: That decisions over fate are moved from the natural to the deliberate. So that all people from one country, because they speak one language, have numerous things in common, but that among them some will show inclination to work with mechanical things and go into a training in waste management, through an inner inclination. That inner inclinations be viewed as the most important thing. That all financial barriers, that a child with an inclination would be prevented from following it because the family needs them to earn a wage, are to be overcome. 

 

Humanism: The reorganization of all human achievement which gives the Deed or the Action a new significance. The greatest deed, to become an Individual. Thus the inner wellspring of mere motion, the “motive”, is the “Individualized” soul. 

 

On the other hand this Humanism is the shadow of a radical materialism in the form of Science or the sciences. “An elite is tempted by Russian neo-Marxism not so much because of its humanitarian gospel as because of its vision of a totalitarian civilization linked to the cosmic powers of matter.” The sacrifice of beings in the Russian Futurism and the subject matter of Boris Groys, the downgoing of the sun, and the nihilism which resets in order to build from a black null. The well-known Nazi “mysticism” which is really a “cosmic power” cult of "planetary criminals." The liberalism which flattens this and comes to speak of “consciousness” as an effective experimentally available limit state of material. Thus the deification of the essence of Reason as sheer availability. The human become the being that has for its specific differentia Availability (or presence).  

 

The Individual: That which is isolated by the economic machine and forced into universal gladiatorial contests of the most vulgar kind. The removal of the human being as a reasonable being under a principle which is the path to bliss or “happiness,” to what is the same as health to the whole. 

 

The Individual: The inner being without a soul, which is now the subject and not the possessor of the “knowledge as power.” Originally, the “knowledge as power” was a force against the environment of an animal gifted with reason. But, when the animal became a Material “consciousness” (no longer seriously recognizing a distinction between environment or surrounding world and itself) the “knowledge as power” was turned against it and began to menace it. 

 

The Individual: According to the Contract Theory notion an entity called a “rights bearing Individual” replaced the subject who was a duty bound possession of a king. When this notion became absurd to the rising middle classes, and it was asked, can the king of France sell one of his subjects to the King of England, the new regime was brought in. Undeveloped in America, with only Empirical institution, and more thoughtfully in France, with a Civic Religion of Equality (and Atheistic "rationality"). But, in what does the change actually consist? In effect the American has the duty to follow the laws. Thus duty still exists. The office of the Right bearer, is that of Law Obeyer. Long consideration produces the conviction that the Social Contract so-called Legal Fiction is much less radical than it presents itself. True, the Individual is supposed to live in Society and so in the gladiatorial contest where it is an isolate being and not part of a civic culture. And yet the civic culture goes on being imposed, but simply without an explicit admission of its obligating title. Thus a certain destructive clash exists between the State as referee over the gladiatorial world, and the Civic Culture imposition.  
 
 
In going over these  subject matters continually the “guiding aim” is to draw the whole into view as the rule of the past that lives on so as to remove the comfortable relaxation in what is already decided and effective everywhere. Only then can we begin to ask why Reason itself must become not “consciousness”, but rather being. And just how our leading question will unfold: Is the genetic power of the Phenomenology which still speaks from the Essence of Availability set aside in the “guiding aim” of the Truth of Being? 
 
 
Again, as the Methodos thinks, it comes to ask more profoundly about the “Truth of Being” in its founding. How can anything be founded that is not subject to the Metaphysics of Presence at all? Even Heidegger. Someone who has a possibility, someone who knows what to do with a shoelace, because they are that kind of being, already has, say, the standing future of tying a shoe. The Megarians make this sharper by pointing, ultimately, to the claim to an essential difference in this. Because accidents might prevent someone with a skill to carry it out in action and complete it perfectly in its end. A drunken contractor may fail to make of his raw materials the two by fours he needs. The failure to fabricate what is needed for the building could happen for n number of accidental reasons. Thus the ground of the energia, that place form which the standing possibilities come forward, is set over and against the supposed accidents. Yet, common sense sees the reliability of numerous skills in their possibility. In considering this as a field of competency of thinking that has come to pervade the human being as a correctness can we ever not treat our thinking as the actualizing or the deed of grasping what is available in order to decompose the mystery of dunamis and energia, of the coming to be of the possibility and the actus purus? In such reflections that go more closely to the base of the being question, is there supposed to be a moment when the End of Metaphysics is already overcome, when the leap to the another beginning is not present in the availability of the research? We must consider this again more accurately in what follows, out of Husserl and (Phenomenological) Consciousness (of the “encounter”) question [keeping in mind that Phenomenological consciousness has nothing to do with experimentally efficacious consciousness under a Liberalist Materialism of the so-called sciences].

Friday, October 25, 2019


Notions of a Platonic Logic (as prior to the Laws of Thought removed by Husserl after Schopenhauer brought the final one to frame as “necessary reason” [of Leibniz] become will) 

 

Image result for the end of the world wenders

 

 

Truth as correctness (which we must never confuse with Anglo-conceptions such as “correspondence” or justification) is a phenomenological subject matter. A description which is a carrying out of what is properly substantive research. What it describes, as the combination of tattered threads, in the large, is the characteristic manner in which things said come into the general opinion as a power over human life, which is always a mysterious power. In saying this, we risk going beyond the simple description of someone who says what they do not have before them as, for instance, a memory or experience or any other envisaging along with the words that say what is seen. In the general opinion the earth moves around the sun. But, what is most often seen is not like that at all. We have all seen pictures of the sun in the way the popular idea comes to us as an authoritative (which means not only what lays down from outside, but, as much, what one freely draws towards [in the vulgar culture such talk is even called "conspiracy theory" as if it had to do with interested persons seeking some pleasure or the pleasure of power itself enjoyed in the absence of any witness) statement. Sherlock Holmes is said, in the first  adventure in which he appears, not to know of the Copernican system. He readily takes Watson’s word, as an educated man of sense, only saying that it doesn’t concern him. Thus, some things could plausibly be said to circulate without ever being at all envisaged, and these are correct truths. They may include all manner of historical trivialities and events of individuals who will be utterly forgotten even while they are still alive, as is the case with the billions. 

 

The standard physics can as well represent this correct truth as a geocentric system. It doesn’t need to appeal to the daily sense of individual observation at all to bring about efficacious results. Truth as correctness describes a manner of forgetfulness of beings in that the correctness takes on the reliance or pistis of the phenomena. Truth as correctness is a manner of phenomena just as is everything, specifically, that of the way words take on a life apart from the intentionality of the communion with things. 
 
The reliance on a “logic” is the same movement pushed further away from community of “identity” with the beings spoken of. A genuine, or, Platonic logos, can be logical as strict keeping with the beings. 
 
Plato logos and a correspondingly strictly-made-conscious logic is not a representation of a proposition. It is Intentionality. The word cup is used to say cup. It tells. The question of philosophy is whether the positive “is” of the “cup is there” is not set along with the negative “is”. The quality of the honor which leads Dostoevsky to speak of a “trial by slap in the face” is felt as an exeliencey (arete) but it is not to be taken as a judgment. It is out of the spontaneous sense of those who belong, say to the time when the “new courts” were cropping up in Russia to avenge physical offence of a petty kind without the need to duel, that the excellency is there or not there. Thus it is prior to a valuing or a judgment. Which, one can always bring in later, in order to consciously modify one’s ownmost intentionality. 
 
We can bring in the “multiculturalism” of Dugin (not as a Dugin scholar or as one with any serious knowledge of Dugin's works, but allowing Dugin to stand merely as a figure of our thinking and a rubric [I must add that it is contemptable that in the Western press the word "mystic" is meant as a depreciatory slander, as in the repellent article in the "Huffington Post," and we repudiate such shallow talk utterly and without qualification (everything destructive of human seriousness flairs up, a divagation towards living death a prophesy of treachery, and evil, and we oppose it to the death (so far as we speak of Dugin, it is from the view of absolute correspondence of aim in everything essential]) So far as in the spontaneous support of my life I regard forced activity, for instance, as unjust, I do not “value” but just as I see a cup and say “the cup” the logos tells from what is there. I find in intentionality what is ownmost and not a choice. The choice is the political moment, decision. I can pull out of the spontaneous ground of my being and “judge” otherwise. Much of Dostoevsky's conflict over the violated dignity of the underground man is past sorge properly. In sorge Heidegger pulls back from Nietzsche and Schaupneauer where pain and will are two sides of decision as political primordiality. Pain is the passive side of active decision. Pain is to “suffer” in the widest sense. To “suffer something to pass.” To undergo. 
 
Sorge already speaks of the vague field of intentionality out of which Political Dasein comes to modify itself and to bring the “ought” to the blind tradition, such that active Dasein begins to habitually will its "oughts." The fundamental steering of the ethnos by the spirit of truth as correctness moves with the rising power to spirit, and ultimately to the spirit of the “ought”. Spontaneity is Kant’s and Nietzsche's retreat from decision, but in substantive research it is seen to be sorge (Sorgen) of what concerns (which must be regarded as neither active nor passive). The total destruction of the Ethnos which Dugin struggles amidst the it-will-be-for-it-”ought”-to-be also tends towards another “ought” which gives Dugin his existential character as the challenging of a counter “ought”. 
 
In this the “multiculturalism” shows itself because a Tyrannical Liberalism of the "Harm Principle," as a unitary view is set along another unitary view. That of a Pluralism of Ethnoi, as an “ought”. The awareness of the whole distinguishes the system from a pure Ethnos. Because of these matters (because they come to inform, but then, to corrupt as well) Heidegger and the German world as a whole was compelled to grasp the Phenomenological research from the position of being which is not within a world. This claim to the opening of the world in the Da-Sein has to show that it can behind the clearing of the Da and of the corresponding Cartesian soul which is its community in truth as unconcealment, as a coming across what is to be remembered, to another truth, that of being. Not to the pragmatic or the truth about what is available to be used. Therefore we must show that this is possible as a field of research and avoid all false pluralism. Unitary views owe their existence to the supposed necessity of self defense, which, in a certain sense, is the very Greek essence. The very Metaphysics of presence, the Western being as such, is defensive and not free in its first inception into being (it seeks to find in what is a resource, an available thing, and later techne as such, to defend itself: Which may perhaps mean that the victory over the environment was always mistaken, in that it always, of inner necessity, tended towards the conquering, also, in power as knowledge, of the inner core of the, thus, metaphysically present "human" (and so: Kurzweil Musk, and so on]). 

Monday, October 21, 2019


The Journey to the Guiding Aim of Being









The Greek sense of truth which came down to Plato (to “Socrates” in the Platonic works) seems to be a pronouncement of an admonition to remember what had happened. So that the night world, with fire washing over the filthy and sinewy arms of a Spartan soldier, might be recalled when asked about. Yet, better, the fur of some shrewd and man-killing brute in the forest of Artemis, the butcher who welcomes blood as dew drops in the dawn, at the primordial gate, is meant to hold back from the waters of Lethe. She prefers the waters of the divine ichor or blood to the black water of Lethe that reflects only the hazy forms of un-faced shapes on its passing ripples. Something that was asked about, instead of sliding into oblivion, was remembered. The notion of sight is discriminated by Socrates, and comes apart and is doubled into eyes and eyes of the soul. The work with the name Heidegger analyzes Husserl’s account of “categorial intuition” as still part of what has come down to Husserl of the human deposit. This deposit permeates all human things and is not to be regarded as something obvious or, as knowledge transmitted only from teachers to students. It is what everyone “grows” into when they find themselves being. Heidegger speaks of the “analogy with the senses”. Husserl does not, according to this view, grasp that nothing is something for categorial intuition. Nothing is a phenomenon of the categorial intuition. It is part of the "something as something" structure of language. A predictable which can be true or not true. The possibility of it not being true is due to something as something structure itself which is part of daily life and controls daily life. Daily life is impossible without being able to discriminate the true from the false. Human beings might be conceived to survive in an anarchy of confusion over the true and the not true, not knowing if sleep is necessary or not, if this or that thing is food in the sense of something that brings nutrients and maintains health, and in every basic sense of common dealing where one takes truth for granted. This (something) is food (something). Everything might disappear, and no longer be remembered, and the human being itself would disappear. Thus the curious saying of Aristotle who remarked about the ancients that they constantly had the anxiety that being would go away. 


Truth in Heidegger is not truth about the remembered images. Even if to maintain a world they have their place. In this sense of going back to the open where the images show up, it is said that Heidegger is prior to consciousness in his “guiding aim.” Things soak into being as they reflect the light in colors and come to be for truth as what is not forgotten. The open field is Da, and the beings showing themselves Sein. In this sense the Da or the open field, is the mystical ground of “not being” which itself can not be said rightly. The mystical ground of not being is the obstruction to Event. It is the place of energia or the Godhead where the store of what must be is held forever. For example, that the things that have happened, can not not have happened. Or the long discussion from the middle ages to Frege and Russell which conserves logic as a Cartesian prelapsarian wonder: as what first is pulled out of the chest of man to make woman or unthinking flesh. Geist is vastly more powerful with the anglo-sphere than it was in the German because the German mind was permeated with the truth of Geist, with the knowledge of being in it. Thus in being reactionary, in drawing towards the worn out truism of the triangle which must have three sides, it was revolutionary because it most of all held the whole of the world as it had made itself before itself. Whereas the imbecile Anglo-sphere (where there is no philosophy, cf. Arendt's letter to Jaspers) only in its most brilliant representatives, but never as a world, came to grasp its own unconscious workings and remained, as still today, absorbed in hallucinations and all forms or derangement concerning the daily dealings which no longer operated under the power of intellect, but were stupidly still dreamed to by the world. Of course the alien forces of the experimental science moving within the forces of the field of the opening overran and constantly forced a minimal awareness of the true situation onto these beings. Sometimes in the form of bizarre irregularities such as the addition of “dark matter” or the issue of the “nothing” that was not accountable in terms of the rigour of a physics tied to the current ability to make measurements. Because the world, that which is visible or conscious and remembered, issuing from the obstructive field of the opening, suppress, as by popular opinion and common sense, the true situation. The situation, which, the super subtle genius of a few could still grasp, but which, as a world, as what was a field of opening, went under with the war and survived only in its isolated children such as Heidegger, Marcuse, Arendt, Strauss and many others who no longer had a world to support the spontaneous life of their being. 




The guiding aim of Husserl and that of Heidegger is our main issue. Both these come from the German field prepared by Kant and Leibniz and Nietzsche and others. Later on by Brentano, Cassiere and Dilthey and many others. 




Simple problems: 1. The guiding aims are products of worlds (“cultures” in something murkily like the sense in which culture is brought out as, not only prior to, but simply effacing of, nature, in Boas, and the sense of culture as civilization in Spengler, and the “multiculturalism” of Dugin who is the most subtle and powerful representative of this thinking today). However, a descent from a world is impossible so far as a “guiding aim” speaks from being. Because being is prior to the Da and the Sein, or to the Open field and the knowing in it of its world. 




2. If a “guiding aim” is strictly a term that claims descent from the thought of being it can not be said of Husserl’s Phenomenology. However, Heidegger owes its formation to this Phenomenology. Again: The claim of a genetic efficacy must be removed in a pure historical account of a world with respect to the “guiding aim” of being. In other words, it can’t be said that “being” is something that “knows better” than did the last part of the unfolding of a historial world as the conscious unfolding of the Open Field of thought (cf. Was Heist Denken). 




3. Howsofar must one proceeding this far learn the throwing away of names? Because in the Greek thinking names go with faces, and the face of the world. The throwing away of names means that we speak about what is a matter for daily life, and then abstract, for instance by speaking of human beings, and not only thinking of what was seen, into the world of meditation or abstraction. Thus we meditate on the abstracted thing as a thinking. The two name different things, meditating on the abstraction is the problem of whether certain froms of intelligence bring us benefits, but it is also what is thought in the sense that all issuing into consciousness from the Open Field is thought. But, not all is meditation in abstraction from what is seen and is to be remembered. How is a Phenomenology which knows that the “two suns” that of the immediate vision, a small image in the sky, and that of reason, the large body at a distance, both are different datum issuing from an unknown region? The nothing of the pure black of the intellect, as though everything with color were removed but consciousness still envisaged, is remembered and set alongside the Open Field. This nothing is no psychological nothing, it is a natural nothing viewed by the psyche, except the psyche can no longer be what sees only in the inner region, but it is as much the eyes and ears in a sense-deprivation chamber. However, this chamber is the universe that is “nothing moving faster than light” (In the thoughtless explanation given by the popular physicists to the lay public concerning the account of cosmic expansion of the “heat event”.) These examples concerning physics are unnecessary, but only illustrative, concerning the major themes. What is established belongs to thought, what thought, as what grasps what issues from the Field of the Open, and this in turn is what belongs to being.    




4. 

The book edited by Strauss, which includes a part on Heidegger that is not written by Strauss. There the simple claim that Heidegger must be putting forward a claim to “know better” than the earlier thinkers is put forward. This claim, however, is not a claim which Strauss in his considered thinking can aver. For the issue is more subtle. However, it seems inescapable that the “guiding aim” of Heidegger must in some way claim a “higher” ground. This is at least so from the point of view of its survival as a teaching in the world. Even though it must say that being as such can not be regarded this way. On the other hand, Phenomenology, which we will now leave off as treating as a guiding aim, never claims to issue from being. It claims, rather, to issue from the overcoming of logic in its connection to history, and the problem of the impossibility of induction (which the older Russel recognizes before fleeing philosophy, surrendering his claim to the reality of logic (ergo, admitting its status as mere form of "math" [which no longer has any serious meaning outside its immediate efficacy for experiment (& "world" of daily "dealing")], and entering politics with the enthusiasm of a death-bed convert to religion) and the existence only of “special cases”, that is of things which happen only once and thus can not be regarded as being built up from. The whole of the phenomenal world is singular rather than particular under a universal. Inclusive also of the thinking of particularity under universality, even with respect to mathematical units (whose status as [consciously abstracted] part of the intellect itself is thought in the singularity of a “special case”, namely that of the unrepeatable whole. We remain well aware of the modern interpretation of the made-thing, the Tatsache or fact in connection to the repeatability of experiment and corporate (cf. Quine) or collective human experience which brings within a world credence to the collection of knowledge under the apparatus of an epistemological (in the vague British sense) oversight throughout the generations of the techne art (or so-called “sciences”).

Tuesday, October 15, 2019


The Return of the Genetic Circle in a Question about the status of the “guiding aims” in Heidegger and Husserl 


Image result for heisenberg heidegger
 
Heidegger claims that Husserl thinks, for in thinking all is thinking, in what follows when philosophy ends, there is only grasping what has been thought, on the basis of an “analogy” on sense data. This means that first the Greeks pour into the being that is Dasein the thought of action. Action is what acts on the things. So that the eyes act on the colors that are the surface of the things. If this action acts, it acts on what is acted on. And the action of the senses (which at the end of Philosophy are gathered around what is most cogent for our natural Dasein, namely touch, “corpuscularity”, solidity, up which, the crooked monster Schopenhauer says “all the senses refer to touch.” and this natural Dasein is what does not yet raise its eyes to Dasein. Which is not a clear saying except that it means, which has not yet lived these 24 centuries and seen to our own time what is seen in Husserl and Heidegger [though not fully accepted in Strauss. And, perhaps, utterly rejected in Heisenberg.]) act on what is. Thus what is come to sight as what is sighted by the activity of the senses. So, in coming to sight, the colors that mark the surface of all things seen, are said to be conscious. Thus, available to the activity of the being that acts with its senses. 
 
So, what Heidegger says is that Husserl still retains a part of the notion of the Metaphysic of availability. Availability to the being that acts. The color that marks the surface of some thing. Thus, that which bound the thing as its “surface.” But, if one has only the surface, it is not sufficient to the reality. Reality mean the basis from which knowledge might spring. Reality, however, is still held to in Heidegger, because Heidegger says Dasein is that world sharing being which has the world that the other Dasein have. 
 
It is not necessary in thinking beings, then to think surfaces. Heidegger then says, the colour is as much being as the being that is supposed to be the being (substance) of the coloured being.
 
What exercises us, though, is this: Is such analysis under the “guiding aim” of Phenomenology that performs the ultimate doubt? How is this thought? Is the whole of the analysis under the doubt, or, only the phenomena? The phenomena names the whole of our beings, everything. 
 
When Heidegger denies consciousness in the sense of what first glimpses the color of a thing, he posits. Does he posit within phenomenological doubt? This is the genetic circle. 
 
Here, there is something that comes to light, anything at all, the whole of what we know, everything. This is phenomena. Then it is said, already, being of the kind to sit, we are sitters. As though something were set back behind the phenomena. Or, already, before the house which is for dwelling, we are dwellers. we make houses, because we already wanted to live there, because we are the kind of beings that are like that. what does a beetle care for living in a house? It is no dweller. The “opening” is not mere “space” in the sense of dimension. Or, a place where there can be dimensions. Rather, it is what is ready to receive the one that is open. when something is there in the “open” it is then, only then, conscious. 
 
However, does Heidegger than, from within the possibility of the Phenomenology, posit? What is open is itself full of content only in its fullness as what come to be grasped. And then the content is “ontic.” The prior ground is firing outside presence. So it is not available to conscious. 
 
Now we see what is in question: Where is this Phenomena, and where is this posting as mere posting. Both positive and phenomena are phenomena of an absolute doubt.