Monday, July 30, 2018

Fearful Solitude with the Text as Means to the Subject Matter of Thinking


These days, airplanes and radios belong among the things that are closest to us. When, however, 
we refer to "last things," we think of something quite different. Death and judgment, these are the 
last things. In general, "thing" applies to anything that is not simply nothing. In this signification, the 
artwork counts as a thing, assuming it to be some kind of a being. Yet this conception of the thing, in 
the first instance at least, does not help us in our project of distinguishing between beings which 
have the being of things and beings which have the being of works. And besides, we hesitate to 
repeat the designation of God as a "thing." We are similarly reluctant to take the farmer in the field, 
the stoker before the boiler, the teacher in the school to be a "thing." A human being is not a thing. 
True, we say of a young girl who has a task to perform that is beyond her that she is "too young a thing." 
But this is only because, in a certain sense, we find human being to be missing here and think we 
have to do, rather, with what constitutes the thingliness of the thing. We are reluctant to call even 
the deer in the forest clearing, the beetle in the grass, or the blade of grass "things." Rather, the 
hammer, the shoe, the ax, and the clock are things. Even they, however, are not mere things. 
Only the stone, the clod of earth, or a piece of wood count as that: what is lifeless in nature and 
in human usage. It is the things of nature and usage that are normally called things.


The artwork? How could it be a thing? Of course, if we leave our senses and become foolish, 
the artwork is what is hung on the wall, it is what is there as corpuscular compound, it is the 
dispersion of mass in the interpretation of the physics of entropic energies calculable and in 
motion according to nature, nature dimly still taken over from the genuine past, that of the being 
of western history become the planetary extension of technology into the region of human power. 
On the other hand the artwork names the non-thingly, which is only an expedient of language. 
Rather, it names where it happens, i.e., being. In the last sentence, the “it” names the where of 
being as it is, as what happens. Such a where, firstmost draws us to think of a transcendental 
condition, but it is no such thing, for it is simply there without theoretical assistance from a 
doctrine of experience. Most of all it is not experience, for experience names the distanciation 
of man and what comes forth in mere nature. Being, as the artwork, therefore does not name a 
agental cause, and yet, most of all, it makes one think of such a cause, so far as one does not 
think the where as being and so of thinking.

“Yet this conception of the thing, in the first instance at least, does not help us in our project of 
distinguishing between beings which have the being of things and beings which have the being 
of works.”

What the guidance of the thread here says is: phusis rolls back to its primordial state, it no longer 

gives the thing as what is qualitied according to the ways of Aristotle. Phusis here is being drawn 
over and against art in this sense: Truth, science, what seeks findings concerning what everything 
depends on. Phusis as science is not nomos. Nomos, the economic, society as sheer leveling, 
naked being, no longer phusis as the natural, what is documented, what is monied, what has 
connections to power, the leveled being as what the manufacture driven by profit hoops in its 
region. Phusis here speaks with phusis as art: purely aesthetic, morality becomes moralism, 
Freud: the moralist who makes all humans “adjust”, such that morality can no longer be morality, 
but becomes arbitrary formation of beings, and aesthetic criteria determine the conception of one’s 
office in being, of one’s mode of existence. So far, here, we are breaking down the history of 
being without setting it aside. The methodos, as what wants to hear the ergon of Heidegger as 
the mere nomination or titling of the text above, must radically shrink back from all opinining 
that would seek to know better than the guidance by the work. Instead, the methodos should 
attempt to enter the art of the text.

Wednesday, July 25, 2018


Thing as Thinking


The stone on the path is a thing, as is the clod of earth in the field. The jug is a thing, and the well 
beside the path. But what should we say about the milk in the jug and the water in the well? These, 
too, are things, if the cloud in the sky and the thistle in the field, if the leaf on the autumn wind and 
the hawk over the wood are properly called things. All these must indeed be called things, even 
though we also apply the term to that which, unlike the above, fails to show itself, fails to appear. 
One such thing which does not, itself, appear- a "thing in itself'' in other words- is, according to 
Kant, the world as a totality. Another such example is God himself. Things in themselves and 
things that appear, every being that in any way exists, count, in the language of philosophy, as 


The onto-theological here (in the work with the name Heidegger, in detail in the mention of "God himself") 
means that Deus is not a cause (can no longer be thought so simplicter when appropriated by the work).
It won’t do to point to Thomas in order to say that Deus is already a mystery. According to the theological account, which takes over 
metaphysics and wends it into a coming-to-ever-richer-expression of every thinking that was 
in the midst of the Church Fathers with Aristotle as what assimilates and deepens, Deus makes 
the stars, Deus makes the sun. Those who worship the stars, and they who worship the sun, 
them who exalt in the gods, and they who rejoice in what is holy, serve what Deus makes. 
To be sure, in Aristotle nothing is created, the primordial material is held in place by Zeus (the
tugofwar with the Gods is a kind of Muthos of causality which is no causality, neither mere "because"), 
who becomes Deus only in the fusing of the traditions, of the Hebrew and, most of all, 
the near-eastern and Syriac thinking into the Mediterranean Christendom. Here, what is 
thought is no longer a back behind, a first cause, or anything that can be thought as a thing. 
Ergo, the radical presupposition as a sensing of what is the “because” comes into play. 
Sensing is never causal, but what is causal is always the past and future of what is unconcealed 
in any sensing when sensing is sensing of the Element as Ereignis.

The setting aside of the history of philosophy in the radical doubt of Husserl always brings us outside 
the Western object and “Elsewhere”, as flight form modern ego or classical nous, and away from 
Eastern subject as masterly (effortless) stream within that flows away from the illusion of all things. 
The Lotus Eaters, on the one side, and the Utopians on the other are set aside in the 
radical doubt so that the student of Husserl in the form of the text with the name 
Heidegger gathers the world essence in the question of the planetary Essencing of Technology. 
The question of the thing, again, sets us into the ground of the Frage about Wissenschaft
the das Wissenschaft Dankt Nicht. The question of the non-thinking of technology means 
that the thinking must enter the technological essence as its thinking and not allow itself to 
be cast out under the rubric of a subject and object. In approaching the thing, in what follows, 
we approach the confrontation of the essence of technology, which is Ereignis of Da-sein.  

Monday, July 23, 2018


Angst (dread) 



What, in truth, is a thing insofar as it is a thing? When we ask this question we wish to know the 
thing-being (the thingliness) of the thing. The point is to learn the thingliness of the thing. 
To this end we must become acquainted with the sphere within which are to be found all those 
beings which we have long called things. 


Richard Dawkins is not the only living theologian, (or a-theologian), but to admit the presence of 
something parenthetical to a reality, one must mention that in the opinion of Kierkegaard much of 
Aristotle’s first philosophy was what was, by Kierkegaard's day, considered theological. (Theology, 
as metaphysics, becomes corse outpouring of the claim that man is unimportant in the face of what 
alone brings grace. I.e., the universe. This completes the West as such, which is what effaces man 
utterly, and denies utterly all thought, as what is merely human. And neither of the radical 
"Elsewhere" of Platonic before. Or, of the uppermost rationalist inner-postive-law of medieval Deus. Nor
(once we have thought through this, leaving it behind) of universe, 
as site of the modern ideal of the flight form "folk" or mere man.) Which lets us ask: Why is there 
never simply a grasp of all the things, as they are, free of the rebuke: “Why should we seek to deceive 
ourselves?”. The question of the talk about the thing is closest to us in the bland talk about facts, 
facts, if one looks into it, are voluntary acts. One voluntarily runs an experiment, and in this way 
establishes truths as facts. After this grand Idea, that of Science, all things are called facts. And no 
more is left for the human being (for all willing follows the will to establish facts). Yet, in former times, 
while the human being was not yet a total subject, a proclaimer of values, living amidst a totality, 
that of all (objective) facts, there was the West, not yet, planetary picturing as the correctly stored ostensive which allowed 
for no logos

Kant answers the question about what the whole stock of things are with the phrase:  
Bewustsstein uberhaupt, Kant’s phrase which means a conspiratorial (Mitwissen) aperception, 
a knowing amongst compatriots, is in the work with the title Heidegger: Mitsein. This is misleading, 
for Mitsein is never thought as mere uberhaupt, standing reserve. Or, is it? The question here is this, 
is the text called Heidegger a kind of joke? Meaning, does it propound, as true, the end of philosophy, 
thereby repudiating all claims of truth? Or, rather, does it set aside truth as “what everything 
depends on”? Everything, to be sure, in Kant, depends on transcendental aperception, on the 
stock of things uberhaupt. On the philosophy of transcendental aperception. 

Uberhaupt is said in contradistinction to logic (but also to rough empiricism). Rather than a rule, 
like the rules of math or chess, it speaks to experience. In this sense Denken, or thinking, is thought in the text called 
Heidegger as not knowing: I know I stand on solid ground, how?, I feel it. Instead of knowing, 
one thinks. Experience as thought is the Husserlian putting into doubt. I know the earth stands 
still, how, for I see it. I know the earth moves, how, for I see it. The sense of knowing loses its 
basic trustworthiness. It becomes, instead, certain, in the sense that standing still is still standing 
still after a fashion. It can be marked down as such. In the sense of a mathematical set of the 
things that are still. But, in the sense of uberhaupt, there is no possibility to remove the 
self-referencing of the set of all sets. The stock of things demands the setting aside of the 
human being as myth. 

In the text called Heidegger this becomes thought. No more is there a knowing, but rather, thought. 
Experience as thought is not reasoning, or not only. I am tired, I think, what am I to do, sleep. 
Such is reason as thought. Reason as thought can be set alongside action. I come to the 
conclusion that I should sleep, common sense, but I may or may not act on it. Reason is 
thought, but thought is also knowing. Knowing is no longer knowing, it is not to be expected 
as a rising up out of opining. Knowing has become thinking, and now we are attempting to 
think thinking as art. According to Kierkegaard man can not have fallen. Whatever being would 
be said to have fallen would not be man. Man as such is already in dread 
(however-much this appears as unremarkable every day meaninglessness). The dread of the 
break from aperception, which is awareness, but not asking, what should I do, should I go 
this way, or that way, should I do what I did yesterday? Or, is there a better thing to do? The 
dread of the highest awareness of this essential holding sway of the human being as the 
perfectibility of all things is called sorge in the text called Heidegger. Ergo, even though the 
Element, as what is ├ębauche, rough sketch, that shows in the phenomenological description 
of boredom as leading to its full being, suggests the move to the full being of concern as 
dread as its coming to hold command over what is.

Thursday, July 19, 2018

Aristotelian Christendom as History, as means, what is to be removed, and privation of thought


We wish to hit upon the immediate and complete reality of the artwork, for only then will we discover 
the real art within it. So what we must do, first of all, is to bring the thingliness of the work into view. 
For this we need to know, with sufficient clarity, what a thing is. Only then will we be able to say 
whether or not an artwork is a thing — albeit a thing to which something else adheres. Only then 
will we be able to decide whether the work is something fundamentally different and not a thing at all. 


Aristotelian Christendom thinks the material as moved by Deus. Motus is change, most of all it is a 
learning, and it is movment. Deus is the most perfect form, as the form of all forms. Morphe when it 
becomes a technical term in Aristotle means the species-giving cause. It never means the shape. A 
learning must have its ground, where actor and patient meet. Deus is the name for the answer to the 
question, why?, concerning all change (unmoving movement). Actus purus is the only perfect species, as the energia of all 
species. Nothing here is created (the hyle is always already) so far as the Hebrew thinking is omitted. The Hebrew thinking is 
G-d, as what befalls man. A Befalling is plunging into of what was not sought. In this sense, the 
most ardent wrestling to hear the the law of G-d (e.g., in Maimonides, the highest model of rationality, as  
rationality which is in the necessary service of G-d, as what seeks the law. But then, also in mysticism?)
which is what brings bliss, is never a befalling in the sense of the primordial Hebrew thinking. 
G-d as creator is radically excluded (where there is seeking), so far as creation is befalling. 

As means in the service of the question: what is the meaning of being? Deus is already an answer 
to the question: on what does everything else depend? It is a conception of Truth. Here, most of all, 
the work with the name Heidegger ‘sets aside’ truth as motus. Art, as what claims one, as what sends 
the one who is claimed, is already more like the Aristotelian Christian: beauty. However, beauty is 
not thought as a form. It becomes thought as the “because” of the world as Event. 

Motus as a what all depends on, in Kant, is no longer in the material, but back behind the synthetic 
unity of the phenomena it is world totality as god. Beauty makes one think of Lebenszusammenhang  
and life world in the sense that what halts the man before the totem is less the carving and the 
intricate message of the carving than the world meaning in the totem pole. In what calls to those 
who are chosen and sets them going. Motus no longer is needed in such a world given as 
concrete speaking in the thinking as what serves the leading question: why are we not yet thinking. 

Is motus to be removed? How far has this already been accomplished? Howsofar does it still live in 
world thought as life world, as the beautiful, and howsofar is this overcome in the thinking of beauty 
in life world as what is not form. Life world does not think beauty as form in the mind of Deus
Rather, as underivable opening of world as what calls. Already we see some connection 
between the text now above us, part of Holzwege, in what is said. Holzwege marks the so-called 
turn, whereby the ontological difference ceases to play the chief role in the work with the title 
Heidegger. Instead, more and more, the eventing of the event of the worlding has to be 
thought life world without life. Heidegger sets aside life and lets beauty, unconstrained 
favoring that claims, play the role of motus. This way of thinking is all too Christian in so 
far as one recall that for the Aristotelian Christendom Christ is the most beautiful, and 
the one who claims most of all. Ergo, this approach is insufficient to the current text under consideration. 

As a privation of the forces of thought the Aristotelian Christian thought seems to be the 

attempt of throwing cause aside, in the manner of courting the “because”. The “thigleness” 
here points into the history of being as Aristotelian Christendom as keeper of the thing, not 
at all to be confused with thing in itself. The thing is always ground as primordial and 
uncreated ground of the actus. It is what the change, e.g.: learning how to wield a steel 
sword properly, the night growing out of the going down of the sun amidst the evening glow, 
the hidden lines in the stone yielding the sculpture from the stone, happens on as 
spontaneous support of being.