Thursday, April 19, 2018






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Comment on The English Problem of “Consciousness”









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Our object in what follows is to teach ourselves philosophy, precisely by setting aside the false English 
problem of Consciousness. What is harboured in false English thought is nothing other than the 
Essence of Technology. All English thinking is in the service of this master, therefore, it does not 
think at all. Technology, and that means, what does not think. Only in the sense that English thinking, 
which is planetary thinking, is privative, does it think. If standing still is the limit case of motion, then 
not thinking is the limit case of being human. Human, a question, not the biological conception, not 
the Catholic conception, not the primordial conception known by the Early Greeks. Philosophy, this 
remains a name for the End of Metaphysics which is the consummation of the Greek World, as what is 
Planetary. Here we ashew analysis of the distinction between philosophy and thinking. 




We will take the road of a Hermeneutic Circle. We ask what is Consciousness through the four 
distinct levels of the problem of perception. 


  1. Perception is the work of the sensorium, the eye or the ear, etc., and it is first taken up by 
    Socrates in the liberal fashion, which is to say, not in the style of insisting that one can learn 
    nothing more about the matter. Dialogic work, in the Socratic manner, always presumes what 
    is latent and only comes to be seen in the Medieval period. Whether this whither was always 
    to be enunciated and so spoken explicitly, and so removed from its tempore or flow, 
    is a matter for the study of the History of Being. Yet, one knows that in the Medieval period 
    the sense of meaning of “ad hominem”, the principle of Socratic investigation, came clear. 
    Whoever denies the role of the human, as the ground of the statement, remains outside 
    the circle of learning.

In the course of a collective investigation someone affirms that through the eyes they gain 
knowledge of something. Someone sees the pale skin of Socrates. Socrates is pale. Through 
the eyes they have learned something. In the first stage what matters is that perception is of 
something, and that it happens through the sensorium. That what is learned in this way is kept 
within the being who has learned, and that it is something that can be known on multiple occasions. 
What is not meant is that this one, in their idiosyncratic character, has learned. 


2. On reflection one comes to consider the possibility that Aristippus and Plato may perceive 
something according to their own nature, thus differently. The subject matter of perception is 
alienated, and becomes the concrete question of how this one knows, and that one. Aristippus  
says Socrates has a sickly complexion, and Plato says, Socrates has not got any sun. There 
is no question here of the representation of something, skin that gives off a certain light according 
to a spectrometer, and an evaluation of that skin as this or that qualitative pattern. The eidos 
names what is seen prior to such an abstract division. The edios (idea) is theorized as genus or pattern. 
So one can say, Aristippus sees a different genus or kind of thing than does Plato. This issue 
never comes out in Plato because Plato does not analyze the eidos of “stones, mud and hair”, 
but only of the gods, e.g., Dike or Justice. 


3. It is theorized, that is, through reflection it is considered, that each animal might have its own 
manner of perception. This is not, however, to be confused with post-Cartesian thinking. It is not 
considered that physiological changes in the visual system lead to Perspectivalism. As in the case 
of tetrachromacy. The issue remains obscure, and might be translated as a question of intelligibility 
of something as something according to language and for beings without language, for captivated 
beings, and for choosing beings. 


4. The question of perception becomes the question of transcendental access. In Kant this 
reaches the highest clarity. How does any being get at what is? The question is not asked 
anymore about the sensorium. Perception and existence become the same thing. The notion 
of “German Idealism” comes clear only because the English take up “the other side” and say 
that existence, both primary and secondary qualities in Locke, are set off against the “Realist's” thing, 
i..e, the thing that Locke says “excites” the brain. This Lockean thing-in-itself falls away 
and Hume simply declares the whole world a fiction. In this sense physics continues, 
regarding all that exists, all that is “conscious” (read: folk knowledge), as set off against “the math”.           
    


If one recasts “consciousness” as existence one sees that it can not be that things that exist, 
such as the brain, are set off against other things that exist. If consciousness means, Socrates 
is pale, and he still exists whether or not I am now conscious of this paleness, one uses 
“consciousness” in a trivial common sense way. The conflation of these two conceptions leads 
to the absurdities of English thinking, which is an attempt to use the everyday notion of 
consciousness as a part of the sciences understood as movement taken up mathematically, 
or, as blind technology. The Cartesian problem is basically the understanding of “what exists” 
as, e.g., Socrates there is Cognized as Socrates there. I.e., Someone inwardly grasps 
Socrates in something that stands before them. What stands before them would not be 
there except that it was Socrates, i.e., the known eidos. At the same time, it is said, 
the something there is “outside” and thus a split of mind and body, as a split of outer and 
inner is asserted. Socrates, the form, can be thought, or pictured, or made plasticity, 
here or there, and in indefinite number. Ergo, the thought has no basis in the 
concrete symbol or property. Nothing is ever encountered that is not both form, 
and symbol or concrete thing before one. Ergo, Descartes must posit a connection 
between the realm of forms, and this brain. Yet, as Leibnitz says, such a form or 
“consciousness” is no place to be found in the brain. 


So far as “consciousness” is a figure, like DNA, used to discover the commands issued out of the 
causal web, it is a problem of Technicity and Power. It remains outside the circle of Philosophy. 
Consciousness is not a philosophic question, but a technical problem like improving the guidance 
system of the homing missile.    


Sunday, April 15, 2018


Impressions Pertaining to the Difficulties of the Estrangement of the Concept of Culture


 



In English the usage of the word culture stems from Ruth Benedict. Benedict was freed from the 
theoretical entanglement with the older sense of the word culture, cultivation, as in the sense, 
agriculture, with the explicit meaning of genuine education or perfection of nature. Boas and 
Malinowski describe an ultimate Maginot line which no longer allows one to grasp the difficulties 
that came prior to them, except artificially and schematically. These difficulties, the life of the 
peoples of former ages, can not be entered into. Cultures becomes worlds, yet, the horizon of 
world is only that of this world. There is no breaking the sphere. There is no "soil"
there is a universal "post-heimat". The conception of "post", of "before" no longer says anything. 
The raising of various "logical" difficulties is wholly empty in such cases and, though of possible use, 
by in large indicates a sterile retreat from the question.





Schematically the two meanings are simple. On the one side, phusis, is set off against, on the other, a 
perfectible custom. The problem of death, given to man as man, for instance, is perfected 
in the doctrine of Karma. Or, in some other way. However, in Spangler, this perfection still 
refers to greatness. Only those beliefs which are great sustain the spontaneous pinnacle
of the peoples that are worthy, that are strong, that give expression to themselves 
spontaneously in the form of architecture and music, and the rest of the features of the 
organism of a great people. In the theoretical sense Boaz already sets aside “greatness”, 
there is already the opaqueness of the notion that one must understand that others “really exist”, 
the demand to drop the one-sidedness, or narrowness, which sustains everything that is intense 
and able to enhance its forces to the zenith, the powers of the “mono culture” recede into the 
contemporary dogma of mere “difference” which ends in the meaningless sense of culture, 
culture as formal “difference”, which, in the strict sense no longer has the right to speak of, e.g., 
“pre-literate” culture. Since this implies a presupposed education, i.e., a raising up, that leads 
to the more cultivated state of literacy, rather than a mere change. It may be as well said, 
with as much rationality, from the theoretical point of view, setting the empty contingency 
of the empirical aside, that the literates are “pre-illiterates”. Of course, this too, would be 
an error of another kind, and only demonstrate the difficulties raised by being poisoned 
by the sophistry of confusing conceptual lenses, and the confused individuals who keep to them.





Spengler speaks of the movement of the herd, formation, the coursing of the Wildebeest 
along the plain. This stage is closer to that of the Ethnos, or tribe, than to that of the Polis 
or Humans as constant askers after change: Political life. Political life is coextensive with 
culture in the older sense, it implies the “agriculture of the mind”. Where the mind is 
always coextensive with the “script” that the Polis plays out, as the actors to use 
Aristotle’s image of the hylomorphic regime. 




The routinization of culture suffers from the same disability as that of religion. 
Someone who is “religiously unmusical” is in no place to consider religious subject matter. 
No more than a nonmusical person can speak intelligently on the subject matter of music. 
This is as much true of the “civilized” if this word means Geist as the afterglow of culture 
becomes mere abstract or distanced conceptualization in the form of schemas of what 
was once spontaneously supported within the continuous coursing of a living river of belief 
in a “way of life”, such that the even high-water level remains unbroken for centuries, 
only distorted by the smear of forbidden heresies and skeptical, not to say nihilistic 
cancerous individuals, which never kill the organism. In our own time, when nihilism 
is the general condition, when the sovereign innocence of “kinds” of things is sensed 
as artificial, as unnecessary, when all is most of all seized upon a heterogeneous, and, 
ultimately non-existent putty, which can not be “educated”, but is already in its final condition, 
the notion simply refers back to itself. It is not a kind of thing, “culture”, of which either 8 or 
1000 examples could be counted up and laid bare, but the cultures refer only to this Geist 
at the evening-glow, which smears its forbidden confusions into the strange enunciation of 
what it no longer understands.




It can not be “culturally musical” because it itself doesn't float on pan-oceanic currents, 
but is long since annihilated along with all “kinds”. Phusis no longer produces the 
possibility of being set off against education. The busied attempts and aspirations of 
pure intentions, adequately impossible to destroy, move in the smear of the afterglow’s 
gleam, but the night-world is the only sight of worlding thought, of the essenceing of 
earth and world. Conceptions, like ideas and kinds, like all “differences”, remain in 
the suspense of a non-abeyance of a perpetual afterglow that courses on the night, 
brilliantly and absolutely. Most of all the difficulty has its positive side in the overcoming 
of the division of phusis and perfection. If man is blind even as what sees, what is man? 
Man is set aside in Heidegger, in the sense that he becomes a question, and no longer reason.  

Thursday, April 12, 2018



Stepping Down From What Sustains in what is Lofty, and Must Sustain





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Since τὸ ὂν and τὸ ἕν belong together in this way, it follows that λέγεται δ᾽ ἰσαχῶς τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν
( I [x] 2, 1053b25 ). “Being and one are said in equally multiple ways”.  





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Everything basic is alien to us, thus we remain expelled from the region we must move in. 
The plight of everything basic is done with human beings so decisively that they seem to 
taunt human beings openly, they who are long used to walking busily along the path which 
goes infinitely on towards more honorable advanced and lavish beings. To win a place 
among what is simple, how little has this come to our attention amidst history. 
The Historial is the domain of the End of Being, it is what lets the Event region. 
Aristotle was already too lofty!

Wednesday, April 4, 2018





Dispersion of what is Relentless as Captivation by what is most New
Revolution as Thoughtlessness

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It may be difficult, almost impossible, to truly shed light on this relationship through the texts of Aristotle that 
have been handed down to us. But just the same it remains indisputable that Aristotle lets the two of them be 
rooted in one another. The oneness of being is therefore rescued not only over and against its manifoldness 
but precisely for it; rescued in the sense of the word as it was understood by Aristotle and Plato, to let something 
stand out as what it is, to not let it slip away and be covered over by the babble of common opinion for which 
everything is equally beyond question. 


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Αριστοτέλης hears language which tells him form and substance are the same, for those who speak of 
epistemology they are several. This separation is not Christian as such, yet, at the same time it is a theological 
development under the medieval world of European Christendom. What development, what emerging is, 
remains obscure. This touches us as much in our several and factional committed actions, in the clamour 
for power to say what is universal, as in the very attempt to think the being of beings as the history of being. 
It is precisely because Kant says correctly that Metaphysics is not a heading inserted arbitrarily by later 
compilers of the work of Aristotle, that the (subject) matter is a difficulty. 




Correctness means one discards the vague and simple knowing of sameness by one who is part of a 
community of knowers. Iki is (manly) elegance (never wholly removed from its conection to brutality)
 as distinguished from the foppishness of a pink-shirted dandy, a Robert Louis Stevenson, 
such men of flâneries are not chiefly libertine nor profligate, the Barnard College writer  
Ariana Reines readily produces the judgment: “Baudelaire, a mama’s boy.”, 
Salvador Dali with his Armadillo and antipathy to what is normal for the sake of being against what is normal. 
A transformation of the vector of mere snobbishness towards what is Modern. Chus Martinez, 
in the "contemporary", raises or peruses the animal as what is "universal" according to the law 
of the equalization of difference, of the destruction of the norm(ie) as
the holding sway of a universal law of versicolour niche beings. The translation, which is also, and at the same time, a 
interpretation, Iki, Chic, is correct in that the chic is what is revolutionary as a new 
form of revolving. That means modernity is inked with the wet press of awareness of what is the same. 




The status quo as change is a notion of modernity, for instance as upheld by Groys. However, it is 
just the rhythm of this change that is revolutionary. What is correct in this translation of Iki is not that 
it grasps any of the community concern of the Japanese world before it became a culture, alongside the 
other cultures (one speaks, e.g., of Chinese Civilization and of Chinese Culture, of Adolescent Culture, 
but not of Adolescent Civilization [except by simile].), but rather that it shows that this modernity was 
drawing towards Japan from within, so far as we can just now speak of a within and an outside as we 
have long done without evading thoughtfulness. Aristoteles, when language speaks, hears nothing of 
this enfeebling division of what revolves and revolution. 




The word form means the natural kind. Form (forma, from morphe) is opposed to symbol (sumbebekota). 
When it comes to man it is the interpretation of the symbol. This is basically the sense Kant retrieves 
(without ever being able to reach what he would retrieve) when he says “Kingdom of Ends”. 
A telos is an end. If one takes a wild plant and cultivates it one ‘educates’ the plant in its true and proper life, 
in the older sense. If one uses the plant against its telos, for example as dry brush to start a fire, one uses it 
“simply as means”. What is peculiar about form is Aristotle thinks form formally, where Plato (and Socrates) 
do not yet take this up and think through it to a conclusion as an answer to the division in thinking between 
those who take up the side of the symbol, i.e, irrational or empirical history, and those who take up the side 
of the idea, i.e., the natural kind as the source of motion and intelligibility for man (i.e., for the concept). 
Symbol and idea become hule ( “matter”) and form. Thought at the same time in the same thought, as 
the solution to the extreme views. 



When we understand what is almost alien, the syllogistic sense of form, is for Aristotle, the same as the 
sense of form of a chair, that a chair is "for use," we come towards a world where thought comes easily. 
Where envy even of the genius of Plato as what is unique is impossible—for thought is still in the 
bubble of its first enunciation. The question of the division of the discipline of rhetoric into its 
three parts moves in another way, insofar as it makes the form a stem for parts. What is crucial, 
rather, is the sense in which the incorrect derivation of inference from a mal-formed syllogism is thought. 




Modernity is small because it looks further to what is remote and to the hugeness of what is “micro”.  
Our objective in what follows is to think how phusis and idea, which Aristotle thinks as ousia and energia,  
draw toward the thinking of being and beings. Modernity, dromo-logic, Deleuze, the attempt to draw 
towards what is nomadic as what is still greater empowering of power which is the overcoming of 
“will and reason”, soar to the inmost essence of science as stock of deployable reality, real, the effective. 
For Aristotle everything is larger. A two-handed sword, made to slaughter, can cut the head of a Gorgan 
apart to the ears. Between the shoulders the heart is still full of steadfast resolution. However this revolt 
of the organs against the brain, yields the view that the neurons are everywhere, and that the empty body 
is what is the same. The Genetic Circle overcomes everything modern in the enfeeblement of 
thoughtlessness. And its bubble world which commits to what is new as what is best.




We must clarify, in what follows for the Methodos (which is thought’s track), how this question differs 
from the modern war of educations. And the rhythm of revolutions which abnegates the scope of the 
range in what it feeds perseverance in the resistance of false goals.