Thursday, February 8, 2018










A Weak Feint Pertaining to the Direction of a Locus of the Beings Rethought in the Technological 
Coming Forth of the Being of Beings as the History of Being

Image result for Nobukuni Enami


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What sort of peculiar differentiation is this? It is the oldest difference;
there are none older. For when we differentiate beings from oneanother, that other differentiation has already occurred. Without it,
even individual beings and their being different would remain hidden
from us. A is differentiated from B—with the "is" we already maintained
the older difference. It is the ever-older difference that we have no
need to seek but find when we simply return (to remember:
ἀνάμνησις). This oldest difference is, even more so, prior to all science
and therefore cannot first be introduced through science and theoretical
reflection about beings. It is merely espoused, cultivated, and used
as self-evident by theoretical comprehension and in this way put into
effect in everyday speech. This differentiation of beings and being is
as old as language, that is, as old as human beings.
—————————


It’s crucial to see that what is unveiled in lived experience must already be there. This reminds 
of the issue of the origin and locus of things in the brain. It cannot be that light comes to the brain 
and some electrical processes produce what stands before one. In Nietzsche’s simple formula, 
the eye cannot make the eye. The brain is already something alongside everything else. And so 
cannot make itself. Thereby one pictures a true world or world (things) in itself where that happens, 
where the true light enters the true brain, and an indefeasible representation comes to be as our 
world (cf. Dennett). Likewise, it cannot be that in the field of the ready-to-hand, in performance, 
one acts such as to establish a trope, say typing with a keyboard, and in doing so one reveals the thing.
Rather, with what is primordial, rather than civic or planned, following the thought of Spinoza, one must 
say there is no performative issuing forth. Rather the origin of the trope is underivable. This may also 
be true of a keyboard, and yet it is difficult to understand the sense in which the being around which 
the activity gathers, is modified, takes new shapes, first gets its center or form. This center is the 
center that is already being, as the being of a form. If one rules out the true world, one finds the issue 
of its origin a radical mystery. It cannot be that the trope forms while it already exists. Which, however, 
is the way memory presents it as the going forward into the past as what is already the “same”. 




Let us consider here a radical issue of what language tells us, which is not so primordial as this 

split between being and beings, but, which is primordial. Language considers the object and the 
subject not in any doctrinal sense, where the conception is given a content, but in the sense of the 
something as something. Let us consider the English words who and whom in this respect. 
If one says “Who will shiver like a masthead of a sinking ship?” One says something of a “who”, 
ergo, by the grammatical thinking, the “who” is the subject upon which one thrusts the situation of 
the shivering like a masthead on a sinking ship. Until Aristotle this situation was never adequately 
philosophized, made perspicuous and clear as can be, it became, through him, the distinction 
became a basic descriptive orientation, theoria, which survives to the current day. The qualities, 
however, are by no means merely the situation. So far as one is able to think. Who made this 
unusual interpretive masquerade? This unusual interpretive masquerade is for whom? It is as 
much that the ant that eats rotten wood is white, as it is that the form of white is now, just now, 
the termite. Yet, for the Greek, this never was the deployment of a system of separating the thing 
in itself from the perception of a subject. The objectified object had not yet come to be thought. 
Indeed, the something as something was no play of primary and secondary qualities. Yet, then what? 
What sort of peculiar beings are these? Insofar as one attempts to raise the question of radical 
thinking, of opening the tradition, one can not stay with the formalities of thinking, but must think. 

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