Historial Thinking, Aristotle as epigone of Parmenides



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§ 4.

It is evident why Aristotle substitutes τὸ ὂν, beings, for εἶναι, being,

about which he is inquiring: namely, because it stands for τὸ όν ή ὅν,
being. And being is one, ἓν. But does Aristotle not say that being is
many and multifarious πολλά and thus πολλάκις and is not this
proposition the guiding principle-—or his entire philosophy? Is he also
one of those who in the end no longer understand the insight of
Parmenides? It would appear so, indeed it not only appears so but
must obviously be so if we consider that Aristotle explicitly and in no
uncertain terms battles against Parmenides. Aristotle emphasizes at 
Physics A 3. 186a22ff: πρὸς Παρμενίδην, in relation to and against Parmenides is to be 
said ᾗ λυσις… ψενδεσ his solution (to the question of ὂν, that is, that όν, εἶναι is όν) 
is deceptive, it conceals the true; that is, ᾗ ἁπλῶς λαμβάνει τὸ ὂν λέγεσθαι, λεγομένου πολλαχῶς—Parmenides fails to understand the essence of being in that he assumes  
that beings are addressed ἁπλῶς. Purely and simply as the simple one, 

whereas they must be understood in manifold ways.

As proof of the manifoldness of beings (being). Aristotle mentions the

πολλάκις of the categories (A 2, 185a21ff.). thus the πολλάκις

the narrow sense. This is worth noting. Yet it is not as though the

physics does not already have the πολλάκις  in the wider sense; see

r I, 200b26f., where the discussion of κίνησις is most intimately

connected with Book A.

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The ἁπλῶς, simpliciter, simple, single being as the hen, ἓν. What is to be said for this which has 
been brought to history by Parmenides is said so that it doesn’t say enough, in that Aristotle needs 
to bring it to genuine questioning by letting what is to be said for it speak just as it must be so that it 
announces itself as what can be dealt with. In other words, it is not as if a description of some reality 
had failed, but rather, what could be gathered concerning the worthy thing, Wolfgang Köhler speaks 
of the “aha! moment” when something comes forth, which is the insight as what is gathered as what 
is to be said, is turned so that it moves κατά Ἀριστοτέλης. An orange poppy opens when visited by the
morning sun, kata phusis, according to nature. Yet, this nature is already what there is to be said for 
what is. Here one should have the thoughtfulness to take up this loosing, or endlessness, of the 
historial as it turns with Aristotle. This saying of Aristotle, is a rubric, but just as much as it is 
rubric, it is glossa (language [not writing or speech), as what guides, as what is to be the cybernetic. 



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Side Note: Is it not so that Dugin, though he argues that unlike Gumliev, he goes to the existential, 
to what is not ethnos, in fact, this is the ethnos as what is most self-free? At least as what is 
supposedly chosen. And therefore, most Western. Most cybernetic. This transformation of  
ethnos into freedom is nothing other than the coming of universality. And yet, in Gumilev the 
treatment of time is more primordial, since it is allowed to be vague.  

Directions and Logoi

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But in all this we are merely relating something about this differentiation,

not comprehending it. Are we standing at the border of
what is comprehensible? Is this difference ultimately the first concept?
But then it must at least permit of demonstration and questioning
precisely as to how the conceiving, that is, how the concept in its
possibility is determined by this boundary. Yet we ourselves know
nothing of this. It has not yet even been questioned. On the contrary,
we determine being the other way around—from the viewpoint of
concept and assertion. For a long time the erroneous doctrine has
existed that being means the same as "is," and that the "is" is said
first of all in judgment. It therefore follows that we first understand
being through judgment and assertion. While we are fond of appealing
to the ancients in this connection (one of whose treatises it is our task
to interpret here), I suggest that this errant opinion can appeal to the
ancients only with partial legitimacy, which means with no legitimacy
whatsoever.


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The something as something form, it is now come pellucid, for the direction or Methodos is 
Enlightened when it thinks “On the contrary, we determine being the other way around—from 
the viewpoint of concept and assertion.” 

Something as something belongs to language, and is its perfect speech, it is reason, 
it is logic. In it, judgment finds its origin and meaning. What is clearest in this clearest 
crystal is that the crystal, something, has come clear, something. And yet does the 
oneness of the many first speak as something, a oneness, which is something, many? 
It is just this conceptualization which is now put aside. At the same time is language 
capable to speak in any other way than by judgment? Language is always reason, for 
Plato, even Homer, with his primordial guidance, who gave the Hellenes first paideia, 
that is, who first taught the Greeks how to move forward in a situation or subject matter, 
was the teacher of Pythagoras, and Aristotle says that Plato is Pythagorean. Yet we remain 
childish insofar as we think this way, we remain utterly naive. We warm to thinking as soon 
as it occurs that Aristotle may have hated Plato, and wished to slander him. Not that we 
believe that, but, rather that we see we are speaking of living persons, is what brings us to 
thought. The situation between Husserl, and his student——one quite distinctly parallel to 
that of Plato and Aristotle, not by ikonastic or perfect reflection, but by phantastics, as with
entasis——does not immediately suggest perfect insight of pupil into the work of the master, 
nor the other way round. 

However, to be sure, Plato conceptualized the thinking of Socrates, but not in order to think it 
conceptually, but for the sake of polyphonic presentation and that thinking which is mentioned 
in the Seventh Letter which holds several regions of thought in one thought. The meaning of 
entasis is that the reason, which speaks to us of the straight line of the pillar, which is a 
column only in so far as it follows its logic, is ruled and comes forth correctly, is warped, 
fattened near the bottom, so as to gain the look or eidos of the pillar. The eidos is reason insofar 
as the entasis gives the form. Thereby they mortally error who speak of an aesthetic correction if 
they thereby mean that the pleasure of the glance is aimed at, except that the glance is that of the 
eyes of the soul. So far as reason comes to be seen by the glance it speaks in the manner of the 
being of beings, of what is clamoring to bring man as man towards itself. 

How does the being of beings speak in the mere conceptual form, though, true, the most perfect 
conceptual form, of the something as something? To reiterate, it simply says that the oneness of
being is many. Yet, when one thinks this one sees that the being of beings is drawing man as man 
to it through the reason and the logic of the eide with their call that draws forth what is itself just 
what is called from itself. Man as man, which is essencing, resounds in the mood of the look. 
In this sense one is thrust into the worlds, for instance, that the look of how it looks is not the 
same for the so-called People of Origin, or American Indians, as it is for the American who 
is not of this group, when such a one is schooled in the American school, it soon happens 
that their heart is torn out of the world, and this rifted being only returns to such a world as 
the compassionate one, as the false. Whatever origin points to this or that earth, to this or that world, therefore is thought 
Historialy according to the presupposition which language never tells us about. The lack of “
legitimacy” is never absolute, in the sense that Edward Said rightly observed that orientalism 
is not a matter of the distortion of one group by another, but, most of all, of the group itself 
concerning itself (for one is always more motivated by ones own self reserved narration, 
than by any project of cruelty or fascination). True, most of all one must defend oneself, 
but this is because of the essence of technology, because the increase in the power 
of the logic of the outsider to overpower the group in their own logic, is ever more exigent 
and the momentous resolution of the group that would hold its own insofar as the 
West becomes total ever demands each orientalism put itself underneath the demand 
of demand itself in the manner of a Doktor Faustus, and yet, this Faustian West, as 
Spengler called it, is more comprehensive than any previous world, indeed it is planetary. 
This reminds, of course, of the work of Lukács (in his approach to owning the conception 
of Marxism as Ideology) and of the “Strong Program” of Sociology, and of all such reflection 
that turns inward (usually only with the lips, seldom with the heart—and yet what is spoken 
is reasoned and comes to settle in the look which pulls the heart to itself), each becoming 
aware of the look that is self reserved in its turning towards and onto its own fiction, 
its own Narration, races with the Essence of Technology just in the direction which it is 
drawn from itself.

A Weak Feint Pertaining to the Direction of a Locus of the Beings Rethought in the Technological 

Coming Forth of the Being of Beings as the History of Being

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What sort of peculiar differentiation is this? It is the oldest difference;

there are none older. For when we differentiate beings from oneanother, that other differentiation has already occurred. Without it,
even individual beings and their being different would remain hidden
from us. A is differentiated from B—with the "is" we already maintained
the older difference. It is the ever-older difference that we have no
need to seek but find when we simply return (to remember:
ἀνάμνησις). This oldest difference is, even more so, prior to all science
and therefore cannot first be introduced through science and theoretical
reflection about beings. It is merely espoused, cultivated, and used
as self-evident by theoretical comprehension and in this way put into
effect in everyday speech. This differentiation of beings and being is
as old as language, that is, as old as human beings.

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It’s crucial to see that what is unveiled in lived experience must already be there. This reminds 
of the issue of the origin and locus of things in the brain. It cannot be that light comes to the brain 
and some electrical processes produce what stands before one. In Nietzsche’s simple formula, 
the eye cannot make the eye. The brain is already something alongside everything else. And so 
cannot make itself. Thereby one pictures a true world or world (things) in itself where that happens, 
where the true light enters the true brain, and an indefeasible representation comes to be as our 
world (cf. Dennett). Likewise, it cannot be that in the field of the ready-to-hand, in performance, 
one acts such as to establish a trope, say typing with a keyboard, and in doing so one reveals the thing.
Rather, with what is primordial, rather than civic or planned, following the thought of Spinoza, one must 
say there is no performative issuing forth. Rather the origin of the trope is underivable. This may also 
be true of a keyboard, and yet it is difficult to understand the sense in which the being around which 
the activity gathers, is modified, takes new shapes, first gets its center or form. This center is the 
center that is already being, as the being of a form. If one rules out the true world, one finds the issue 
of its origin a radical mystery. It cannot be that the trope forms while it already exists. Which, however, 
is the way memory presents it as the going forward into the past as what is already the “same”. 

Let us consider here a radical issue of what language tells us, which is not so primordial as this 
split between being and beings, but, which is primordial. Language considers the object and the 
subject not in any doctrinal sense, where the conception is given a content, but in the sense of the 
something as something. Let us consider the English words who and whom in this respect. 
If one says “Who will shiver like a masthead of a sinking ship?” One says something of a “who”, 
ergo, by the grammatical thinking, the “who” is the subject upon which one thrusts the situation of 
the shivering like a masthead on a sinking ship. Until Aristotle this situation was never adequately 
philosophized, made perspicuous and clear as can be, it became, through him, the distinction 
became a basic descriptive orientation, theoria, which survives to the current day. The qualities, 
however, are by no means merely the situation. So far as one is able to think. Who made this 
unusual interpretive masquerade? This unusual interpretive masquerade is for whom? It is as 
much that the ant that eats rotten wood is white, as it is that the form of white is now, just now, 
the termite. Yet, for the Greek, this never was the deployment of a system of separating the thing 
in itself from the perception of a subject. The objectified object had not yet come to be thought. 
Indeed, the something as something was no play of primary and secondary qualities. Yet, then what? 
What sort of peculiar beings are these? Insofar as one attempts to raise the question of radical 
thinking, of opening the tradition, one can not stay with the formalities of thinking, but must think. 

What is the conceptual basis of Thinking in contradistinction to Epistemology?, some remarks written in a thin pencil

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Beings, what are they? What is proper to them and only them? The answer is: being. 
Beings are meant here in the sense of beings as such όν ή ὅν—in this ή ὅν. Beings are, 
so to speak, secured and retain only in order to show themselves and to say how things are 
with them But we have not gotten very far with this discussion; in fact, quite the contrary. Being 
is here differentiated from beings. What are we differentiating? Distinguishing one being from 
another is fine. But being from beings?

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Because we can’t rub off our Technological Essence without a mangled logos, we would have to let 
this mangled logos speak to us if we wanted to think over this originary division. Instead we use the 
conception of the uniformity of nature to approach its locus and origin. The unitive with respect to a 
law of nature implies the division of motion among the many things and processes. Motion is much 
confused in the modern thinking. It is motion and motions. And, most of all, it is relative. Beings are 
also relative to being, and in a similar way. Since if one stands on the earth, it stands still, unless it 
move relative to the universe. Beings are so far as they are not not-being, and yet not-being is so far 
as it is relative to being. What is analogous here is nothing at all formal, but rather it is the perplexity 
in the vagueness of our human knowing which comes forth as what is analogous in this case.

However, we are no longer in the region of knowledge when we abandon Philosophy. What remains 
of Philosophy, is the problem of perception, which has become the problem of consciousness, 
where this later names a technical term. The technical term consciousness, reminds of the term 
phusis, since the same shortcoming exists in both cases. Phusis, as nature, never ceases to 
somehow still mean nature in the sense of the sloshing of waves at the foot of a sheer cliff, or the 
scent of pine trees in a chill wind, just as consciousness never ceases to mean not being knocked 
out, or abstracted utterly. These bookends skirt the meaninglessness of all that is being rather than 
beings. Beings are meaningful, but being is always essentially meaningless. Americanism, and the 
American, which is the name for the most Western, the core of what is West (whereas, the most 
eastern part of this all-encompassing West is called China), of what the European became when 
Europe became the mighty West, having risen from what was Mediterranean. When 
America ceases to hold what is essential, in the Sovereignty of Becoming (as the Prussian said it), 
being is then Macht.

Ever since Berkeley the epistemological question has come to interest those who take an interest in 
what is interesting in the interpretation of the sciences. (The question whether epistomology is only 
rightly thematized with Ferrier, or whether it already was unveiling itself, we leave aside).
The infinite reality that is what is known and what is, as yet, unknown. Perception is awareness, 
“conscious awareness”, it is “apperception” as availability. One can always slip into understanding 
space and time in Kant as Newtonian, though, it is not the most uncommon thing not to fall prey to 
this error. This shows us that Kant is not epistemological (or, points us in the direction of the  
Kantian question).Rather, in Kant we see the basic determination of Denken, as thought, in Heidegger. When   
anschauen (as view that is not an act of judgment or predication) does not require aperception, 
when it is not “consciousness", but is not aware of it, it is not “available” or present to hand. In this 
one goes ahead in Kant, beyond Greek availability of Greek being. Yet, in seeking to return to the
First Beginning, through Aristotle, working further back to Plato, one never has that logos that does 
not journey under a moonlight that is like fog in its glow, for the Evening and its glow, are now 
failed and the End of Metaphysics is more distant than any Going Under of the West.