Wednesday, January 31, 2018

A Word Concerning that Fabled First Beginning

(But it is preserved only as long as it still provokes and sustains a
question. Nevertheless, this original truth is not that of essence; rather
essence is necessarily deprived of power in it. The beginning immediately
 becomes entangled in being as presence [actuality]; presence is the ineluctability 
[of essence] in the first breaking open.)


This word bursts open, and yet it hardly is a whisper. Why? It is precisely the forgetfulness! In contrast
 to the urgency, to the divine outcry of the Early Greek fragments, this word is simply something that 
speaks, as though alongside other “high” “culture”. What could mislead more fatally? Most of all this 
word, which does not declaim, but can only narrate, urges the wondrous to come forth. And what is 
the wondrous word but that which is ready to set aside the break between what is and what becomes?
 Presence is the available, the stance of some manner of being, over and against what is ready-to-hand.
 Nietzsche, rightly understood, says, There are no moral appearances, only reliable appearances
 morally interpreted. These “reliable appearances” (gewisser Phenomena)  are what a temporary 
and local community agrees upon. They are “common ground”. The Platonic thing. And yet, in Plato 
all is illusion, all is ‘Socratic’. Since, only in the Seventh Letter, does Plato speak from his own resource. 

Eminent questioning—I do not say human questions—questions—this: What is causality? “Science” 
is always Greek ‘metaphysics’—the study of nature—phusis—natural order—reason.
“Always” implies the “is”, the independent existence of “being” which is no “becoming”. 
In the work called Heidegger being & time never name being and becoming. Becoming corresponds
 to “presence”—the available—being to the ready-to-hand—the already, standing immediacy of the 
interpretation for the human being. Time is the “-”.  

What is “a question”? It is what is asked as that which is the essence of man. For only man 
can ask. Howsofar does the question seek man? Howsofar is the human being what must be 
left aside in the coming of the being that has no rubric? Yet, most of all, man seeks to 
obliterate from the face of the earth the enemies of humanity. Leaving, of them, no trace 

Monday, January 29, 2018


The Element of the Decisive Phase of Forsaking the Track of Metaphysics  
as the unsayable Being itself 

  Image result for carlos scarpa open fields

Even though Western philosophy up to Hegel has basically not gone
beyond Parmenides' proposition: τό όν τό έν, despite all the transformations.
This does not signify a deficiency but a superiority and indicates that
in spite of everything, it remains strong enough to preserve its original truth.


Because Hegel identifies being with the ideas he leaves the disjuncture of speaking or reason and 
the empirical or nature behind in his so-called logic. When the logos, speech, becomes logic in 
Hegel’s sense, it becomes “all the things”. In this way his thinking comes closer to dissolving the 
problem of the sensorium’s relation to its objects which is the perennial supposition of the natural 
intelligence or common sense of man as man, in absolute immediacy of the apperception as the 
identity of idea (the thing as pattern, e.g., the look of a pine tree, the idea of a pine tree, the presence 
of a pine tree, the sense data of a pine tree all say the same thing in their own register) and 
orientation or rationality. In presupposing something more than human knowing, in arrival at the right 
way to understand what one sees, in genuine knowledge, one at the same time suggests thought as 
what is always the thinking of what is there as what can never be outstripped in a truth which is what
always is. Thinking in its sense where it is liberated from the disjuncture of appearance and truth or 
thing-in-itself, seems to outstrip Parmenides' initial and “original truth”. This thinking which is not
Husserl's but the epistemological logic (cf. the psychologism dispute), a kind of errant knowing as 
what fails to reach its absolute comes forward. 

In this sense the cognoscenti see an aspect of the saying that there is no progress in philosophy 
since “it remains strong enough to preserve its original truth.” In part this means that the 
degenerations forsake the track, they decay like what is admitted into the world in the West in 
Spengler’s (The most decisively German!) account, or like the radical flight into the personal in Nordau, Nietzsche, and Stirner (&al.). 
The so-called End of Metaphysics then withstands the flight of Parmenides' beginning which is the 
same thing as philosophy. Philosophy is nous, the faculty of being, as the human being. The most 
comprehensive science, science itself, is philosophy. It is empiricism and speaking concerning 
being as the inner questioning of the being of the human being. Science, in its basic sense, means 
what requires speech or reason, it stands in opposition to art which is what can be learned by 
empiricism alone. The sower of seeds can learn by watching, but the science of agriculture must 
have a guidance through speech. For instance, Socrates, who knows all about planting seeds, and 
who could do the work, does not know until he speaks, ergo, reasons that the seed must be planted 
deep enough so that it does not get dislodged by weather, animal or insect, but also that it must not 
be so deep that it never springs up from the underworld. Modern words with the suffix “-ology” still 
are evidence of this notion of science (which is still in play). Yet, the sciences when they are thought 
like this can only be science insofar as philosophy is the word for the most comprehensive science, 
which is the science of meaning, namely, the meaning of being. Whatever is purposive, biology, the 
study of living things, or physics, the study of bodily cause, has its merit or efficacy, its method, and 
its rigor measured from itself, as what it in essence is by the self evidency of its measuring judger 
as command or arbitrium, as this or that seeking, but meaning itself has no purpose in the way it is 
when one does not neglect to prevent its disturbance but covering it with a purpose, especially in the 
sense of a universal science which is always the science of a sample space, of a rigour and method 
that prepossess the researcher in essence evading the rational and the arbitrary alike meaning
the region of the philosophical preservation of the human being withdraws from purpose as what is meaningful. 

The human being in preserving this sense of meaning as of being which is not the many purposive

activities of human beings, first becomes itself through this opening that allows purpose to show
itself as what is chosen against the way being shows itself as it is. This sustainment of being, that
belongs to the First Beginning, has not yet reached the point of the degeneration of the radical 
departure, the forsaking, which is the starting point for the thinking of the saying of being which can 
not be since the logos can not found its own issue as a New Beginning. And yet in holding in thought 
the modifications of the basic ground of philosophy, as the human being, the attempt to hold 
steadfastly in resolve is indistinguishable from the Methodos. The hominem ceases to be the place 
of taking up of an attitude towards what stands before it, as the meaning of the processes of what is 
calculable. The rational and the positive become the existential as the confusion of the two regions, 
but even when Da-sein separates and clarifies the hermeneutical phenomenology only draws 
towards the Event, being remains unsayable and the play of meaning becomes the actus purus, as 
Macht and Rausch. Ergo, since around the time of Hegel, everything up till now has been letting go, 
though living off the track and refusing to forsake the course thinking what is unbearable to think it 
reaches the sameness that one is already done with once one hears of it in letting strenuous thinking 
take grip.


Friday, January 26, 2018


A word on a Faulty Popular Translation/Interpretation of Nietzsche, and a Preparatory Indication 
about the Text


Ever since Pannenides, the battle over beings has raged, not as an
arbitrary dispute about arbitrary opinions, but as γιγαντομαχια, as
Plato said, as a battle of titans for the beginning and end in the Dasein
of the human. And nowadaysthere remains but the word play of
ambitious and clever chaps who purport to say that Parmenides'
propositionbeing is the oneis as false as it is primitive, that is,
amateurish, awkward, and hence inadequate and hence of little worth. The
falsity of a philosophical insight is, of course, an entirely different
matter which we will not discuss further at this point. As to the
primitiveness of the proposition τό όν τό έν, it is admittedly primitive,
that is, originalin the strict sense of the word. In philosophy and
indeed in every ultimately essential possibility of human Dasein, the
beginning is the greatest, which henceforth can never again be attained:
it is not only unable to be weakened and lessened by what
follows but, if what follows is genuine, becomes truly great in its
greatness and is expressly installed in its greatness. However, for those
Whose actions are oriented toward progress, the original and early
become less and less important and real, and the most recent is ipso
facto the best.


The English sentence that appears in n number of “serious” books, sometimes attributed to the 
translator Kaufmann, taken from the text of the so-called Posthumous Fragments: 

...keine moralischen phänomene; sondern nur eine moralische Interpretation gewisser 
Phenomena (eine Irrtümliche Interpretation!) 

Reads “there are no facts only interpretations” in the popular translation, not to 
say the popular imagination. Yet, it reads: [There are] not any moral phenomena [appearances]; 
but only a moral interpretation of certain Phenomena (a wandering [erroneous] interpretation!)

The pitiful nonsense, the public situation with respect to philisophic rigour, is 
unimaginable and can hardly find an excuse. However, this is not the time to be 
ensnared by the temptation to despise the idiocy and lack of seriousness of contemporary 
society. On the other hand one must insist on not allowing the force of laxity to take all ground. 
To be overcome in complaisance would be outrageous. 

The distinction between a fact and an appearance, in the Latin or Greek appearances reads  
phenomena, is crucial for any approach to an understanding of what “beings” says. 

“Ever since Pannenides, the battle over beings has raged, not as an
arbitrary dispute about arbitrary opinions, but as γιγαντομαχια, as
Plato said, as a battle of titans for the beginning and end in the Dasein
of the human.”

It is not so easy to see what “beings” names as it may seem, and we must not lay ourselves open to 
an obsequious surender to common sense, to the ready assent to the parlance of everyday 
conversation. The “fact” is for one opposed to the “opinion”. This is not so with respect to the 
appearance. What appears is the stupid man, the dastardly act, the “demonic” aspect of Bismarck 
and the work of the Prussian genius Nietzsche. As much as a mountain of so many  meters or a piece
 of granite of such and such a weight, or, if one likes to be scientific in the mathimatiko-physical style, 
mass. The distinction between fact and value does not belong to the appearance. If I say there is a 
lovely woman, what is ready-to-hand is the lovely woman, that is the look of what stands there. It is
 not as though, in fact, a woman stands there who might be tested for attractiveness according to 
“symmetry” of features, but rather, what appears in the look is what has been stated. If one tries to 
sort things out, for instance, by saying, how is it he could make such an error, it must be drunkenness!
 For that woman is not “lovely” in the least! One assumes the priority of another appearance. 
What is agreed on gives a common ground, that each says, there is a woman. What comes next 
is the pursuit which attempts to discover what truly is. For example, through discovering contradictions
 in one’s statement of one’s opinion about a matter. Is the lovely what is attractive? Certainly. 
And is the woman attractive? No, she is a nasty woman, and rather unbearable. So you see, 
she can not be lovely.  So it seems. Likewise Nietzsche denies all such circumlocutions lead to 

The fact however is different. It has a certain objectivity because it is defined. For instance, if there is 
something that is supposed to vehiculate, a car, and it doesn't operate when one turns the key, one 
can say it is a fact that that thing there, the car, is defective. For it doesn’t do what it is meant to do by 
agreed definition. If I say cars should always run at full throttle, on this point I will find myself espousing 
a value. However, here we speak of the “fact” in its technical sense (cf. Simmel and Weber, later in 
transformed and ‘question begging’ form Logical Positivism, A J Ayer etc., i.e, nothing that is not 
“scientific” can be spoken of, later, in, e.g., Dawkins, the “scientific fact” which attempts to reach 
into biology from the mathematics-physics but with terrible incompetence and without awareness 
of the difficulties or nuances, or, indead the basic thrust of the subject!). In the common usage fact is, 
it has become, a vague term, derived from “action” (rather than passion) or ultimately factum, which 
has come down from the technical meaning to the public, and tends to be used to oppose mere 
“subjectivity” or opinion. However, what are these beings? 

“And nowadays—there remains but the word play of
ambitious and clever chaps…”

Here we have a difficulty. Do we speak of the work with the name Heidegger, of a critical or 
hermeneutic phenomenology, or directly of “ta panta” (the many as beings) as it issued from the abyss of the thought of 
Parmenides and the early Greeks? If one speaks of things, one can adress what stands before one, 
as what stands alongside other things, and is involved in processes of various kinds, e.g., the 
electrical flow through the nervous system. Yet, in opening ourselves to things, without the 
constraint of closed terms like “fact”, or “object”, one moves in the vagueness of the parlance, 
and of daily dealings, with the apparent aspiration of reentering the traditional avenue of philosophic 
dialogic. Such is philosophy. Yet, what are the beings? In Heidegger they stand as determined from the 
ground of the phenomena, as what is not phenomena. One is said to see a field, let us say, under a 
dazzling sun. The field ‘appears’ to one as much in a photograph, from this or that vantage, more or 
less strikingly caught by the photographer. Again, when one envisages the field, and the dazzling 
rays of the sun, in one’s mind’s eye, one sees that being. Ergo, a specific vagueness is exposed to 
our thinking. It is not the daily thoughtlessness that takes this to be a memorey, and that the 
“real thing”, and the other the image in all its sharpness and newness captured by the extraordinary 
artist in her masterwork, in the photograph. On the other hand, it is not that this or that appearance in 
the special sense of Husserl, not in the simple sense that there appears the Golden Gate Bridge 
under a pink sky the color of the dawn. Rather, Husserl gives us a peculiar manner of thinking the 
appearances, which makes them for him the ground of all datum in the ultimate doubt which says, 
maybe it wasn’t so. The being is thought in Heidegger as neither phenomenon nor, indeed, anything 
else but being. True, there is a hermeneutics that surrounds these beings. Yet, here, what we are 
doing is approaching Aristotle in order to approach Plato, who would then lead us to the thinking in 
Parmenides. But there is no scaler of the development, anymore than can our vector be 
prepossessed in any specificity, rather it is only indication. 

“and the most recent is ipso facto the best.”

This implies (since Heidegger, so to say, in a certain sense is the "most recent" in the line of 
great thinkers, but can not possibly implicate himself, so to say, in this spurn) that the thinking of beings
in the work that goes by the rubric Heidegger is already “primordial”, 
which means that the History of Being is meant to be held in a “privileged” moment 
where the First Beginning is not seen as part of a series of indefinite developments, as of moral or 
technological movements. It might be noted at this time, that what was said of Kant’s noumenal
world, of the moral act of freedom or spontaneity, that in saying nothing can be said of them, one 
says something parallel to if one would say nothing can be said about things being better, for the 
“better” is not yet. Or, if one were to say, one can not speak of further development in the sciences,
because no such “further developments”, but only the one’s already seen, are known. 
A profound bond to the principle of induction, itself a “wandering”, hysterical thing, a “wandering uterus”,
a truth, reminds one of the movements that hold one in speech, as it tells. 

One should see in these comments only a cloud that hangs such that it grazes the periphery vision, 
producing illusions of sight, pointing towards the substantive handling of what is hinted at above. 
Now is not the time to expound on the conceptions of fact or appearance, of thing or being. But, 
we want to be not wholly taken in by a darkling hubris, that of the common sense which already 
knows what it is ready and why. We must hint at the right kind of scale for weighing these pages 
so as to avoid sterile and inane caricature of the material. In all its directness and freshens the 
Element of Greek thought suggests its Event.