——————

Retreat to the inmost. 

——————

—————————

What could be more obvious than that man transposes the way he comprehends things in statements 
into the structure of the thing itself? Yet this view, apparently critical but in reality overly hasty, has first 
to explain how the transposition of the sentence structure into the thing could be possible without the 
thing first becoming visible. The issue as to what comes first and provides the standard, the 
structure of the sentence or that of the thing, remains, to this day, undecided. It may even be 
doubted whether, in this form, it is capable of a decision.

———

What is there as the spontaneous ground of the bare word is for the early Greeks taken up as 
what is unconcealed and not as what is reveliable. The phenomena. The revelability of a thing, 
by contrast, means what can be inferred out of the thing. Revelability is Christian thinking of what 
for the Greeks was not yet perfected, the sharing with, and entering into contemplation of things
in active contemplation that comes to be in the way of what it rests in. Revelability is reception, 
and in Kant this becomes the “legislation” of the thing by the transcendental power. The throwing off of
the movement of this metaphysics takes the form of, on the one side, the fact value distinction, which obviates the 
possibility of questioning in the universities, and, on the other hand, the general existentialism 
which holds with a romantic notion of the meaninglessness of the interpretation of all 
things which is always essentially credited with a unimportance before hand. This thinking then 
is a devious journey beset by the devastation of the human being: on the one side the biological 
interpretation: the cheep gathering of mere facts about what behaviour shows up which never grasps 
the decisive lack in such an approach. Instead, what arises is a asymptotic endeavor to raise 
“values” from the “facts”, which is already set aside as a possibility before the attempt is made 
(especially in a kind of bare fantasy of wiling it so because it, in exorbitant researches,
"must be", which corresponds to the sincerity of the strenuous contestation over ideologies).

On the other hand, the theological interpretation of man has utterly given way to the spirit of the 
“development of doctrine,” under the notion of the radical weakness of the “flesh of human weakness” 
in the light of the text which is written in human language (cf. Pius XI). The entire project to raise a living goal, a 
way to the eros as what draws towards the Sacred Heart, repudiates itself in disintegration. The 
philosophical interpretation (meaning, so far as the rare cases where philosophy is 
taken seriously exist at all, for instance in Strauss, and not in philophy as it stands 
as "Analytic," which is mere slavish subordination to and inmost essential dependence 
on the European Science) of man wanes in the backward look at the early thinkers, 
so far as they are taken up as models to teach what “genuine philosophy” is. What the first “raising of the eyes” 
of the human being says is: from here the rest is posited. For instance, there is no such thing as a 
bare biological being, there is rather, a human life, from within, that posits an account of a bare biological 
account as a sculpture cut from its own block. The “animal,” likewise serves such a function in the 
pseudo-thinking of such derivations of the meaning of “human being” as what is or is not “animal being.”

Here we move into a ground where the taking up of the thinking must remain in touch with the 
question of time as seen at the End of Metaphysics where it appears most sharply. When bare 
phenomena can be set out alongside the fully developed metaphysics of presence, as what is 
sheer accident or individualized things thought as under the mathematical unity of a whole which 
is in each part what belongs together because each part is the same in its reality as what can be 
measured, the strongest form of presence shows itself in that which is not present as accident, 
but is the support of the spontaneous whole. At the same time the thinking sees what is 
phenomenal, as what is sheer coming forth of itself as what it is in each case, as what already 
is itself and is not there for the sake of being revealed. Aristotle still speaks of the pleasure of 
just seeing, in the sense not of a taking pleasure from the thing, but of the beholding of the 
flow of the stream with the flash of light on its contour and the “light of the sun” as what is sweet 
as the sweetness of just being. This is already a kind of corruption of the primordiality of 
unconcealment in the dawning of presence. Here, then, in what follows, even the mere “because” 
which is prior to the thinking of all “possibility” is set aside as a place holder out of the mystical 
thought of a period closer to our own. Instead what is sought is an abandonment of the claim to 
the necessity to make something pay man. This is vexed in the look back so far as the seeking 
implies what is thought in the radical question. Suffice it to say, such searching is wholly impossible 
under the general mucking about of the opinion of human beings and the vagaries of what doesn’t 
even see the transformation of the pre-science or pre-philosophy in the first theorizing. The 
insinuation of this reflective theorizing into the habitual dealings with the world describes the 
transformation of phenomena into raw material for exploitation by the European Science. 
The collective malaise which sees nothing to overcome is what is to be overcome in the 
withdrawal from the general opinion’s menacing decision which is towards power, as gladiatorial 
contestation over the ratcheting up of cybernetic methods of thoroughly subduing the earth 
and everything on it. These manipulations which constitute the quiet and tranquil motions of an 
animal in a pot with the heat rising, which grows ever more comfortable, according to Kant’s 
joke about the  patient who died form the cure in historial terms: in the sense of the rising up of 
presence out of the First Beginning. This withdrawal from publicness can only mean a making 
of atonement to what is let slip by in the glance of historicism: in seeing the moment of the 
region of questioning in this withdrawal of the phenomena. 

The question of what “remains” “undecided” in the language should not think that the seeking 
of the primordial is a end in itself, rather it aims at aiding in the thinking of time. Time is no longer 
thought in the sense of “reality,” as the finest line of decimals in the measurement 
(cf. The Mighty Richard Feynman),  or as what is merely the romantic grasping of the 
whole by this or that opinion of an existentialist “subjectivity” here or there. Time can not be given 
to the regions of a pre-unfolded reflection out of the Greek Beginning.

Reflections on the Pathetic Movements in the radiating Publicness

————————————

It is generally held that the definition of the thingness of the thing in terms of substance and accidents 
appears to capture our natural view of things. No wonder, then, that the way we comport ourselves to 
things — the way we address ourselves to, and talk about, them — has accommodated itself to this 
commonplace outlook on things. The simple declarative sentence consists of a subject — the 
Latin translation, and that means transformation, of ὑποκείμενον— and predicate, which 
expresses the thing's characteristics. Who would dare to threaten this simple and fundamental 
relationship between thing and sentence, between the structure of the sentence and the 
structure of the thing? Nonetheless, we must ask: is the structure of the simple declarative 
sentence (the nexus of subject and predicate) the mirror image of the structure of the thing 
(the union of substance and accidents)? Or is it merely that, so represented, the structure 
of the thing is a projection of the structure of the sentence?

————

This view is not concerned with “words, words, words”. The issue of what is lost in the “Latin” 
world is a matter of the primordial inference out of what is revelable. This stands in contradiction 
to what is learned from a chain of proximate causation, as with biological causation. 
The difference of man and animal, if it is thought biologically reads: a difference in degree, 
not in kind. The essential character of the specific which makes the “sapience” or wisdom 
of the human stand as what is peculiar in the human being is not longer thinkable as what 
is not the genus animal, but this essential being, which is human. The essence, which itself 
grew out of the Greek thinking, comes forth with the sense of imagination which is the causal 
power or the faculty of potential. With Hobbes it becomes pride, as the sense of potential which 
is understood as power. Only the human being has power, since only the human being 
contemplates its potentiality in the main as what is wide reaching. The thinking of being 
thinks back through to the origin of this essence, attempting to think being as time. Being 
as time is always not the First Begining, or any beginning.

It’s not the word we want here, when the translation is spoken of, rather it is what is 
inferred out of the basic subject matter. Cicero, for instance, speak of the “ego arbiter” 
and this is correctly translated conscience, and moreover it is identified with the “gods” 
as in the subject matter of the Euthyphro in the place of miasma and the carfulness of 
the Socratic Daemon, and of Euthyphro’s strange and excessive aversion to [moral] “pollution”. 
Though, the conception of conscience was only worked out in the wake of the work of Aquinas. 
What is meant here is that the bare word, which is not lexically derivable out of the authority 
of authors, dictionary, or even the unavailable mundane usage, lives in the intimate sharing 
of the soul with its closest object. Here, it is not wrong that we speak of the object of the soul, 
for we move always without fear of speaking of objects, or subjects, even if what we seek is 
to keep to time. Being, said as time, always speaks the “where” in such a way as to slip 
past any “proximate” knowing. So that one could say, in the sense, like in the legal usage, 
the “but for cause” is not the principle. Where the principle is always something more 
vague than any cause. In thinking to the principle we head away from positivity, in 
the sense of merely saying what happens (cf. Comte) away from the machine task 
ordered out of the algorithmic scientific reality. It is not, however, that one does not 
correctly see what the proximate causes say, but rather in the thinking one seeks 
their primordial language which moves back of what is inferred from the thing that 
avails into what is thought as an unconcealment. We must be careful with the 
dangerous conception of translation which is interpretation of the being: in the fateful 
and guiding sense that being is said in many ways.

The swift pouring in, abiding embodiment, and the gaze back of what comes to be horizon 
holds its grip upon the very life which is supposed to move out of the most limpid statement 
of the beautiful, true, and good. The medieval world is still that brooding zenith of rationality, 
the only moment of faith which is pistis or knowledge as reliance, which is to say truth 
properly so-called, the supra-rational rationality, both in the Jewish and Catholic 
interpreters of Aristotle, drew towards energia, which means that the Deos, 
that which has long since become the frittering away of “sapience” or wisdom 
in the light of its removal from what is rigorous knowing. Of the taking up of eudaimonia, 
as a beatitudo aternia, as a good telos. And the Christ as what is most kalon. It is a 
strange feature of this thinking that Deos must be thought as incurvatus en se 
[strictly, the "presence", availability, posits the "object" which the sin is meant to speak against 
in its positing], this is because the inference out of the object that is the revelability of the dark magic of 
the Sacred Heart is itself nothing other than what avails as the Greek presence. Here one 
must see the great light that crosses before the vision of the Greeks proper 
(the "translation" and what is severed is nearby here), thus the 
obfuscation in the Western soul, even the most uneducated and unexposed to doctrine, 
to the First Begining’s primordiality in the unconcealment. This is vexed even in the text 
called Heidegger which seeks the essential far-reaching look of the First Beginning with 
the most perfect seeking. Here we must be cautious of all publicness with its huge and 
terrible confusions.  



Most of all this means: the contest of gladiatorial sincerities concerning the fate of all beings on 
the earth. The continuation of “wisdom's” flight from the  Planetary European Science in the 
“value” and the “value judgment”, and the ever more desperate attempts to draw out of the 
Science itself the most efficacious movement of what is not “universal”. The manipulations 
of "media" and "war of ideas". Ergo, the constant self-destroying with the Technological 
Essence of the remaining efforts of the “human being”. The earnestness of an Alexander 
Dugin or a Jordan Peterson for instance. Strauss says here, the modern consciousness 
has taken up the fact, and made it eternal. This means, at the same time, it has made all 
wisdom into mere romanticism. The very sapience, which is the coming to the species, as 
its specific difference out of the animal genus, is a God as an "ego arbiter" subsuming itself in the 
broad embrace, flavour and kiss which lacks the essential exclusivity of everything intense and 
living, of the grandiose goal. For all goals are become "parochial," partial, flakes in the 
Milky Way which is already credited with a lack of importance which can support no genuine Fate.  

————

On the Moral Question

————

These designations are by no means arbitrary. Within them speaks something

which lies beyond the scope of this essay: the Greeks' fundamental
experience of the being of beings in the sense of presence. It is through
these determinations, however, that the interpretation of the thingness
of the thing is grounded that will henceforth become standard and the
Western interpretation of the being of beings established. The process begins
with the appropriation of the Greek words by Roman-Latin thought;
ὑπόκειμενον becomes subiectum, ὑπόστασις, substantia, and σῠμβεβηκός accidens.
This translation of Greek names into Latin is by no means without
consequences- as, even now, it is still held to be. Rather, what is concealed
within the apparently literal, and hence faithful, translation is a translation
[Ubersetzen] of Greek experience into a different mode of thinking. Roman
thinking takes over the Greek words without the corresponding and equiprimordial
experience of what they say, without the Greek word. The rootlessness of
Western thinking begins with this translation.

——————

Bellow is an investigation pertaining to morality.

Heschel says it would be absurd if one were to define an animal as 
“A human being without the faculty of reason.”. What is a human being? 
How can one define something on the basis of something which is not instinctually 
known? The peculiarity of the human according to the Greeks is that the instinctual 
or natural understanding, the knowledge which is known through the spontaneous 
activity of the soul, is the object of rational reflections which aim at the truth. 
The question what is morality depends on the spontaneous understanding coming 
upon the subject matter of the proper and the improper and the good and bad. 
The spontaneous understanding is what knows, e.g., oak trees, human beings, 
games of dice, the law courts, the subject matter of knowledge and that of morality or justice.

The words mores and ethos are the same throughout Western history, until some time in 
Modernity morals, from mores, took on a sexual connotation in the English speaking countries
(for the same reasons roughly as the Gin Taxes, surplussed cities and the rate of change 
un-linked to Evolutionary time). On the other hand, a science, which of late has 
been called ethics, in the last forty years or so, in contradistinction to morality, which is the empirical thing, the thing understood by the 
spontaneous understanding, has taken over the name ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics, for instance, 
uses the word without the sense of the split between a sure knowledge and the natural or instinctive 
grasp of the matters involved being laid out through the word and its usage. The laying out of the usage
indicates a break or cleft in the thinking which itself runs along with the raising of the Modern sense of Science.

If one does not know what the spontaneous understanding is, how could one ever have a sure 
ground for a science of ethics? In Plato the subject matter of Justice is not treated scientifically 
at all, except that the rule of noncontradiction is present in the dialogic discussions. Justice is 
treated as what is present as a subject matter or idea, it is not yet taken for granted that it is the place 
of an ideal, as in the Catholic sphere where this is already presupposed as the fee for entry into the 
discussion. The opinion that Dike or Justice is the interest of the powerful is as much part of the 
subject matter as is the aristos opinion that Dike or Justice is what improves a human being. 
The subject matter is taken up comprehensively in order to ask what it is. The ideal, by contrast, 
in the Catholic thinking, is always the aristos opinion, as right reason’s truth: as the fullness of 
being in the Aristotelian take over by the Church. 

When the Greeks (from at least Plato) take up the questions of better and worse there is already the 
Greek thinking of presence, but it is not brought into question as the questionable ground. Presence means that 
something is taken to be available as what can avail man as man. In this sense the conception of 
nature, phusis, is taken as what is to avail man as man. From this the moral interpretation of 
philosophy as the help of human beings arises. Man as man smears his speech with this notion 
of himself as what has what is available in order to help himself. The joke in Nietzsche, at the 
beginning of Beyond Good and Evil, is as much true of the conception of nature. Of any conception. 
An invention or a discovery? Because the ground of morality falls prey to the word of Heschel, 
since one can not speak of the specific difference of reason, which is what one does the science 
of ethics with without first instinctively grasping the subject matter of morality empirically 
through the spontaneous understanding, unless one would first know from where it has its 
general existence. It is as absurd to assume the meaning of human being in saying what the 
animal is, as in assuming the meaning of the animal in the grasping of the power of reasoning. 
The animal is taken up as what is available by the natural understanding. The 
natural understanding is the only supplier of the raw material of the rational power of the soul. 
In what follows we must remind ourselves that the Catholic doctrine which gives all as what is 
revealable, already assumes revealability as the sense of a power of inference by the natural 
understanding. And yet, this natural is as much a ungrounded subject matter as any other. 
We move here with the thingleness of the thing, in the above word of the thinking called Heidegger, 
in the track, in the concern pertaining to the investigation of what is groundless in this 
Western availability: in presnese as the interpretation which man as man smears his talk with. 
In this sense Heidegger says: we must remain outside of publicness.