Thursday, November 30, 2017





Notes in passing about an Essential Matter, Namely the Grand and the Epic Style



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Who would deny that philosophers have been discussing beings and
being for a long time? This equation of τὸ ὂν and τὸ εἶναι, beings
and being, has a venerable tradition. We already encounter it in
Parmenides at the decisive beginning of Western philosophy: τά έόντα
and έμμειναι (an older Lesbian form). But this equation is at the same
time a hidden and not understood difference that does not come into
its own.


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τά έόντα

The form έόντα, is suggestive. The text proceeds as an argument. All arguments attempt to reach us, in our decision, as the one who has opinion. Insofar as the light cast by the argument catches on the region of constant decision a turning can occur.  A good argument, think of the word eutopia, the good place, not utopia, elucidates a matter in such a way that it reaches us, ad hominem, and yet, so far as man as man is ousia, this conviction is thought as now and how it is, rather than what is renewed constantly, often by blind habit. When an argument sways us, to change our opinion, we do nothing other than what we always had done, i.e., sway in our decision, only, then, we are proximate to the swaying and notice it in its essential being. Why is the Homeric form, the grand form, given? Why is Nietzsche's notion of the grand style brought (albeit tacitly, implicitly) into destructive proximity with Homeric splendor? The grand style, oder the epic style? In what follows in § 3 the question of Nietzsche’s error (his onticness or failure to see the scope of his surrounds in the History of Being) is being posed. What is an error? When can thinking be in error? We touched on that in the last post with respect to Dugin. Howsofar does error reach the decision, reach towards being? Howsofar is it a matter of correctness and thereby of ousia, and so a genuine error? To be outstripped by a more primordial relation with being. 





So long as nous is presented as intellect, it threatens to become Geist, to become what is ghostly most of all, not only spirit and the spiritual, but rather, and most of all, what Nietzsche deems worthy of his most destructive attack, rationality. And yet, is it said truly that Socrates was the “first theoretical man”? Insofar as the West and its existential analysis of all things falls over the other worlds, for instance in what remains of the old Hindu world, it superimposes the juxtaposition of the sensual and emotional with the spiritual and rational. Insofar as man frees himself, gains a moment of quite peace, evades what is pathological, emotional, threatening and repulsive, intellect is free to summit the zenith of its universal law giving vision. It shows the right way to live. Yet, in the Indian world the right way to live is not the issue on which everything is essentially grounded, rather, the world as such is illusion, as much searching for the peace to contemplate the right way of life, as the most intense passion and abandonment to the parties of Berlusconi, or any wine of a tsar. This thinking is not bound by ousia. It is the most common of errors to read one’s own into something else, into the alien. Here, when we work back into what is most Christian in the Greeks, we leave what is most known, the reversal and continuation of Christianity in the present period of political consent (rather than proper prescribed behavior) and pleasure seeking (to the notorious point of an imposed reversal or inversion, the so-called duty to be happy), passing the Roman puritanical age (the high patrician optima), and reaching into the first notions of the childlike beings of humans, to be corrected under the sway of Socratic Eros. One might note that in the Roman period, far from what is widely presented, the most monumental and shocking transformation of the human being occurred, such that sheer abnegation reigned with the upper classes, this afterwards gave rise to a massive literature of slanders, the notorious cubicle of a Messalina, and all that one knows from Graves et al. Much later, during the period of the medieval popes, this form of literature was greatly slackened, for, indeed, again rose the actual practice, especially among the lower clergy, of the sensual life of the Christian, culminating in the days of Martin Luther, who, of course, had children by his consort who was a nun. And yet, howsofar is this spirit, which became, finally the empty talk of  a Russell, of the set of all sets which is, at bottom, man’s essence, which need not be accounted for in a inquiry into the Cybernetic question: What is Life? (c.f., Behavioralism, Francis and Crick, Dennett, Pinker, et al.)   
   

(An inchoate sketch, made in passing:
Is orexis as thought by the early Greek already susceptible of the existential analysis of Feuerbach, who sees in all pursuit human projection, ergo, in all eros? So that Rausch, as the Nietzschean principle of aesthetics, i.e., of the noble, could have already been fallen into the abyss of the nothing according to the Eleatic stranger? The nothing of the Sophists?) 



The region at play, which in its serious form becomes contemplation of the forms or ideas, is no rational region if rational is taken to mean that which measures the objectified object and first lets Cybernetics be as regular and dependable effectuation of making something happen again, whether intricate or simple. Rather, ratio, at first, is not what it became at the end of the First Beginning, when it decisively began its life as an orientation, leading to the theory of a morality, as the so-called halfway house, which in the Medieval period was a theoretical-practicality, that which finally was developed in thinkers like Dante as the earliest formulation of a global binding on reason, but not yet a manipulation of man as object. If one puts it down as a formula, the Cybernetics of systems of quantifiable objects, leads back to the age of the reasoned argument binding on man as rational animal, and finally through the Romans, most of all Cicero with his notion of Natural Law, one ekes a way to Aristotle. And yet, by what means is one to bring oneself with a flash to the very dawn of the Greeks, long prior to Plato, and here thinking of the alien world the epic style? Is the epic style more Greek than the Hellenic period, which was already the end of the Polis? Is it more Greek, as an arche, as the archaic foundation of the Classical life of the Athenian Greek? If each decision, as constant decision, is measured only by its own essential inner creativity, it is not a duty one can discharge, the going back to what is archaic in the period prior to the raising of the “Greek Temple”.

Monday, November 27, 2017



Some Historial Connections concerned with the Questioning of Being, and the movement of the Metaphysical Gods



Related image


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Even today, we still commonly make this equation, although more
with a sense of a hopeless confusion. Thus we speak often in philosophy
of being and mean beings. On the other hand, we say beings
and mean being. Basically we comprehend neither the one nor the
other. And yet we do understand something when we say this, even
though everything dissolves into thin air when we attempt to grasp it.
For example, this thing here, this piece of chalk, is a being, it "is"; we
say this of the chalk because it, as it were, says this to us in advance.
In the same way, my speaking now and your listening and paying
attention are [ways of] being. We experience and grasp beings constantly
and with ease. But "being"? In a certain sense we understand
this also but do not comprehend it. How then are we to distinguish
the two beings and being, or even understand the relevant inner
relationship between the two, if all this has not been assimilated or

for that matter even expressly questioned?


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The talk of beings brings our thinking into proximity with the thought of the whole, and yet, the notion of the whole was a great discovery, and it is not part of the thinking of all human beings. The whole, each thing, one after another, until the last is counted. The whole, for Greek Thinking, stands between khaos, which is the unbounded, the black gulf, and cosmos, which is the mete and the bound that binds all things. Later, this khaos means, confusion, stasis in the sense of anarchy or wild activity, uprising, the Arabic word fitna reminds of this. Khaos makes one think of a primeval forest, the early overgrown world, the howling of the wind in the heart of winter, man has not yet become man. The space of the city, where, as it is said in Thucydides, men first walked freely without fear of attack by their fellows, even when meeting with strangers from afar. In all this, which is far-radiating, and has reached us, we hear nothing of this “But “being”?" The text of Being and Time speaks, as we have mentioned above, of the “peculiar” word of Aristotle, concerning the fear that being might “go away”, which Aristotle ascribes to the “ancients”. The whole is the region where the zenith, in the form of a teleology, is sought as the to autos agathon, it is the region of nous and the noetic. It is the region still sought by the rationalists, who separate the moral from theology, it is god when god falls prey to conceptualization and becomes “projection” or the “subject”, i.e., of man as beside the objectified object. 






We must properly allow the “But “being”?” to reveal itself to us. In all talk of Nature, something else is implied alongside this Nature, in formula it is that referent that must not refer to itself, as in the thinking of a Russell, it is the human being. In this talk of the “but,”being”?”, this is not so. There is no outside from which to come to a truth about this matter. As though what was being thought, in the customary way of moving forward, in the Methodos, was to be judged according to a claim to knowing it all, or being mistaken. Rather a decisive involvement is means that truth is always something thrown up in such a way as to imply man as man. Ergo, the what it is without man is not a question that concerns some reality or Real. This question is not at all moving in the region of the Metaphysics of a Marxism. Rather, the entire relation of ousia, as energia and dunamis, as the essence of non-contradiction, is, in the sense of the “But “being”?”. Ousia, which is the essence of the nothing as absence, and of the something as the categories and substance, is this being that is a being, and not being. We should allow what logos as Narration brings out to draw towards this region so as to sense what can’t be laid down in a rubric or formula. 





Surely we must be wary of the continuation of Metaphysics in Ethnology and Anthropology. In the “post-modernism” of “difference”, in the doctrine of cultures. At the same time, it is not prudent to say, as of Dugin, he has made an error, since one must say, instead, this thinking is another thinking. Why? Not only in the sense that if we take a thinker to express something serious we must not measure it against a presumed know-it-all measure of what is true, but also because we have here a what is thrown in another way, than the West (or, perhaps one might hazard to say, the Commercial Global North), where the bourgeois ego is the measure of all things. This is no praise or blame, since, most of all this “ego” is the condition of the thinking we now pursue, of the “But,”being”?”. Whatever is the condition for the thinking is only measured out of that thinking as it strikes down in every way short of madness whatever is in the way of the drawing forth of its essential Questioning. 







What is this question posed by the saying of what is “expressly questioned”? It is precisely in delineating every question that is merely empirical, each formula, and each empty sense in which we draw towards what is to be let be to reveal itself, that we prepare the attempt of genuine questioning. At first questioning was said in the sense of a Nietzsche, or, as it was put forward by Dostoevsky, f.i., in the momentous discussion between Stavrogin and Shatov, “The very fact that you reduce God to a simple attribute of nationality …”, where the question that everywhere deluged man as man was being thought with the most piercing and shocking might. The ego, most of all, was threatening with its onslaught. So that it was less and less sensible to dedicate oneself, or, better, to love one’s country, one’s own. It is still, today, in Russia, that this ego is not wholly founded, since one can still love Putin as a Russian, just as Pushkin or Stalin is loved as a Russian. In Germany, for Nietzsche, it was still that it could be said, the Germans produced a genius, Goethe, a “saint of existence”, or, the Germans produced a Heisenberg, a great physicist. It was not yet that each one, apart from them, envied chiefly, and thought of one’s own only abstractedly (this is the condition of Schmitt's conception, because prior to this the split between one's own, a child or country, and the specific manner of arrangements in that country, or the character of that child, was the primary political question, but then it became total and ceased to have a binding principle in a kosmos or order, the notion of Schmitt became, unbeknownst to him, a matter of the abyss or chaos of an anarchy, which is the transformed, the busied and empty sense, of the primordial gaping of Hesiod and the Greeks) , and later on like a consolation within the Cybernetic Essence. Ergo, this questioning was first over the sense of god, as the creative god, or, on the other hand the “attribute of Nationality”. This sense of the desperate attempt to save the ownmost, as in Wagner’s notion of the Social Work of Art, the work that spoke the Geist of the Volk (when the dawn when the talk of the "imaginary" of the social was a spore and not yet clarified), was transformed by Nietzsche into the Macht of what is most mighty in the essence of what is that sensual basis for being, the place and people of birth, the family, the allegiance that is not a matter of individual interest or fact. This order, when it was annihilated by the onslaught, in Europe, of the West, of European Nihilism as the West, and as much in Japan and China, never wholly annihilated the Russian world, ergo, the continuing schism. In all this, one moves at the level of ousia, as what is thinkable as the available beings, as the beings that are now, as they are. And yet, in Aristotle, the sense that what now, at this time, is as it is, is split by the dunamis and the energia, by the becoming and the being. The Russians have their being out of the first rise of the Christian world, before the institutions synthesized with the Aristotelian, and so, the Greek Fate. On the whole such questions are obscure, yet, what we here are looking at is the way the being of the whole, i.e., of the Cosmologists, of the Philosophers who would be political (cf., Enlightenment), is not named by the sentence: “But,“being”?”.       

Monday, November 20, 2017


Without guiding the souls, a consideration of education as staunch resolve in the refusal of direction



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§ 3. The equation or the differentiation of beings and being.

Being as one in Parmenides

We have seen that the question τὸ ὂνwhat are beings?is the

question τὸ εἶναι, what is being? How can Aristotle equate τὸ ὂν

and τὸ εἶναι? Why say the question is about beings (ὂν) when it is

about being (εἶναι)?





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Stated negatively the “what” is not the question about substance (, this we learned in the last section). Heidegger here rules out the sense in which the what speaks to “morality”, as a possible transcendent border, definition or orientation, from which one could know how to live, by knowing what ought to be. He thereby removes from the region where Nietzsche is chiefly active. The region where one finds a yardstick, by which, in history to know who is blamable, who has been a criminal, and who is, contrary to this, worthy of emulation, towering and mightily be-powered by power. On the whole, Cybernetics (when we bring it into connection to human beings, as an anthropomorphic conception, and not a holding sway) means, whoever would guide all things must be ordained by power, in such a way that operative means come to their greatest intensity, in the form of the methods of power (one need hardly mention this applies as much to the defenders of goodness and morality, liberty, inclusivity, and the protection of the precarious, etc., as to those who are not on the side of the angels). Exploitation of unconscious biases, sheer manipulation, the extreme possibility of propaganda, the transformation of of every region of the earth into struggle, a fit technical system. Such that, in the end, whoever wins the power struggle, will themselves fall prey to the Cybernetic essence, in the effort to maintain their position, against the rivalrous powers. Ergo, the notion of “intention” not as a knowing in the older sense of metaphysics, but direction in the being of the human being, as the movement from the ”not yet” to the “it has been” on the ground of a fundamental availability of directive service to power in its European essence, in the essence of that European Nihilism that Nietzsche names the darkness of a most distant star, already shaping the world with its darkness, that is not yet come to be aware that it does not exist. 




There is nowhere individuality, that which is in each case the case, without the possibility to take what is individual as one case of a larger grouping. And yet this distinction, in Aristotle, is not the same as that between all beings as individuals under universals. Rather, we are referred to ousia as the availability of the wholly theoretical (not, however, of course, in the modern operative sense of theory as distinct form practice. What this designation concerned is a a question about the peculiar manner of grasping the subject matter named by the rubric "theoretical"). The medieval notion, for instance in Dante's tract on world government, of a theoria which opens the teleological rationality of a universal law, is not found in Aristotle nor Plato (except that it is superimposed, read back, into the Christian reading of the Symposium doctrine, of Eros as the condisention of the Sacred Heart, of actus purus as God of Love). The question in the Parmenides, concerning hair, mud and stones, whether they had ideas, is not part of a moral inquiry,  an inquiry about the right way to live. Rather, here we move in a region alien to the other ages of Western thought. The equation of “τὸ ὂν and τὸ εἶναι” in ousia has a peculiar register as its support. It is long a matter of contention how Aristotle regarded logos (in connection to his notion of forms), but here it is thought has bounding the theoria. Not as a logical definition, or in the sense of Russell as a mere extra thing, aside from being, but something one is fundamentally unaware of in its spontaneous existence as what tells everything that is. Aristotle is unaware that it is language that tells us everything (his notion of man’s essence in ratio is different, based in the doctrine of the psuke, and its purification through the philosophic art), yet the Narration in Heidegger is concerned with this. There is apparently no outstripping the word of Strauss, historical awareness, that of the fundamental history of metaphysics, implies an improvement over the earlier state, a knowing (taken without mete or bound, in a suitably primordial unclarity) better, but at the same time, a position that is not a way of moving from the “not yet” to the “already has been” is achieved in a way that outstrips metaphysics as direction sending. We put energia and dunamis into the methodos, without the sense of becoming, as the piercing power to transform ousia.  

Thursday, November 16, 2017





A comment as we Prepare to think Aristotle's position within the region of Parmenides’ One 



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Thus we have the πολλαχώς of the various categories within the wider πολλαχώς (τετραχώς). The  πολλαχώς as such is itself a δίχως λεγόμενον; it is said doubly. The connection between these two must be seen clearly, not only in order to get to know Aristotle's use of language but so that the Aristotelian question of ὂν can be conceived philosophically.  



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Here we have come to the end of § 2 of the Introduction with the heading: The Aristotelian Question about the Manifoldness and Oneness of Being. The notion that the ”oneness” is to be taken as the question about essence in the sense of asking, ‘what’ is this?, what kind, person, place or thing, substance as essence, form as the “what-being”, is dispensed, since that is but one of the (divisions under the) categories, and, on the other side of the ὂν is taken up as ousia, the logos is a hurricane, for which no storm windows will suffice. Yet, we begin with the sense of logos that we become when we attempt to be attentive to Aristotle, as that ergon which is the historial thinking of ousia. We Narrate the logos, relate or tell it, which is thought under ousia, which is becoming the logic of the Schoolmen, which is already become the logic which states the First Philosophy (as the coming to be of the dunamis of the First Beginning, ergo, the establishment of Aristotle’s basic position). Beginning itself, says, dunamis. Yet, it is also being narrated, and that means, not reckoned with. Once we admit the will, seeking a owned worthiness, is not at work, do we not slip away from the problem as stated in Dugin? The claiming, by freedom, of the basic being. And then attentiveness in this limited sense is thought against the will, as what is not connected to that class of dangerous beings called humans (even when they are thought beyond the position of a basic holding sway that only afterwards congeals as a knower, and that that is known). The attentiveness is not a “not yet”, on the way to a New Beginning. Even less is it a ghostly and unplaceable dispersion of (as it were, postmodern, liquid or risky) “consciousness” out of which anything might come to pass, from the cloak of an infinite abyssal unrestricted region. 





In the text there follows a graphic that goes through from a solitary ὂν, into the fourfold, to the categories, and terminates in λόγος. Narration is not fiction, but, nonetheless, insofar as no metes and bounds make it firm, as a logic, it never gives itself to a mere saying of what is. Whatever seems to say what is, embracing one with the thought of being true, has strayed from being. And the logos, as such, as set off against ὂν, is called the First Beginning, or the Greek Beginning. It is prior to logic of any kind. 





What is λόγος here? It is ‘not yet’ narration, it is speech about what is available, what one comes across, like a electric light that shines and shows as it moves, everything is “uncovered” by the passing light, in its availability or presence. And yet, so far we don’t see the basic metaphysical sense of Aristotle’s position, which is why we are preparing to consider Parmenides (in the next section of the Introduction), in what follows. Metaphysics here means: the historial as it rises to the return (return is something never to be thought in brute causal determination, rather, the historial and the Return, fundamentally speak the same End of Metaphysics, as the gathering of what is its past) to the Question of Being. Thus, in terms of laying border stones, it is the ergon of Heidegger understood as the releasement form the understanding of being as a Narration. The logical as a saying of what is available, becomes the certitude of the basic thinking, such that a thinking is the basis of any knowing. On the one hand, logic becomes Symbolic Logic, the analytic of Thought’s certainty as datum, on the other it becomes the speach that addresses the historial. Narration is the same as the newly raised metaphysics as the End of Metaphysics. It speaks only so far as it does not find resoluteness in the staunch Attentiveness that bellies Thinking in coming to Being as what is overcome in entering the Thinking. Thinking means the same as that anything is known, and when this is sent as a way that the basic being holds sway, rather than as the presupposed ground of a certainty, it is historially grasped (the historial is never a counter-concept to the causal, what is causal is sent historially). And yet it remains the presupposition, though no longer of certitude about the datum. Now, as the staging place for the “not yet” (never thought as "freely chosen" or willed) of an event of being. The event means the same thing as sensing being, in what is no longer the presupposition, as the fresh youngness of the leap. 



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The true necessity of thinking what from the very start we have been posing to ourselves as Aristotelian, along with another view, the one of Parmenides, will only come out if we are able to learn something from what follows. We don't have sufficient clarity to ask if this view is another view, or part of the unfolding of the First Beginning. On the other hand, it is trivial, that we would not now, in what we pursue, be racing through this text, if not for the invisible purest light, the opening of the hour where we are. Such an inquiry has never before been.