Approaching the Close of the Introduction, We Reconsider Alexander Dugin
The treatise on δύναμις and ἐνέργεια is one of the ways of questioning
about beings as such. Aristotle does not say any more here.
Rather, after the sentences we just read (1045b35ff), Aristotle proceeds
immediately to more closely delimit his topic and to delineate
the course of the whole inquiry.
It may seem strange that we include a consideration of a thinker that is not obviously a part of our current path, yet, when Heidegger brings Nietzsche's Will to Will into the guiding statement, at the beginning of the text we are studying, he signals the atmosphere of a thinking that allows the superimposition of what is both alien, because Heidegger does not subsume Nietzsche under the End of Metaphysics insofar as Nietzsche (like Kierkegaard) is no longer thought as only part of the Western thought, and, at the same time, insofar as Nietzsche is thought by the ergon of Heidegger (the name of a particular propounding of a forged way), he is part of that End of Metaphysics which is the most radical possibility of that Metaphysics, the eyes that look at the movment of the “genuine philosophizing” of Aristotle are guided both by a fundamental presupposition, by the possibility that is ownmost to the thinking with the title Heidegger, and at the same time, by the greatness of what is great in Nietzsche.
We want to let the statement “the ways of questioning about beings as such” be heard by the Methodos under another thinking. Whereas Alexander Dugin, born January 7, 1962, in Moscow, Russia, is the philosopher and anthropologist who has given the most thought to the question of the ethnos. In what follows we consider the ethnos in the sense that it answers the question about the origin of all things. Aristotle says, in a way, the soul is “all the things”. At the end of the 19th century the question, which in Spengler's sense, happens at the same time, as the question about the man of the Polis, who in Plato and Aristotle is contrasted with the ethnos (or, so to speak, village man), is the question “What is man?” With the three possible answers: the creature of a creator, the biological organism, or, the philisophic anthropos, who is, at bottom, understood as the political animal. The distinctive flavour of the political animal is, when the “ideal” (stemming from Kant, i.e., the emphasis on the possibility, over the certainty, of a directive attitude founded in good intentions) becomes the “value” (as Simmel’s specific transformation of the Nietzschean nihilism, which goes beyond nihilism, by denying even the appearances) is felt as the Essence of Technology. All “values” are as much felt as causal forces, which are now regarded as homogenous, and no different from the other forces. In this atmosphere of the Technological Truth, the thinking in Heidegger superimposes the ownmost presupposition of its ergon onto the Technological Truth, as the supposition of Being, rather than the Truth of being as what is the ‘being of beings’. To think of this as a kind of “degeneration” which amounts to the same thing as a projection of the essence of the truth as a “lie” belonging to a lawmaker would be to deny the sense of Phenomenology, as that which allows one to “look” without meditating over Being. The presupposition, suggests itself as Will to Will, yet, presupposes that it is not. Will to Will the question of the conception of will, which finds in will something unintentional. The will, is conceptualized, and so becomes Metaphysical. The will is not conceptualized, because even the appearances are not appearances, and so becomes “lie”. The Will, as willed, is willed from the depths of the abyss. The Nietzschean thinking is radically liquid, swallowed up by the curve of an amphora, by what is most "womanly", by the science of der die and das, by the "female" value, Truth, so being unsolid and tending towards a radical drawing in of the most extreme distances of concrete possibility to the consciousness of the now living being. The living being, the ready-to-hand, is the being that is plunged into the practical activity, that is itself guided by the gods, by the tacit truth, which is the thinking of the dunamis of the being of beings. Thus Nietzsche advises to give way to the ready-to-hand. At the same time, this ready-to-hand is essentially present. This man, who is the overcoming of the Last Man, is essentially available. Available is the other way to say present, as the presence of the rejection of what is ready-to-hand.
The ergon Heidegger sees the serious-minded citizen, embroiled in the ever smaller region of the practical, which is in ever more extreme measure pierced by the phenomena of the radical availability or presence, “sees” Being. Husserl first discovered this manner of seeing, but it was Heidegger who superimposed it over Aristotle, and, paradoxically, over Husserl himself. Nietzsche remained “ontic”. In the study of Aristotle we are considering ousia as the ontic. How does Dugin think the ethnos?
This seems to be an answer to the origin. If someone has an opinion, something can move them to another opinion. For example, Socrates argues that Zeus, the highest god, was guilty of a terrible and impious act, of patricide. The immediate effect of the argument, which acts almost as a revelation, is to transform the opinion of his dialogic partner concerning the place of the gods in the order of things. For the anthropos of the Polis, the logos constantly suggests something that is a danger, and must be watched over with the greatest keenness of vision. Invigilation over the logos, even prior to the split between the rhetorical and the scientific (or dialogical) logos, compels the absurd question: Why is the logos not all powerful? The manifest absurdity of the question of the logos, becomes sensible, when the opinion of the investigator comes over to the view that the logos can not be wholly excluded from the sphere of power. Then the question of exactly where, and exactly why, it stops to exercise its power becomes compelling to the opinion.
The man of the Polis, according to Dugin, is split between high and low beings, in the sense that there are warriors who slay men for their primary occupation, who can not be flattened to the point of some supposed “equality” with the other men, who, in their own way, have a positive and peculiar character, that of the subordinated peasantry. It is only when the ego rises, when man becomes possible to be “equal”. The bourgeois who invests his ego in culturally objective projects, who protects this ego at all costs, is according to Dugin, the coward. The more everything is governed by a logos with a life of its own, the established legal order, the more the ego becomes an “equal” abstraction. All life consists in rescuing one’s ego from destruction. Man forgets the possibility of moving the opinion through dialogic discussion, and pursues interests. Interests which are, in essence, the same for each one. Some are supposed to be better informed, and some worse informed, but otherwise they are “the same”, as Nietzsche says it. The ethnos is supposed to stand prior to the “imagined” world. Everyone can see that the image of a world, a world picture, or Weltanschauung, is not identical to an “opinion”. Even in the simplest sense opinion is not image, but all the more so when opinion comes to mean doxa, comes to mean psuke, that which is moved in the ad hominem address, the address of the being of man in its peculiar organization as that which informs a man of what is better and worse in action. As that which the dream shaped by man as man looks to.
The ethnos can not be addressed ad hominem. In the strongest sense he is not susceptible to be moved to another opinion. One can not address the peculiarity of his conviction. What strikes one in the problem of the ethnos is the way that Dugin wants to think the ethnos as the foundation of the bourgeois or the “imagined” man. When someone is tiered, it is common sense that tells them to sleep. Thinking common sense, as opposed to doctrine and what one learns both in the family and in books and school, does not bring one specificly to the ethnos, yet, if Dugin says one can choose to be the ethnos he implies a break from the ethnos, who is not a choosing being. But a formation that is fateful. Insofar as “rational” man confronts problems that, if contested seriously would shatter his reason, such as a radical conflict in values like the question whether a unborn child is or is not capable to be murdered, or if unhealthy pleasures, that limit the span of life, can be said to be stringently ruled out of the rational life, or whether the promise of the doctrine of pursuit of happiness can never become simple facts, the fateful becomes a brick, which shatters all resplendent rubies which call themselves after names of former beliefs concerning rationality.
“And to delineate the course of the whole inquiry.” one sees in the Methodos the Genetic Circle which never has the problem of origin as a non-present given, as mere life. Instead, the kindling which is always easily lit, assumes that our own opinions are available, but at the same time can never think this availability, in the practical sense of its availability to change, without presupposing the ethnos as the source of the Fate. As the limit state of the “freedom”, without which the deepest room of shadows would not be a room where some shadows were not quite so deep, and some invisibility or light did not let the chamber resound. In considering Aristotle, as we move forward, we at the same time consider the way the measures we have suggest their own renunciation. The way the approach to Aristotle is a consternation of the waves of philosophic consciousness which presuppose a drawing back from the waves to Being.