Thursday, September 28, 2017

The banquet of ousia in the thought of the abyss

Image result for THOMAS SCHÜTTE


Ths sentence, Τό ον λέγεται πολλαχώς, is a constant refrain in
Aristotle. But it is not just a formula. Rather, in this short sentence,
Aristotle formulates the wholly fundamental and new position that
he worked out in philosophy in relation to all of his predecessors,
including Plato; not in the sense of a system but in the sense of a task.


The setting of a task is a drawing forth in which a going away is first realized. Ousia is primarily the sight of this task. Truth, for instance, is thought as the shining forth of the beings. The phenomena, thought as ousia, becomes the true. Thought as ousia, the phenomena are the actualization of the potential, and the potential of what is actualizing. Thought as beings, the phenomena are being with the other beings. Some being like this, other like that. Thought as ousia, the phenomena are that which can be forensically addressed, according to the predicaments, which are ways of accusing.  

Only so far as this lets think, rather than know, does it mean also for the methodos a task.

Monday, September 25, 2017

The Danger of the word of Nietzsche, What would there be to create if there were gods?


The sequence of the list is different here. But this is at first of no consequence. More important is the way that Aristotle introduces the four foldings of beings, both here and in the other passages: εn μεν, έτερον δε, παρα τάντα δέ, έτι παρα πάντα παντα-on the one hand, on the other hand, in addition to, besides. It is a simple serial juxtaposition without any consideration of their structure or connection, much less their justification. Only one thing is said: Τό ον λέγεται πολλαχώςbeings are said in many ways; in fact, in four ways. 


According to Heidegger, the remark of Aristotle, concerning “the ancients” occurs as something peculiar. That the ancients feared that being might “go away”. Something peculiar is here raised in that the “four ways” are not predicaments that anything at all is found in. The sense of this peculiarity is the same in that everything that is decisive in the claim about the forgetfulness of being, is raised in passing! by Aristotle. He does not make the “four ways” into the problem that the ideas are. The ideas, rather, are what occasions the penetrating searching into the dunamis and the energia, which constitute one of the folds. 

The going away of being does not mean what the forgetfulness means. Since what assails the forgetful is fullness of the accidental, of the predicament. Whereas, the rise in heat which accompanies the break of the First Dawn, gasps in dread of the preceding night. The menacing which stirs in the feelings of the first to raise their eyes, is the will of that distancing which distances unutterably in the End of Metaphysics. 

For now we must forgo even a proper schematic presentation of the place of creativity in the basic strife of the Apollonian and the Dionysian, but in passing, the methodos reminds that the ideas were at first thought as in the mind of god, by the Early Fathers, so that the actus purus, action as the will to will, does not move in the region of the "four ways". But Nietzsche can not be exhausted with such schematic de haut en bas. Rather, what is sensed in the ergon of Nietzsche should be accented in the thinking, even when not mentioned explicitly.

Friday, September 22, 2017

The Accidental, according to the sense stimulated by the neo-scholasticism of Brentano

Related image


In addition to the three previously listed foldings, Aristotle here gives a fourth, which he in fact mentions first-the όν κατά συμβεβηκός the accidental being. Συμβεβηκός

accidental [zufällig]; this is a remarkable translation. The translation actually follows the Greek literally, yet it does not hit upon the true Aristotelian meaning. The accidental is indeed a συμβεβηκός, but not every συμβεβηκός is accidental.


The “accidental”, is, according to the teaching of Aristotle, almost the truth. That Priam was the father-in-law of Helen can be read from his person, in the sense that one says, there is the father-in-law of Helen, the shameless one, or, Helen, the pride of women. This which moves is by chance, and not held in what must be. Yet, thought rightly, it is what Priam was, and so it was to be by the boule, or plan, of Zeus, if, Zeus is but a different grammatical case of Dios. Of the highest god. The accidental moves in constant and unlimited waves, radiating most perceptibly in those natures which Fate has cast into the abyss of what breaks and deviates from the one, insofar as it is great. For instance, as dramatized in the legend of the Fate of Oedipus, whose death was said to “bring a boon”.

It is always possible that in this thinking we must consider the mind of Zeus to be the place of the “material”. What is being in the being is the tradition as much as the confusion which rises when the tradition becomes available. Most of all, the objectified object is guiding the truth, such that the peculiar dunamis in the age where cybernetics hold sway, loses itself in tradition, as though the seventeen to twenty thousand year period prior to the age of Plato would return and swallow time. In this sense the text called Heidegger lays down the word of dramatist von Kleist: "I step back before one who is not yet here, and bow, a millennium before him, to his spirit." 

In this, in the region of the accidental, the will to will does not throw open its doors to the presupposition, but, rather, to the storm of all truths. Even in the strata where one thinks the material, the word of the dramatist Heiner Müller recalls us to Nietzsche’s teaching: Aufenthalt im Material, living in the material. What material says here, we must not yet pound out in iron, but Aristotle speaks this as the answer to Plato’s question: What is the eidos?

Thursday, September 21, 2017

Preliminary thesis on the approach to an identification with the ergon of Aristotle according to the questioning guided by a text of Heidegger

Image result for luisa lambri


Without going into detail about all that the beginning of this chapter
offers that is new in comparison to that of chapter one, we can see
one thing clearly: the passage again has to do with the folding [Faltung]
of the being. The being with respect to the categories and the being
with respect to δύναμις and ενέργεια are again mentioned in the same
order. But then a third is added, namely, the true-or-untrue being. The
being is not (διχώς) dually folded but (τριώσ) triply folded. Thus the question of the unfolding
of the being and the origin of this unfolding becomes noticeably more complicated;
the inner interconnection of the three foldings becomes more impenetrable.


Various sentiments of existence which belong to groups are styled world views. They lay claim to no absolute, yet, in proxy, they play a virtual absolute to the varied scatterings of life experiences. They are not opinions. A number of such views come to the general attention of the age, not of this or that age. They were never known in former times. After the break down of agricultural dependence, peoples, set free, began to cultivate the figure of the worker. The rustic existence of the "foreign slaves", serfs, peasants, ceased to exist. The civilizations, which had, until the turn of the century that led into Napoleon’s annihilating storm, ceased to exist in Europe. Hereditary nobles according to styles of breeding, in the oscillating eddies of that coming to be which preceded the American notion of education as distinguished from training, the only proper French, Spanish, English, Germans and so forth, withered and blew away. Various magical identifications, which allowed the ego to invest itself in safe houses, gave the meaning of life found their fons et origo in the age. Each one could no longer be distinguished, in the crudest sense, from brainwashing (or, ideology). No one has the power to see the others as anything but sheltered by trance.The frightening power of the human being to superimpose its sense-of-the-world on others, extended in all directions, and was only limited by the constraint of human personality. This concerns us, when we read Aristotle, for the reason that we want to know how things were with him, and not in some other way. 

The classist can always come close to such a knowing, but in each age the account given by whoever guards such knowing, shows its peculiar aspect. Therefore, one can not take the doctrine of reading out of texts as a proper rule, for it is not equal to the profound power of the human being. Insofar as one speaks in the modern style, this potential remains thought as human. As has been discussed above, we bring something of our own to Aristotle, asking him and being answered according to our own concern. (More has been said on this topic, and the surrounding issues, in earlier entries.)   

According to one powerful and often rehearsed verbal (rather than philosophic) account, Aristotle was mainly a kind of biologist (and in a secondary sense a polymath of unprecedented largeness of interest), highly concerned with taxonomizing the region of nature where the living things are to be observed, indistinguishable in the decisive respect, from post-Darwinian researchers into the sphere of natural species. This account is plausible insofar as we presuppose that Plato was an idealist and his student a realist. And that species, the Latin for eidos, says more or less the same thing as the American word, which is the same, species. If idealism means that the relative weight is given to the one doing the perceiving, rather than to the real thing, as it exists apart from the observer, no such idealism was ever discussed in any ancient text (since the common sense meaning of something existing apart from us is not in question in an idealism, but included in the "representation" of the "subject"). If species is understood as naming a term in a classificatory apparatus, unconcerned in principle with the life of the subject matter, it is doubtful that it even applies to the modern life sciences, which yet come into conflict with the fundamental understanding of nature in physics. Yet, also, Aristotle does not understand species in the sense of a group of animals that one has gone forth and observed empirically, that have through a series of transformations reached their current state. Rather, even in Latin species still chiefly concerned itself with the look of a thing. Species is, let us say it again, the translation of eidos. For who? Not for the Romans, but, rather, for the Schoolmen. Everything that has been saved in the world, in the gigantic storm of the ages, still, considered rightly, hangs over but some 24 hundred years. At the same time, this reckoning in years is obscure, and can't hold. Here we must forgo, the excursus into that matter. 

What is eidos? It is a name for the thing most commonly called intelligence, the ability to think in patterns. More exactly, to come to see that one has before one a pattern. Nothing is presupposed in this sense of the word eidos. That is, intelligence is not taken to be a feature of some objectified being (which, for its part, exists only in so much as it can be calculated), or, in the brain. No more is it a manner of dealing with sense data, which allows one to, after being so stimulated, to throw forward a representation in the style of a “primary quality”.  If Aristotle were to treat an essence, f.i., of the placentals, as a specific subdivision of the genus of Mammals, he would do the same thing as when he speaks of dunamis and energeia, with respect to ousia. Which is to say, he notices a pattern, which is part of what is there (NB: the "there" (read: "Da") is not set off against Geist). That certain animals have the specific difference, i.e., the peculiarity, of gestating their young in pouches, gives the essence Marsupial. Ergo, when we move from Plato to Aristoteles, the student of Plato, we do not leap, with a thud in our chests, from Pythagoras to Darwin. Here we ask about the eidos, in the manner of Plato, and in the modified answer to Plato, of the material. It is not as though a class of people were waiting, such that from youth onward we would be entranced by their sentiments, and find an amazing sense of self-worth in our identification with some image of ourselves, f.i., as a sophisticated person, or, as a worker, or as a emancipatory political agent, rather, from within the self-evident patterns, one discusses opinions, which are identical to what one is, in the sense that when addressed by the logos, one can be moved to transform one’s opinion. What is lost is this: a discourse, in the style of dialogic exchange, on the material. There is no great reason to think Aristotle did not produce such a discourse. But we don’t have it. Instead we have a treatise which speaks to us in-one-way.         

In what follows we will consider what is put down as though it were eating into the being of someone who had been moved through discussion to the opinion (doxa). The material is not an eidos, thus, in what other way is it supposed to be presented to the students at the Lyceum? What hatches out and grows with the young, is not the same as what germinates in whosoever is already standing on their own feet. At first we must see the intelligibility of what was thought. Being moved to change one’s view says something different from that the argument is intelligible. The notion that Plato won every contest of wrestling in the Greek world, and also at Thebes, and then went on to throttle the Persian king in personal combat, though intelligible, will not move us to the region where it holds sway, provided we are in some way adequately informed about the life of Plato and have some sense.  

Monday, September 18, 2017

 Aristotle's teaching of the ergon of Aristotle


As soon as we probe, albeit in but a general way, into the realm of the question of beings, we find ourselves once again in obscurity. But our perplexity increases further in that we are not permitted to remain content with the mere either-or: beings are said either in the manner of the categories or in the manner of δύναμις and ενέργεια. Aristotle himself apprises us of yet another way in the beginning of the tenth and final chapter of this very treatise. (With this chapter, the treatise reaches its proper end; indeed, the whole of Aristotle's philosophy attains its "highest point.") Chapter ten begins:

 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὂν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν τούτων ἢ τἀναντία, τὸ δὲ κυριώτατα ὂν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος


··Since the being [das Seiende] and non-being are said on the one hand in accordance with the forms of categories, and on the other hand in accordance with the potentiality and actuality of these or of their contrary (in short: in accordance with δύναμις and ενέργεια). but the most authoritative being [das Seiende] is true and untrue being ... "


The statement “here we find no genuine philosophizing”, can be contrasted with the statement, “here, just here, there is, genuine philosophizing”.  The one says something as much as the other. They both take the form of sentences. We have two sentences. One says something is not, and the other says that it is. That is the way we find ourselves, amidst language, dealing with what is not, and what is. Being is like that. Aristotle, thusly, merely draws out what is to be said about ousia. He doesn't invent something, or discover anything. However, when we think about it, this feature is questionable. What is the most basic is “obscure”, but thinking is drawn to admit that it is not yet thinking over what it most treasures. This treasured being, the one that is said in the manner of not being, and being, is also said in the style of potential and actual. Is this because of the human being? Or, is it a feature of the reflective character of mammals, who when they are hungry, know that they are hungry? Do only human beings have the ability to refuse hunger, and fast? Is it because the human being is different that it alone has being and not being, potential and actuality, or, rather, do all being have this? Or, is it the same as what the things are when no beings are here? The sense in which ousia is found to have these traits remains oblique, it looks from the side, it takes opaque formulation not because we lack sensitivity to the issue (like an examination of musical things, by an unmusical person), or because more information about it is needed, but because it does. 

Insofar as we see a “genuine" or "real”, chair, and not just some old thing to sit on, we look from the side, we see in a peculiar way. But, even when we see a chair, what is there is looked at aslant, and the look is the look of a suppositum. According to Aristotle the individual substance appears according to the look of the phenomenon. Thusly, the look or eidos, is called the particular, for it is part of the eidos. Whenever we discuss a “genuine masterpiece”, we move from a particular instance, e.g., Descartes’ analytic geometry, to the general conception, for instance, of “something extraordinary”, The analytic geometry is “something extraordinary”, and, the phrase “something extraordinary”, means, such a particular thing as the analytic geometry of Descartes. Yet, when a student in grade school plots some coordinates on his graph, there sits a individual unfolding of this geometry. This one, and one points. But, what one points to, the thing that subsists and can not be divided, at the same time is the particular, or part, under the conception. The individual is raised in a insufficient form, insofar as the idea looks sideways at it, determining it according to the look or idea. This is said in order to ask, does being, ousia, speak according to a side glance? 

The region of the “motion” of dunamis and energeia is beyond the region of the eidos, and within the substance, both of the intelligent things, i.e., persons, and of the non-intelligent. This “ousia” penetrates beyond the phenomena. We see a tree, but that it is an “individual”, belongs to the intellect. Yet, not in the same respect as a line, which is without width, but a length, belongs to mathamatical projection. It is a region of motion, and not of the eternal truth. The “wood” or “earth”, the stuff that things are made of, the material, is not exactly part of the mutable world, but neither is it thought as eternal. Each thing is as a different material substrate, that comprises its substance. When Goethe speaks of “frozen music” he compares the eternal realm of geometry, to the mutable, but resting, region of architecture. It is “frozen”, for if one stays with the eidos, with its appearance, it moves, but in slow motion, as it were. Howsofar Goethe’s metaphysics is the metaphysics of looking, and not of intelecting, is a question that reminds us of Aristotle’s notion of individual movment, movment beyond the eidos. How would this be called, according to the Scholastic schema? Music is mathamatical thinking in time. And geometry is that thinking in space. Astronomy moves in time and space. Yet, why is Astronomy thought as a mathematical thinking? Mathamatical means that the knowing is, with sure reliability, cast forward into the things. Thinking animality in the animal, and the character of plants in a plant, is mathematical thinking. Likewise, Astronomy, because it takes place according to circular, celestial motion, and not according to earthly, error ridden motion, is thought as mathamatical. The mathema is what is learned, in such a way that the memory becomes experience, and so, according to what Aristotle teaches, it “harmonizes with the truth”. Thus, the animal things, truly are animals, according to this thinking of the way we know through popular or common sense. Animals are not stones. They are not to be reduced to atomic facts, according to this popular way of knowing which stands decisively disputed by the fundamental science of physics. 

We are making an attempt to think through the manner in which Aristotle conceived of the region where the dunamis and the energia were thought, by thinking over a basic conception of thinking, that of the mathema. If being itself, ousia, is the place of truth, and falsehood, is that compatible with the thinking of being as having the “fold” of dunamis and energeia? Yet, do we not, in experiencing being, harmonize with the truth, which is itself what we learn about, when we gain the experience? Aristotle does not raise a logical attack on what he finds, and raises without disturbing, in or as the “obscurity”. These difficulties we should constantly struggle not to forget as we make our steps. Allowing ourselves, as much as is possible, to transform into Aristotle.

Tuesday, September 12, 2017

imbricated to the being, the being of beings overlaps

Image result for Luisa Lambri


§ 2. The manifold of the being of beings 

Beings are said and addressed sometimes as category, and sometimes as, δύναμιςενέργεια; thus in a dual way, διχως, not μοναχώς, not in a single and simple way. What is the origin of this distinction? What is the justification for this twofold deployment in the address and saying of being? Aristotle offers no explanation or reason for this, neither here nor elsewhere. He does not even so much as raise the question. This differentiation of the ov is simply put forth. It is somewhat like when we say that mammals and birds are included in the class of animals. Το όν λέγεται τό μέν—τό δέ. Why are beings deployed in such a twofold way? Is it because of the beings themselves that we have to give this dual account of beings? Or are we humans the reason for it? Or is this solely due neither to beings themselves nor to us humans? But then to what is it due? 


The many sides in which being is there is a matter of course, spontaneous to the “genuine philosophizing”.  If we come across a stone, we know that it is not a lizard or the basin of a small waterfall. We may yet need to learn the particular names, but, the distinction is spontaneously available to the freshness that accompanies whoever the muses have sung language over in their cradle. Which language? And how so far do we go from language to language? Does more than one language still exist? The language of homo brutalitas, the reasonless man, the nihilist or positivist ego, global man, already washed back and forth in the waters where Shūzō Kuki willed Iki to become a concept, when it no longer erupted amidst its world. In the questiong the spontaneousness of the fresh thinking of Aristotle no longer stands in the fleur de l'âge of a magnificent spring day, but it moves in the dark wind that the day loses itself in. The nocturnal questioning no longer reaches a thought of time as something later than the Greeks, as something before the event. This would fundamentally misunderstand the sense in which thinking of being as time is conceptualized in order to be let free in the resolute pursuance of the presupposition.  

A particular learning in accordance with Aristotle’s teaching changes the way of knowing. Learning is not a matter of esoteric lore or bookish abstraction, but of coming to stand beside the beings as something that brings forward the being of beings. What differentiates learning from becoming, as of phusis, is that through a habitual action we transform ourselves, in a way that is not available to, e.g., water, which simply falls down noisily from above to bellow. But a dancer, when they train, will in time learn their dance provided they have the talent. Here this talent is what must already be ready to be brought into shape by the dream of the dance. The will and the heart of dance waits amidst the beings for whoever would be swallowed up by their positive guidance. Yet, the dream shaped by the dance would be nothing if it were not for that which Aristotle takes as a matter of course. Namely that there is potential and actuality. When we consider the specific possibility of the style of Dara Friedman, we can not say that by nature, the relative of Pina Bausch, came to be a dancer. The comparison of their styles is artificial, for in each case it springs from a different potentia, and therefore according to a different will it comes into the fullness or flower of being. So far as we think of this or that dancing, we do not come to consider the univocity with which dance speaks. This is all the more pressing in the case of the ubiquitous nature of the possibility of learning, of becoming something that brings forth according to a knowing, in so far as it is the basic trait of Western being. That which becomes technicity.        

The thinking of Heidegger puts forward the “why” in the positivity of questioning, which entails all that we went through in the talk of the mystical vision that says “The rose is without 'why'; it blooms because it blooms.” As it stands with the everyday knowing, with the political knowing, with the scientific perfectio, which, in principle completes “folk” knowing. All that is becoming the learning, in the Aristotelian sense, of the path to knowing, is already underway according to the thinking that does not know, but that in admitting it does not yet know what thinking is comes to question, in the ergon of the text called Heidegger. At the same time, is the Methodos learning Heidegger, such that it would become that being of beings that knows in the style or 'mode' of questioning, or has the questioning which is more and more radically a part of the average being of all beings on the earth, already doing something unthought by the thinking that is its tutor? What is still unthought in the thinking of the guide, like an old volume, when its dust is first brushed into the air, suggests both its own outline and overwhelming substance, and the largeness of its demands, and also the possibility of its being left behind. At the same time, the great thinkers are not those innumerable mediocrities, the professors, which everywhere describe the odor of the dust.

Thursday, September 7, 2017

The First Beginning According to Aristotle as thought in the ergon of Heidegger, as seen in the methodos

Image result for Luisa Lambri


Aristotle does not say any more. But it is enough, more than enough, for us—we who come from afar and from outside and who no longer have the ground that sustains this inquiry. It is more than enough for us who have been trained in this indiscriminate philisophic scholarship, and who conceal our philisophic impotance in clever industry. What we need is a brief pause to reflect on what is said here. In the announcement of the treatise's realm of questioning. We want to see more clearly what Aristotle asks about and how this questioning is worked through.


We now come to the end of the opening remarks (of section one of the introduction)

The freshness of Aristotle, by contrast with the scholarship of “we who come from afar”, is “genuine philosophizing”. Whoever comes for a visit, expecting much, will be disappointed by the sense of how ordinary everything is. In coming to Aristotle we are bringing something with us, that we expect Aristotle will help us to answer, so that his answer can only come through what we bring. Yet in a mirror, what conforms to what is brought to the mirror, is answered back by what the mirror gives, so that something in common to be shattered is brought forward to being. Most of all the thinking in Heidegger wants to caution itself against contemplation of what it finds, and instead to look at what Aristotle shows, and to let what is shown work on us. The sense of the leap is like that of the event. What goes beyond the objective character of what can be presented to thought as what is logical, is what is meant by the poetic “afar”. We are “afar” because we lack the sense of Being, because we are durably cabined in the “clever industry”.

The “genuine philosophizing” is the affirmation of the “sun” and the sweetness of being, which more than anything the First Beginning was hypersensitive to. In contracting the germs of this tempore, we do not aspire to rehearse it, or to rescue it for the sake of bringing it back, but rather to gain the sense, rather than what we already have, which is the power to picture or envision in a present account or in thought, the way that Being is flowing in the subtle sense of the conception of time we find in Heidegger. At the same time this conception, this metaphysical thinking, is working on us, the ergon of Heidegger wants to put the human being, which has reached its most radical end in the metaphysics of the objectified object, which is commanded by the Will to Will, ostensibly by the ego invested in the society organized by the sciences, to the fire of the event. In our last post, we suggested how the question of the origin of the human being, which is that being which ritual sacrifice of the human being called forth in its origin, amongst archaic man, at the moment of death. Aristotle, one should recall, said that the soul was what one calls life. This life which in Aristotle is “all the things”, flashes in the rays of sun on the surface of the ritual knife, when the blood flows over it. Again, in Heidegger, at the close of this History of Being, death is brought back from afar, quicking the passion for thought that fills the body of the thinker.