Will to Will, as Sustainment in the Historial
It is convenient and therefore popular, particularly in giving an
account of ancient philosophy, to appeal to later and more recent
doctrines to aid in understanding. On the question of the Aristotelian
categories, one usually consults Kant. And in point of fact, he also
derived the categories "logically" from the Table of Judgments, from
the modes of assertion. But "logical" for Kant and "logical" for
Aristotle have different meanings. Not only that. The comparison
above all overlooks a fundamental character of the categories as
Aristotle understands them. This fundamental character of the categories
is expressly stated in the passage we are considering: κατηγορία τον οντος
"categories of beings." What does this mean? Does it mean categories
that refer to beings as to their "object" (genitivus objectivus) or categories
that belong to beings as to a subject (genitivus subjectivus)? Or are both meant?
Or neither? We shall have to leave this question open.
We must be ready to think philosophically. When one comes to think of it, in the universities, the higher and more capable among the faculty, speak of the romantic. Whatever form this abusive term takes, it must mean fiction. In thinking, one must be ready to think without this crutch, which separates and excludes. Most of all when we ask, who does the word speak for, subject, object, both, neither, we come to see that we are not yet philosophizing. This demand is most of all a simple demand to be ready to admit that we have not yet understood what philosophy means.
It is clear that in Kant “logic” is determined according to the “framework”, if you like, which gives the phenomena that character of being held in place by rules. At the same time we are not facing the world, we are not in position to be Aristotle, to stand in the First Beginning. We are not considering all this as an available world of beings, but through Kant, the methodos has a guidance unknown to Aristotle.
We should remind ourselves that in the text called Heidegger, the doctrine of Close Reading is set aside as a fiction. One can not merely read out of texts, we do not perceive them in the sense of the “genitivus objectivus”, as what is directed from the object. Even in our reading we are already venturing to let the methedos learn something to and for itself.
Historiologicaly, is it at all clear who the so-called Neo-Kantians were? Was the name an exonym, leveled by a second tranche of Neo-Kantians, Husserl and Heidegger, against the Marburg School, did any of them read Kant, or were they all “neo”? What does the “neo” mean here? That Kant was set aside, and taken up again. That Kant was modified, by some resurgent readers, and then others, more orthodox, retrieved Kant himself? It is easy to set aside the current Kant, the “Deontological” Kant, as mere childishness, a kind of taking parts from the whole in a wholly arbitrary fashion which never gets to Kant at all. So that the “Deontological” Kant might as well sit beside a “Transcendental” Kant without the moral doctrine, and a “Noumenal” Kant, without the rest of the doctrine. As if no essential guidance were to be found in Kant’s own form, in his character as philosopher. The shattered slate that appears in the Analytic Kant, in the current vapid talk of “Kant”, which is mostly made by those who beside from being wholly incompetent to read even a page of Kant properly, in the main, do not even read Kant more than an essay. All this means that a text is always suspended above the Nothing. Only the constant and resolute movement into its regions allows for the possibility of its “inner will” to bring what is most worthy in it to pass.