Monday, July 31, 2017

Will to Will as the κίνησις of Being as energia or action




The third sentence we cited from Aristotle in the above passage further determines in what sense οὐσία is first among the categories. "For everything that is must of and in itself have the saying of οὐσία." For example, ποιόν, the being so constituted [Beschaffensein]. Taken alone, there is no such thing. We do not understand being so constituted in its most proper meaning unless we comprehend as well the being so constituted of something. This reference - "of something"- is part of the very makeup of the categories. The other categories are not only incidentally and subsequently connected with the first category by means of assertions, as though they could mean something independently; rather, they are always, in accord with their essence, co-saying the οὐσία. And to the extent that the categories are beings, they are co-being with οὐσία. This is already said beforehand and being beforehand. It is the first category, and that also means the first being: τό πρῶτος όν. 


According to Aristotle one is always on the lookout for essences. The mind, nous (nóos), wants to hunt them down. Does nous here stand with the logos, as it were, stand and fall with the logos? And thereby not with any other form of speach or thinking. Logos is already working with concepts, but what concepts are for Aristotle is not what they become for Thomas Aquinas, or for Willard Van Orman Quine. The modern tradition, however, when in Husserl it casts off the logos, which was always working with, most of all, ousia, does not thereby rid itself of its limit state. Its limit state is thus thought as Aristotle. Insofar as today one speaks against the concept, in Bergson or a lesser thinker who strikes against philosophy as what is conceptual, one orients oneself by Aristotelian thinking.

The British thinking, when it inherited Kant, lost the sense that Kant had thought the analytic. We now look at the manner in which thinking shifts its tonality. If thinking could think a tautology, a mere statement, unconnected to reality, “all bachelors are single,” as analysis, it would be involved in a theoretical speculation (it would be like the other incorrect example commonly given “all triangles have three sides”). Kant thinks his analytic propositions according to an engagement with the world. The analytic proposition is a proposition, which is not tautological, or true by definition. Rather, it is true so far as the predicated thing, as narrated by the logos, can be derived from the concept. The concept is the universal. A universal is what is the same in each case of a given genus. I make a sweeping statement: All human beings intuit essences. To intuit an essence is to have immediate understanding of the concept. Each human being, has the universal power, of all human beings: to intuit essences. He is the only being, or only earthly being, with this power. 

Every time one comes across, to give another example, a tree, what the thing is permeates it with the possibility of being thought as what it is. Nous searches out the answer to the question What is it?. A tree is a plant that stretches its crown towards the sky, this is true of every tree. Trees stand, animals do not stand, humans stand. Yet, one might find a tree that is not a plant, that when it falls under the eye, is seen not to stand and stretch towards the light of the sun. Every rule has its exception. At least as long as it is a rule that is part of prudential reason, of experience, and not a abstract theoretical rule of pure maths. One must have some recourse, in the last instance, to checking the knowledge one has of the universal. The universal, which is what is known of all trees, a priori. In the strict sense, if I can not see the tree, I can not intuit the essence. Every time one comes across a tree, one thereby is granted knowledge of the concept. The thing seen could not be what it is without the esse, the being, that it is. 

Not once does Kant think in the flat and abstracted manner that wholly abstracts from Reason, from the knowing of things. Kant speaks operari sequitur esse. The exertion of influence of the thing stems from its “esse.” Here we should let the medieval terminology speak to us correctly, about the unknown Aristotle we now approach in the current text. The medieval Aristotle, who is ‘the Philosopher,’ is not that Platonic Aristotle of the ancients. Yet it is no mistake, on the contrary, it is wholly correct, to let esse speak as a wrung on the same ladder as ousia. We must consider that, in fact, in the general awareness, even the shift in tonality from Kant, to the British thinking, the Analytical Thinking (which one can say stems in some major way from Bacon) and the French thinking (which is well sourced in Descartes), the Continental Thinking, utterly forget the determination of the ergon still at work in Kant. The force necessary to think back to the First Beginning is much more extraordinary than that small force, which is, however, generally unavailable, needed to think back to Kant. 

The ‘cogito sum’ thinks the something as something as the esse. It thinks itself, the sum, also, as the esse. The sum is the ‘I exist.’  The ego, the something, and the something, all stand in the being of the esse. The question raised here is whether the being alters the ego, the something, and the something. The energia, the action, of that being, is also called Life. One’s life in the full sense. The therefore I am means that the human has a Fate if and only if the action is thought. It makes no difference if this or that assertion is made about the energia, that it is “determined,” or random. That it has or does not have a sense. In speaking of the Geschick of being we set all this aside in the radical unthought region, in what Strauss calls the “radically mysterious dispensation.” 

Put another way, the question starts with Aristotle because in Aristotle it is taken, as it were, naively, that man can know. That he is fitted to the world. And the thinking until today still orbits Aristotle, in more or less doubting this. Christianity teeters when it is thought that God deceives human beings, that man is not in the natural position to know the world: adaequatio intellectus et rei. Aristotle, prior to the tradition of the Christians, even further from the certainty of moderns in their technical reason, in its knowing. The technical reason is the completion of the concealment, since it is wholly believing in the power of man, in the belief in his activity, in his being at home so far as to utterly slumber in blind and prompt obedience to Power, to Will to Will. Will to Will always brings the action to the centre of effect, empty effect which can be collected as sheer zest for possibility. As future itself. This future is future because in the technical there is no “what for.” It is because it effectsthat is the meaning of Power as such. 


The eastern thought, which was not metaphysical, never thought towards the Knowing. Rather it was beckoned cessation of the transmigration. The Aristotelian thought, very late coming back into the East, made the cessation seem to be a thinking, whereas it was never thinking. Thinking is chiefly that self assertion, that doe
s not hear what draws forth. In this sense the "deepening of the modern tradtion" (ref. Strauss) in the ergon of the thinking with the title Heidegger, holds in abayence the loop of its horizon, the technical essence. It doesn't know whether the loop has its full limit, whether in the whole of the terrestrial orbis, or in some region. 

If the hardness of the concept, the grave stricture of the logical tonality, with its power to logically exclude, is brought in as a signal trait of "Aristotle," as the lumens arguens, the clear light, the luminosity of what has the power to suggest, of the arguens, the silvery light, the argument, we only pay out in kind a methodos, a guiding way, that guides without accepting everything that is thought in the style of this or that tonality. In not knowing guiding as guiding, or, better, in stepping outside the circle, in removing, the sense of "guiding" moves, it sees that it is not fixated, it is moving insofar as in the moving, rather than sensing the seriousness of the station, it plays at the guidance, it senses the movement and the guidance in the being of the circle and the leaving of the circle, and so becomes the Methodos.


The thinker who dies young, not so young as Lessing's son, who perhaps did not know the world so well, Kleist speaks banality: 

“I step back before one who is not yet here, and bow, a millennium before him, to his spirit.”

If in thinking Heidegger as hubristic we fail to see that in thousands of years only few great thinkers arrive, we then fail to see the banality of this word of Heidegger, who, before the task, showed proper awe. What else could one who saw what was to be seen do? Ergo, in this nothing personal stands.

Thursday, July 27, 2017

The Nietzschean Spirit as Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta according to the art of the ergon with the name Heidegger


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(The essence of the categories is rooted in λόγος as a gathering and making manifest. Does this connection of oneness and truth signify being? At that place in Parmenides where the first saying of being occurs, the character of presence is ἐν [compare p. 19 below]. Notice the interconnection of ὄν as οὐσία, παρ– and συνουσία, and ἐν as together with, and λόγος as gatheredness, assemblage, consolidation; and in this context the "copula," the "is.")


A part of the Paramenides Fragment reads:

Μόνος δ΄ ἔτι µῦθος ὁδο

One path only is left for us to (muthos) speak of


When we think “ὄν as οὐσία” we think according to the ‘categorization’ of οὐσία. Categorization is emphatic, it tends to promote, is a sly way at first, discussion that does not see what it is saying at the level of the tonality of what is said. Rather, it tends to fix the standards. The Einheit, unit, as the unitary, which is spoken again, as Einheit is what Nous as the faculty which is defined by the thinking of this categorical ousia as thought in the Parmenides fragment becomes for Aristotle. We have, on the other hand, Hericlitus, who speaks of the one and the many in another way:

λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι ‘πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει,’ καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς ‘δὶς ἐςτὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης.’

Heracleitus says, you know, that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream.

Here we have this Platonic talk of the same river, auton. Insofar as our technical skill, is not perfect, in sensing and bringing to thought the fine distinctions, in Parmenides, in Hericlitus, in Plato and then in Aristotle, we fail to keep to the level of consciousness demanded by the essence of the work that thinks Nietzsche into the Methodos.

We must here make what amounts to an excursus from the text, but we must know what is going on in a way that does not come up in the text. If we stay to the understanding of Nous as the faculty at work in Aristotle, we must understand nous that when Aristotle sets Plato’s theory of Participation aside, as we will see in the text forthcoming, he at the same time, putting aside the  methexis, Aristotle, who was known by the ancients as a Platonic Philosopher, and was not as is often said a great dissenter from Plato, though, true, he founded his own school, brought this problem back in at the level of Nous. Here we make a distorted jumble of biography and philisophic thought, out of spirit with the text we are following, yet these remarks are necessary to give the Methodos a contact with the comprehensive knowledge which is needed to move in the region of the work of thought undertaken. It is even possible that we will come to sense this problem in the λόγος.

One must consider the question whether the limit of the logos is what is also an object of the eye. The seesaw of sight and the word that houses the sight, or the symbol that one makes, and the thing, hold the immediacy of the understanding between them. However vaguer images, that in a concrete way, for instance in the art of the artist, can be the potential or power according to which a thing is made, are not necessarily clear inner pictures. When the logos is made to serve the natural precision of Aristotle, which is exacting, but not artificially so, as with many others, it, even with this graceful exactitude that knows the limit of exactitude, cuts into the basic ground. The tendency to think is wafted up in this movement towards greater and greater remove form the undivided or orginary, which is not a ground to be expressed. Thus we have the evidence of the muthos of Parmenides.

Muthos is said to be a manner of speech, distinct from logos. In Ortega y Gasset we have the opinion that muthos was used by the Early thinkers self-consiously, in a dissent from the older tradition, which used muthos unironically. thus that logos ran through the muthos, either because no other way was available, or because it was to be hidden from the public arbiters, or, again, because the ironists enjoyed the stylistic game. However here the Methodos follows another view, the muthos is not yet broken into ground and reason, and the thing being thought is not yet ousia, it is not yet determinate in its character. Not the word philosopher is passing about yet in the public, amongst the gentleman. Insofar as it speaks, it is a only for those who are developing the new Lichtung. This is how the text with the name Heidegger is thinking the originary, as prior to the split of the ground, and the reasoning.

Great technical skill is demanded in the exposition of this that is said in the above, only loosely. Ergo, we must be on the lookout for the unfolding of the theoretical rigor of this thought in the text as we move forward. When what holds in the material is thought, it is though in the logos, or in maths, it is represented, either as this and that thing, or as the ubiquity of the einheit of potential and actual. In the Christian thought, this movement that in the Greek was never fully thought, and remained the subject that we now enter into in the text of Aristotle, raises up out of the Greek idea, that the cause and the result are thinkable, that they yield a Lichtung for the thinking, into the Godhead, as the energia that is thought as the pure kinesis of the Erotic movment. Man is thought as that being that is receptive to the movement. When history is thought as Progress, this thought casts off, for the first time in Kant, the Godheit, it casts the potentia away. It makes of Progress a Salvation without the “Parasit der Ethik”. This thinking becomes the notion of determinacy. The consideration concerns the necessity, which, finally becomes nature-fact, rather than artifact. The History of being, looked at as concrete development, is the coming to see the fact as ground, and the value as reason. Yet, anyone who stumbles amidst the bleached bones, senses the falseness of the division, but without the power to regain the unity.


Light and matter are both single entities, and the apparent duality arises in the limitations of our language. It is not surprising that our language should be incapable of describing the processes occurring within the atoms, for, as has been remarked, it was invented to describe the experiences of daily life, and these consist only of processes involving exceedingly large numbers of atoms. Furthermore, it is very difficult to modify our language so that it will be able to describe these atomic processes, for words can only describe things of which we can form mental pictures, and this ability, too, is a result of daily experience. Fortunately, mathematics is not subject to this limitation, and it has been possible to invent a mathematical scheme — the quantum theory — which seems entirely adequate for the treatment of atomic processes; for visualisation, however, we must content ourselves with two incomplete analogies — the wave picture and the corpuscular picture.
  • "Introductory" in The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory (1930) as translated by Carl Eckhart and Frank C. Hoyt, p. 10.

Werner Heisenberg

Monday, July 24, 2017

Will to Will vis–à–vis Language

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Yet earlier, in our interpretation of Aristotle's second sentence in the above passage, we said that the categories have their home in λόγος. But λόγος, assertion, is assertion about beings, not the beings themselves. So we have a dual claim: the categories belong to λόγος, and the categories are the beings themselves. How do these go together? We do not have the answer. From now on let us remember that the question of the essence of the categories leads into obscurity.


second sentence:  The other beings are said with regard to what is said when saying οὐσία, the how much as well as the how constituted and the others that are said in this manner; for everything that is must in and of itself have the saying of οὐσία, as stated in the previous discussion.

To say “this is a teacher” is a clear and distinct categorization, a gesture accompanies what is said, the fact is perpetually and constantly established by the, so-called, accusation. The laws of thought demand that a Teacher be understood vis–à–vis a connection to what belongs together, what is gathered in the accusation is a kind of logic. A teacher and not a student, a teacher that at the feet of which must sit students. Something is opened in the horizon of the Laws of Thought. An area of reality in which ousia moves. The problem, as over and against the question, is an object of such logic. The logos, since Husserl, in its independent Power, is not nailed to the cross of the logic. At least in the sense of what is correctly understood, we now see Category as more Philosophical, in the sense of the tradition, than is logos. At the same time the tension of the Erotic movement, of the development of the Geschick, is inferred back into the orginary logos. The History of Being is meant. 

Someone uses the category, or categorizing, in the style of a non-muthos, a “logical” fixation of the positioning of something as something amidst the world known to nous. Logos, speech, as speech, not as the rational, is prior to muthos. But on the other hand, language is not simply identical to speech or writing. This should be kept in mind. A Lichtung, lighting, as the “intentionality”, is an Erotic process, it presupposes the logos as wisdom, as ultimate intelligence or sophos. The sophos which is concerned with the right way of doing things. The possibility of ad hominem address, of the way what is intelligible can come before the man, and in its diffuse or irrational shattered look, move the opinion to transformation, belongs to the logos of Eros. But the Eros itself, when thought as Will to Will, is perspectival. Its sun is only the one it happens to see, in the same sense as that some ancient animals who were infinitely excited by the proximity to heat, to the living body, were quite indifferent to the crackling of lightning in its thunder. The Socratic theoria, theoria is synonymous with guidance or orientation, is brought closer to the sensing of the questioning that holds that Thinking is not yet happening. Questioning is then correctly said not to be a matter of a problem. It is not that learning which is a movement of the opinion towards the true sun.      

The teacher as the one there, and you point, is the correct truth, but what appears before one, when the one is taken back into the thinking, so the one (the subject), and the something as something, the teacher seen, who is held to be a teacher by the guiding or orienting of man as man, as the historial truth, as what always is seen in the incredible impossibility, that of holding to one view, all come to the orginary logos. But we as yet remain in obscurity. 


Various Remarks of an Exploitative Character

The radical Freedom envisioned by the Greeks, the opening of the highest good, is today, in the universities, called 'anti-democratic'. The absurdity of such ill-informed talk, however, is of no arbitrary origin, nor does it speak, in essence, incorrectly. What changes in the Historial, is Dasein, so that nothing remains in the energia, in the fire, but the simple lighting. Dasein that seeks wisdom, that seeks the right way of doing things, looks at the eidos within, then at the potentia ordinata, then to disolution of all "ways of doing things". Insofar as a definitive possibility ceases to obtain for the Will to Will, Dasein itself wavers like the blooming of explosives in the wind. Da-sein prepairs to step aside in the Thinking, but it as yet does not venture to learn Thinking without Da-sein. However, Husserl says, one can only watch the movement of the Phenomena. Husserl is like a giant walking along the infinite distance between two stars, and never showing any sign of peevishness in the face of the forsaken waste, but the text called Heidegger is synonomous with a silver crown hanging on a throne, which as though in supreme consternation flickers, its comprehension the play of light along the calm surface of the pool of Diana at Nemi. 

Whereas ancient or Biblical Hebrew speaks of before and after it lacks the present tense of the “is”. This is true, formally, of the Modern Hebrew, but in essence the Modern Hebrew language is thought in a diverse manner, but whatever its essence, it is not of what was held in being from that time. Ergo, the Dasein of the Ancient Hebrew no longer exists. If this is true, the Language is not what is spoken, or written, but in the eidos, or opinion, that ultimately guides man as man. The “is” that corresponds to the Western nous, is not the word, but the nous that first raises its head at the gate of Athens is what is thought by the Dasein of the ancient Greek according to what comes forward in the lighting, in what stand before as what flows in, issuing from the Early Greeks, prior to philosophy as such, in Parmenides it comes to its categorization. 

In this we turn from the subject as the one who the something as something appears to, to the something in the way it resounds as the something. To the circle itself. The eidos, as the opinion that Justice is to return what is owed, can always be moved, so that it is no longer what justice is, except in mere talk. Mere talk, the abstraction, along with reflection, is not the being of a being that is categorized as ousia by Aristotle. As late as Aristotle, and not earlier.  

Sunday, July 23, 2017

Will to Will as Telos


‘the ensuing lack of orientation’


In any case, the usual representation of the categories as "forms of thought," as some sort of encasements into which we stuff beings, is thereby already repudiated for having mistaken the facts. All the more so considering that Aristotle in our passage even calls the categories simply τὰ ὄντα, "beings" [die Seienden]. That which absolutely belongs to beings.


It should always be understood that the teaching of Aristotle is under discussion, so that one should never think that what is asserted is a claim, on the part of the work called Heidegger, about the Truth. One might think that, in a case like the paragraph we are now looking at. Rather, what is being distinguished, is the reading of this and that reader of Aristotle, and an adequately (by the standard of the standpoint of the methodos of the text called Heidegger, that must role out if it is to learn what it admits in admitting that it does not yet Think) informed and careful propounding of the Truth concerning Aristotle [Truth as Historial correctness! As the 'read in' (to the text).]. Therefore, the text called Heidegger, in its path, as it ventures to think, admitting that it doesn't know its path, but is led only by the venture to take up the path, speaks of the orginary Ἀριστοτέλης. Aristoteles, the aristos telos, the best telos, the best way of taking one’s steps. A teleological process has to do with stages. 

Here, however, we do not speak of telos in the sense of the developed sense of a passage through stages, but rather, in the sense the word will has in the translations of Homer. The word will does not exist for the Greeks. the word τελέω in the opening of Homer’s Iliad is correctly, according to the customary understanding, read out as “Will”, but it says, as we have earlier touched on, as correctly, Plan, as correctly, brought into the idiomatic language, it would say, it happened the way I wanted it to, it happens according to what I want is not Will, but according to what resonates in the Character or Form. Nature, as Zeus, is the way what happens on its own Wills the coming forth of all results, of action, of the conditions of man as man, of all things, of the Earth. But the same thing happens in the understanding of texts, in their ergon, as they accomplish by being brought into the ever more forcible circling of their activity. 

[It’s not that the Methodos abandons the need to keep to the text, and instead takes up all manner of arbitrary excursus into etymology, but rather, in what the Text resonates with, in what the text is here for the sake of, as Politia is always for the sake of some title to Rule, e.g., Aristocracy is for the sake of Rule of the Best, a claim is made to listen to what resonates in the text. The excursus is to be judged by the standard of the golden ear, and the tin ear, which is that ear which draws towards what resounds or sounds out in the resounding.] 

Aristotle in our passage even calls the categories simply τὰ ὄντα, "beings" [die Seienden]. That which absolutely belongs to beings. 

Even the Methodos is a being. The categories are not ways of labeling the genre or divisions of beings. The situation, all things that, as it were, stand under the galaxy, show themselves only as what is occasioned by category. Everything that is, is not categorizable, but rather, catagory. The ground of any being is its category. What shows itself, and stands, is always what is this or that. We are making a bridge, taking our steps, comprehending Aristotle and Kant. At the same time, the Will as what is supposed to stand in contradistinction to nature, is flowing, not by force of some reader, but by the whole of all things as they come before das Man, in nature, into the Laws of Nature, into the Highest God, Zeus. What belongs to being is effect. Effect is Power as Future. Effect means that teleology, that which is behind the actions of all men and all animals, said in its unthought form, means to ends, e.g., that a rat in a garbage can tries to get out, that a man in a locked room tries to test every spot, in order to escape, in the first case, by instinct, in the latter, by his understanding of his End, ceases to be Telos, the Maxim of action towards what resonates, but becomes Power as such, Future as Effect that is blind. Yet, in all this, what is “absolute” in the beings, never ceases to be as that ens which is of the omnes, the thinking of Will to Will remains what is of the ontic. 

In the surrendering, is the take over. When the represented subject is surrendered, in Nietzsche, to Will to Will, at the same time consequens, the consequent, what is effect as Future, stacked up in the Possibility, comes to Thought. Thinking for the first time understands, or, better, senses, that it is not yet Thinking. The ‘ego cogito’ casts itself as the ground of omnes ens est unum, and the logos as entity replaces the genitivus subjectivus, but no longer speaking from underneath (the Greek sub), form above (the Christian Beyond), or from within (the Kantian ex ante synchronizing region).  

Tuesday, July 18, 2017

Will to Will, as Sustainment in the Historial

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It is convenient and therefore popular, particularly in giving an

account of ancient philosophy, to appeal to later and more recent
doctrines to aid in understanding. On the question of the Aristotelian
categories, one usually consults Kant. And in point of fact, he also
derived the categories "logically" from the Table of Judgments, from
the modes of assertion. But "logical" for Kant and "logical" for
Aristotle have different meanings. Not only that. The comparison
above all overlooks a fundamental character of the categories as
Aristotle understands them. This fundamental character of the categories
is expressly stated in the passage we are considering: κατηγορία τον οντος
"categories of beings." What does this mean? Does it mean categories
that refer to beings as to their "object" (genitivus objectivus) or categories
that belong to beings as to a subject (genitivus subjectivus)? Or are both meant?
Or neither? We shall have to leave this question open.


We must be ready to think philosophically. When one comes to think of it, in the universities, the higher and more capable among the faculty, speak of the romantic. Whatever form this abusive term takes, it must mean fiction. In thinking, one must be ready to think without this crutch, which separates and excludes. Most of all when we ask, who does the word speak for, subject, object, both, neither, we come to see that we are not yet philosophizing. This demand is most of all a simple demand to be ready to admit that we have not yet understood what philosophy means. 

It is clear that in Kant “logic” is determined according to the “framework”, if you like, which gives the phenomena that character of being held in place by rules. At the same time we are not facing the world, we are not in position to be Aristotle, to stand in the First Beginning. We are not considering all this as an available world of beings, but through Kant, the methodos has a guidance unknown to Aristotle.    

We should remind ourselves that in the text called Heidegger, the doctrine of Close Reading is set aside as a fiction. One can not merely read out of texts, we do not perceive them in the sense of the “genitivus objectivus”, as what is directed from the object. Even in our reading we are already venturing to let the methedos learn something to and for itself. 

Historiologicaly, is it at all clear who the so-called Neo-Kantians were? Was the name an exonym, leveled by a second tranche of Neo-Kantians, Husserl and Heidegger, against the Marburg School, did any of them read Kant, or were they all “neo”?  What does the “neo” mean here? That Kant was set aside, and taken up again. That Kant was modified, by some resurgent readers, and then others, more orthodox, retrieved Kant himself? It is easy to set aside the current Kant, the “Deontological” Kant, as mere childishness, a kind of taking parts from the whole in a wholly arbitrary fashion which never gets to Kant at all. So that the “Deontological” Kant might as well sit beside a “Transcendental” Kant without the moral doctrine, and a “Noumenal” Kant, without the rest of the doctrine. As if no essential guidance were to be found in Kant’s own form, in his character as philosopher. The shattered slate that appears in the Analytic Kant, in the current vapid talk of “Kant”, which is mostly made by those who beside from being wholly incompetent to read even a page of Kant properly, in the main, do not even read Kant more than an essay. All this means that a text is always suspended above the Nothing. Only the constant and resolute movement into its regions allows for the possibility of its “inner will” to bring what is most worthy in it to pass.  

Monday, July 17, 2017

How does Will to Will come to be thought from within the Appearance as Thought, Time, Space? Here we name a background consideration in the Methodos (μέθοδος). Referring to the wavering Fate of the text called Kant.  

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Κατηγορίεν means to accuse, to chargethus to begin with not just any assertion, but one that is emphatic and accentuated. It is to say something to someone's face, to say that one is so and so and that this is one's situation. Applied to things and to beings in general, it is the kind of saying which says emphatically what a being properly is and how it is; κατηγορία is therefore anything said or sayable in this way. If the categories have their home in λόγος, then this means that in every assertion whatsoever of something about something, there is that exceptional saying wherein the being as it were is rightly indicted for being what it is. Aristotle sometimes also uses κατηγορία in the broad, attenuated sense of what is said in verbal transactions, what is simply asserted; or better (see Physics B I, 192b 17), the simple claim [An-spruch], that which one literally has given one's word tothe name, the word, and the relationship to the thing. What Aristotle calls "category" in the stated sense, however, is that saying which is involved in every assertion in a preeminent way (even when this is not expressed).



A forcibly-expressive saying, made prominent, “telling it like it is”. And yet what makes this graspable, and at the same time peculiar, is that this is what “is involved in every assertion in a preeminent way (even when this is not expressed).”

Categorizing is speech as such. It is all speech. Nothing absconding or deviating. Or, indeed, only nothing, the lack of expression. Because the text called Heidegger can no longer let the being of a world, of this or that human world, be the be all and end all, it is already thinking from the leap. From the presupposition that what belongs to all worlds, only belongs to all worlds. If the Categories were higher, more general, and speech lower, more general in the sense of being less special, less all embracing, less general in the sense of being more comprehensive, then, one would still seek a Synthetic a priori, something that was basic and without content. An assertion, however significant and pronounced, however “real” the “talk”, is no Truth. Truth is thought here as the lichtung, the orginary exhibiting, of what is as Da-sein. 

This Da-sein as what appears before, in the categorizing, is not an entity in the sense of this or that being that goes out of existence, and sometimes in droves. Yet, this Da-sein is asserted. Thus the leap is presupposition. Everything is accidental, so far as it conditions the characteristics, or the nature, of this or that being. But that something appears before one, is not conditional on this or that accident. In the same way the Synthetic a priori is thought to the point of Time, Space, and Thought, the potentiality, the WIll to Will, of the categorizing, is thought as the same in all worlds.   

Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities [wirkliche Wesen]? Are they only determinations or also relations of things, but still such as would belong to them even if they were not intuited? Or are they such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to any things at all? --Kant

The circle of the immediate intuition and the concept, which says exactly the same thing as the something as something, is put aside in the appearance of what stands before, what stands is the being. The assertion of the being is the ground of its being. All notion of causality is set aside, erkenntnis, cognition is set aside. All notion of knowing is set aside in the sense of knowing the essence. Knowing of causality means representing according to a reflection about what is happening. Knowing the essence, in the sense of universal, is an accident of the empirical situation. This is all obliterated in the wake of the reflections of Hobbes, Rousseau, and finally Kant. At first Hobbes considers selfishness the center of man, his nature. Rousseau says, to check this, we must check actual men, who are the result of accident. All is accident, of weather, of situation. When nature is set aside, reason, intellect, attempts to speak of equality.  Intellect is set aside, for it too, must have experience, or it will say nothing. Then we go up to the forms, supposing them invulnerable to conditioning. Finally, free self-giving of imagination comes into view. But Kant never treats the uniformity of phenomena and logos. 

So far we are not thinking logos, as we must to gather the methedos, in its moving path.