On the First Paragraph of the book about: Aristotle's Metaphysics Θ 1–3

 

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Introduction

The Aristotelian Question about

the Manifold and Oneness of Being

§ 1. The question concerning δυναμις and ενεργεια, along with the question about the categories, belongs with the question about being.

This course confronts the task of interpreting philosophically a philosophical treatise of Greek philosophy. The treatise has come down to us as book IX of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. It is a self-contained unit, divided into ten chapters, whose object of inquiry is δυναμις and ενεργεια. These words are translated into Latin as potentia and actus, and into German as Vermögen [capability]  Verwirklichung [actualization] or as Möglichkeit [potentiality] Wirklichkeit [actuality].

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Kant says that Hume does not extend his empiricism so far as to enclose mathamatics. Kant encloses mathamatics within his empiricism but does not go so far as to include the Laws of Thought. Husserl includes everything in his empiricism, which ceases, thereby, to be empirical, and becomes profoundly ambiguous. The distinction between being, and on the other hand, the thinking of being, becoming aware that one is breathing, is the same as the knowing of the distinction between being and becoming. Insofar as there is a spoken phenomenology, Language and what Language speaks come to the thought that has no law, is not logic, but is Language, in the ergon of the work called Heidegger.

  

Why do we say, the “work called Heidegger”? In Kant, we set aside the ad hominem, which is to say, the principles of a man. That that was the subject of the Socratic recollection of what the soul is to recall. That Polemarchus sees that he does not hold the opinion that dike, justice, is to return what is due. The proper sense of ad hominem has been forgotten, but for good reason. It is because it means, formally: An argument that is based on the principles of the person addressed. In the essence of Technicity, principles don’t play a great role. They are what belongs most to man, they are conviction, they are, when not thought, opinions of the judgement. They become, therefore, mere air. Ideology, the thing conditioned by causation, that which differs predictably according to demographics, class positions, epochs. They become the subjective in the most debasing and pejorative sense. 

The ad hominem, when thought beside the ad rem, by the British, was construed to mean, a faulty argument. Not a pragmatic argument. When the human being is rethought, in the mesmerisation of the History of Being, it is what by degree of change comes out of things that are not human, atoms and, as one says, parts of atoms. Earlier things, that have no essential difference. The ad hominem ceases to exist in the world, becomes an insult and an informal logic problem concerning the origin of an argument. The ad hominem was always distinguished from the eristic and the agonistic for the reason that, even today, adversarial training of the lawyers is necessary for the Law as such. A defense attorney can not be open, ad hominem, to persuasion by the prosecutor or he will abdicate his duty to zealously represent the one accused. But when the human being no longer exists, the notion of responsibility, like the ad hominem, becomes no longer a matter of the inner man, or of opinion. Yet, insofar as what is “inner” is subsumed by what is outer, the brain becomes for example, the place where psychology happens, there is always something that can not be completely subsumed in the empiricism. By the same token intelligibility, as such, is in just as fine fetal, and can claim to subsume everything, except its supposed object, the Absolute Hegelianism.  

On the one side, the ad hominem, the judgment of this one, and on the other side the natural justice of man as such, are cast away in Kant. The regulating principle, the Categorical Imperative, is what is supposed to be in any rational being. It is parallel, to the conditions for the possibility of any rational being’s experience. Space and time are what are included in any experience, they are not a concern of this one or that one by opinion. Insofar as one attempts to set all causality aside, all psychologizing, one is already beginning to think of the propounding of the truth. When we speak of the propounding of the truth we set aside all biographies, though, what Ortega said is still active phenomenologically, the whole of his philosophy of the biography. Which is what everywhere, in a pathetic way, dominates the avant garde of thought in the so-called humanities. As though it were an escape from the sheer sciences, as Science.  

According to the propounding of the truth, or the ergon, the determination of the meaning, that speaks in the work with the name Heidegger, truth and meaning say the same. Just as the conditions for the possibility make all science relative to time and space, not by the ad hominem, or by empiricism, i.e., the ad rem, but by the Critical, the truth becomes the matter of this Critical “-” that lets Da stand beside Sein. Da-sein means just what we see when we make one or the other part to speak the whole. But the truth that is being propounded is the play of the “-” insofar as the “Manifold and the Oneness” are in question. This is where the presupposition of the being as what can’t be a rubric comes in. 

Arendt, who is perfectly well-informed, which is to say, unlike all but five or six persons, perfectly well-informed, puts down a word of the poet Valéry: Tantôt je pense et tantôt je suis. Sometimes I think and sometimes I am. And yet, in having everything before her, never does what is written in the Black Notebooks: People are waiting for the second volume of Being and Time; I am waiting for this waiting to cease and for people to finally confront the first volume.

In Strauss, who is likely less-perfectly informed about everything, from a certain point of view, there is, an absolute difference. He does, in some way, “confront” this thinking, which is as much of the work called Husserl as of that with the tag Heidegger. Thus Arendt herself says: “Sometimes I wonder which is more difficult: to instill an awareness of politics in the Germans or to convey to Americans even the slightest inkling of what philosophy is all about.” And so here there is no animus that is determined in its dunamis, which would be worth calling that inkling, of the thinking which is asking why being is not yet thinking. The question why if “human being” is the thinking thing, it does not yet think? 

Therefore, again, let us dispose ourselves twice towards what “inner” says: Being and Time I a very imperfect attempt to enter into the temporality of Dasein in order to ask the question of being for the first time since Parmenides, cf. p. 24. -- saying 8 in the Black Notebooks

Again: the distinction between poiesis and praxis is to be undercut, such that Aristotle leads us back to this, but, of course by palimpsest, i.e, there is no more struggle to determine time cognitively, nor by what is particularly untimely, but the position of its profound ambiguity has been hired out to conduct one.  

Investing Thought with the path taken by the work called Heidegger that Thinks about Energia and Dunimas: A First Word  

 

(This image is given to indicate the reclaiming of thought by the visual realm, capable of thinking thought, and not of thinking the non-objective fate of Technicity alone. Thus, of the reclaiming of what the artistic power clothes itself in, of a freedom higher than the freedom of talent.)

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Aristotle's Metaphysics Θ 1–3

On the Essence and Actuality of Force

The inner will of this course can be characterized by a word from Nietzsche:

Perhaps some centuries later one will judge that all German philosophy finds its authentic worth in that it is a gradual recovery of the soil of antiquity, and that each claim to so called originality sounds trite and laughable in relation to the higher claim of the Germans to have reestablished the apparently broken link with the Greeks, up to now the highest type of “human being.” —The Will to Power, Aph. 419

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We direct ourselves to the sense of the word inner, in the phrase “inner will”, already, when we read a word from Kant:

But, as all representations, whether they have for their objects external things or not, belong by themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state, and as this inner state falls under the formal conditions of internal intuition, and therefore of time, time is a condition, a priori, of all phenomena whatsoever, and is so directly as a condition of internal phenomena (of our mind) and thereby indirectly of external phenomena also.

The ancients did not speak of “will” at all. Homer uses the word βουλή, boule, which is correctly translated will, but could have been translated as easily, in the case of “for so was the will of Zeus fulfilled”, by the word plan or the word determination.  A determination in this sense is a settlement, it is a setting down, a laying down, as of the law. That which is “fulfilled”, is thereby set in motion according to a plan. A thing supplied with its telos is “fulfilled”. Its meaning is established, it is set in motion, the time has come forth as what is “inner”, the “inner will” is upon the text. 

In this we only set ourselves something to understand, in some manner, such as to let our thinking find its way. Insofar as our thinking is a palimpsest, it is thinking everything like Zeus, constantly laying down new determinations which are fundamental. Thus it supplies the thinking with what is entrusted to it, from out of the history of being, which here is thinking “will” according to the way history leaps, according to the movement of time as such. Already we are thinking what stands before us, history, as what is ourselves. Ergo, we proceed by understanding that nothing stands in the past, that what is thought stands before us and is us, in the thinking, and that why one gives, puts there, “human being”, and not human being. We don’t have this determination, of that conception, of those two words, ready made. What we confide then, to the care of that word is being thought now, and not set down in some past time.

When we think of Kant we are not thinking for the sake of the philosophy of Kant, to think of time according to Newton and to science, to raise time up, to raise time and space as the conditions for the possibility of a science, to make science relative to time and space, to raise up and destroy science, as of Newton, and make it include that “Moralism” which, in the higher form of the Kantian science, the science raised up and destroyed, is present and manifests itself in the availability of moral certainty from within the determination of that science. Not at all. Rather, we only bring our thought, in some way, to that “inner” which is named by Kant, understanding as best we can.

Plato knew of no will in the way that was obvious to Kant. And which had already been developed for more than five hundred years before Kant, by the Schoolmen. In Plato, one thinks of the distinction between the two horses of the Phaedrus, and the guide of that horse, the intellect. Insofar as knowing is what is the most important thing, such that, unlike Aristotle, Plato does not allow that Justice, Dike, that even agathos, the Good, can be anything other than knowing, the Socratic position, this “will” is nothing but knowledge!

But the Greeks never make a close distinction between the different forms of knowing. Practical reason, a kind of prudential reason, is not mathematical episteme, and episteme is not the sheer knowing of the determination of each essence which is the higher nous. But all this remains shadowy, and is only the subject of fundamental investigation, and never laid down as the finished result of deliberations, the result of Christian moving above the appetitive, into what is only human, into the non-animal reasoning, not determined by teleological instinct. In other words, if the animal wants something, food, and it plans a way to get it, its reason is dominated by appetite. Only, then, if the thing available, anything, is taken up without what flows from phusis, but from intellect alone, does one fulfill the essence of man as man, and thereby move towards the plan of God’s will to move towards the Utopia, which is what will be thought towards, in the thinking of the perfect laws, when the thinking is given peace to think.

Will becomes what is lower, because the human being is not the divine intellect, and does not have to remember, in the Socratic fashion, what is most natural to it. Rather, it has to surrender to what is only knowable to faith, that is invaded by God’s intellect, which is what Love as such, the energia of God, brings one to. Will in Kant means only that one set oneself, as opposed to the means and the goal, on a path to a goal. Will is in Kant meant to be determined by what is above, by the Freedom, by the noumenal. Will, in the ordinary sense of intention, is no Will to Power. Only if it were to be determined by the actus purus, by energia, which is guided by eros, can it become God, i.e., Will to Power.

In all this we are only getting a look at the ways of thinking this ‘will’, in the text we are now preparing to think, giving our confidence to the path of the thought, “inner will” already does not mean a will of a God, for that is the “ontotheological” thought of what is the same, as what is Life Giving Lie, as the potentia ordinata, as what is an order, in its pragmata, that is eternal, and not what is thought as “holding sway”, such that substance, is no longer thought as what remains the Same, but as what leaps, in the Critical, which is to say, not in what is taken by the measure of experience, or what is by the rule of a law derived by the intellect. It is not here important to ask about whether Nietzsche was rightly thought as “ontotheological” or whether, indeed, some disservice is done to him by this determination.  

So far this is how we are thinking, when we enter into this work concerning Aristotle’s commission of the word energia, and the word dunamis, to philosophy, to the philosophy of the Evening Land. Why of the Evening Land only? For the reason that either one starts from where one stands, simply saying what is available to all, building out of the ground where one has come to be, or one must already start with crossing out each other word and making scare quotes around every word. So, in this sense, though it is possible to say where we stand in a very rough way, it is not possible to know how far the circle extends, or who it includes and keeps. At the same time we could have started in another way, simply trying anything, as it were, and so it means this way of embarking is a presupposition.

Reflections on thinking Heidegger’s, or, the work with that name for its title, work on reason: What is Learning, What is Called Learning?

All learning is a command from the past. A being ordered by the past, such that all is arranged already but modifiable according to further learning. An artist brings forward an object, and soon, amidst the abstracted eyes, announces that it is a chair. The judgment of some of the onlookers begins to see it. While others, their judgment rejecting the eidos, find in the phusis something else. When asked they attempt to answer according to their Ownmost, according to the God. One can, they say, sit there, but that does not make it a chair. One can as well sit on a grass field bathed in the early summer brilliance. Such a location is not thereby a “chair”. Has arbitrariness taken over everything? Are we to be fooled by every assertion, under the claim that we ought to be having fun, strolling through a “Fun Palace”, or, somehow, resolving our attachments to the “normative” or to some “hierarchy”? These commands, insentient, hold sway in the essence of the God, thus in what is one's own. Thusly eidos and phusis, what is one’s own, and the command, as the path which resounds in the God, clash as though in the brightness of the pan-oceanic sea, and in what is snatched away as each moment, obliterating the eidos from the face of the phusis. 

The thinking of Being then, is constantly, when it thinks this Four Fold, as it is called, always aware of this being as what can’t be named by the rubric, but only sensed by thought, when it is named it means the essence of the god, the being of being, when it remains unspoken it is supposed to be resounding, as what would let the human being abandon its stand, in the leap. “Thought” is said not in diremption with deed, but rather, it is said, as it were, as what like a sugar cube in tea, makes the fact, in its availability, what is not True, what is not home or the God. Thought is what, in everything, is the strife of the plunge into the Four Fold. 

In Nietzsche this remains gaseous, yet, in what is gaseous there is already thought of liquidity, and what is liquid is already thinking of the solid. In the thought of one’s peculiarity, as what belongs to speech, one at last is thinking of what would be the subject matter of the leap. It is just this speech that points to Language, to the essence of any human being. Language is never the speech, nor the writing, but it is the interpretation of the signs in its entity, in it predurance, to speak, to have the predurance of the house of what is one's own possession, one's dearest holding, in oneself, in the eigenstate of the human being. Ipsissimosity in Nietzsche still is correctly called the place of the daimon, of eros. Eros in Socrates is what, through energia, comes to call to the lost one. In the Christian time it is actus purus, as the God of Love, as the Sacred Heart. In Nietzsche, this pure act is called Will to Will. In all this one must be careful to see the crucial implication, which is that tone is not oneself in the core, but the will is willed, but the soul is called, but the faithful, the true knower, is taken over, ever so violently, by the love of the god who enters.

There ceases, then, at length, to be any sense to the technological essence, with its belief in the neutral valence of each standpoint--so far as it is one's own! In captivation, in the forgotten. In the lack.Yet, in the learning, in the learning that is dedicated to the strife of the so-called Four Fold, something wants to speak that does not speak from the ipsissimosity. For example if one would speak from judgment, which is exposed, as it were, to experience and judgment, one is laid open ad hominem, as Socrates held, in such a way as to enter the argument, and so to possibly see what is ownmost. One looks to see if one really holds this or that opinion. Yet, in the sense of the problem of competency, as Strauss conceives it, this matter of the spheres of talent, in which one pursues matters according to the moral sense, or the sense which seeks political principles, or to the sense that is for thought, or the sense of wine tasting, etc., one posits to say what is not ad hominem, not opinion, but sense. A particular sense. Yet what is the point of this sense, the sense of the sensitivity to thinking, except that in the thinking the essence of what is set forth will leap? What else is the thinking supposed to be thinking for, as it were? Is this then a “why”, of the kind excluded according to Nietzsche, a why of it all? Or does it rather slip away from all “whys”? One can only think this half way, what discernment or understanding, as though of a regularity, would be there like a handy ingredient? One thinks it almost not at all.  

At this point let us put aside the thinking for a while, insofar as we have sensed something of the thinking called Heidegger in this. Remember that, if one thinks Heidegger as more centered, and Nietzsche as lopsided, it suggests something of all lopsidedness and of all being staunch, which is part of the path we herein have thought. It brings a play into the seriousness of the thinking, that is a sensing of the path of thought. How are these dead bodies still speaking, along with Jung, and Strauss? In the thought of the path that holds up for the sake of letting the path speak, as though the path were like the archetypes? The archetypes speak most to the balance and the lopsidedness of all thinkers, as though from a place one is suspicious of, the “neutrality” of the valence of all Truths. A slimy snake, or a body, moving without attachment to any Truth, propelled by unknown forces, utterly alone, yet on the move and somehow with great moment.

Reflections on the resistance that resists by entering the ergon or tonality, which is True, as what is True as what is the Same

 

#33

Seen wholly apart from the historical character of the polysemy of a word, language nevertheless has an essentially historical character such that it appears to us to be a complex of words whose words, as one says, are the bearers of meaning and therefore have meaning. That such is the case with words--that there are word-meanings--we hold as being as obvious as the fact that beings appear to us as Objects. Hence both of these representations are also related in a way. Apropos of this ordinary representation of words, namely that they have a meaning, we find various meanings of the word Grund. When we ask after the fundamental meaning [Grundbedeutung] of the word Grund, we have, with this very question, already answered, that means introduced, what we mean by Grund, namely the basis, the fundus upon which something rests, stands, and lies. We speak of foundation walls [Grundmauern], of a fundamental rule [Grundregel], of a fundamental principle [Grundsatz].  

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The maintenance of a path consists of the intangible charisma of a constant letting what is most favored be heard, so that it guides by being what is most worth while. All such maintenance is what could be abandoned, insofar as whoever forsakes the path knowing that the path doesn't exist, by example, for the sake of the intensity of experiences without regard to whether they are melting into the air or like the true stars, the true sky, and the true sun, fails to follow the path as that which doesn't exist. To follow what doesn't exist remains an open path, and is called "steadfast resoluteness". 

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“One can imagine a man who is totally deaf and has never had a sensation of sound and music. Perhaps such a person will gaze with astonishment at Chladni's sound figures; perhaps he will discover their causes in the vibrations of the string and will now swear that he must know what men mean by "sound." It is this way with all of us concerning language; we believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things—metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities.” From Nietzsche's essay On Truth and Lies Without Morals [without telos is meant]

Without guidance is whoever is forsaken by the truth, which lays behind what is merely there as what is the Same.

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Here, the talk of “representation”, which had played so conspicuous and decisive a role in the history of the world itself, of all things on the earth, not so much as talk, but as what attunes one most sharply to the “every tightening circle of the forces of technology”, by letting the scientific, the clear and distinct everywhere find its ground, finds its saying as what stands in contradistinction to any criterion, to any system of so-called epistemology, to any attempt to guide human beings by means of a philosophy, which has now become a word like ideology, rationalization, fiction, propaganda, idealism, value. Insofar as “representation” comes to mean fact, not as a human doing, but as a clear and distinct or scientific truth, it comes to be a mouthpiece for technicity as the essence of this age. At the same time, here, in the thought of the ergon of the work with the name Heidegger, it names the thought there in what is. I.e, it speaks of the “second tonality”.

“Representation” is what is the Same. This is a change in tonality from Kant. In Kant, representation names a specific determination of the phenomenon, or of the appearances. The view that the appearances are created, or, legislated, as Kant says it, by the so-called subject. Which means the same as that what science is everywhere relative to, space and time, are the creation of the so-called subject. Not as what is “subjective”, not of human being, as opposed to a bee, but as the fundamental manner of any world coming forth in its jointure or harmony, of the order of all things as what is identical for the science of the non-metaphysical physics, the observational science, and for the visionary glance of theoria which orients and lets theory become what masters practice, such that it becomes technicity. Such that it has nothing to do with the “thinking there” of equipment worthy of the use and enjoyment of serious beings.

Appearances must be thought as the appearances of something. Like appearances, representations, in a certain sense, represent something, but they are as much renderings, which is to say, what is built on the spot, and does not correspond to something else. In Husserl this rendering becomes explicit because all thought of a ethical teleology, of a moral noumenal region, is dropped. True, Husserl still speaks of “the point of it all”, in saying that only if it all ended might one speak to this “point”, thus, he reminds us of someone still speaking like the Utopians, like Kant, Hegel, Marx.

When the representation, which is still representation, is thought in the new tonality, as what is the Same, it loses this sense of having a noumenal background, or of being the appearance of something. Yet, at the same time, it represents the Geschick of being. But not in the manner of a brain that processes electrical impulses, and creates the world, from the data of the electrons, which as light or heat have entered the eyes. Such accounts, which can never answer the question about why the world comes forth, are put aside. Neither does what appears sink back to a real nature, or essence. It finds in the essence, what is holding sway, which means: entity. The essences are thought as entities, so that in representing, they speak of what is the Same also in the “holding sway”, everything thinkable comes to the same level, as it were, but not as something “flat”. The withdrawal and the lighting are supposed to happen here, so to say, not in some “behind” world, or in the “real brain” which must be posited in a scientific account, in order to explain what it is that creates the representational brain. When representation is what is the Same, it falls wholly prey to the Geschick, which itself brings forward all things, all entities, including questioning, including the holding sway, including representation.     

However small this change in the tonality of the thought, with the tattered strings showing everywhere, as though of something laid open, but deprived of all solid operative potency, it is something never before found, as a path of thought. One, however, who makes this thought their own, as it stands there, not as what is present, for whatever is present is present for the operation of the operative sciences, but rather by entering this tone, which rises like the pathetic whistle of someone calling a dog, which is aware of nothing but this Same that permeates the whole, has come to what is most open in thought as though they were more completely awake to the difficulties, and more clear headed, then those who still attempted to tie loose ends together from amidst the wreckage. This entering is itself an entity, but as it is known, which is to say thought, to be an entity, and not a wisdom, it resembles the death of God, since what resounds in it is a call not towards the Good, the Sacred Heart, nor to the Utopia, but this authenticity, to which the eros or wisdom calls, too, appears, as entity, but it appears under the sounding of what is the Same. This pathological, as it were, enigma and trick, reminding one of Nietzsche, is thought in something more like the antipathy of Nietzschean erosion, of the abyss of all peaks. At the same time what is strange is that if the thought is thought as archetypal, as a path that is not individual, but which makes the thinker heroic, as it were, which is universal, and not historial, a different region comes into the thinking, as though the synteresis in each thinking, stands in the fear of pitfalls, which are in each case peculiarly known, and only known in their essence, by that darting invigilation which glances darkly on each possibility of error.

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Some Expressionistic Pondering of a Small paragraph at the end of the Eleventh Hour of the Lecture Course on the powerful principle of Leibnitz

 

# 32

When we ask what is called Grund, then we at first mean what the word signifies; the word signifies something; it gives us something to understand and does so because it speaks to us of something.

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One must not wreck oneself to nought under the predilection of a maxim that demands only that activity which led to a human goal, a concrete goal, empty in itself due to its ultimate illegibility, since the horizon is never but a melting into thin air, in the light of the historial, in the light of the fading of all theologies, in the light of the emptiness of the projects of beings, in the face of the failure of all Western projects, of the world project, there can be no moral obligation to disdain or look down on some obscurantist, as though man as man existed and had a telos. In the lack of a telos no higher judge can speak to what deserves praise or blame, or what is obscuring or Enlightening. 

Only those who can discern the ergon of a thinking, by virtue of an ear for thought, can assume bother with thought. Can assume to recover the work of a thinking. Nothing can come to oblige one to respect or refuse such work as though it were a matter of giving views about political direction. That is, except the political and its arbitrary captivation which has no higher warrant.

Everything stands in a fundamental vagueness, but tends to think there might be, there must be, more than the vagueness. The fundamental vagueness, the grounding in existence. But, this would be no grounding if it were not already directed towards its own deviation and to evade itself in the lighting that happens when the break is sensed. One breaks towards Reason, towards the certainty of knowing what is going on. Ergo, the fundamental Grund, the Grund, is what appears in the light of the bifurcation of Grund and Reason. Existence means the same thing as the denial of Reason as an ascending from opinion--the Socratic project of Eros, Wisdom as such. Existentialism is impossible because the denial of Reason is the denial of Grund. Yet, one still, in the thinking, knows what Grund says, what fundamental says, what start and ascent says. One starts, one ascends, but in the lichtung of the destruction of the True world and the apparent world. The apparent world appears, and ascent towards the Truth begins, but it is already faded out. 

The rat in its sordid activity, when pointed out to the Chinese with the intention of pointing to the problem, the health violation, is understood to have been pointed to for the reason of an opportunity to admire the animal that has had a year named after it. Look at the rat: “Yea, that’s a big one.” Everything in its being, in its truth, lies in the core of the “-” between the given and the one who has an inner life. The given is never what a thing is, it is only the ground. And the one who finds the Reasons, only seeks to bring what is There to the rule. At first, in the first age of philosophy, when the definition was meant, not to bring about the lawlike description, it aimed at, in the defining, to speak the core of the being. This would be different in the Morning Land view than in the Land of the Declining Sun. But, no longer is there East and West, since they have come into the whirlwind of concomitant being in the lighting of the event of the historial. 

The theoretical no more than the empirical can speak of the rat as rat. But thought itself can enter into the cirrcle as Hermenutical Circle, without doing the work of interpretation or the reasoning about what is as the truth of this or that world, it may, without speaking, remaining what circles about in the erosive abyss of the eidos. The eidos that is not eternal or part of the true Sky speaking to man as man of the True Stars above so that it fills the breast, the "-" of the is of the world with the predeliniation of the authentic or the autonomous from which the way of life is spelled out in the guidance for the soul made legible in the laws that are above, but capable of drawing into, the becoming or accidental order, that, since what has come before is not restraint, can be what is conducive to the full and permanent good of man as man. 

This is the sense that the return to being, in the egon of that text that bears the name Heidegger, is always saying that History is what is supposed to rekindle the sense of what comes prior to the bifurcation. Clarity about the vagueness: Grund, fundamental grounding in the vagueness of daily thought. The demands for presentation of the why, the different ages of the Geschik of Thought, the holding of being that is not in the conscious motives of the ones who are being mortal, and who see the thing there that is alongside the other things there. Philosophy is no word, that names philosophy, ultimately, since what is cancerous in the thing said, brought to the gentleman who look on and are amused by the activity, to the newspaper and the Wikipedia article, is not the name of philosophy but of sophistry. At the same time, philosophy, as the decay, stands within the practice of philosophy, almost like an obstacle to its historial essence, in, e.g., the correctness of the word rat that speaks two beings.

The Cyclical Problem: Thought always acts like a cancer that has what is thought as the cancerous flake, built on what came before. Whenever Though begins, it is always standing in something Become, or it is wanting to think what has Become as part of the stream of thought of being. It thinks this way, it thinks that way. It starts, it dies like memory, something dead, it builds on what is dead. It can’t escape the presence of beginning in a available thought, in what is there. Broder is the first to bring out the cyclical question, but it is not adequately thought through. This is because all thought until this, was as thinking towards a regulative service: in order to make more of the thought. However, this claim is easily open to confounding and withering critique from all sides. It is only said in order to bring the thought into the basic circumstance of the thought of those with philosophic ability. Which are amazingly few.