Wednesday, May 24, 2017


Some Words in Passing Concerning the History of the Geschick as the History of Ideas in the Thinking




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#30

In order to blaze a path here we must make the best of the fact that our exposition has come to a standstill in a crude form. What was noted concerning the understanding and saying of the word Grund [ground/reason]. In the previous sessions, all of us have understood the often mentioned word Grund in some manner. Hence we were able to set aside what we are now no longer able to pass over: the discussion of the word Grund and the names on the history of thinking that name what is generally characterized by the German word Grund.   




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Truth ranges from Ground to Reason. Sometime Reason is called Rationality. Sometimes reason is understanding, as in Kant. Thinking not only ranges as much in the grounds of experience, as in the givens of dreams and inner happenings, but as much in the taking up of judgment with respect to syllogising, figuring, calculating, and every form of finding intelligible, as in reading of a sentence or Satz. A sentence, which passes sentence, telling what is, is not then to be confused with ground or reason. If, for the reason that all sentences tell, and this is a sentence, this tells, it does not mean, obviously enough, that the sentence, in what is intelligible about what it says, that this sentence tells, is the (physical) cause of the telling (i.e., of what is told in the sylogising as the inference or conclusion). Also, it is not, as sentence, the reason. It is a reason, but the reason is in what the sentence says, not from the hule, speaking metaphorically, of the particular issuance of Language. Then the question about what Language says refers one to what is ranging, as the Same, in each part of Language. A sentence passes sentence in this peculiar way, insofar as it speaks of the Same and of Language.



Formally speaking this creates a triviality of reference and self-reference. Yet, for thinking it is not like that at all. Insofar as we come to think we don’t enter the material, as though to remember what it had hidden. We don’t go over the things to be thought, as though there, to be free of the encumbrance of the appetitive disturbances to the intellect. Yet, neither can one, simply push aside Language, as though this logos were not (as in the manner of Bertrand Russell). 





Whereas the play of reason, recta ratio, hangs around something to be interpreted. The art object for which the artist brings out the something in the truth of its form, its essence, and then leaves it empty, as though only pointing to the non-object, the de-produced. The world as such, where each thing is emptied, and given over to the hold of the power, as the collection of all that an effect can effect, not as means, but as sheer power. Insofar as this maintains, metaphysics is still in its end. the Meta speaks as the decision about the physics. All is cast into the play of Power thinking, having scattered this way and that, into the Political which is no more politics, as much in Arendt as in Schmitt. But whoever hears Language would have listened to what is not speaking about the production and the de-production of the thing and the something as something. 




Insofar as the orders out of the genes are overlaid with the race explanation, and the struggle talk, they are like the labour thinking, and the class explanation. These two thoughts dominate the university, and anyone who does not mention them as the explanation has something wrong with them. The more they loose their peculiar individuality, as what some genius gave expression to, in a Hobbes or a Marx, the more they sink into the demand of each one. They satisfy the demand of the why which each one is always peeping about for, as though from under the burden of their life, which seeks to pride itself on its knowing. When the village in the pale beige plane amidst grasses grows, more come to be part of its region, it now has become a city, and there there is the activity, the doing of what is called politics, that is not the political. Only when the action of politics is said to come forward as something existential, trans-natural, determining what is natural, do we speak of the political. Yet, what is this going beyond the natural activity? Is it not only to catch the contagion of ideology, seeing it in the teaching of race and economics, and then doing the same either more naively or more knowingly? Granted, Ideology is said in two ways, of what is prefigured and then advanced by thought, and of what is endemic to unhappy thought as immediate sensing, and then in intermediary senses. For example, as bringing the tradition of thinking about aristocratic lineage into the idea of a realism of natural interests, survival interest, reading them over the discovery of evolution as change and fossil record, finding there race, and then when race becomes racism, weaving this into a generic and all pervasive thinking of the human society as such in all universities. Disappearing in the prevalence. The same happens with the class thinking, which is now everywhere demanded in all accounts of life in the so-called humanities. And then it is all accounted for by the Interest of the Political. But, such semi-Nietzschean, unworthy of Nietzsche, activity, we mention in passing. 




Insofar as those preceptors of the declension of history who find the destruction of the older teaching, as of teleology of moral purpose in Bishop Berkeley, they range in the thing as what is built out of the reception of the Geschick when told by the saying of the Phenomenological thinking in Husserl, and, a fortiori, the student of Husserl as the energia of the work of the Thinking that has that name, of that student, as its title. Yet, one should keep a clear grasp of the punctum of the difficulty, especially by not exaggerating the possibly misguided word “naively” in what was written above. And the crucial struggle of the Nietzschean and the Heideggerian version of a primus motus of the Thinking.

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