Some Inmanifest Thoughts as Considerations of Thought’s Fate
We only seldom and with difficulty bring into view the fullness and proper character of the “same” [in the history of thinking]. Being proffered itself to early Greek thinking as, among others,φύσις. for Kant, being means the objectness of objects. Now, even if for Kant this object is principally nature and the Greek word for being, φύσις, is translated by natura, and nature; and even if φύσις on the one hand and objectness on the other hand give the appearance of meaning the being of nature, we nevertheless cannot then conclude that what proffered itself in the early and in the modern Geschick of being—in φύσις and in objectness—is the same. In any event it is not what one calls “nature.” Yet traits of the Geschick of being can be introduced in which we can discern the extent to which basic words as disparate as φύσις and “objectness” indeed speak the same.
The difficulty is that every “basic word” is at the same time a Metaphysical Truth. When Russell says that whoever denies that unicorns exist wants to say: never will it be possible to say here stands a unicorn, he speaks of the objectness of objects. He explicitly casts off the openness of the eidos of the unicorn, as the problem of the status of the concept. He lets the mathamatical-logos play in a realm apart from the objectness of the object. According to what is said above, this is not the opinion of Russell, but it is the articulation of the essence of technology, in the guise of an answer to a question in metaphysics, concerning the status of the concept. If the Geschick is in hand, so to speak, as the “basic word”, it speaks Thinking in the tonality of the objectivity of the object while at the same time glancing into the End of Metaphysics, which it does only insofar as it surveys the history in its tonalities as what is a “legacy” in the “same”.
On the one hand, metaphysics, which is always shifting and uncertain in the vagueness, almost like the sand of the questioner who questions, and on the other hand the Geschick in the “basic words” is the one who tells us, the language as that which tells the one who understands what is said. Taken in the older sense, still known to Hobbes, the language which speaks, lets one understand what is there in the appearance of what is really there. Hobbes still Thought natura, as the essence of being, of the being of what is the same as what is Thought in the objectness of the object and, in its tonality as the End of Metaphysics. Seen from the End of Metaphysics there is Thought, as the dispensation of the Geschick.
Insofar as poiesis is contrasted with phusis, one would think creativity as something short of the dispensation of the “basic words”. In the same way, taken with a peculiarity that lifts it out of the former comparatives, the Will to Will as the Life-giving Lie, is the Creativity of a highest being, in this way, when the thinking in (the work with the name) Heidegger thinks Creativity, it's in another way than Nietzsche, but not as alongside Nietzsche in a way suitable to comparison. If the creativity is the Geschick of being, it hangs away from all worth, from all “esteeming”. The same as what is thought in the disputation with Cassier is not part of Nietzsche's “all the better my friends…”. Though, true, Nietzsche never fixes the genesis of the Truth of his Lie. Of the the Truth of his saying that “There is no Truth." On the other hand, when thought into the abyss, this is incomparable. How much the tearing away of these thinkings are the articulations of the Fate of Being is not visible. So far as what is ponderous and profound is not True, or not Valid, is not easily laid down in law as though by one with the correct philosphica documenta. There is no higher judge, but, at the same time, there is a lookout on what is unfolding which is not devoid of a kind of judiciousness in Thought.
According to a widely held saying Strauss was an atheist. This opinion is basically correct. But, yet, insofar as today, anyone who rejects orthodoxy is atheistic many more are atheists than call themselves so. Yet, Strauss was at the same time not an atheist. Because the basic words hardly have a ground. If one starts with the saying that whoever rejects orthodoxy, preferring assimilation, is atheist, one prefigures the ground historically according to a certain situation. If one considers then what follows from the point of view of Schmitt, the entire matter is lost when the concrete situation no longer exists. Namely the situation of the Jew in the wake of the paper of Marx, advocating for assimilation, and the rise of the Zionist movement, as with Nordau, with the Dreyfus Case, and the supposition of the nakedness of mere Zionism, as with Jabotinsky. If one then thinks the reflections of Strauss in the manner of the “Jewish Problem” the god problem then follows as a kind of parasite on a passing or historical situation. Yet, insofar as one absconds from Schmitt’s concrete oppositional conceptions, into the living situation of a man wrestling with a difficulty, in this order the basic words start to reach higher vagueness. And if from this region of the basic words one comes into the region of the leap, will one not be threatened with what befalls in what lets the bearing of the highest things shiver through the soul?
If the thought of Strauss, vis-a-vis the text of Husserl and Heidegger always moves towards the phusis or nature still known to Aristotle and Plato, it does so only from the Thought of the Historial and the Thought of the Arising of the Tradition, in the ground of the choice of “how to live”. The “choice”? If it were thought according to a struggle to grasp the need of man as man, that is no choice. Yet, because in Strauss the constant openness to learning seeks more than the tradition can provide as a framework, everything remains, de facto sui generis. Only, then, in this Epoch, does all thought not base itself on the considerations of simple nature. The End of Metaphysics, and the objectness of the object, even as the split between the Orthodox and the Assimilated, rise into the leaves at the end of each branch, to the premonitions present in each shadow, and the Thought seems to wander towards the genuine Thinking of this annihilation. In the work called Heidegger there is equally talk of a “new science”, which makes all criticism of the proximity to the power of technicity unfortunate and otiose, and, secondly, of the “letting be” as the “setting” of the human being, of Da-sein as the Thinking of the Ready to Hand and the Presence in their co-reliant apportionments.