Friday, May 19, 2017






Some arguments that try to overcome the 2 + 2 = 2 in the hope of bringing suggestion to Thought 




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#29


Yet what the word Grund and the corresponding names name can be exhibited only with even greater difficulty, especially when we seek to bring into view what is the same that is touched upon in previously used names like Grund [reason], ratio, causa, Ursache [cause], “condition for the possibility.”

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In seeking, i.e., in already venturing to seek, we suppose ourselves to be wise. For we do not know what we seek. How is it that ignorance is supposed to be redoubled, intensified? That, we who do not know what this “same”, “that is touched upon” by each part of this same, are more wise than they who are perfectly informed about what, e.g., a cause is, or, a reason? Aren't they supposed to be even ignorant of their ignorance? But in all ignorance there can be no redoubling. One either knows, or doesn’t know. So we who suppose ourselves, insofar as we seek, and they who Know, and so don’t seek, are both the ignorant with respect to this matter. Yet, in our seeking, we suppose ourselves to venture better than they who seek by Knowing, in the ways das Man knows it all. 




This wisdom is supposed to consist in a kind of consternation, whereby what is the same becomes questionable, not as what can be questioned, but as what is not solid, but, rather, shaky, insolid, swimming, questionable as such. Yet, this is supposed to be true even for those who don’t Know that the same is like that, and so are correspondingly not full of dismay. This wisdom is the drawing forth of the abyss, as the reception of the call. Yet, in everything that is calling there is always a hearing whether it fills us with dismay or lets us continue on at once already sure of our Knowing in the style of das Man. At first the philosophers had no name, but then the Thou sharply distinguished them, regarding them as worth noticing because they were, like the games, something of the passing procession that glitters with a faint radiance for those who know, and not for those who do not yet know that there is such a thing as a philosopher. Someone might not know that someone who was running was part of some broader space of activities know as Games. Cicero, contradicting, as it were, Aristotle, is quoted often by Arendt, who says, in staying with Plato we prefer what may not be True to what is true, whereas Aristotle preferred what was True to Plato. But, then, does one become a Platocracy, preferring the chratos, or power, of Plato? Did Language first teach Philosophy, or did some more primordial word already exist in the archipelago, and let language speak, before the mob of the gentleman took up their sport, watching the philosophers argue in the dull-purple shadows of the houses?




The “same”, too, has its history that rises in the archipelago world of the Mediterranean. Insofar as we ask about the same of the same we bring forward the problem that the same is a being. Howsofar does same say truth? Is the same than what is always to be found with Truth? Is that what is the same about the same? When the same is the abyss of freedom, doesn't it stand together with the conditions for the possibility, but without becoming the abyss of the “There is no Truth” as the, if you ask me how this can be True, I answer: All the better. When Iki speaks it does not speak as Truth, or as what is the Same, Thus Nietzsche says: Truth is a woman. Why? It is a teaching: because in German Truth is gendered, and, Nietzsche says, once, there was a world where, men sought the genders of the things in an alien way, just as Iki names the Japanese world, there was a world where the gender of the moon was a Poesis and a Phusis: a “living in the material”. If in saying when Truth is no longer Truth, we are refered back to each other world, to what is the Same, in each world, through the teaching about Truth, that is gendered, we come to the prostration before what is the Same in the dismay of the one who is wise in the not knowing of what is the Same in all worlds. Entering into such a circle without becoming utterly dizzy is a Thought about Thought, in the text of Heidegger we have this question about What is Thinking? This should not be misunderstood to say what is “called”, as in  a drawing forth, thinking. The subject matter of the reception of the thinking should be distinguished from the question, what is it we call by the name Thinking? Or, what does Language say when it speaks of Thinking? 




At first it seems that only by Thinking, can we Think what is Thinking. If someone who understands a matter holds an opinion we can always discuss with them whether or not they really Think what they say they hold to be so. By contrast, if someone says that 2 + 2 is 2, and rehearses all the time this statement, even when it is demonstrated to them that two cups, set beside another two, are four, they will never be persuaded. Since they only repeat what they don’t Think. What is thought is then like what “makes sense”. But what makes sense itself stands on a Grund, on a Sameness, that is never challenged by the argument that raises objections and
new examples that still speak out of the Sameness and the Similarity which is the turning away from the same. And yet, the matter of Thinking the Same comes into Thinking in one way or another as what is Thought, and not only rehearsed or spoken in the manner of the 2 + 2 = 2.    

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