Contending Thoughts for the sake of Thought
Initially, as well as later on, being cleared and lit itself, though in different ways, as having the character of a shining forth, of a shining that lingers, of a presencing, of the over-against and countering. The citation of these moments is still merely a listing of references, far removed from an insight into the particular epochs of the full Geschick of being and into the way in which the epochs suddenly spring up like sprouts. The epochs can never be derived from one another much less be placed on track of an ongoing process. Nevertheless there is a legacy from epoch to epoch. But it does not run between the epochs like a band linking them; rather, the legacy always comes from what is concealed in the Geschick, just as if from one source various streamlets arise that feed a stream that is everywhere and nowhere.
The possibility of parallel lines is Thought as hanging back in the History, for example, neither as a statement of a universal, nor as a particular instance of such a thing, put forward in the manner of correct identity with the universal. Rather, as a basic, it is upon the basic word, which lets it be housed, in both the universal and the particular. The parallel, as an example of what populates a History, is upon the individual that is out there, as much as on the lines when envisaged in the mind as a picturing, the picturing is Thought, the Sensorium is Thought, but most of all it is thought that wants to Think back behind what is customary, back to the things that were first kept and guarded conceptually when they had been noticed along the Historical, as part of the Geschick. But the Geschick can not be thought as a collection of basics as though the agglutination were a pile of parts. Rather, in the basic words, what is housed as the worthy, stands eerily behind the customary opinion of human beings who gather in the sheltering of the basics while chattering about the Known. The Known is the seduction of the Thou, who stands as oneself, in the holding up of oneself, according to some opinion that being altered has begun to manifest as what lives large amidst the Thou. But when History is thought this way, it doesn't say enough, it could still be a Hegelian History, manifesting according to the outlay of the high telos, thus, we have the series of saving clauses that play out in a necessarily stilted manner and coming to annihilation in the clumsy metaphor: “The citation of these moments is still merely a listing of references, far removed from an insight into the particular epochs of the full Geschick of being and into the way in which the epochs suddenly spring up like sprouts. The epochs can never be derived from one another much less be placed on track of an ongoing process. Nevertheless there is a legacy from epoch to epoch. But it does not run between the epochs like a band linking them; rather, the legacy always comes from what is concealed in the Geschick, just as if from one source various streamlets arise that feed a stream that is everywhere and nowhere.”
History, then, is thrown to the vision of a vagueness, and a vaugeries. But, crucially, there is the tradition or “legacy”, which is no tradition in the sense of the tradition of the thou, or of the country, culture or civilization. The “legacy” is here the reception of the basic words, as the speakers of what is lost in the Geschick, but yet resounds, as the ownmost ground of each epoch. But, the ownmost ground is always the Historialy ravaging of the being of beings, as a holding sway which is at the same time a hiding and casting into the Demand which is the thrownness.
The series “shining forth, of a shining that lingers, of a presencing, of the over-against and countering.” Is presupposed as the basic movement of the epochs, in the ground of the First Beginning. Already in the Socratic work we see the rise of the “over”, of the wisdom, the wisdom that becomes, when shorn, ratio. Surely, sophia and metis, do not answer to the name ratio and causa without further ado, the diremption is like that between two pairs of leaves, blasted out ahead of a great wind. The historial is then not added up, or collected in various memories, that become experience, or through the consideration of the concepts, but it speaks being to Thought, either to those who listen, or to those who don’t listen.
What is found in the Thought that finds being as the unconditioned, rather than being as the being of beings (a historial basic ground), then reminds of the Transcendental ground, but rather than time and space it has a kind of understanding and a kind of reason. Thus, Grund and reason, as the Thought empirical, and the Thought reason. What is given and what is known. But what is there now, and what is seen as something, both, stand on the Historial basics, as the “-” in the enunciation of Da-sein. The bestowal of the Geschick, however, like this, still does not bring being as the unconditioned into sight except as presupposition.
There is no grand telos. The transcendental conditions become the there and the holding sway. The science of Husserl, being outstripped, ceases to be Thought, genuinely, as knowing. Thus the transcendental is no longer a “condition” for anything. No longer cause in any sense. Yet, the fact in the vague sense presents itself as the folk data, the thing given to thought as what is here and now. One then must speak with Nietzsche. In the is/ought of Hume the fact remains the holder of the natural law, only, one can not derive the worth from the fact, yet, Hume says, the worth, the principle, e.g., the principle of equality under the law, is not arbitrary. In fact, Hume, implies the divine nature of the Ought, in saying that everywhere certain oughts are found to reign, though one might say, through the mechanism of a evolution spun out by the natural telos. In Schelling the abyss is determined as the non-teleological Freedom, or the arbitrariness of what is ownmost according to the gods or values, the practical principles. In Goethe the matter is taken up empirically, as the hypothesis of the current fact. In Nietzsche the fact ceases to be differentiated, and circles into the gloaming abyss, now transfigured into sheer insolidity and lostness. Therefore, in the vagueness, we let History rest in the opinion, while peering towards the basic words, the primordiality of the Geschik. The vagueness is itself vague, and in Nietzsche, the Truth of the “there is no truth” is not brought forward, but nothing is stipulated, but the reception of the presupposition of the Geschick as the Fate of history as the withdrawing of Being simple. Thus, thinking the waning of Da-sein, as the removal of the human, is not the same as Being simple, but it would be the Geschik simple. At least when taken as an unthought formal possibility. Kant too brings in god as what would stand if the thing in itself didn’t require the condition for the possibility. Yet, in a quite different manner, since this is the natural telogical god, which is behind the world in the substance. This thinking of Kant still lives on in the notion of a computational account of a representation which is consciousness, that itself refers to the real stuff or the “one stuff”, as in Dennett, or tacitly in all Scientism.
Insofar as Phenomenology throws off the doubling, of true world and what appears, of consciousness and philosophic matter as the “one stuff”, it lets Thought grasp the path towards primary vagueness, which then comes in as a unqualified being, in presupposition, behind the withdrawal and the Geschick. It remains natural to say here, “behind”, in the last sentence. Though, that is not how the Thinking wants the “rubric” of language to think it. This is an issue that recurs in the work called Heidegger, as the problem of the rubric. Thinking the movement of the thought is by no means a mere history of Philosophy, but, rather, it is the Methedos of the Thinking, that would leap, unlike what moves ahead all the time in regularity. Only this Thought, along the path, could leap, so far as one can see. With that consideration I have a small essentially impressionistic reflection to make:
Heidegger and Jung, roughly contemporaries, seemed to feel hate for one another. Jung says, when someone brings out our flaws we don’t like them. When by their being they bring out our flaws, rather than merely through some critique or other. Hate is here the right word. Heidegger puts aside psychology and typology as a matter of causal science. There appears in all his work a radical lack of attentiveness to individuality of any kind. Except, of the great thinkers and artists (and there he thinks of the works, not the biographical persons). But where do the great ones come from, what role do they have in the work called Heidegger? If Jung thinks the types as archetypes, does he think them into the basic words? To the historial? All this populates the thinking of the Geschick in a very untidy way. When Hegel gives way to Marx, and the teleology of history speaks of the resolution of the class contradictions, it thinks in vast aggregates, such is the rolling forth of the thinking Heidegger takes up with the salt of such as Kierkegaard, who blames for the lack of the Freedom as the Freedom of the individual. Freedom thought as the abyss, according to an archetype that moves along the surface of the Geschick complicates the Geschick greatly. In Kant, freedom meant, ultimately, absolute command by god, taken as the source of the autonomy, as the highest telos. But, in Schelling this command falls apart, thus, in the Knight of Faith, nothing is really thought that is not in Heidegger in a way, but, it is thought explicitly, where in the work called Heidegger never concerns itself with this. The Great individuals, in their various guises, such as in the account of Lev Gumilev where the so-called “passionaries” uphold the basic substratum of the world. But, in doing so, they show themselves as part of the character of the Geschick, and not in the style of the “individuated”, or of the rising fourth of the “degeneration” (as Nordau would have it), but as what is creative by what Stirner and Nietzsche would have it. This is all not explicitly said in Heidegger, concerning the great ones, concerning their works, this then makes one think the creativity according to different paths. Here a great confusion reigns in our path or methodos.