Tuesday, May 30, 2017







Some theoretical remarks on the Path of the Thinking, as the Thinking of the Ergon of the Work of a text 


 https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/originals/6b/ef/78/6bef780e051eb5cee543a01f02c94f42.jpg




#31


So that we do not stray from the path with these discussions, we should recall what it is we want to achieve. It is an insight into the fact that and how “being” and “ground/reason” “are” the same. In other words, we want to hear what the principle of reason says in the second tonality as an utterance of being. Such a hearing does not simply bear something in mind. Rather, if it occurs correctly, a hearing [Hören] that thinks experiences that to which we always already, that is genuinely, belong [ge-hören].



---




In all philosophizing the peculiar genius of philisophic talent native to the thought of the philosopher who philosophized demonstrates itself in the commonly available output of the philosophizing, which is to say, that which is said in the text of the work present to hand. The work itself, when read adequately to its essential inner activity, is what is ready-to-hand, as the text which speaks with the philisophic researcher who listens attentively to the work. Insofar as in the universities make a textbook, for instance that which speaks of the “epistemology” and the specific notion of the “a priori”, which, though it is a term used by Kant, is in the textbook explicated extrinsically, or, e.g., the notion of the “indifferent” character of the aesthetic, in all these cases, as with the “deontological” morality, we find something which floats apart from the work, and has no essential connection to it. So that just as textbook stands to reality, so does the common, or universal English-speaking University version, stand to the actual reading of Kant. So too with any great work, and, with a work of thought which comes to speak to what is peculiar in the work.




How far does one “stray from the path” who does not respond to the essence of the work? The work can’t be taken up sophistically according to the average way of constructing the sense of things if it is to amount to anything for the philosophic researcher. Here we Seek "to achieve" an insight into the fact that and how “being” and “ground/reason” “are” the same.” This seeking guides the research. All seeking is already a sensitivity to what resounds according to the seeking. So, if we read the text without the peculiar engine of this seeking, already active in our thinking, we putter out into a meaningless region of the discussion about discussion, and about the relative frames in which, having taken the frames, such as the tag “epistemology” or “deontology” one can fit this and that into a masterwork of reference, like a table to be consulted on any occasion and for whatever generic propose. Such a procedure is impossible for genuine philosophizing. Therefore we must understand what is this “seeking”? What is it to find the quite distinct pattern of its inner means of coming to decision which comes to be demonstrated through the work of the thinking? 





“So that we do not stray from the path with these discussions, we should recall what it is we want to achieve. It is an insight into the fact that and how “being” and “ground/reason” “are” the same. In other words, we want to hear what the principle of reason says in the second tonality as an utterance of being. Such a hearing does not simply bear something in mind. Rather, if it occurs correctly, a hearing [Hören] that thinks experiences that to which we always already, that is genuinely, belong [ge-hören].” 



Gratefully the line given in bold text is given again “In other words,” we want to hear what the principle of reason says in the second tonality as an utterance of being.

What follows: Such a hearing does not simply bear something in mind. Rather, if it occurs correctly, a hearing [Hören] that thinks experiences that to which we always already, that is genuinely, belong [ge-hören].” 




We aren't yet ready to explicate without first saying what the doubled text in bold letters is saying. This was the subject of the whole lecture series. At the same time it tells us about what we have been meant to “seek”, in the “same”. The more we come to enter this thought, the more the work ceases to be something we need in order o carry on the seeking. In any learning one can gather to oneself the essential dynamo of the teaching as what is learned. But, in thinking this is not demonstrable to anyone, at least not without a large measure of uncertainty. Yet, whoever reads a text of Heidegger sees something of this work, even if in seeing it they regard it as mere idiosyncratic trash, which is a literature or a mystical jargon. Even they participate, however dimly, in the work which is this or that text. With those who have eyes of more-than-ordinary attunement to the work, whether from nature or through the reading of the text, which is the introduction to the work as the essence of the text, it is obvious, just as with the sense of colour in the world, that whatever the ultimate status of a work is, there is independent existence in the realm of such works. The things that are subject to the sensorium may not exist ultimately, yet, nonetheless they are independent of the ego understood as the one who reads, looks, or smells.  



We have been looking for an “utterance of being”. What is first helpful in this is the word of Leibnitz. It tells us that wherever human beings come across something, not this or that human being, but man as such, not the faulty one, or the one distracted with some other matter, but man as man, there is a look which seeks reasons. Even when, in the extreme, reasons come in the form of the “because”, the empty and lethargic poetic “because” which returns nothing, like an erosive abyss into which everything pours. Like a beggar or a child. Everyone has heard the empty “why” of the child who only asks in order to ask again ad infinitum. 



At first what we hear in the statement of reason, about how everything has a reason, is a trivial observation about the objectivity of the object. Each object, by virtue of it existence, is related to the conditions for the possibility, as to a proximate cause. The proximate cause is time and space, as of the non-metaphysical physics, which, when coming to hear itself, hears the obscure decisional property of its own demonstrations, by listening back into the ground of its seeking, in the reasoning which wants to know about the only perfect reason, reason as such, reason as a basic being. When reason is viewed as a being, since man as man is not a creature living in the sky, but amidst everything, since its essence, that of reason, too, is exposed to the abyss, reason can not be said to be something perfect. Insofar as man is guided by seeking, this seeking was the history of reason, which, being one being alongside others, is one being that is amidst the Geschick of being as such. Therefore, reason must come into our seeking as what is said in “the second tonality”.  Which is to say, as what in a World, i.e., in that specific modification of the thinking of Sky, the eternal, when we see that it is nowhere grounded, but melting into thin air all the time, in a world, or as a world, there is here, as this world, reason. The change in tonality means: at first the objectified object has a reason, namely: what caused it. The row of dominoes. But, in the change, we don’t let anything hang alongside the object like an ideal or a value, like a being, instead we say, being as such always has a reason. It always calls out with the “why”, even as the cause, the power thinking, the storing up of possibilities for the empty and the listless matter. 



Of those who today would still hold with Ulysses, against the slumber of the blessed Lotus Eaters, “who mean no harm”, only a small number would think to turn their consideration to Thought. Departing with those political spectres which haunt the better impulses of good nature, of the good nature of the human being. When nature, when the moral senses, in their scope and sagacity stun out in other directions, denying the principle of the “marketplace of ideas” will lead to the Common Weal, seeing no Progress and no Development , but that peculiar to some power mass, passed off as a Country come Nation State, instead the Political Waxes in the existential eye. That eye of unusual sagacity which evades the Political, is thereby exposed to Nihilism in its tangible sense, as what is self-independant. Letting this parenthesis pass, let us go, or pass, back into the statement of the text. How much can be passed off as mere text?



What does the second tonality say: The world as such is one world. Literally, the current world, is technicity, as for its essene technicity. But the current world is the dispensation of being as such, the Fate as this seeking of what is the same: reason. Reason being undermined was what was performed in the work called Kant. But at the same time, so long as the common presentations in the universities go, there is constantly a variegated terrace of yet unextinguished manner of presenting the why which have not yet come to cause. For instance the class thinking, and the race idea, the morality of the race idea, and the economic prefabrications and predictions of the class thinking and its every-more predictive demographic analyses. Yet, they remain essentially defective when compared to the basic causal thinking which is Power itself, as the storing up of undefective knowledge as such. But the more the ideological, and the economic melt into the peculiarity of the Sky, into the causal as what is always the same in all thinking, in being as this world, the reasons as arguments cease to speak, and the reasons as sheer pictures, of logographic keys to the storehouse of possibilities which is Power as the future stored up as causality. The more the being of human beings fusses with Power as such, the more the confusion of being hides, and withdraws, in the melting away. The more the melting away comes to conceal the human being, in its annihilation, such that the human no longer even celebrates its destruction, but goes on living through the activity which is now the inner peculiarity of the Power, the more then the bodies function as the act of this power, as the letting be of its thought. 




Then the consternation of the one who hears is the consideration of this moment when the general being is sinking away, it wants to catch the look of the same. It wants to, in its seeking, in its hearing, to see the path of the Geschick. So that the turn, the leap of the world, comes into sight. That is what the thinking called Heidegger then purposes, or, in fact, actually works out in its essence, according to its thinking which is not a why asking. In fact, far from what is mostly said, in Husserl, all this would be flat. It’s not that in Heidegger the thought rejects basic Phenomenology, in order to speak of death and of the ready-to-hand as the Nicht nichtet, or nothing that nothings as the energia and the fundamental activity of the unalloyed action, but rather that the resolute steadfastness is supposed to be able to guide towards the leap without asking why or being part of the reasoning of being. In Nietzsche: the dispensation of the basic ground or nature is no longer Sky. It becomes World. But World is aware of Worlds. When one thinks of  a “common weal” as what the moral sensibility seeks, in its independent sphere of activity, like the sensorium with its things, it seeks the one Good, like the target, like the tracing of the cursive line that the hand of student follows in their learning. When one speaks then of 1. the common good, one says one thing, a sentence. When one speaks of Lyotard and the postmodern one objects that the postmodern (as of course with the earlier such views since Hegel), the multiplicity of the Pagan is, 2. Multiplicity of the Worlds, broken apart by the differend



So: statement one and statement two. Each a all-speaking statement about all that is, about a world. One saying many lines to trace out, another saying one line. Many scripts one script. We remember all these objections formally in each discourse of the past, but we have to now remind ourselves that what is said formally is not quite the same in the world. For instance, if one says, there is one light. And then in looking one sees some light fountaining down through a window in brilliant rays. All of a piece, all brilliant light. One can say again, there are many lights. 1. One light. 2. Many lights. As statements they are on par, but in looking we see pale violets, and the dusky afterglow of the horizon with orange hues and yellow, and above the clouds the wan blue of the evening sky. Yet, what the formal statement, the reason, the rule, says about its Grund, out of which its meaning emerges, is not something aside from being. Both are being. In Nietzsche the work of decision grasps this. And comes to think of all leaps from within the World that is now given and exposited in the rule-like thinking of the statements. This presentation is no history, and no experience, it is the wellspring of the thinking as the growing energia of the work one calls Nietzsche. But in Heidegger this thinking wants to take the changing of the World, moving in the regions where the Laws of thought, the contradictions of formal thought, doesn't hold what Language says in its spell, just as what is contradictory in a Penrose triangle is not too great to overcome the mind of Thought as such, just as Bayesian thought eliminates biases in the realm of a idealized perfect causality, just as Galileo dreams in the region of his thought experiment which draws motion into the perfection of inertial frames, to the turn and the leap, to let Thought think into what is Same un-housed, uncabined. Thinking to this region.

Wednesday, May 24, 2017


Some Words in Passing Concerning the History of the Geschick as the History of Ideas in the Thinking




Related image



#30

In order to blaze a path here we must make the best of the fact that our exposition has come to a standstill in a crude form. What was noted concerning the understanding and saying of the word Grund [ground/reason]. In the previous sessions, all of us have understood the often mentioned word Grund in some manner. Hence we were able to set aside what we are now no longer able to pass over: the discussion of the word Grund and the names on the history of thinking that name what is generally characterized by the German word Grund.   




----



Truth ranges from Ground to Reason. Sometime Reason is called Rationality. Sometimes reason is understanding, as in Kant. Thinking not only ranges as much in the grounds of experience, as in the givens of dreams and inner happenings, but as much in the taking up of judgment with respect to syllogising, figuring, calculating, and every form of finding intelligible, as in reading of a sentence or Satz. A sentence, which passes sentence, telling what is, is not then to be confused with ground or reason. If, for the reason that all sentences tell, and this is a sentence, this tells, it does not mean, obviously enough, that the sentence, in what is intelligible about what it says, that this sentence tells, is the (physical) cause of the telling (i.e., of what is told in the sylogising as the inference or conclusion). Also, it is not, as sentence, the reason. It is a reason, but the reason is in what the sentence says, not from the hule, speaking metaphorically, of the particular issuance of Language. Then the question about what Language says refers one to what is ranging, as the Same, in each part of Language. A sentence passes sentence in this peculiar way, insofar as it speaks of the Same and of Language.



Formally speaking this creates a triviality of reference and self-reference. Yet, for thinking it is not like that at all. Insofar as we come to think we don’t enter the material, as though to remember what it had hidden. We don’t go over the things to be thought, as though there, to be free of the encumbrance of the appetitive disturbances to the intellect. Yet, neither can one, simply push aside Language, as though this logos were not (as in the manner of Bertrand Russell). 





Whereas the play of reason, recta ratio, hangs around something to be interpreted. The art object for which the artist brings out the something in the truth of its form, its essence, and then leaves it empty, as though only pointing to the non-object, the de-produced. The world as such, where each thing is emptied, and given over to the hold of the power, as the collection of all that an effect can effect, not as means, but as sheer power. Insofar as this maintains, metaphysics is still in its end. the Meta speaks as the decision about the physics. All is cast into the play of Power thinking, having scattered this way and that, into the Political which is no more politics, as much in Arendt as in Schmitt. But whoever hears Language would have listened to what is not speaking about the production and the de-production of the thing and the something as something. 




Insofar as the orders out of the genes are overlaid with the race explanation, and the struggle talk, they are like the labour thinking, and the class explanation. These two thoughts dominate the university, and anyone who does not mention them as the explanation has something wrong with them. The more they loose their peculiar individuality, as what some genius gave expression to, in a Hobbes or a Marx, the more they sink into the demand of each one. They satisfy the demand of the why which each one is always peeping about for, as though from under the burden of their life, which seeks to pride itself on its knowing. When the village in the pale beige plane amidst grasses grows, more come to be part of its region, it now has become a city, and there there is the activity, the doing of what is called politics, that is not the political. Only when the action of politics is said to come forward as something existential, trans-natural, determining what is natural, do we speak of the political. Yet, what is this going beyond the natural activity? Is it not only to catch the contagion of ideology, seeing it in the teaching of race and economics, and then doing the same either more naively or more knowingly? Granted, Ideology is said in two ways, of what is prefigured and then advanced by thought, and of what is endemic to unhappy thought as immediate sensing, and then in intermediary senses. For example, as bringing the tradition of thinking about aristocratic lineage into the idea of a realism of natural interests, survival interest, reading them over the discovery of evolution as change and fossil record, finding there race, and then when race becomes racism, weaving this into a generic and all pervasive thinking of the human society as such in all universities. Disappearing in the prevalence. The same happens with the class thinking, which is now everywhere demanded in all accounts of life in the so-called humanities. And then it is all accounted for by the Interest of the Political. But, such semi-Nietzschean, unworthy of Nietzsche, activity, we mention in passing. 




Insofar as those preceptors of the declension of history who find the destruction of the older teaching, as of teleology of moral purpose in Bishop Berkeley, they range in the thing as what is built out of the reception of the Geschick when told by the saying of the Phenomenological thinking in Husserl, and, a fortiori, the student of Husserl as the energia of the work of the Thinking that has that name, of that student, as its title. Yet, one should keep a clear grasp of the punctum of the difficulty, especially by not exaggerating the possibly misguided word “naively” in what was written above. And the crucial struggle of the Nietzschean and the Heideggerian version of a primus motus of the Thinking.

Friday, May 19, 2017






Some arguments that try to overcome the 2 + 2 = 2 in the hope of bringing suggestion to Thought 




 Image result for Castelvecchio





#29


Yet what the word Grund and the corresponding names name can be exhibited only with even greater difficulty, especially when we seek to bring into view what is the same that is touched upon in previously used names like Grund [reason], ratio, causa, Ursache [cause], “condition for the possibility.”

---














In seeking, i.e., in already venturing to seek, we suppose ourselves to be wise. For we do not know what we seek. How is it that ignorance is supposed to be redoubled, intensified? That, we who do not know what this “same”, “that is touched upon” by each part of this same, are more wise than they who are perfectly informed about what, e.g., a cause is, or, a reason? Aren't they supposed to be even ignorant of their ignorance? But in all ignorance there can be no redoubling. One either knows, or doesn’t know. So we who suppose ourselves, insofar as we seek, and they who Know, and so don’t seek, are both the ignorant with respect to this matter. Yet, in our seeking, we suppose ourselves to venture better than they who seek by Knowing, in the ways das Man knows it all. 




This wisdom is supposed to consist in a kind of consternation, whereby what is the same becomes questionable, not as what can be questioned, but as what is not solid, but, rather, shaky, insolid, swimming, questionable as such. Yet, this is supposed to be true even for those who don’t Know that the same is like that, and so are correspondingly not full of dismay. This wisdom is the drawing forth of the abyss, as the reception of the call. Yet, in everything that is calling there is always a hearing whether it fills us with dismay or lets us continue on at once already sure of our Knowing in the style of das Man. At first the philosophers had no name, but then the Thou sharply distinguished them, regarding them as worth noticing because they were, like the games, something of the passing procession that glitters with a faint radiance for those who know, and not for those who do not yet know that there is such a thing as a philosopher. Someone might not know that someone who was running was part of some broader space of activities know as Games. Cicero, contradicting, as it were, Aristotle, is quoted often by Arendt, who says, in staying with Plato we prefer what may not be True to what is true, whereas Aristotle preferred what was True to Plato. But, then, does one become a Platocracy, preferring the chratos, or power, of Plato? Did Language first teach Philosophy, or did some more primordial word already exist in the archipelago, and let language speak, before the mob of the gentleman took up their sport, watching the philosophers argue in the dull-purple shadows of the houses?




The “same”, too, has its history that rises in the archipelago world of the Mediterranean. Insofar as we ask about the same of the same we bring forward the problem that the same is a being. Howsofar does same say truth? Is the same than what is always to be found with Truth? Is that what is the same about the same? When the same is the abyss of freedom, doesn't it stand together with the conditions for the possibility, but without becoming the abyss of the “There is no Truth” as the, if you ask me how this can be True, I answer: All the better. When Iki speaks it does not speak as Truth, or as what is the Same, Thus Nietzsche says: Truth is a woman. Why? It is a teaching: because in German Truth is gendered, and, Nietzsche says, once, there was a world where, men sought the genders of the things in an alien way, just as Iki names the Japanese world, there was a world where the gender of the moon was a Poesis and a Phusis: a “living in the material”. If in saying when Truth is no longer Truth, we are refered back to each other world, to what is the Same, in each world, through the teaching about Truth, that is gendered, we come to the prostration before what is the Same in the dismay of the one who is wise in the not knowing of what is the Same in all worlds. Entering into such a circle without becoming utterly dizzy is a Thought about Thought, in the text of Heidegger we have this question about What is Thinking? This should not be misunderstood to say what is “called”, as in  a drawing forth, thinking. The subject matter of the reception of the thinking should be distinguished from the question, what is it we call by the name Thinking? Or, what does Language say when it speaks of Thinking? 




At first it seems that only by Thinking, can we Think what is Thinking. If someone who understands a matter holds an opinion we can always discuss with them whether or not they really Think what they say they hold to be so. By contrast, if someone says that 2 + 2 is 2, and rehearses all the time this statement, even when it is demonstrated to them that two cups, set beside another two, are four, they will never be persuaded. Since they only repeat what they don’t Think. What is thought is then like what “makes sense”. But what makes sense itself stands on a Grund, on a Sameness, that is never challenged by the argument that raises objections and
new examples that still speak out of the Sameness and the Similarity which is the turning away from the same. And yet, the matter of Thinking the Same comes into Thinking in one way or another as what is Thought, and not only rehearsed or spoken in the manner of the 2 + 2 = 2.    

Wednesday, May 17, 2017



Preparation for the First Reading of the Eleventh Hour of the Work on the Principle of Reason, insofar as the First Reading of this Hour comes to Thought 




 Image result for carlo scarpa







# 28

This remark has a fundamental significance for every discourse about being, whether it occurs in this lecture or elsewhere in the thinking and pondering what has been thought. When we say “being,” when we say “is,” it is no hollow sound. We understand what we say, that is, what we articulate. At the same time we are at a loss when we have to say—here that means, when we have to bring into view—what we think. And we remain perplexed when we assent to the fact of what is historically the same, despite the various manners of representation, experiencing and expression. We gladly avoid being perplexed and take refuge in common opinions. Associated with being perplexed is the absence of any inkling about the fact that is what is most worthy of thought is what we thoughtlessly think in the word “being.” Yet the usual and customary manner in which we understand and speak of “being” resists letting one fault it as being careless and doing away with it. The customary sort of relation to “being” necessarily belongs to the way that humans, residing among beings, first and foremost respond to the Geschick of being. Therefore, even the thoughtful question of being always remains alien and disturbing, most of all for those who attempt to ask it. This points up a difference between the sciences and philosophy. In the former one has the excitement and the stimulation of the ever-novel and successful; in the latter one has the consternation of what is simply the same, of what does not admit of success because nothing can follow from it—this because thinking, insofar as it ponders being, thinks back into ground/reason, that is, its essence as the truth of being.        







---

The whole lecture series contemplated, while wanting to think, the range: from the poetic which has “no why”, to the objectivity of the object, which itself points to the object that, according to the Macht principle, “has reason”. Which means, not that one who looks around will find the reason for something, but that in the Macht or Power of the what is there in the light of cognition is only insofar as it is causal. That was the shift in tonality, from looking aside to find the cause, to looking into the thinking of being as what in this epoch has a cause. Being became causal. What is done is gemacht. Here we see the limits of the Geschicht of being in the German language when it speaks of making experiences. The English speaker has experiences, but never makes experiences. The German is likely to say, in English, they have already made that experience. Poiesis, in Greek, is a making, contrasted with phusis, which is what comes forth on its own. This is not like the distinction between nomos, the conventional, and phusis. It has another role to play in the origin of our human being. 




Insofar as language can say something to us, even as we misuse it, it can never say what being would be without language. Thinking is more primordial a being than is the that or the what, yet, it is a being, and so conceals being as such. Truth is the essence of any thinking, so far as we know, of any thinking worthy of the name. If Thinking is already determined by what it says about the Geschick, as a rule, then Thinking is always what has the Truth for its essence. The whole lecture series was trying to shed the faintest light on the range of Truth, but not in order to ask more about the meaning of Truth, or about its essence, but in order to leap to a, one would say, if one could, new Thinking. Since we have to, hear, reflect on what is being Thought, we can only remain with Thinking as what our reflections are relative to, except that we leap according to something like a change in tonality. Tonality itself is relative to Language, at first to this or that utterance of language, such as the Mighty principle of Leibniz, where we see the decisive change, but ultimately to Language in its essence as what is “the house of being”. Sentences are always speaking to us as though they were reasons, grounds, insights into what is, yet in this speaking we listen not to Language, but rather to an articulation of the Truth of being, as this being, as what is brought forth in an epoch of the Geschick of Thinking. 





“The customary sort of relation to “being” necessarily belongs to the way that humans, residing among beings, first and foremost respond to the Geschick of being.”





This sentence doesn’t tell us what “humans” means. If humans are thought as objects, from where does the objectness shine? It is only through humans that anything can be thought as an object at all, and be an object, as what always has a reason or cause. Humans, in the Thinking of Da-sein, never says something like, a biological organism with the capacity to reason, nor does it say, in the style of Erwin Schrodinger's essay called What is Life?, something like, information which gives commands which itself is identical to awareness which is the commanding of all movement, it does not pose a problem that could then be solved through making more experiences involving the seeking of what commands what will follow, in the manner of the first tonality of the principle of Leibnitz: nihil est sine ratione. Rather, Da-sein as human lets metaphysics come to its end, which is not to say overcomes metaphysics. The end means that the change in tonality must be spoken by being, be a reception of being: to seek the system of all objects, as the causal structure, is to let the objectness, as the way of thinking all objects, be. This has its concrete example in what we said about Russell in an earlier post, it is the fixation as a metaphysical determination about being. It fixes the seeking of all making of experince. But, the fixing of the seeking, and the things sought, each stand in thought as the “-” “play” of being which is both object and objectness of the object. Something worthy of our attention is to be found in the thinking of Arendt, insofar as the subject of why a certain meaning is Thought at all, would be welcome here, but our ignorance as yet forbids this inclusion, and so it is mentioned in passing as a possibility or power latent in the Thinking.  




Insofar as the seriousness of this play becomes a purpose it becomes the standard by which the Thou as such derides and praises. Das Man, which is the opinion of the epoch, and speaks from the epoch, seeks more and more the ownmost of its epoch, as the Truth, as the True opinion. To prevent the determination of this ownmost is to despise oneself as obscurantist. To respect oneself is to achieve the demand of the Geschick even when the slow wits of das Man have not yet seen the Truth of it. Each deed is deemed Real, and a True piece of work, inssofar as it accords with the ownmost ground of the epoch. But to have Truth does not guarantee that one’s actions have not been empty, since Truth is the Truth of an epoch, and though it command through conviction from the essence of Truth, as what is authentic, it can not be more than the authentic arising of the abyss in the conviction of whoever rightly finds the center of self respect and self contempt of man as man. When this freedom is no longer grounded, it no longer commands at all, its tonality becomes that of life itself which is without meaning, that which swims in the pan-oceanic which has no target. When the Geschick comes into this ground, it asks, am I too such an epoch, the epoch of saying that there are epochs? The first epoch that refers back to being as such.    






“This points up a difference between the sciences and philosophy. In the former one has the excitement and the stimulation of the ever-novel and successful; in the latter one has the consternation of what is simply the same, of what does not admit of success because nothing can follow from it—this because thinking, insofar as it ponders being, thinks back into ground/reason, that is, its essence as the truth of being.”






Here what is said is strange, since it Thinks, without claiming to Know, that from within the technological, where there are sciences, there is a philosophy which is not the technological. The Dogmatic and the Empirical would have another name: the Same. This is the meaning of a Critical Philosophy. When critical means the spirit of the Enlightenment, to bring everything to the question, to question Catholic universalism, to dissolve in the Reformation, to become the Frankfurt School, it does not speak of the Critical as what is the Same. Kant discovers the Critical, which was in a way always known (as was the principle of reason, it was: as though latent in its sleepiness, in its everyday somnolence and unnoticed exhaustion which one hardly listened to, and ostensibly concealed; not spoken explicitly as what is at issue), by criticizing Reason and finding, that like the thinking, e.g., of the parallel line, Reason is a being. Reason itself is never the Same, but it turns out to be the abyss. It is the abyss when it is measured against the condition for the possibility, when with Simmel condition and abyss becomes the fact and the value existentialism falls into the chatter of a superficial stance against dogma of all kinds: thus, the you can’t tell me about good or bad, about anything, it's only words. Ideology, brainwashing, a trick. Everything becomes justified out of the power of standing practices. In this way, the actual Geschick shows its Work: the essence of technicity as the firmness of the I shall not listen; whilst at the same time as the success of the I must have more intellectual stimulations; but, crucially, only as the interesting and the political which is always a non-thinking political that is relative to the Same. 




The more the Same captivates the more man as man becomes an animal. Animal is always the concept of man, seen from man, as what is lower than man. There is no higher judge to say what is lower and what is higher in the Geschick. When cheap books are written, and passed off as philosophy, on the subject of an original material artifact prior to the existence of man, when one takes as proof of one’s origin information about a remote heat event, when one is impressed by the constant command of the causal structure active in the chemical structures of the genetic code, one falls to the Same, as by way of a Captivation which can not Think: that the sciences do not think is as much the case with man as man, insofar as the withdrawal of being becomes self-evident in the Same. When the Same is no longer recalled as being as such, it is a fixation on the Truth of being, as what is there, as the whatness that is there in the thereness which are both no longer remembered as beings, or, as beings which, however, are only beings under the being of beings as what always is.
Only insofar as one sees this can one come into the attempt to think the essence of the epoch as the step towards the leap which is more than a leap in tonality of a word that states this or that.  

Friday, May 12, 2017





An Impressionistic Excursus concerning the difficulty of the Individual and/or as Work of Talent 



 Image result for Maxi Cohen




The difficulty of our last step in the path, of our last stepping forth, in the previous post, concerning the confusion over individuality has a direct answer in Hegel which brings clarity to the confusion:


“At the outset, then, the nature of individuality in its original determinate form, its immediate essence, is not yet affirmed as active; and in this shape is called special capacity, talent, character, and so on. This peculiar colouring of mind must be looked at as the only content of its purpose, and as the sole and only reality. If we thought of consciousness as going beyond that, as seeking to bring into reality another content, then we should think of it as a nothing working towards nothing.”







The whole of 401, especially when it comes to the sense of Talent, of Hegel’s chief work, is worth bringing to our attention, let whoever wants to pursue it read it. “Nothing working towards Nothing." This is said in order to say that one who has not come to wisdom or happiness, said in the Socratic way, remembering it, or, in the other case, not having remembered, is in a relation to this ratio, wisdom or happy consciousness. Nothing working towards Nothing is set aside as ridiculous and empty, or out of hand as what is not already confirmed by the thinking of the Absolute, since all are in relation to the Real or actually, Thought rightly/happily, that Real. But if nothing is working towards nothing we must think already of the descent into a well with no bottom, as in the Nietzschean abyss which is aimless. However, said from the Hegelian ground, it is the unhappy consciousness which is aimless to the extent that it aims at the irrational aims, and not at the rational aim. But, such an aimlessness, is only relative, and no devaluation of the highest values occurred, in such a way as to make the devaluation itself the value as the solidity that tosses on the pan-oceanic wave which has already annihilated: thus in the baseness of imponderable confusion which one can hardly enter into. Unless this is the “monster” that one who “stares too long” is. Whoever, in the text of Heidegger, the arbeit, the work, the energia, is uncertain, is questioning along the Grund and even in the essence of the abyss. This means a particular modification of the Thinking of creativity is at work. To the place of the work goes this Nothing, and the place is Nothing. So self-love exists, no self forgetfulness, no bringing towards the happiness in self love can occur, for everything refers not to a circle that makes the being, but to a Nothing. But in the Absolute, science, the self-love still speaks! All absolutes are thus cast aside.





In Hegel the place of the work is the Real. This notion is still active in Science, where science remains metaphysical. For example Chomsky’s distinction of the mystery and the problem. Here he lets the mystery be in the Real, i.e., in what lies beyond the capacity of the human equipment, the human brain. A wide region of the Real actually exists, but it is not reachable. Something like this is thought in Dennett as well. Consciousness is a kind of super-duper unhappy consciousness. It is both lame in its human structure, and it is causal. In Hegel, the consciousness that is unhappy is misdirected, has the wrong aim, but it is moral and it is moving towards its Real. Once there is Creativity there is no Real. The mystery is not relative to the searcher.  






The more science as the essence of technology purposes the now commonplace, but constantly growing in power, openness of a Positivism that comes to an apotheosis, in the saying that what it is doing is not to be understood in any way, for example in the commonplace talk of the advance of physics, it moves into the power of the essence of technology where it begins to fuse with the captivation of all thoughtless beings. In Comte, positivism, was the thing observed, but managed by the common sense, which still had the status of a actual intelligence, and not what it becomes, the passing dogma of the arbitrary township, at this or that moment. Thus, it becomes a brilliant absolute, that binds with its heat. As though everything were essence, and nothing left over as the Nothing. Without the Nothing, with its apportionment of openness, the annihilation of the wave of human beings in the shoar of movements brings delusion and dream into being as a rule. The more the seduction to the Lotus Eaters, which guides all souls, brings greater and greater ease and joy to human beings, the more the concealment of Being has happened.     





“Talent is not other then individuality with a definite original constitution looked at as the subjective internal means, or transition of purpose into actuality.”







Because the “talent” is not some entity crawling around inside the body, but actually the sphere of the horizon of the being of the one who has the talent as their world, the aim of the talented one is the same as the world. Understood in the Hegelian manner the whole individual is a movement of error in the unhappiness that has not brought the happy world to the horizon of their existence. Existence is thus fallen short of the Real, but in so far as it is talent, to that extent, it has at least done so in a glittering way, and in a way to shine brilliantly, as with van Gogh. Obviously van Gogh, however much one is enamored by his work, was not a pious and grave man, was not a man who saw the true way for the political community as the shape of life of the people, but, rather, something glittered and came forth, and it sits there on the outskirts in the houses of art and in innumerable glittering reproductions. It is almost a contagion of the world, this reminds us of the Greek Temple, in the work that goes under the Rubric: Heidegger, the philosopher. 







Still, the confusion of the Jungian Archetype comes in. A "type" is not a symbolic presentation, but is said literally. Where exactly do these personality types come in? They are not the preserve of some few gifted ones, but of each one. Each one has a personality. This of course is in great contrast to the thinking of Goethe, for whom personality still meant the same thing as gift, as Talent. And was not bestowed on each one. Yet, Jung understands this, and Thinks it, perfectly adequately to the older notions. It is simply that he tries to show, through observations, available to him, not only to him, but more to him than others without his personality, that each one has these traits in lesser or greater prominence, in more or less conspicuous expression. IT IS THIS: What Jung noticed, that no one ever had brought out, but some had know of, is that the inner life is as contoured/pan-folded as the Gift of the talented in its specific inverse of the Talent. The more hollow, and free of personality in the old sense, the more cavernous and full of recesses is the inner life in its rich enjoyment of the world of the Thou. For instance, Borges, when he says Shakespeare's talent was unconscious, or that he made his work as though unconsciously, he says, this one has no cavernous inner space of contrivance, everything moves along the absolute of the talent, in its contact with the Nothing. The more Jung was able to understand the peculiarity of “inner banality”, of the mundane and ungifted, the more he saw in madness a wave crashing in the cavernous recesses. This strange un-German, as it were, praise of being qua being as the ungifted, as the uncultured, not as Volk, but as Individual. That the Volk would be Individuals (cowards as this reads in Dugin), is what seems slightly strange. But all this is unclear. One should not let it appear that in Heidegger there is not reverence for the all those who appear to have brought forth no work, or to have made no exploit shine in the eyes of das Man. Yet there's something deeper in it. Because Heidegger, what is rejected in the work called Heidegger, is the split in the worlds which leads to the chaos of the schizophrenic, so-called, world of Jung and his coloured Nothing. All this remains thought without a good grasp of specific tonalities. So far we are simply vomiting certain obscure apprehensions and formal scatterings. Leaving this matter aside, we are now ready to go on with the Methodos under the renewed impetus of the Power of its questioning.