Thursday, April 6, 2017


Thoughts Pertaining to Thinking a Distinction: Formal Rehearsing and Thinking









Paragraph #20


{When speaking of the Geschick of being, “being” means nothing other than the proffering of the lighting and clearing that furnishes a domain for the appearing of beings in some configuration, along with the contemporaneous withdrawal of the essential provenance of being as such. The age in which Western thinking was setting up the principle of reason as the supreme fundamental principle was an age at play in an epoch of the Geshick of being that even now orients our contemporary historical existence, orienting it even if, for our part, we only know the names of the thinkers of this epoch—Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling—and no longer experience their inner affinity and common destiny.}




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In one far-eastern tradition thinking for oneself, far from meaning doing one’s own thinking, as though to advocate for originality of experience, meant to think for the sake of the realization of one’s nature. Thinking can never fail to be the thinking one does oneself, but it can fail to be a thinking for one’s self. Whenever one goes beyond the sophistry that rehearses schematic distinctions, which separate without being able to lead the one who speaks of the distinction to what the distinctions say, whoever thinks, is always likely to think for themselves. But in thinking for oneself, through the thoughts of the great thinkers, one remains with what is most characteristic of the Geschick of thought. In this sense one is lead to the so-called archetypal thinking, where in the realisation of one’s character through the thinking for oneself, one reaches one is forced into a conflict with the god, as the first cause. Thusly in the thinking called Heidegger Nietzsche is the Will to Will as devaluation of the first cause, as what is no longer the god, but what is ‘in the place of’ (the scare quotes indicate a radical difficulty in the thinking) the first cause. The abyss, as in Shelling, and the Nothing, as in Heidegger, the region of the drives in Freud, the Will to Will as the devaluing, grapple with the mystery of intelligibility of cause, origin, the why of the destiney. According to the thinking called Heidegger, secundum Heideggerem, which is not to say according to veritas, but is also not to say according to the biographical Heidegger, this movement into the unintelligible, which Jung calls “the point where critical reason comes to a halt” describes a matter that holds sway in the end of metaphysics, but not an Ultimate consideration as such. It is part of the Christian god that it holds the thought in its reason, because orthos doxa is what receives the inspiration of faith in its intelligibility as rect reason, as what laws forth above man and within the spectre of grace. Thus in the modern thought, the spectre of the light of grace casts out its shadowy surrounds. And man everywhere speaks of the mystery that is degraded by the word god, as the personal god. The word of Darwin suffices to speak for the modern reception of the abyss, when he speaks of the dog that tries to conceive of the mind of Newton. Thus man is supposed to stand towards the abyss of the spontaneous artificer, of the origin of evolution as the power of what “breathes life into the equations”, as Hawking said it. The “allowing to arise” that stands in all bodies, making them hold their form through the motion, as of, e.g. life, where a tree that ceases to “arise” becomes meer wood, holding its form under the deeper cause, of the principle of motion hidden within the kinesis, as the action of the mind of god (the being of the energia). The overcoming of the Christian thought is self evident in such a way as to disappear from common sense, concerning rect reason, at the end of metaphysics. In the paragraphs that we are now reaching, we begin to read into the thought of being, which is said schematically in such words as “Kierkegaard was ontic”, i.e., not ontological in the sense meant by the text Heidegger, which is what is vouchsafed by a reception in thought, that is not the reception that thinks for itself (according to the rule of realisation of the primordial individual character of the thinker). In a popular documentary, Jung says of this character, it is already “highly complex” in the child, [and its “determinants”, which are elements of distinction, are already thought in a Western fashion which points already to Will to Power.]     





Da-sein has its regard (concern, its being towards the ergon)—man his things (with properties, representation as the founding of externality), consciousness its Power (as ‘process’, as the concealment of being in the devaluation of the value of the first cause; the devaluation is what is in the place of the first cause, rather than nothing being in its place, as one might think if one thought in the technological fashion). Da-sein names the Greek thinking, which, retrospectively, can be thought over Western thought as a whole. The blush of the thaumazein, wondrousness, as the atmosphere of glittering dust in the lighting, is supposed to be before the Da-sein in the Early thinking. This reminds us of the atmosphere of Christian grace. Therefore, the thinking called Heidegger, attempts to think being with the four thoughts, in the ‘glance back’ over the whole Geshick of Western thinking, and never tries to raise one of them to mastery over the other. 




“When speaking of the Geschick of being, “being” means nothing other than the proffering of the lighting and clearing that furnishes a domain for the appearing of beings in some configuration, along with the contemporaneous withdrawal of the essential provenance of being as such.”






Being is said in many ways, and here too, being does not name being as such, but being as what the sentence says. Namely, “the proffering of the lighting and clearing that furnishes a domain for the appearing of beings in some configuration, along with the contemporaneous withdrawal of the essential provenance of being as such.” How does one think this being, as it is here stated? As the “domain” which conceals the “essential provenance of being as such”. This being is thought, then, in a faison, roughly speaking, that is parallel to the Nietzschean answer, and the Freudian region where the drives exist through the space that proffers them a region to be, and the abyss of Shelling, and the spontaneous artificer which looks like the common sense of technological thinking that thinks back behind the evolution into the ground of the matter in its arising and keeping to its laws which describe form. So this being, and what withdraws in its commoning forth, describe the ontic realm, and the ontological which has withdrawn but which is said to proffer it through the withdrawal. 





“The age in which Western thinking was setting up the principle of reason as the supreme fundamental principle was an age at play in a an epoch of the Geshick of being that even now orients our contemporary historical existence, orienting it even if, for our part, we only know the names of the thinkers of this epoch—Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling—and no longer experience their inner affinity and common destiny.”




In a sense that is both cheap but also raises a difficulty that is not trivial,
one can say, Jung thinks the archetypes within the modern thinking which demands an investigation with an empirical character. For the Greeks such investigation was called historia, true investigation into what one comes across at first hand, what became Natural History, and then the Life Sciences. Jung thinks the phylogenetic unconsciousness as a collective unconscious. He throws the “das ding an sich”, what arises on its own, into the “Geschick of being”, when thought in a Heideggerian way Jung is ontic. Jung objects to Heidegger on grounds which may be serious and may be mere insults (provoked by the spat of Heideggerian/Existential psychoanalysis, i.e., crude rehearsals of existential sayings according to the authority of fashion, not thinkers, analysis which annoyed Jung with its stupidity to no end) saying that Heidegger is banal and bristling with unconscious complexes. This comment may as well be taken to apply to the text, since Jung made no attempt to read Heidegger in the way Heidegger the text put that text forward, but read the text, rather, in an external fashion, according to extrinsic thinking. However, on the lowest level, one may say that the claim that Historicism is the moment when thought sees beyond history, is, on the same level as that historically determined thinking into the biological nothing, as the collective unconscious, as it could only have been thought be men of the age of Jung, who where receptive to the Geschick of thinking then proffered.  

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