Monday, April 10, 2017


How would the Nothing be Thought in proximity to Language and Being? 





Paragraph 21


Nevertheless the history of Western thinking shows itself as the Geschick of being when and only when we glance back upon the whole of Western thinking from the point of view of the leap and when we recollectively preserve it as the Geschick of being that has-been. At the same time we can prepare for the leap only by speaking in terms of the history of being, a history that has been experienced in terms of Geschick. The leap leaves the realm from which one leaps while at the same time recollectively regaining anew what has been left such that what has-been becomes, for the first time, something we cannot lose. That into which the leap anticipatorily leaps is not some region of things present at hand into which once can simply step. Rather, it is the realm of what first approaches as worthy of thought. But this approach is also shaped by the traits of what has-been, and only because of this is it discernable. We must take all that is ranged under the first four of the five main points mentioned earlier and think it back into the history of being. The fifth main point regarded the change in the tonality of the principle of reason. A leap from out of the principle of reason as a fundamental principle about beings into the principle of reason as an utterance of being concealed itself behind the change of tonality of one and the same principle. As a recollective anticipatory principle, the principle [Satz] is thus a “vault” [Satz] in the sense of a leap [Sprung]. If we fully think through the polysemic word Satz not only as “statement,” not only as “utterance,” not only as “leap,” but at the same time also in the musical sense, then what Bettina von Arnim wrote in her book Goethe’s Correspondence with a Child also holds for our path through the principle of reason:


If one speaks of a movement [Satz] in music and how it is performed, or of the accompaniment of   an instrument and of the understanding with which it is treated, then I mean precisely the opposite, namely that the movement leads the musician, that the movement occurs, develops and is concentrated often enough till the spirit has completely joined itself to it.


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Now, what the title says is not immediately evident in the main body of what follows, but only in small details, but it is the overall endeavor of the thinking in the passage that is named in this title. 







Insofar as we speak of a leap, we speak of a region that is not a matter of the rule, or of the rough fact (i.e., the empirical). These days one speaks of so-called epistemology, and so-called ontology. Empirics are a kind of doctors, who, as it were, just poke around and spend their time with the sick, thinking that next time they will get it better, better than the last. Whereas those who make rules might always be accused of being too bookish, and of trying to make the world fit their fancies, their libraries are full of wonderful and pleasant fictions. Insofar as the leap happens, it happens as much to the intellect as to the sensorium. Or, put another way, it happens to what is essential, but not actual, to the occulted eidos. The actual is what actually exists according to the essential. E.g., man, by one account, the medieval account, was said to have for his essence deliberation, by which right reason might come to its rule, its science. For instance the science of the law, of justice. Insofar as this was experienced as what is neither law nor fact, it is the subject of the leap. When reason becomes causality, that leap is effected, and law becomes the subject of a doctrine of Sovereignty, or of positive statement. Again, if a circle is raised to view in speech, through the sound definition, where the genre and the differentiate come out, that a circle is a closed curved line, its genus, with the particular differentiate that it is everywhere on its circumference equidistant from the center, speaks of the essence of the circle, but the existing circles are never like that. The law, here, is the measurement of rationality, the definition, the law of the circle, is measured by the essence of the circle, as it is found within man. The circle, as what exists, is not guiding. But for the law of cause, when cause becomes man’s essence, it is the reverse, the definition is a statement of the facts, made according to a so-called idealization.






When the leap is understood as a transformation of the essence of man, it is as a transformation of truth, and it is as a transformation in the essence of regard. Truth points, in the statement of Leibniz, to the doctrine of Nature, as motion, thus to the correctness of the mathematical doctrine based on the thought experiment of Galileo, concerning the nature of motion as entropy (it is more straightforward to say as inertia, where entropy is then derived from that model, where space is presupposed as capable of a pure inertial movement, falsely. One can also use the example given in Chomsky, of the failure of the machine view, to explicate the Nature, as thought model, in another way, which is in principle, the same matter), stands in the empty correctness as the machine, or formula of repetition, for the motion, which itself is a description, and never what it tried to be, the essence of a homogeneous principle of nature. On the other hand, ratio, as language, is speaking to man’s regard, so that the nature of each thing becomes the presense for common sense of each kind of thing, as all the species of things, each one different from each other. 






When the ‘sentence’ is thought as movement, it means that a principle of inner movement, and a principle of regard, as a world essence, leap along in the Geschick. Time as the Geschick is not the time of the Natural principle, as the inner spring of motion, nor does it speak of the world-time, as the time of what the things are according to their ergon, according to what they are in their beings. The beings which are the beings of this Historial moment, belong to the leaping, according to the way language is bringing forth what can’t be thought. Language means the course of the leaping, as said in what the citation says. The nothing gains its content because of the Historial. Otherwise it would only name an unconscious, as a Natural place where drives have their domain. The nothing is a world domain, which is always holding back its possibility, that of the language, as what can be another language. The ergon belongs to this language, as its essence, as the activity of the beings in this or that world. Insofar as absurdity is the essence of British planetary life, it stands with the essence of technicity, which is truth as correctness, as already pictured above. The absurdity is the skhole, the leisure, of the regard of the human being, in the planetary Britishness which is the technicity as the saying of Leibnitz, as the mighty principle of Reason. 





Generally it is not understood that Will to Power refers most of all to a nous, a god of Reason, that is devalued, not in order to revalue, but as such (this was mentioned in the last post), such a head or state, a status as a governing or a eunomic power is not intentional, it is like the cause as an essence, it essenses over its Nature, such that the existence obeys its essencing, in so far as this essence is always the look-out and the eyes of each mortal. Although cause does not exist it is driving force of everything util, everything that can bring something good, which is power in the case of the essence of technicity, as the storing of the possibility, but this God, this nous, which is neither Olympian or Cosmic, rests in the Geschick of Language and Being as such. Being as such is the being of this world, when it is thought, but in the presupposition of Histrorial movement it is being as such (without further qualification). Likewise, then, here we show that this is also a presupposition with respect to what is called language, even as what is not this or that logos or logic. Up until now the relation of the house of being and being was thought without the realization of the way they stand entirely in the presupposition as a pair. 




This oversight is because Husserl doesn't think in terms of Language, but of logos that is pre-logical. He draws back from the specific essence of that logic, but not from speach as logos, back to Language as what
spans the Histories. The radical presupposition of Heidegger is largely unthought these days. For this reason the confrontation with Nietzsche is not understood. It is even taken as a matter of personal power, as though of fame or glory. Something more like the reverse is at stake in this “personal”, which is not what it means to a university professor who thinks of their carrier. But, even when one thinks of philosophy, as the discussion of the great philosophers, this is not what it means at all. It is a destinal time that wants to create confusion, or that would remain shaky, if the thinking which is strictly non-human would draw closer to what is worthy in the confrontation of the thinkers.       

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