Tuesday, April 25, 2017




If the path or methodus does not go by, but is ablaze, what would it teach, what tonality would learning harangue in?


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# 25


In the mean time we have spoken for a number of class periods about “being” and “reason” without our having fulfilled the most pressing requirement, which is to grasp that about which we have continually spoken—namely, “being” as well as “reason”—with rigorous concepts and thus to secure in advance the necessary reliability for the course of the discussion. Why this neglect? The neglect comes from what we were speaking about when we were recalling the history of being and the principle of reason as one of the supreme fundamental principles. In recalling these things, being was spoken of in the sense of φύσις, of what emerges-on-its-own; being was spoken of in the sense of the objectness of the objects of experience. We talked about reason as ratio and causa, as conditions for the possibility. Of course what we havn’t taken as our immediate topic of conversation, but which nevertheless could and should have shown a little bit of itself in a mediate fashion on the path up to this point, is the following: what we in different ways named “being” and “reason” and which was brought into a certain light in such a naming cannot, for its part, be put in a definition in the academic sense of traditional concept formation. If henceforward we neglect something that remains inadmissible to the matter at hand, then strictly speaking it is a matter of neglect that in fact isn’t one at all. But does this then mean the names that in various ways bring “being” and “reason” to language—does this mean that the thought we think in the historically diverse names for being and reason is fragmented into chaotic manifold of representations whan plucked out of history and shoved together historiographically, there is a sameness and simplicity of the Geschik of being that comes to light and, in accord with this, a solid constancy in the history of thinking and its thoughts.   

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Here where the text is concerned with the “reliability” of the “concepts” in play, still one moves in something extrinsic, and here too, we speak according to this periphery in order to clarify the genuineness of what is genuine, in so far as everything hangs on whether this can be held to lead out of the realm of the human project, towards the Element. 


This, that is written in Heidegger's notebooks, speaks of what Questioning means:
“My rectorate was based on a great mistake, namely, my wanting to bring questions into the temperament and regard of my “colleagues,” questions from which they were at best excluded, to their advantage—and undoing.”




To bring something into a temperament is no easy task, and no matter of presenting a list of questions, or admonishing someone to regard questions as the chief matter of philosophy. Just as Socrates meant to guide the soul to wisdom, through the so-called Socratic method, by drawing what is ‘forgotten’ to someone, who, stimulated by a teaching, finds the core of the abyss has transformed them, through its luminous quality, the questioning is meant to sustain the shadowy essence. To let the apportionment of shadow lead the temperament to the task of the questionability of what is. Not in order to change what is, but in order to tender to the questionability the regard that receives what is most worth hearing in the questionable. The wert-frei science is nothing else but the worthless, or worth-free science, for being unguided, it is not to be deployed without as much damage as benefit to man as man. But the project of the benefiting of man as man was philosophy, which has ended. 




It is obvious that, in all philosophising of the past, something was sought according to a project. Whether the good of human beings, or the ground of everything as the question about what god is, insofar as all projects were put aside, even the ‘life-giving lie’, an attempt to let whatever had been thought be set aside was made, and to thereby not seek, but to simply look. This was implied in the basic affirmation of a phenomenology, which did not suppose to know “what the point of it all” was. Yet, as a science, not of the clear and distinct, but of whatever came forth, the presumption was still that something was to be learned. What learning is only the one who learns knows, from the essence of learning, which is the only measure of learning. The text called Heidegger, from the starting point of questioning, let the question of the meaning of being become question, thus abandoning the meaning of being. In the because, the being is because it is, just as much as in the cause, the it is caused by this or that, e.g., by the quantifiable flow of energy called entropy, there is as much an essence which is a reason, which is a logos that explains. But logos does not only explain, but it is what befalls and first speaks what is so that it is.

   

 

The genuine, it issues not from the task, not from what is essential or from an abiding and staunch resolution towards what belongs to one. Rather the genuine is determined from the realm from which the call is already active or, one might venture to say, ablaze. Thus the genuine is not the task or project. Everything depends on this, since a project, is a searching, and then, always already for what it seeks, even if in the questioning. Questioning, not asking a question, but bringing blackness into what is brilliant and visible in order to Question, not to ask a question, but to make the questionable question, as a lack of certainty that draws one to uncertainty, is not this genuine, for it is the expectation of the continuation of the question, through the questioning, as the sandy ground, as the running away of the solid, as the nothing to stand on that is a wrest (even if this wrest were somehow a work, and a thoughtfulness, a 'leisure') and a accomplished comfort, but Questioning itself is abandoned in Thinking, and Thinking is thrown aside in the genuine, in the hint of the Element. 



Hericlitus speaks here, in fragment 30, of the genuine: “This world order [the same of all] did none of gods or men make, but it always was and shall be: an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures.”

κόσµον (τόνδε), τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν, οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόµενον µέτρα καὶ ἀπο- σϐεννύµενον µέτρα. 



The fire, which is the Element, has nothing to do with human beings. Thus, when it guides, it is no questioning, or even thinking, that is in play. The speach of Hericlitus somehow still represents, at least by its path, the genuine. It is able to tell us of the genuine. How that is possible is far from clear to one who hears what Hericlitus says in this word of his.
The order or cosmos, which is the same in all, therefore fires in this fire which is the Element. This was likely still known to the Pythia at Delphi, which was the temple of towering Apollo. Perhaps this is that war, which is most of all praised by the gods in Homer. Wouldn’t the leaping point simply destroy the one who rejoined the call of the element? Perhaps this path leads on to an unanswerable conclusion. Yet, at the same time, what unfolds in terms of this “sameness” of the correct truth, of this “atomic age”, of the causality and facticity of all facts, seems to claim the methodus, which continues to learn in its changing tonality.  

Sunday, April 23, 2017



Misuses of the Rubric Transcendental (are streng verboten)



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# 24


The more sharply we distinguish “being” and “ground reason,” the more decisively are we compelled to ask: how do being and ground/reason come and belong together? To what extent does the principle of reason in the second tonality speak a truth, a truth whose import we can hardly imagine?  




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Where is this truth? Is it futile to seek it? Does one seek what is already a fate? How does one think this? Insofar as Thinking can not be thought in an originating manner, how little can it be thought as orginary thinking? In what follows we will take a brief look at the movement form Kant to Heidegger. In order so that what is said in the word above can appear to us in its essential implications. 





So far as I know it it not common (though there are some who do so) to mistakenly regard Hegel, a successor of Kant, Historically, as a thinker, as a thinker of the so-called transcendental. Whereas, though it is less justified by far, Heidegger is understood under this erroneous heading by a great many so-called philosophers. If one thinks of theoretical reason as what is least human, and the understanding, as what is in medias res, pure reason is a kind of theoretical reasoning that is understood first hand. Pure reason, that is, what is in every experience, and must be in every experience. That which doesn't speak to situation at all, except that it is what is in every situation. In the British thought this is called ‘epistemology’ as though, rather than being a factum about being as such, it were supposed to be some kind of frame, like a psychology, limiting the exercise of knowing beings as though it were a pair of sunglasses. 





The transcendental is what is, insofar as it must be, and can not be changed. It is the absolutely necessary, not the accidental. It is being qua being. This is also called condition for the possibility. And in Leibnitz it is thought as affecting as such. It is the principle of First Philosophy as the ontology of logos. Kant calls the intelligible realm, as opposed to the realm that is, that which must be thought to be, though it can not be experienced. The intelligible, the source of all divisions of things, of all species, is thought as a hypothesis. In Hegel, it is thought of as what is understood in daily life. That one understands an oak to be an oak, this is knowing the intelligible (i.e., the noumenal). In Hegel, the understanding becomes absolute. One must think that this absolute is contrasted with the conditioned or accidental in such a way that the absolute is always broken. It is standing there, yet split. Whearse in Kant, the intelligible (the noumenal [which is later radically developed in Jung, and less importantly, one might add, in such ones as Rudolf Otto]) is what is not, it is the equivalent of the realm which always absorbs Socrates: it is the logos where logos is the ability to say positively the thing that is not, the lie and the false. In Kant the logos is strangely bent. In Hegel no thrift is given to it at all, for everything stands in the eidos and immediately is understood by cognition. 





When Heidegger takes up this thinking of Thinking, as it was in Kant, as what is not a knowing, it is raised up into the center of the work. In Kant, what lies behind knowing cognition, what sits there as what is not known, but only thought, takes up the vague outline of being as its factum. The place of the “hypothetical” and the “absolute” ceases to be a place at all, but is thrown into the abeyance of Phenomenology proper. Phenomenology proper is no appearance or erscheinung, for the reason that appearance is appearance of something, it is reality. Appearance is reality that stands and waits for psychological cognition to understand it. Or, in Kant, it is what is ‘represented’ in the ontological action of being qua being. In Heidegger the real and the intelligible have wholly disappeared. Being as such commands as this Thought, which is what is vague, yet still datum of being qua being. 





Such a history of the movement of thought is useless insofar as it remains the innocent subject of a newspaper record. To catch the drift of the thinking genuinely brings one into the lands of Thought only insofar as one genuinely comes to the leaping point. The leaping point is somehow still part of the “atomic age”, it stands thinking the “conditions for the possibility” as the furthest from man qua man, as the principle of necessary reason, as the mighty principle. It stands in the light of the British question of so-called consciousness as the intelligible understood as bringing forth of the “what it’s like" of the species of things, as the beings that must be known to be. According to the fancies of British thinking this stands closest to man, whereas the laws of nature, stand furthest and do not involve him. Yet, in what is said above, we see that Thinking is distinguishing  ““being” and “ground reason,”” in the discourse that we have been studying. Ground is what we speak of in daily life, and Reason is the world of motion, understood as cause. This motion ostensibly has nothing to do with human beings, it is going about on its own. Whereas this that we “speak of in daily life” is strictly related to man qua man, as a fancy. Yet, the motion would refer to nothing at all were it not for the fancy-world of human beings. Still, this Thinking thinks the distinguishing of being form ground/reason, and not only reason from ground.   





This truth that is part of this “atomic age” is thought strangely by a thought that regards this “atomic age” as part of the Historial outlay of the Geschick of thought, of itself. Thought is the outlay of being qua being, that is, of the Geschick, yet, it is the rolling back and veiling of being as such when that names the fundamental presupposition of the thinking with the title Heidegger. Yet, the presupposition is everywhere proposed by genuine thought of the proximity of the leap. The originating in Kant is what comes from the inteligable, but the inteligable is in the abeyance in Heidegger, so it is brought into a transformation under the thinking of the illumination of a specific modification of thinking. The orginiary, which as it were thinks from the bottom of Thought as such, is a mysterious feature of this Thinking insofar as it speaks back into the First Beginning as part of the presupposition. There is something relating to this in the biographical book on the trip to Greece in old age, when Heidegger speaks of the anxiety over whether or not the Greek Da-sein will be heard. Biographically, one must say, it is always something that genuine thought might be substituted out for mere formulas in the text, all texts suggest such lies.










Tuesday, April 18, 2017


Certain Guidelines of the Thinking According to a Path of Thinking (Posited as a genuine Thinking rather than a fancy of ground/reason)  



#23

When we say: being and ground/reason: the same, then being and ground/reason are not clumped into the greyness of an empty oneness such that one may then say “ground/reason” according to one’s inclination. Rather, each of the words give us something different to think, something which nevertheless we do not immediately appreciate even if the principle of reason is read in the second tonality: ”nothing is without reason.” This means that ground/reason grounds such that what it grounds is, that means, is a being.      

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A new stream which had not existed before the rain, we detect along the crisp silhouette of a hill, blazing in the light. The same we reflect upon in the mind, where there is no space, but only time. For the small streams still pour when we picture it. The being, which is in both, is not this ground in space, which is the ready to hand, nor this reason in the presence of the mind, which is the time of the soul. It is the Element, or its place is that Element, which in the Questioning of Thought is like a hill drenched in fog, in the soaking bath of a fog. Because it remains difficult for Thought. Reason as Ground thinks in the realm of movement, as cause, as when one slams a door, and that causes a sound. And Ground as Reason Thinks in the freedom of a choice, as when one who regards an understanding of what is there, acts in accord with the intelligence so gathered. With the intelligible, there is the ungraspable. For the intelligible, though ungraspable, comes forth as though it were a ground. Just as what stands there as Ground, seems impossible without that which says what it is, that which speaks the things in its narration which always binds. Yet, Thought, as though it had another course, hears what it draws towards and reason names this the leap of Thought which is a transformation of ground/reason as the essence of the Geschick of History, as what Nothing does not have. Attempts to say anything about Thought, are like words that represent Thought, and when they speak of Thought as such, can only reach so far. The Element is as though the throwing back of Thought into the manipulable region of space, but having made some as yet not well thought inversion. This Thought was attempted in the analysis of boredom, where the Element was given as arising with the help of the consideration of a traditional Sabbatarian Sunday where the world, as it were, is closed. 



Heidegger constantly attempts to change the basic stratum of Thought, not in order to bring something else that is like this to bear, but in a wholly unthinkable manner. This is why the talk of “letting be” or “releasement” is always wondering about abolishing the necessity of the mortal or human being. Even when the Element is holding sway, in inversion, the human being is still as though introducing something like Da-Sein even into the Element.


One must not prolong a consideration concerning an apology to the reigning ordinary opinion concerning this Meth
odos or ‘Way of Thinking’, which is the translation of Denken or Thinking, so long as the Thinking is genuine. When anschauen means appearance, which is not to say phenomenon or Erscheinung, it means that the looking at and the look in orginary Thought are cast as undisturbed. Since the distinction must be laid out in secondary thought, derivative on the look that is also the looking, Thought as Denken, as the Way of Thinking, says that this look and looking as what receives what is most seeable in what is to be seen by letting the thing to be seen come forward, is a casting into Question of this looking/look. I.e., it is a casting the originary into Question, by Thinking the Thinking, as the Way of Thought in the Geschick. It is both presupposition and Thought Genuine. Because it is not in a region where one can make the determination binding. Thus the discipline and the risk of delusion in the basic region of the ontology. Because the region of Kant, the Transcendental, is the region of Existence that stipulates its bound in terms of determining what must exist for Cognition, but in Thought the Nothing is the Horizon that lets Being speak above Existence as its Element. Thereby the limitations of Space and Time, as what gives what exists its character, and so brings the human being to be, is cast away in the Thinking that needs no frame to let it be. Roughly this is like the break with Logos as a holder of a First Philosophy. Thus, in the current reflection, the First Philosophy concerns the Mighty principle of Reason, which is the Fourth Law of Thought under the Thinking of the traditional First Philosophy, when expanded.     

Wednesday, April 12, 2017





Some Impressionistic Comments on the History of the Atmosphere of Thought Leading to Historial Being


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#22


Said in the second, unusual tonality, the principle of reason sounds like this: ”Nothing is without reason.” The emphasized words “is” and “reason” now allow a unison between being and reason to resound. The principle now says what it says through this unison. What does the principle say? It says: being and ground/reason belong together. This means that being and ground/reason “are” in essence the same. When we think the same—more precisely, sameness—as a belonging together in essence, then we keep in mind one of the earliest thoughts of Western thinking. Accordingly, ”the same” does not mean the empty oneness of the one and the other, nor does it mean the oneness of something with itself. “The same” in the sense of this oneness is the indifference of an empty, endlessly repeatable identity: A as A, B as B. thought in the sense of what in essence belongs together, the same indeed bursts the indifference of what belongs together, even more it holds them apart in the most radical dissimilarity; it holds them apart and yet does not allow them to fall away from each other and hence disintegrate. This holding-together in keeping-apart is a trait of what we call the same and its sameness. This holding [Halten] pertains to a “relation” [Verhältnis] that still stands before thinking as what is to be thought. But through metaphysical thinking it does come to light in particular shape; it does so most purely in Hegel’s Logic.   




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Similarity and sameness, which is to say “difference and repetition”, is the mystical reading of materialism (I call this "mystical", because from the core of man, comes the ability to make similarity, from which all that, out there, the real exterior things, get their founding), where the problem of the universal is subsumed under the ability to see one thing as like another. Insofar as similarity is a basic feature of intelligibility, it has to be raised to a material absolute. Since it is what allows one things to be, because if there were not many, as a kind, that fell together as similar, there would be simple unintelligibility. The similarity would have to stand with the principle of identity, constantly asserting that there was not the similar, but the same. But this materialism is cast off utterly in Husserl, since it is a rationalisation moving towards a tendentious and overweening project of process and relation of similarities, that of a materialist realism. Said more appropriately, from the Phenomenology of Husserl, there is the abeyance. In the abeyance there is no rationalisation. But putting aside all these muddle-headed English projects, why in Heidegger does one still speak of sameness? Because the sameness is not an identity according to a law, but according to the abeyance of the reception of the “everyday” reception, that itself points, or radiates, towards the scientific and towards the primordial. Thus, schematically thought, the text called Heidegger thinks neither the function of the process as the samneses, nor the property of the substance as the thingley object. It thinks on the beings, in terms of the ready-to-hand, which is the substance cast into Nothing, and a presence-to-hand as a look which asks for no rationalisation to account for its genus. 





If the Nothing were thought according to the biological thinking, the hand, which is the first and obvious example of the ready-to-hand, would be held to be a great adaption, a prized trait, which made, with its opposable thumb, the rise of the human being and the master of technology possible. But, in the abeyance no such evolution is thought, as an explanation. Neither is a field of drives to be found in the Nothing (which is always: Nothing-ing, Nicht nichtet), which leads one to a mantic Dionysian region, from which the world of presence could be measured as lacking. There is a night world, and a day world, but everything hangs on the possibility of holding the phenomenological observation of the two beyond all projects. In abeyance according to the Historial grasp of being as such. Only if the glance at being as such is no project is the abeyance still at work in the Historial “interpretation”.     




"Said in the second, unusual tonality, the principle of reason sounds like this: ”Nothing is without reason.”" Insofar as this nothing, the region of the Ready-to-Hand, has no reason, it was observed by Hume in his simple claim concerning the psychology of association. But the cause rests in the Geschick itself as the Principle which is mighty. The Nothing is thought and not thought. In Kant the Nothing is ruled out of bounds, since Kant holds one can be sure that one has gone a certain span, even if lost in thought. And all the way one’s hands may have been grasping a wallet or a cellphone, and one was abstractedly walking about, engaged in locomotion, preceding to travel from this place to that one. But, according to the thinking of the look, the eidos, in Kant, the thing as a species must have an independent region of subsistence, beyond the presence of what comes forth according to what one calls sensorium. The Geschick comes to the horizon of the Nothing, and looking into it, as though at what is roughly like the present world, but not quite, supposes what can not be deduced but which shadows the edges of the topographical presence. The Nothing is only the Nothing in so far as it regions beside presence in what shines forth in its own shadowy fashion. One leaves it apart from the projects, not knowing why or blaming it for making some aim untenable.     



“The emphasized words “is” and “reason” now allow a unison between being and reason to resound.”

Thusly we are lead to show Reason, once again, as the “-” which is the region of the Open, whereby the Geschick makes Da-sein come into its regard. Cause is not found in the region of vision, no more than is identity, a being that saw but knew nothing of identity would act only according to the Readiness of the Nothing. If world is not thought as Nous, the god of Reason, the Olympian and the Cosmic gods hold no sway. The Olympians are the law givers, which speak over presence, and the Kosmic gods are the ones who come forth in the Nothing, as of their own. But Nous is the sight of the bifurcation. However, when Nous thinks ontically, for the first time, in Parmenides, noticing that there are always more things, but each must be thought according to the whole of a world, already the bare level of what is thinkable has flown. The coming forth of the orientation is scrambling out of the dimension of the Geschick







This talk of “the same” is thought according to manner of one who looks towards the ‘memorey’ to find the source of the higher motion, as with Socrates and the notion of the wise. The remembering, would be what brings into the beings what guides them. But according to the Medieval thought, the things are the makings of that transcendent God, having become Christian, they sought the inspiration from above. Only by the inspiration might they put down the law, as what the higher faculties could read out, though not follow with felicitous readiness in the case of the interpretation of the law into the case at hand. In his most human man was reaching for the God. With Hegel, following Descartes and the rest, the god was found to rest in the surface of the presencing sensorium. It was as thought remembered in the flesh, from outside, and not from the chthonic abyss of Socrates. Then, with the coming of the cause, and the putting away of the telos, in the modern moment, which in fact is layered over the final teleology, as we still find it so in the Marxist teleology and the Neo-positivist technicity, the possibility of effects becomes the essence of future as Power. What can we expect? Only in the abeyance does philosophy look upon itself as something ended, as something entirely different giving way to dissolution. This is the atmosphere in which “the same” comes to speak of the beings. In Kant already this same is basically known, as the realm of the Critical, the critique of insight becomes another name for metaphysics. There is an insight in the sight of equality, that man knows one thing to be of equal length to another, for instance. Insights come to rest in the basic stratum of what is learned. As what is learned but not given from the outset as are fingernails, for example. Always, language, is not given, but it is only there afterwards.  






One can see that the four movements all are, according to being as the concealing. And being as the concealing is the history of the Geschick as the thinking of this epoch. What is concealed is being as such. It seems useless to think such things at time, though having moved through them we often loose sight of their concreteness, until at length one again glimpses the reception in such thinking of what is calling out to be thought. Everything leads to this thinking, in so far as one thinks what is worthy of thought. Therefore why? But the why is perhaps also what is given up in the Historial more than anything else that is the last leaving off, when the why is set beside the mere cause or span between cause-effect and telos as the opening of the “sameness’ of the leaping region which is being.

Monday, April 10, 2017


How would the Nothing be Thought in proximity to Language and Being? 





Paragraph 21


Nevertheless the history of Western thinking shows itself as the Geschick of being when and only when we glance back upon the whole of Western thinking from the point of view of the leap and when we recollectively preserve it as the Geschick of being that has-been. At the same time we can prepare for the leap only by speaking in terms of the history of being, a history that has been experienced in terms of Geschick. The leap leaves the realm from which one leaps while at the same time recollectively regaining anew what has been left such that what has-been becomes, for the first time, something we cannot lose. That into which the leap anticipatorily leaps is not some region of things present at hand into which once can simply step. Rather, it is the realm of what first approaches as worthy of thought. But this approach is also shaped by the traits of what has-been, and only because of this is it discernable. We must take all that is ranged under the first four of the five main points mentioned earlier and think it back into the history of being. The fifth main point regarded the change in the tonality of the principle of reason. A leap from out of the principle of reason as a fundamental principle about beings into the principle of reason as an utterance of being concealed itself behind the change of tonality of one and the same principle. As a recollective anticipatory principle, the principle [Satz] is thus a “vault” [Satz] in the sense of a leap [Sprung]. If we fully think through the polysemic word Satz not only as “statement,” not only as “utterance,” not only as “leap,” but at the same time also in the musical sense, then what Bettina von Arnim wrote in her book Goethe’s Correspondence with a Child also holds for our path through the principle of reason:


If one speaks of a movement [Satz] in music and how it is performed, or of the accompaniment of   an instrument and of the understanding with which it is treated, then I mean precisely the opposite, namely that the movement leads the musician, that the movement occurs, develops and is concentrated often enough till the spirit has completely joined itself to it.


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Now, what the title says is not immediately evident in the main body of what follows, but only in small details, but it is the overall endeavor of the thinking in the passage that is named in this title. 







Insofar as we speak of a leap, we speak of a region that is not a matter of the rule, or of the rough fact (i.e., the empirical). These days one speaks of so-called epistemology, and so-called ontology. Empirics are a kind of doctors, who, as it were, just poke around and spend their time with the sick, thinking that next time they will get it better, better than the last. Whereas those who make rules might always be accused of being too bookish, and of trying to make the world fit their fancies, their libraries are full of wonderful and pleasant fictions. Insofar as the leap happens, it happens as much to the intellect as to the sensorium. Or, put another way, it happens to what is essential, but not actual, to the occulted eidos. The actual is what actually exists according to the essential. E.g., man, by one account, the medieval account, was said to have for his essence deliberation, by which right reason might come to its rule, its science. For instance the science of the law, of justice. Insofar as this was experienced as what is neither law nor fact, it is the subject of the leap. When reason becomes causality, that leap is effected, and law becomes the subject of a doctrine of Sovereignty, or of positive statement. Again, if a circle is raised to view in speech, through the sound definition, where the genre and the differentiate come out, that a circle is a closed curved line, its genus, with the particular differentiate that it is everywhere on its circumference equidistant from the center, speaks of the essence of the circle, but the existing circles are never like that. The law, here, is the measurement of rationality, the definition, the law of the circle, is measured by the essence of the circle, as it is found within man. The circle, as what exists, is not guiding. But for the law of cause, when cause becomes man’s essence, it is the reverse, the definition is a statement of the facts, made according to a so-called idealization.






When the leap is understood as a transformation of the essence of man, it is as a transformation of truth, and it is as a transformation in the essence of regard. Truth points, in the statement of Leibniz, to the doctrine of Nature, as motion, thus to the correctness of the mathematical doctrine based on the thought experiment of Galileo, concerning the nature of motion as entropy (it is more straightforward to say as inertia, where entropy is then derived from that model, where space is presupposed as capable of a pure inertial movement, falsely. One can also use the example given in Chomsky, of the failure of the machine view, to explicate the Nature, as thought model, in another way, which is in principle, the same matter), stands in the empty correctness as the machine, or formula of repetition, for the motion, which itself is a description, and never what it tried to be, the essence of a homogeneous principle of nature. On the other hand, ratio, as language, is speaking to man’s regard, so that the nature of each thing becomes the presense for common sense of each kind of thing, as all the species of things, each one different from each other. 






When the ‘sentence’ is thought as movement, it means that a principle of inner movement, and a principle of regard, as a world essence, leap along in the Geschick. Time as the Geschick is not the time of the Natural principle, as the inner spring of motion, nor does it speak of the world-time, as the time of what the things are according to their ergon, according to what they are in their beings. The beings which are the beings of this Historial moment, belong to the leaping, according to the way language is bringing forth what can’t be thought. Language means the course of the leaping, as said in what the citation says. The nothing gains its content because of the Historial. Otherwise it would only name an unconscious, as a Natural place where drives have their domain. The nothing is a world domain, which is always holding back its possibility, that of the language, as what can be another language. The ergon belongs to this language, as its essence, as the activity of the beings in this or that world. Insofar as absurdity is the essence of British planetary life, it stands with the essence of technicity, which is truth as correctness, as already pictured above. The absurdity is the skhole, the leisure, of the regard of the human being, in the planetary Britishness which is the technicity as the saying of Leibnitz, as the mighty principle of Reason. 





Generally it is not understood that Will to Power refers most of all to a nous, a god of Reason, that is devalued, not in order to revalue, but as such (this was mentioned in the last post), such a head or state, a status as a governing or a eunomic power is not intentional, it is like the cause as an essence, it essenses over its Nature, such that the existence obeys its essencing, in so far as this essence is always the look-out and the eyes of each mortal. Although cause does not exist it is driving force of everything util, everything that can bring something good, which is power in the case of the essence of technicity, as the storing of the possibility, but this God, this nous, which is neither Olympian or Cosmic, rests in the Geschick of Language and Being as such. Being as such is the being of this world, when it is thought, but in the presupposition of Histrorial movement it is being as such (without further qualification). Likewise, then, here we show that this is also a presupposition with respect to what is called language, even as what is not this or that logos or logic. Up until now the relation of the house of being and being was thought without the realization of the way they stand entirely in the presupposition as a pair. 




This oversight is because Husserl doesn't think in terms of Language, but of logos that is pre-logical. He draws back from the specific essence of that logic, but not from speach as logos, back to Language as what
spans the Histories. The radical presupposition of Heidegger is largely unthought these days. For this reason the confrontation with Nietzsche is not understood. It is even taken as a matter of personal power, as though of fame or glory. Something more like the reverse is at stake in this “personal”, which is not what it means to a university professor who thinks of their carrier. But, even when one thinks of philosophy, as the discussion of the great philosophers, this is not what it means at all. It is a destinal time that wants to create confusion, or that would remain shaky, if the thinking which is strictly non-human would draw closer to what is worthy in the confrontation of the thinkers.