Horizon in Thinking the Dislodging of Will

Paragraph 18

When the being of beings proffered itself as the objectness of objects, the Geschick achieved a previously unprecedented decisiveness and exclusiveness. But the decisiveness with which the essential provenance of being withdraws also corresponds to this proffering. Namely, if ratio as
Reason, that is, as subjectivity is the wellspring of ratio in the sense of ground/reason and its demand to be rendered, then the question of the essential provenance of being as objectness cannot find a site within the domain of ratio. Why not? Because through ratio as subjectivity we see the fact that and how Reason implies the fullness of every possible rationes, of every foundation. What is transcendental about Kant’s transcendental is in no way a procedure invented by human thinking. Just as what is transcendental about this method peeps back into the φύσις of the Greeks, so it points forward into the newest epoch of the Geschick of being. For the dialectic which one finds in the metaphysics of German Idealism is grounded in the transcendental method implied by the objectness of objects--that is, by the being of experienceable beings. When one thinks this dialectic in a being-historical manner as transformed into historical-dialectical materialism, one sees that it determines the contemporary history of humanity in a manifold manner. In our age the world-historical conflict has come closer than the short-sighted, political and economic power struggles would like us to think.    

----

The essence of causality is Power. The “objectness” is being that is not without reason. It is the manner of being, of a being, that has possibilities. Only the object, strictly speaking, has with it the possible. Though, rightly said, the object can not be without the possible. No object is without the possible. The “objectness of the object” bestows to all objects the possibility of being a cause. It is the thinking of the cause that is the essence of mortals when they hear the call of the Geschick that ”achieves”  “a previously unprecedented decisiveness and exclusiveness.” And this is the withdrawal of being as the undifferentiated being of beings. The last accusation or motif, is the thinking of cause as cause. Insofar as the human remains the subject of the Geschick, and the House of Being is still not what has left its resting-place, the essence of its truth is Power. 

Vor-wurf is accusation, but its tonality when it is problema and motif is not the guilt of the sinner, but remains enigmatical because it is alien, but it is what “is now not destroyed”. It is us in so far as we are the History of this Geschick. The far-ranging power of the Geschick of the “atomic age”, of a Fermi, reaches into causa when causa has become the unintelligible region of the possibility of physical theory. The Power is the only end, when all ends have been dispelled. All ends, are the ends of the animal, and only the Power is the essence of the human, that still remains futural. Only the human is futural, through the possibility, which is the futurity as Power. All ends correspond to the coming-forth of beings as beings, as what is not pure Power. Power reveals its essence only when science withdraws. Science was a knowing, which was intelligible. The intelligibility was according to the essence of man, the rational, ratio as the Greek ratio of identity. 

“Namely, if ratio as Reason, that is, as subjectivity is the wellspring of ratio in the sense of ground/reason and its demand to be rendered, then the question of the essential provance of being as objectness cannot find a site within the domain of ratio. Why not? Because through ratio as subjectivity 
 we see the fact that and how Reason implies the fullness of every possible rationes, of every 

foundation.”

The text which is called Heidegger is also the chief text of the genus of Historicism. This Historicism Heidegger calls a “presupposition” of Heidegger (the text is meant in both namings). Leo Strauss gives the usage herein upkept when he understands Historicism as “radical Existentialism”. Reason, the intelligibility, is still, prior to Existentialism, thought as the essence of man, as the knowing animal. But when ratio becomes cause, “Grund/reason” as the withdrawing science of being as cause under the knowing of the mortal being of man, Existentialism supersedes the thinking of the “bifurcation” through the projection of the “presupposition” of the non-Greek logic. The non-Greek logic was first thought by Husserl, and in a sense it was demonstrated. But it is prudent to say “presupposition” because of the great difficulty of the turning point of this thinking. “Reason implies the fullness of every possible rationes, of every foundation.” For Existentialism the foundation is presupposed as a myth, because there is nothing that corresponds to the end, to any end, which is animal thought. The cause is also the animal thought, the telos or end, to reiterate, when it is what no being is without (under the Principle, that is “mighty”, macht, of Leibniz, as it has come-undecayed, in the final epoch of the Geschick.) What is now, just now, the undestroyed, can be thought according to the end, which is Power, to no end, without stop, like the stone of facets, which is world horizon. Under the thinking of Nietzsche the resentment is the doctrine that says the past is not overcome by the turning of the facets which is the spectrology of perspectives. Something might be said about Life-giving Lie vis a vis end as pure causality. This would require certain niceties and a discernment which we do not now propose to raise.

 

“Just as what is transcendental about this method peeps back into the φύσις of the Greeks, so it points forward into the newest epoch of the Geschick of being. For the dialectic which one finds in the metaphysics of German Idealism is grounded in the transcendental method implied by the objectness of objects--that is, by the being of experienceable beings. When one thinks this dialectic in a being-historical manner as transformed into historical-dialectical materialism, one sees that it determines the contemporary history of humanity in a manifold manner.”

Nietzsche overcomes this “contemporary history of humanity” to the extent that he raises relativism to a ultimate statement about the futurity of world-perspectives. In Nietzsche, as such, there is pre-phenomenological thinking. This leads to the thinking of Will to Will within the horizon of the limitation of the resentment-thought. It affirms time as what the Will to Will only in “lie” comes to become, as what circles in Sky. Time remains thought as pure cause under various guises of the Power thought, as the thinking of Power as the futural resting in the horizon threshold, which is the Earth. Eternal Return still thinks the Earth according to the Sky, as a vortex over the abyss sustained as what floats in the music that is always Willed to play again from the start. 

“Contemporary history of humanity” remains an opaque statement, since the thinking of so-called releasement in Heidegger isn’t obviously located, but only, so to say, raises itself at the sill of the End of History. The double thinking of what holds sway, in the “being-historical” and what is presupposed in the “radical Existentialism” is the context of the present study. The abeyance of the phenomenological thought is an horizon without an end, excepting that the Will to Will is thought in what Husserl calls the waiting to see “what the point of it all was” still is ghostly and lets its spirit show. The dislodging is also in abeyance as to its possibility, which would be no possibility of cause and effect.

A remark on a change of a so-called Epoch, from Lessing to Kant 

Paragraph 17

The rendering of sufficient reasons resounds more clearly in Lessing’s translation of objectum by Gegenwurf [“counter-throw] as a throwing-forth which is thrown forth by a subject. Lessing’s word Vorwurf [motif] still retains, in the language of art and the artist, the sense of the subject of a work. Vorwurf is actually the literal translation of the Greek word πρόβλημα. Incidentally, in order to mention it as food for thought, today everyone uses, in our much misused language, the word “problem” when, for example, the auto mechanic, an honorable man, cleans the dirty spark plugs and remarks: “That’s no problem.” It certainly isn’t.

---

The last remark is in a way unassuming, in that it might as well be understood at once as though it were being said to someone who understood the mind of the one speaking it perfectly. We must not become like those who are thoughtless and take the things that are manifestly demonstrated to be free of snares. We need loudspeakers because what we are doing is coming to make things more clear than anyone who has no familiarity or inclination towards thinking would ever suppose made any sense. Everything in thought must come clear to us, not yesterday, but just as we think it. Only in clarity that, as it were, comes more into a true closeness with what we discuss, can one begin to question at all. All questioning that is not about what is truly close is trivial, as when one does not distinguish one sense of the word matter from another, homogenous natural matter (all-but devoid of the polysemous character of the eidos of Aristotle), taken in the mathematical interpretation of the philosophy still known to Berkeley, rather than a subject matter, a thing, taken in the vaguest sense known to language, under discussion. “the word “problem” when, for example, the auto mechanic, an honorable man, cleans the dirty spark plugs and remarks: “That’s no problem.” It certainly isn’t.” How come we don’t know what this means?  

It could mean that the matter is not a difficult one, not a serious problem, but no problem, it’s easy. But on the other hand what comes to mind is that something broken needs to be set right, and solving the problem is “no problem”, again, because it is easy. Already, if we rightly see the texture of the difference of these two accounts of what problem might mean, we see that a sensitivity regarding thought must be there in the one who thinks over any matter at all. But, on the other hand, as a rule, we can understand such things, with a little prodding, in ordinary matters, but only it doesn't come to us clearly and with distinctive determination in the distinctions made. One knows what one means well enough without coming to it explicitly in closeness. Neither the first nor the second manner of thinking is what is thought in the comment: “It certainly isn’t.” That points us to what is said in the remark: “Lessing’s word Vorwurf [motif] still retains, in the language of art and the artist, the sense of the subject of a work. Vorwurf is actually the literal translation of the Greek word πρόβλημα.” The Greek word, problema, problem, means motif, a motif is a kind of trope. In the late works of Bach one finds the motif of counterpoint. Since the time of J Paul Getty man has known a special case of the motif of (good and bad) rent seeking, which is to charge more than what a thing costs to make or maintain, as a matter of a kind of sacred duty to the world system (compared to the Japan that Mishima still somehow received, in its decline, prior to the war, there is almost no comparison. Such was the opprobrium of “money makers” within that world that our on-running pondering of “Iki” still senses, as what is set upon a “what has come before and still is not destroyed”, i.e., it is a form of coming to presence of withdrawing being), in the sciences one knows the motif of the “it works”, which is the discovery of nature natured as something that is Natural as upheld by the ‘conditions for the possibility’ which is Reason. The problema is more like a god than like a matter that is easily set aside.  

Lessing is mentioned always as that thinking that has not come to clarify the conditions for the possibility. Lessing is prior to Kant. In so far as what is concealed is presented to Lessing still more immediately, like someone who knows what one means, as in the examples above, but does not reach them in closeness, in distinctness sufficiently established by thought, he is more at play in being than is Rousseau, so that though they lived in the same years, Rousseau was already coming into another epoch. Rousseau created the atmosphere where it became possible to regard men as primitives in the decisive respect of history of the subjectivity (one says these days, the “identity”, as what is artiface). In Hobbes nature never, or only scarcely in the analysis of physiological conditions of the passions (which thus questions the standing of the soul in Aristotle), means more than anti-social in the sense of one who has the art of god active in one (i.e., nature), but not the art of men, in the mechanics of their commonwealths ordered by laws. Thus the well-known critique of Rousseau (of Hobbes' false natural man). But when we come to Kant this epoch finally stares across an unbridgeable abyss into its former being, such that the talk of Foucault, when he says that at a certain point we do not know if a thing read is right or wrong, for instance a medical text, because the claims raised are no longer sensible to us, speaks to us too of this staring towards the alien epoch, which, yet, still resounds, and according to the definition of eternity, the sempiternal, found in the book connected to Plato’s school, was and still remains. That which is now not destroyed is this epoch, does the concept of the sempiternal, even of time, conceal being? For now we are not in a position to say something about how that stands beside Reason, in what Leibniz says: Nothing is without reason. Everything has in it, already, now, something that is its reason, as a condition for its now not being consumed by the nothing.     

A Limited Remark, on a Comment of Alecsander Dugin (a reader of Heidegger)

 

Our presupposition is that thought must become dislodged. Heidegger says that he made a “clumsy” remark: language is the house of being. This remark is quite striking, it stands among the highest pronouncements of Philosophy, which means Western thought, starting with the archipelagos of the Early Greeks, philosophia, which is at first a Greek word, which looses its distinctive character if one makes it a net that covers all things, it has at first no meaning, and says nothing. This word is not clumsy, except that it is beautiful, and thus it stinks of eros. In saying something about a marginal remark of a contemporary student of Heidegger, Alecsander Dugin, we begin this way because we use his remark to ask about the dislodging. Considering hermeneutic circles. Whatever disturbs us, like this word of Heidegger, when it glitters might become too fixed in its rubric, as a narrating word, in its mere formulation that clarifies in canny coming forth that conceals in brilliance. 

At first it seems Dugin has made a rather unfortunate stab at what he calls “the war of the discourses”. An unpleasant foray into ideology, as propaganda, which compared to the elevation of philosophical reason which seeks to learn, to be as open as can be, and not to be prisoner of traditional allegiances, is terrible and useless. But what confronts us is the lack of guidance when it is no longer held as adequate to prefer one world to another. So long as this point is thought as a split between history and nature it is harmless, or, at least it is not the most daunting thing. But another posture arises for the one who comes to historicism, when it is not a relativity but a simple open-minded coming forth no longer a criminal in the eyes of unwise judges seeking the traditional things: “Not only do we lack any criterion which would permit us to evaluate the perfection of an epoch of metaphysics as compared to any other epoch, the right to this kind of evaluation does not exist.” There is no higher judge, nay, there is no judge. Historicism is only realized because that thought of relativism makes absolutely no sense to one who thinks of being, and not of some development or seeking of a victory over reality of some manner. Of, say, a Utopia; an arrival from the "lack" as that admirable Bloch had it. 

However, returning to Dugin, one is far from ready to say that this or that man brings forth an “epoch of metaphysics” simply by declaring that Wittgenstein has demonstrated that there is no truth, or for some other reason of argument. All the same, let us start from the claim we find in the video (bellow). At first withholding judgment, but only considering that ready on our mind is the sense of being exposed to cheap tricks of mean and treacherous men. But, yet, one must be open-minded. In the dislodging, it would even be possible to think in such a way that such considerations no longer chiefly interest us. Whether all this is an impossibility, a moral impossibility, perhaps even to include a whiff of sarcasm in the phrase "that admirable Bloch" is already the sign of a lack of heart, and a fatal error, or wrong for some other reason, which can not yet be allowed to come to a definitive clarity. It lurks, as it were, in the thinking that goes its own shadowy way. We human beings, remaining animals of representation, live in its withdrawal, which is at the same time, what lets us sense its play and its arrangement. Most of all, from the moment of its birth, the human being was showing itself as wicked, in its laughter, which is most of all the sign of its joy in the down-going, the forsaking of someone else.

The video shows us a man who is not a native English speaker making some ordinary comments in a serious tone, not smiling at all, and then, he begins to speak of “something incredible” and “completely idiotic”. Here we are told that “without any arguments at all” some attack is made on his “country”. The rest one can hear. It is largely unremarkable, and has the sound of typical political speach. Ordinarily, one must say, this notion of “without any arguments at all” means little more than that common sense does not always need arguments. To demand arguments of common sense, of what it finds patently clear, is nihilism. To refer to “crazy accusations without any arguments” as the talk of “such idiots” is only to play the role of a rationalist who demands reasons for everything, which itself is a rather silly thing. And not at all possible to anyone. No one can give full reasons, except for something that has no future, and is already complete. Or is repeatable in a wholly dead way, like a closed experiment. But in addressing this we ask not about whether it makes sense, but about what it means to play a “war of the discourses” in the context of the ethnos. Dugin is chiefly that thinker who, in the guise of an ethnologist, has spoken of the ethnos. But, he is also a Marxist. 

Is it possible to treat the ethnos in the manner of a “metaphysical epoch”: “Not only do we lack any criterion which would permit us to evaluate the perfection of an epoch of metaphysics as compared to any other epoch, the right to this kind of evaluation does not exist.”? Thus one comes into a existential war of worlds? This is not what Schmitt calls a matter of the enemy unless we are to believe Dugin is a ethnos. Meaning that, when the analysis of the state goes beyond the state, it reaches the culture, and when the argument about politics comes to this ground it is no longer a matter of a determinate concept that can come into our sight. However, isn’t Dugin a bourgeois? When Marxists speak of Bourgeois individualism with contempt, that is not something one must accept, not at all. This is the matter of the discussion, e.g., with Max Stirner, and so too, a fortiori, with Nietzsche and in a certain sense even with Heidegger and Jung. One can not at all concede this point to the Marxists. Yet, Dugin himself accepts the teachings of Marx in some way. He speaks too of the “imagined community” (in order to denounce the bourgeois "coward"), following radical leftist thought, which is to say, of the bourgeois. 

What is then in question is nothing else but whether Dugin can shape himself, and administer himself, so as to cease to be a bourgeois simply because he has made some arguments? Has he only made some arguments? Is he more than a bourgeois, a mad man? Dostoevsky used to say that his status, one of his characters I mean, of course, perhaps not Dostoevsky himself, but did he not speak out of his nature, that if he had been called a madman his status would have discernibly risen. The originality of a mad man is nothing if it, I pray say, has no merit. What merit would it have, who is the judge of this merit if reason is no longer that god that can judge of all things? If reason is all too human, and ceases to be a god? Wouldn’t thought need to break from all those who go for long lonely walks, which have already been themselves only because sheltering places were coming for them. How often has politics masqueraded as thought? It is notable, quite apart from this, that the Marxists, when they finally demanded that Marxism be applied to itself, began to become existentialists, but without ever divesting themselves of the asymptotic spirits of their tendentious love of politics? How can a bourgeois claim to be an ethnos, what is the claim? Does the bourgeois even exist, except according to the Marxist?  

    

When one thinks according to the structure of classes, and invades all doctrines and all thought with this tendency, one no longer sees this “clumsy” house of being, but sees a materialism of struggle, which raises up as a Truth. It could as well be regarded under some word of Nietzsche's, but only that Nietzsche had seen something more than Marx in that he saw the lie of that Truth as ultimate. Whereas this is not ultimate in the thinking of the ethnos, but relative to the ethnos, there is no truth but that ethnos is as such, that is implied in this thinking, which is essentially political. Thinking is then a subsidiary of some “mission”. What befalls is denied its reception, and no dislodging nears.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eq622b_EGN4

A Short Word on Nearing Thought   

Paragraph 16

In terms of the history of being, it is important to sharply distinguish between what comes to presence in what is over-against us and what comes to presence in objectness. The status of an object is determined by cognition on the basis of the a priori condition for the possibility of cognition. It is by referring back to a subject that cognition, so determined, goes about rendering the sufficient reasons for the presencing of what comes to presence as Objects. By rendering sufficient reasons this cognition receives the unique character that determines the modern relationship of humans to the world, and that means, makes modern technology possible.  

---

What is most giving in this is what makes us think how cause stands, as “sufficient reasons”. This only comes to power if we think of what the logos says in the work of Aristotle when it says that there are first principles, prōtē philosophia, first philosophy. Without them, the first beginning thinks, when it has become Aristotle, there is phusis as what can not be spoken of. [phusis is what comes forth of its own, even without the logos, until the logos has become convention] Logos, which is to say, speach, becomes philosophy in so far as logic, which is a form of the word logos, means certain rules of speach. This was prepared in an demonstrable way by Socrates with his dialogical discussions and their demands on the speakers involved. But Socrates only prepared in the sense that the first beginning was already received and even resounding with a few, who were its friends, so to speak. One of the rules, which is part of the master science of the logos, which itself is the first condition for philosophy, is the law of thought called identity. Something must be something. We always think it worthy of thinking that Kant, so many generations later, still held with this something, saying even that, sometimes the something is the same as the something. What is predicated is the same as what it is spoken of, as when we say, a cigar is a cigar. According to Freud, only “sometimes”. 

Yet, what we always think is worth thinking, is that Leibnitz, not long before Kant, brought to expression what the first beginning still was giving, in the form of the fourth law of thought. Which is the subject matter of the discourse that we have been studying all this time. The other laws were as though swept aside, because the logos, speach, became just speach, or talk, idle talk, but philosophy was able to continue, even as it ended, in the sufficient reason. It is in the sufficient reason that human beings are able to come into their own as those who have a Natural World. Phusis, what comes forward of its own, comes forth under the tutelage of the logos of sufficient cause, under the law of thought. Thinking is stultified and obliterated, it is impossible and thrust aside. Thus the thinker stands as though waiting for the philosopher's Natural World to step aside, perhaps the thinker even bows before the philosopher, thanking this being, even as though grateful. 

On the one hand, the laws of thought are merely something said, in the same way one says that some things are difficult, or that a certain place is nice on a sunny day, but on the other hand, the laws of thought are taken as a metaphysics. Do the laws of thought come forth in this bifurcation in order to give the philosopher a chance to show the superiority of his manner of narrating existence, with a certain precision, putting stress on the discovery of the god, of the discovery of the truth as it moves through the Sky, forever above? But how does the thinker think, if the philosopher is still looking up at what interests the philosopher most, and the fourth law, which lets the Natural World be at all. It would not let the world be if it were only the word of the metaphysician, but only because it is also the word of whoever likes to say the ordinary things, without further ado about what they mean, but already knowing that if common sense is put on trial the result will be a farce. Common sense knows in a way that is unlike metaphysics. Yet, in this case, it knows nothing other than what the metaphysician knows. It understands that there is always cause. Sometimes it says, there is no cause for my spontaneous act, but, but.. And then, at length it finds a cause, naming some situation, some past, something. Common sense never seriously considers the because, for common sense the because, the because is what has no reason, is a kind of wistfulness, a mysticism, a poetry and a day dream. Life is but a dream. Common sense knows all this too. In a certain sense, like the thinker, common sense surpasses this sufficient cause, but only now and then. As yet thinking does not yet think. What is thought worthy is only that thought would not think anything, it would not be creative, rather it would think.

Comments from an Ideology of Ultimacy, as a mere dispensing with all ideologies

Paragraph 15

The transcendental method is intrinsic to the manner in which objects can be objects for us. Cast as objectness, being clears and lights itself in a novel manner. For the Greek thinkers beings were never objects; rather, they were that which continues on towards us from what lies over against us. Beings were more [war seiender] than our objects. Indeed, we may be of the opinion that beings appear most purely as what is present in its own right when they show themselves as objects, which means, objectively. This opinion is errant, granting that we think the concept of an object in a manner that does it justice.

--

The first sentence is estranging, because if one assumes “knowledge” names a basic constituent of the set of eternal problems how can there be a “method” that is merely discovered in some century or other that deals with this problem? Not only deals with it, but in fact settles the matter in the form of suggesting a field of “epistemology”. Since Kant the human being has been sure that knowledge, as such, is already set behind it. It is not, now, any longer necessary to prove theoretically, in fact, the case that it is unprovable in theory, is the best proof that one need not solve this knowledge problem. The profound depths become a superfluity, any attempt to doubt this is a kind of obscurantism, because it is fated. What is fated? Research into the forms of nature natured, all that is unreasoned, that is pure memorey in the form of instructions how-to-make, this becomes fate. But, in all that, some obscure power remains, a shadowy life, the will of the master of what is natured. Only by an act of faith can one disavow this master, in the form of a faith that there is “determination” by the Natural World. What is this Natural World? In fact, it is the manner of making intelligible, a concept of the Philosophy of the North Atlantic West. 

“The transcendental method is intrinsic to the manner in which objects can be objects for us.” It is difficult to settle accounts with this course, with the course set out by this thinking, in the sentence prior to this one. For human beings there is a action that is connected to the grasping of whatever is said. A praxis, which originally meant action, but what is action? Already the Greeks had become diverse and variegated in their distribution of conceptions. A Philosophy of Discontinuity finds its terminus in the fact of its own presupposition of  location within a development. The universal, action, can no longer be what it was. This, contrasts most severely to the view of Strauss. Strauss says, even for Historicism itself, there are those things that are the same. Strauss never holds, with the view of the transformation of the simple. 

Here the question is, what does personality matter? I.e., what do the personal, or individual gifts of the thinker say to thought as such? Because in Strauss there is a great sense of the power of the practical sphere. Is this a defect? Is this a defect in a thinker? Does this bring us away from the “long run”? From the reflections of a Nietzsche? Where does the ground of the judgment of the thinker have its bona fide measure? That is the problem of the thinker. Individuals mean nothing, yet, such is the point of all philosophizing when it remains sickly. It is thusly architypical manifestations come to force a "situation" on the thinker, as the organic quality of the fated one. Individuality as the modern identity, as the preferences of this and that, as taste, as attainments and specific things, contrasts with the typicality of the basis of all personality in the archaic being of man who first "raised his head", in the "first beginning". Yet, the "true closeness" is that Elemental overcoming of the hierarchy of all personalities, however "timed", however been and being and worlded. 

Here the text tells us that “The transcendental method is intrinsic to the manner in which objects can be objects for us.” It is autochthonous. It is what is ownmost. It belongs to the world. Men have their time. To have a time is to have a world. This is one’s own time. This is that which belongs most to this time: The transcendental method. Yet, who gives any thought to such a method? Certainly scientists are not concerned with it. And no one else either. Yet: “The transcendental method is intrinsic to the manner in which objects can be objects for us.” Distinctly the text says: “for us”. Perhaps the text called Heidegger has simply been in error. But on the other hand, is there not something that is swept aside in every simple obviousness, in what no longer is worthy of thought? The object, the object. It is because one has become oneself that the object exists. At first this can be dragged up out of the abyss by thinking of Freud. Because the expression “ego” is unnatural, as it were. Why is there a ego, full of contents, a “complex”, and then something else. Since when is there an “ego”? Everything points to a sort of illness, that wants to use the Natural World in its own way, perhaps remorselessly. But the “ego” is not an invention, it is the expression of what was already there, even since the pursuits of Galileo began to draw forth the object. Lukács says: “and then one fine day the French pulled down the Bastille.” Which is to say, no justification out of theory comes forth to say why, just then, Galileo came to bring to pass this great pursuit. Things so happen according to this Historicism, this Existentialism. Such is the thinking that proffers itself when the Western conceptions collapse, come to triviality, and begin to crave confusion. When, then, will thought become possible? So long as these things obscure the thinker, posing as serious, being the world and one’s own time, thinking remains a kind of myth, a fancy of romantic ruminators. 

On the other hand it is said that “The transcendental method is intrinsic to the manner in which objects can be objects for us. “ Which is something odd, because no one needs such a method to encounter the search for the secrets of the object. The object can not dream of going its shadowy way, in its own way, for it is sought already as the subject of the knowing animal. It is sought as the nature natured which is the accrual, the greeding up, of all potencies and powers in the Natural World. Such is the entrancing fate, the coming Utopian blush. Such would it all appear to a subject still dreaming towards new pursuits, obscured by the current Geschick.

A Consideration of a Nietzscheian Heidegger, as Anti-Philosophy of the Openess of Creative Life of Meaningless Meaning (as the "Meaning of Being")

Paragraph 15

In the introduction to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant says the following, which is a clearer formulation of the same sentence form the first edition:

I call all knowledge transcendental that in general occupies itself not with objects but with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this can possibly be a priori.  

---

Whereas the faulty British, or, the world English, reads: “with the mode of our knowledge of objects”. Correctly, this is rendered “with cognition of objects”.

Mode, method, system, methodology, even methodos which means the less constricting “path” or way, all these are misleading. There is a cognition or a perception of something that is according to the conditions of possibility. The conditions for the possibility of cognition are those things that are necessary within the contingent. Which is to say, that fulfill the Greek notion of what always is, the sempiternal. In this sense they are knowledge. Cognition is not knowledge, it is experience of something that is given, of something that is there. But in so far as what is there is ‘always’ or synthetic a priori, it counts as knowledge. 

Transcendental is that which experiences the necessary amidst the contingent. Time and space are said to be necessary, whereas what makes up a given situation is contingent. There is no method of knowing, there is perception, or experience. It is absurd to call experience a system of knowing. The term “mode of knowing” shows a lack of sense about thinking, if thinking means bringing determination to the essential things. 

According to the book called Definitions, which purports to be connected to the school of Plato, Eternal is: that which has existed and is now not destroyed.  

This definition is proscribed insofar as it is said that the future is not mentioned. But, in fact it is a better definition of the sempiternal, of the ground of knowing, than one that included future. For, what approaches us form behind is not any future, but it is Being. What now exists, as what creeps before us, as if from behind, is the creativity of the will. The metaphysical as the will to will. Because the “a priori” is the abyss. 

But in what is written above, we are reading not a history of philosophy that is now focusing on Kant’s concept of the transcendental, but rather we are actually speaking with Kant! But it is not as though when he spoke back to us this amounted to having a conversation. Something closer to the reverse is happening. Instead the way what he said makes a path through Being, is drawing closer to everything it wanted to favour in its own day but could not. Everything stands before us according to the definition of Eternity: that which has existed and is now not destroyed. What is called a ghost, of the past, is no more than the thing that now exists, that has become a mode, a method, a system. How does that happen: Exactly as in these posts, in the history of them, when we started along the Methodos we were on a path, but when keeping to the path became a matter of rehearsing what was assigned to us, it began to ossify, and become a matter of the past ruling over that that “is now not destroyed”.    

Insofar as the cognition is that that is according to the a priori, it is actually the creative. Because the necessity amidst the contingency is Truth. The cognition is already a kind of willing according to the thinking of the will to will, in perceiving it strives, but it is itself preceded by the a priori, which is will. The cognition trails after the creative will. Something brings forward something, in order to fulfill itself, but in saying this we don’t arrive yet at the meaningless of all meaning, including that of the creativity.  

The deepest confrontation with the Element is not even guaranteed by the initial kind of its own negativity in a thinking of a Philosophy of Being. I.e., if life is thought metaphysically it means nothing other than that all things in life have meaning, but not life itself. That therefore life as creativity is a metaphysics as a “life-giving lie”, i.e., as super-man. Goethe, as it is said here and there, already used the word Nietzsche made famous, and which then came into the comics and the popular usage of every kindergarten. If the Being here is what replaces the metaphysics of creativity of life, it only stands as the greatest intensity of a anti-philosophy.