Some deficient or expressionistic propaedeutic Remarks on thinking what a God is, according to the leading phrase: “Only a God can save us”
“Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten.”
The appetites and the choice-worthy aims, if they belong to the same agency, offer an enigmatic difficulty to thought. Sometimes they are conflictual, this can be called an addiction, a pull in two directions by one entity. The ancient view implies that the rational faculty can teach the body to come into harmony with the proper principle of movement, so that the body on earth becomes like the stars above. The gods move according to the stars above, and sometimes they exercise the bodies of those with deficient principles of motion, absorbing their very being, becoming them, stretching into the appearance of the Element. The destruction of the literal sky, and stars, when telescopes come in, and the other things, is not the destruction of what is thought through them, as though by a metaphor, the way of thinking according to the stars and the Sky has a continued meaning to the human being as an aid to its pondering on what is.
The Merkmale, attributes or marks of Iki are attributed by Count Kuki to plant life, as well as humans. There is a parallel with the Greek Dike, in so far as in accord with a general principle, a plant is Just in so far as it reaches its perfectio. Perhaps the closest word in present English to perfectio is completion. Since completion is a very ordinary word; the completion of a process is Just. Someone builds a house, and they finish the work. Or, a bear grows to maturity and the peak of its strength. The second example strains the word completion, in the present language. Possibly there is no word that so cannily speaks of artificiality, and growth, in the present language. Spinoza, in his remarks on Human Bondage, draws a distinction between cause and design. One can say that purpose, in biological teleology, that a wing has a function, serves a purpose, does not say that an awareness accompanies the matter. Spinoza does not say, we do not make the decisions in the cases of the designed things. But if making a decision means that one resolves to do a thing, picturing its perfectio, and then does it, it only means that the purpose is somehow announced. But it is no different than the blind instinct in its origin. It differs because it might be rejected, contravened. The instinct and the agreement with the instinct, as though a consent, posit a ground and a reason. The absurdity of an order given to oneself, the commander, and obeyed by oneself, the subsidiary agent, in a certain sense, corresponds to Nietzsche's reflections on the Dionysian and the Apollonian.
How can someone, who is walking up a step path, where the body demands much, doesn't wish to go on and registers this attitude through pain, contravene the body, as though the body were something else, and not the same as the one who began to command in another way? The body obeyed! I forced it! In fact this is totally natural to our thinking. Whereas what Nietzsche says is strange, that “I” command and “he” obeys, makes us think that the self is in question. The body can be treated as a prosthetic, much like any thing. The split can be thought as of the presence of the willer, and the being-at-hand of the prosthesis. The presence of the body, however, is not the willer. The willer is neither the presence, as the known thing, or the body, as the prosthetic. The willer is the principle of motion, the Aristotelian power or virtus. In this sense the distinction between purpose and design is taken away. Even a molecule has a form, or principle of motion. The right, or Just way of moving, of guiding, has nothing to do with the distinctions between stone, living thing, animal or designing creature. The principle of movement, in its specificity is the kind of subject matter the Greeks called a god. For example, the deamon of Socrates, which helped him to avoid the wrong path or evil.
If someone follows a rule, or takes an oath, or sets a goal, they speak to something more and beyond, under which they hope to lever themselves, and propel their will towards an end. In contradistinction to this when the will is willed by the principle of motion it is noticed as something that can be contravened by the Apollonian. Steadfast resolution is supposed to gather without involving anything far off. This discussion leads us to a general orientation concerning the subject matter of Aristotle’s work of the ergon, and dunamis. In a certain sense the ergon is a god. It is a kind of principle of movement, but not in the sense of Galileo's notion of entropy, which itself rests on a thought-experiment which posits a false space, where a thing can move in a pure way. Movement is never movement as such, but always a kind of movement. Presence is a specific kind of movement that makes the world seeable according to the god. Likewise what is opened in phusis, as things thrown into the sides of things, is according to the god. The Element of motion is more like time than is anything else, if time is understood as something that is not obvious so long as the character of presence, and the character of the-ready-to-hand are chiefly holding sway.