Wednesday, January 18, 2017


Paragraph 3: Leibniz and the Princess of Hanover (for as much as what is individual is not "devalued" to annihilation)










The third paragraph, of the eleventh lecture on Leibniz' “mighty” principle, reads:


But when one really thinks about it, rest is not an omission; rather, it is the assembling which first emits motion from itself. In the emission it does not merely discharge motion and send it off, but it actually retains it. Accordingly, motion is based in rest. So if we assume that the history of Western thinking is based in the Geschick of being, then in thinking what we call “the Geschick of being” we think a rest or repose, an assembling into which all movements of thinking are also gathered, regardless of whether or not thinking is immediately aware of this.   

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Here, what is distinct, is that poiesis -- under the rubric Heidegger -- is thought in such a way as to be called Fate. Something which is “assembled” is coming forth. That is a way of talking about time. But not as reason, rather as aletheia. Why does one not rest in satisfaction, but rather is exposed to concern? A reason could easily be given in the form of giving an answer. But, poiesis resists that, or rather it does not know of reasons. Poiesis only says, it is so, because it is. The simple reason is not the scientific cause. The poetic “because” is not reason. In this are we really doing anything at all, except building a schema? What needs to be thought, and not studied out, is how Fate here is supposed to stand in the thing bestowed: namely, the essence of technicity. If we are capable, as we are, of thinking objects as causal, how can we be supposed to think in the manner of poisies? Supposidly Hericlitus still spoke in the manner of this Fate. So when Hericlitus said that many are asleep, when they are awake, he was already saying that he had grasped the “because”.









If aletheia is a bookend, like something standing on an old shelf, that is at last to be taken into consideration alongside correctness, it indicates that we are dealing only with what has come to language, with what language is willing of its own accord to say. If the principle of identity still holds in the “because” then we can not even overcome Greek thinking. It must be that Plato did not think aletheia, the poetic, but instead he already grasped the thing as the “what” and the “there”. Thus Socrates speaks of those who know of the particular and the genus. This is already a kind of objectification. Aletheia is supposed to be the word of the primitive philosophy, before it became a university subject, when it was the living and unnamed experience of time out of the ground of Being. The Earth would then be the “sleep”, and the Sky the “because”. 










What is it supposed to mean that now, just now, we are taking up this language? Is it supposed to all happen now? One can think poises so far as one takes it up out of the present, but if it is placed among the Geschick, written down, it is thought under the present essence, that of the objectified object.


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The Fate is thought as “radically mysterious dispensation”, but then, not as the “because”. The Fate is always what “emits motion from itself” as the unfolded history, as the historial which is what is unfolding as the being of beings. So, the “because” is not what Hericlitus tells us, when he speak to us from the “sleep”, from the ground of the “sleep”.   





For the reason that the technological essence holds sway, we need remind ourselves, that the objects of technicity bring no Truth, niether about all things, nor of Man as Man. In bringing no truths they are the Serious, which comes forth from the Play, or, better, the Arrangement, which is to be sought from the Open. Since the causa, as the object reckoned in terms of the Correct, is the Time of technicity it clutters thought, and points away from the “because” and the “sleep”. Whatever the True Sky, of the causa brings forth in the manner of “what works”, of things invented, it brings only what is standing in the Fate, as the “radically mysterious dispensation”. Everything for the human is the same, a stone or a shoe, a machine for automated factory work, a embedded intelligence machine or a volume of poems. Everything that is correct, is the same in basic statutory. For instance, just as the thing called gravity, when it takes its meaning from the Laws of Einstein, can be pitched here or there, so can the thing called chair, be made here, there, at a remote place in the galaxy. Each piece of technicity is no more advanced than any other, but all stand in the Geschick, as the correct, as what is a knowledge of the universe, and what can become amidst the becoming. Every correct thing, in technicity, is a feature of the Sky, of the eternal system of nature.




When “an assembling into which all movements of thinking are also gathered” is thought, no correct thing is natured out of the stock of possibilities. So the thinking of the being of beings, as the essence of time, always thinks in a way that does not include itself in the World. But of all essences, there is the essence itself: So, if one who knows of health, knows from this essence, that they are healthy, they also have the objective correlate to this knowledge, for instance in the status of a untroubled stomach, but if the being there does not know of the essence of health, the rest too is not. Strauss gives in his book on Natural Right the example of War, referencing Weber. If war becomes, out of its essence, degraded, so that the God of Hosts, that is armies, ceases to be glorious, and the word “terrible” ceases to name what brings awesome fire to the subject, the essence begins to teeter. The turning of the essence means that good becomes bad, falls, is ridiculed, gossip follows, that the essence starts to “devalue”. But the turning of the essence is not the change of the essence into another essence. When the being of beings becomes correctness, as the causa of the objectified object, it describes something more than a “devaluing” of aletheia. What is the correlate, then, of “Sleep”—it is Being. 







But in saying so, what is really said? In one sense Being is what one senses dimly in the Element (cf. the example of Boredom and the Old Sunday when everything is closed). The Element also is what comes forth in the moment of great despair or joy. The Element is not, however, Being. Being is supposed to name what the rubric Being can’t name. Yet that can’t be taken as a riddle, or a strange opinion, because then we would refer back to the Laws of Thought. To the Principles of Metaphysics which close with that of the “mighty” principle of Reason. Even the “because” seems prior to the principle of sameness or identity, in so far as it doesn't say, there is something there as something. So, it is prior to Socrates with his announcement that the learned speak of the genus, and of the particular. Yet, when we speak to Hericlitus about this, strangely, he speaks to us of Fire. This subject matter is taken up, for instance, in the class sessions on Hericlitus held by Heidegger with another professor, and there much is suggested concerning the general external manner of the striving-for implied in the talking with Hericlitus. 







Fire is like a “spirit of decision” which acts like a weaver that brings the moments together, but isn’t seen. “All unseen” says Goethe, but what really “knits” can’t be the decision out of the Nothing, for instance when one speaks, before the speach, the “spirit of decision” is “active” and brings forth the “work” of what is said. Here, one goes about at the level of reflection which fails to overcome the divisions of times. For instance, into the standing system of nature, and the things become in nature, as what is irreversible. Even the
Nothing has a place here as a ground, of the coming forth of the becoming. So this is “ontic”, as with Nietzsche. For example, someone makes some discovery, how to combine this with that, and at any moment they could bring it forth out of the stock of the system of nature. But, yet, what is behind them? Do they stand in what is already natured, or in the decision about what to bring forth? In the thinking back to the Fire, one too fails, at least at first, in one's striving, to come to the point of becoming, as it were, the undivided time. The undivided time looks like something more creative than what is creative, in the peculiar drawing forth of its luminous weight.






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