Tuesday, January 10, 2017

A Consideration about the Position of the Ultimate in Thought (through a continuation of the excursus) 

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The second paragraph of Hour Eleven of the lecture series on Leibnitz’ “mighty” law of thought, titled in English, The Principle of Reason, reads:

In the course of pursuing the various eras of history of Western thinking we seek a view into the Geshick of being. Such a course has assumed in advance that the history of Western thinking rests in the Geschick of being. But that wherein something else rests must itself be at rest. Ordinarily we conceive of rest as the cessation of movement. Represented in a mathamatical-physical way, rest is only a limiting case of movement, which, for its part, is premeditated as a change of position measurable according to spatio-temporal coordinates. If rest is represented in advance as a cessation or limiting case of movement, then the concept of rest is reached by negation. 

A discussion which tends towards the ultimate, and wants to think what is ultimate, is distinguished first by the fact that a temporal sequence can not be given, such that it reads like a set of instructions, that would, when followed with fidelity, bring one to what is ultimate. What is ultimate has an enigmatic character with respect to a ordered sequence of time, or, indeed, to a sequence of time simpliciter. 

Thusly, the “various eras” can not be understood as something repeatable. Because one is not able to have an inside where the subject matter can stand and be manipulated, and so be repeated. 

In the basic sense, it is even not clear that time belongs in any way to the “various eras”. If time, in its enigmatic character, comes first to be announced, in the account, it should read: I happen. The “I happen” means that time means nothing other than that something happens. Something happens is as account of what time says. In a certain sense this can be regarded as an objectification of Being. Since, something is put alongside something, such that the something can be gauged, as it were. The something is the “something”, and what it is put alongside it the “it happens”. Something happens: Aletheia. 

Aletheia, is something. In this sense we can speak of the “Geschick of being”. In this sense aletheia is a name for time.

“In the course of pursuing the various eras of history of Western thinking we seek a view into the Geshick of being.”

The eras of being themselves give “something” with which to gauge the something that happens. This is the way that the so-called Geshick manifests itself to the view which is sought in the thinking. This Geshick is a Fate. The Fate names the way time is given, the way it is there in the beings. But is aletheia more basic than the sense of the objectified object, which shows itself as what moves? Movement is a something, such that it lets time happen. When time is thought as movement it seems to create the still observer, so that the non-subjective concept of duration, as thought by Bergson, becomes thinkable as the one moment, as what is always and without synchronic variation according to many movements, or many moments. The time of Bergson, one should think it over, is not subjective. Where does it get “seen” from? Somehow thought must think it, but this means that thought is no subject. 

“Such a course has assumed in advance that the history of Western thinking rests in the Geschick of being.”

When we think of this Fate, we do not think of a moment, that like a band is unfolding. Rather, we only think it so far as we think the ways time is something that can be happening, time has to be something, so that it can be seen apart from what it is, and so happen. If time is aletheia, truth, it is what being always shows, when it ceases to not show itself, but shows itself? A hand opens, and seems to express something when the fingers stretch in their opening. Such is something, something as aletheia. But the “opening” is not the time, in the sense that a “change of position” is thought as happening in a dimension. Neither, is the time the thing expressed, as if it spoke to the human being, in the creative moment that lasts forever, since it is only a band ever stretching, all in one moment. Aletheia wants to think time into the meaning, as it stands there, in what is seen. Seen can’t say, perceived, in the sense of a problem of how perception passes through a course of transformations, in order to become a represented thing. 

If the hand that opens isn’t thought as a sequence, but as a event, it is not clear how to ask about how it starts ["event" marks a difficulty, a Roman/Latin reason, in its connection to an account of ratio and ground, cf. The Principle of Reason. Alethiea is, appropriately said, no "event"). As if to found the start somewhere, and then to build up form the start. In one sense, when Rousseau complains that the State of Nature is thought from the starting point of bourgeois man, who is scattering the higher clergy and the elite warrior class aside, he says, we must go to the start. If one thinks in terms of a “Minimal State” one goes even further in thinking how the modern bourgeois acts when released from what made that being (which is to say, even further away from what Rousseau wanted to ask about). But what is more subtle is the ravishing of thought, that wants to pick up the being of the primordial, from out of what is not primordial. Supposedly one can think, or even observe, the beginning, objectively, if not as the life of the Orangutan, as the invitation from the village, which we would visit, and look to, with searching eyes. Rousseau is no thinker in so far as his thought is not concerned with what is ultimate. Since, in refusing to ask, how would the current man act if his society was torn apart, under revolution, under Cromwell, as in Hobbes, but rather he asks, what was the former being like. The primordial behavior. 

In Dugin we see this ethnological thought at a higher level of sophistication. Where the Ethnos, and the Laos or people as a stratified people, become the “imagined community” of Anderson. This all happens within the “era” of History, which is “Western” par excellence, because it is globalized. But what brings us to the thought of the ultimate is the difficulty that we can not rely on a way to gauge the progress of this “era” with respect to the other since this is it. There is a disputable point in the Dugin account, because the generalization of the subject matter implies an ultimate ground, from which "each" ethnos is then admirably fit, as it own stem, of the plurality universal. Which is to say that, the ethnos, itself, seems thought as primordial, yet, the primordial is conceptualized, as if each primordiality where subject to the current universality. This question, here, is not really like the similar objections to, e.g., Lyotard (with his infinite legalism, which is "almost transcendent" to use the saying of Levinas). Lyotard never fell to thinking the drastic practical detail empericaly and anthropologically, even when he took overtly 'anthropological' examples to heart. But does Dugin think the Fate of being, as what can not be schematically, like a formalism, removed and put in place? The thinking, one fears, into the dialectic stages, is more Marxist, and less Heideggerean. The ground of thinking is not really seen, the thinking is political. It wants the sovereignty to become what is more commanding, out of the fundamental being of Dasein, yet, it thinks away from the ultimacy.

“Such a course has assumed in advance that the history of Western thinking rests in the Geschick of being.”

Here we “assume”. One can, in a way, think the other “eras”, the other ways of awakening time, or, spoken in the aletheia of being, showing what is hidden by hiding what is as unqualified. Ultimacy begins, here in this disgracefully enigmatic sketch, to remind us of its difficulty. Ultimacy, at first, is ungraspable in terms of provenance. In this, the supposed modern era, is like a work of art, in the sense of a great work, which is not to be judged out of what came before, but rather, what came before only can be measures, as something, as something that happens, because of the essential measure, the starting place, of what proffers to being its essence, as what is the something that offers up time as what happens. The happening is in the artwork, as what is judged to be there, and to be rightly the subject of what is there, according to that beginning. In giving such an impressionistic account we must set a steep path, that one must walk up, in order to seek to bring a greater proportion of clarity, to a deplorably dark subject matter: the ultimate.


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