The quite peculiar shameless disorder of the gathering of the questioning concerning being, as the reversal of the cybernetic 

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Τὸ ὂν = τὸ εἶναι; beings = being. We do not call any being at all,

for example, this thing and that thing, by the name being; we do not
even say the being, but a being. We call it this because this is the way
we grasp and experience it. We experience this or that being without
further considering that and how it is a being and for this reason
belongs among beings. This gets taken for granted, so much so that
we are not even aware of it.

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To speak of a tree is already to speak of the branch lazily curling horizontally to a 

unexpected length, the low branch with many bunches of leaves that, almost imperceptibly 
sways in the mildest of breezes. According to Kant whoever sees a tree knows without 
further ado that they see something living. If they were mistaken, and what they saw was 
some kind of artificial replica, that is not a tree (and the dead tree is wood). What is necessary, verstand, and what is 
accidental vernunft. On the one hand what is by virtue of what it is, and on the other, what 
one learns. We do not know that all things are grey. When the shadow of night sweeps over 
the world many things may be grey, even all things. And yet, what is, each thing, need not be 
grey. Some time after Kant the talk of knowing was given up. Metaphysics lapsed into a 
steadfast beholding of the appearances.  

Most of all, what goes unsaid, and is never observed in Kant, is that the greatest example of 

the intellect's knowing of the essence (of the a priori [predication]), is the case of the manifold of a being as such. Unlike in 

Plato, the manifold does not mean all of the qualities of something. It does not mean that an 

Oak is grey, has many leaves, is short or that it resembles the manner of some human being’s 

posture. Manifold in Kant refers to the possibility of apprehending

as such, to each chance, each look, that is, to envisage or learn more concerning that thing 

(appearance). For Kant, the things (phenomena) are always the appearances, and so the 

manifold refers back to the essence, or, better said, the truth of the thing. The manifold rests 

on the truth of the thing, and all relies on the truth, which is the radical grounding in the  

numen of being. Yet, Kant was not one to give way to the intoxication of the ringing of bells, 

of the tinkling of the divine in the breeze, yet, in the flux of rationality, as the concept of the 

motion of Der gute Wille, Kant lets the irrational and the rational slip away from human 

beings. Ergo, what invades the discussion of Husserl, and for example, in his own way Max

Scheler is the opening up to the illumination of a free look, or better, a look indistinguishable

from being.

   

Each being has its manifold, a priori, beings, likewise, are such as to be there for others, and 

oneself is also one of the class of “each one”. Yet, what is wanted is difficult, since, on the 
one hand the beings are to be thought without an apparatus or paradigm. Therefore, one must 
not insert the truth as a hidden foundation. At the same time, we must be led to this on our 
own, through the learning which is become thinking in the sense of apprehending whatever 
one comes to, a tree, a vehicle, a man. What is thought here is not natural consciousness, as  
an opinion, as what makes sense in our dealings, pistis, on the reliability of the common  
sense of “each one”. On the other hand, when phenomenology thinks, for instance in Sheler, 
closer than does observation or common sense, and sees colour as a green, a lavender, such 
that the something as something is indifferent to ousia, as what is equipment, as what is 
mine, but only reads off what is apprehended, such that grass glistening under the subdued 
rays of the sun which reaches the bald only through a wintery withered sky, is green, and at 
the same time, this failing green, hardly lit, is a green. The something and the something is  
utterly indifferent, yet Scheler still speaks her of form. He still speaks of form, i.e., not of
being. Why? For he wishes to grasp meaning as truth apart from involvement in the exposure
of the thrownness of learning. Meaning, truth, value, are set aside through a judgment, as 
with Aristotle! Yet, being? 

Here we must still see the way to this position that has no regard for knowing. 
As formula it reads: whatever is part of a sample space, or of a throw net that remains the same, can be

collected and added up. But, whatever learned, from what is learning, from what is always

the genetic circle, is… However, it is not so simple that we speak here indifferently of

self-reference, in the style of Russell, or in the style of a subtle refutation. Instead, in enter

the learning of learning, we must learn. At the same time this position is approached along

the horizon at other points, leading towards the zenith of a leap. This is, we emphasize again,

as always, true of the analysis of boredom, when the position of the Element suggests the

Event in its play, which is sensed as distant from what is serious. 

Ever Fresh sources of Being as Unconstrained Forgetfulness of History’s beings

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"Being": a thought un-Greek as no other—or indeed Greek?

"Being": vapor and smoke—or is it the innermost hidden fire of
human Dasein? We do not know; for that reason we are questioning
that is, we are struggling to inquire correctly. All we know at the
moment is that when beings are questioned at the very beginning, this
differentiation of beings and being exists in the form of an equation.
Here we must again note that τὸ ὂν actually signifies being [das Seiend
(participial) and being [das Sein] (beingness). We are provisionally and
in a general way trying to throw light upon this peculiar state of affairs
regarding the differentiation between beings and being so that we can
at least surmise that we are not dealing here with a meaningless and
arbitrary choice of words; all the more so because language is the
source and wonder of our Dasein, and we may assume that philosophy
did not misspeak at the time of its inception or when human beings
came into their proper existence.

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Blood out of the jugular vein, turned loose by a sword, sprinkling the early winter air, the end of the life

that the embodied one found, that had been sent, sent for what? The last question soon grows, and

scatters our energies over beings, it asks what the right way to live is, it asks about use. Plato didn’t 

listen to music which someone made by their own wits, in any way they wished, creatively, and which 

whoever found it a worthy banquet might go hear, for enjoyment. Why ousia? Why did the discourse 

Plato prepared already make it a more remote region, the region of being and beings? It has 

been “sent”. Already the “what” is a prediction of what is sent. The music Plato spoke of was useful. He

 attacked distorted music. There is an art that works with mimesis, and an art of phantasm. So we learn 

from the Stranger in Plato’s Sophist. What is a stranger? He is the one who is guarded, rather than the 

shameless. A stranger is wary, punctilious, he wants to make a good impression. In speaking to 

strangers we do something analogous to speaking to enemies. We bring out a specific form of the 

human essence, through language's phantasm. The stranger says, a statue made for the use of a 

temple, that towers above us, is made by a false arche, its principle is not to produce the proportions 

rightly, but it makes the higher parts larger, to account for the point of view of the mortals bellow. There 

is language, “ language is the source and wonder”, and there are ‘languages’. However, in seeking 

what is “sent”, in this language, rather than through ‘languages’ seeking the end of dialogic work, the 

“what for” of life, how to live, we seek already in the region of a world, in the Greek Beginning, within 

this “whole”. 

According to Nietzsche Kant reverses the relation of ousia, substance, and what is said of the 
substance. If we follow Nietzsche in championing the appearances, we do so by making appearance a 
truth. We must have something, so we reject “truth”, unable to stand it, and bring truth back in. This 
skipping from phenomenon to what is real, spins about being. But in what sense does being transfix the
first “proper existence”? 



A being who in saying there is something, in saying there is being, is saying something is, is saying at the 
same time, or logos says it, that something that is not is. Ergo, here, being as the one, as hen, is, 

and being as the nothing is, and being as ta panta is. However, what is this “as”? In the context of being

as the nothing, this can’t mean that saying nothing means the same as saying something, saying that 

hen is, does not say the whole is whole, saying nothing is, doe not say, nothing is nothing. The whole, 

the world, is. This being, this one, is. If the phenomena are True, i.e., that on which the rest depends, 

they still are. The truth is. The questioning here is not “forgotten” at all in the sense that at an earlier 

date someone wrestled with it. But, rather, something unasked is now drawing one to awareness, 
in the sense that the standard sense of history is the positive forgetting as the life which was sent. From

generation to generation, each one maintaining their own metes and bounds, away from and as a 

being. The radicality is essential radicality, forgetfulness through the withdrawal, as the setting’s (the 

downgoing’s)  most radical hour. What does it stretch towards? Can it be stretched towards?

Approaching Aristotle, Coming again to What is Thinking in the Mood of the Methodos

Is the situation concerning the question of being somewhat as

Nietzsche suggests (in his early period) when he says of Parmenides:

Once in his life Parmenides, probably when he was very old, had a

moment of the purest, completely bloodless abstraction undisturbed by
any reality; this moment—un-Greek as no other in the two centuries of
the Tragic Age—whose offspring is the doctrine of being-became the
boundary-stone for his own life. (Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the
Greeks, 1873)

And was the same Nietzsche correct when in his final period he said

that being is "the last vapor of evaporating reality" (Twilight of the

Idols: "Reason" in Philosophy § 4)?

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The same abyssal disarray stands here, as though before a black curtain, as one finds in Nietzsche's saying “all the better my friends”, which is asked on the occasion of the questioning of the Truth of the death of God. If someone brings in the death of god, and leaves it on the ground by our feet, it stands there as the truth of being. And yet, all truth is godly. Hölderlin, whose name had been mentioned to Goethe, but not correctly remembered, for names are by nomos, and faces by phusis, commented that among the Germans the most un-German thing was to be like the Greeks, who were supposed to be their forerunners, according to the philhellenistic trait of the dawn of the German philisophic age. To be German was to be comfortable amidst abstraction, but the face, phusis, the personae? That belonged to Dionysian life. How did Nietzsche understand Kant’s view of being? Let us suppose he did so according to the saying that the “is”,ειναι, is a “copula” (what connects something to something = something is something). One should keep in mind that in Kant the issue of behavior is always the issue of saying the behaviour as a maxim. The saying always indicates greater clarity, more human oriented, ultimately the freedom of the rational in the guidance of Categorical Imperative. 

That which is, existence, is ειναι says that the “eristic” speech of the sophists is always involving us, and that we can’t withdraw our support of what involves us. If something is said not to be, if the ὂν, or being, of the something, let us say several pawns on a chessboard contemplated by eyes above them, is affirmed not to be, there are not pawns, something is predicated about the something. By “affirmed” (declared) here is meant that one says: There are no pawns (on the board). In order to say that we do see the pawns, and that they are there, we affirm that the declaration that they are not there has a positive status. We contradict the positive denial, and, instead, present a positive positing. Not the declaration, “no pawns (are on the board)”, which is to say something about the situation our eyes take in, but this other declaration, “the pawns are (on the board)”. Existence in this sense, ειναι, admits that the declarations about things that are not, exist. This means that the situation, as the eyes above the activities about the chessmen on the board envisage, is the place of the not being of the pawns. (This is constantly a vexation for logos, in the Socratic dialogic region). 

What is Kant saying in denying this “situation” as we name the place of the “is”? According to Kant knowledge, which is what he seeks, is wholly unconcerned with the “is”? This is exactly the sense in which we just came to the word “What use is being?”. Nietzsche is not unaware of this sense of being, of ειναι, this is where he places the Rausch, or, the be-powering of power as the Will to Will. Heidegger says, in this regard, we do not choose to become angry, yet, when one really thinks about it, neither does one choose to hate, to hate one's ownmost enemy. In Schmitt, the enemy refers to something that belongs to the people, to the political, Schmitt is not a philosopher, and he never enters the sphere of such thinking. In Nietzsche, an enemy is only ever the confrontation with one’s own, rather than the or one’s, enemy. In this sense “projection”, orexis, mood, eat into one’s being, so that one does not have a mood, one does not feel this Rausch, but this life, this life drive, this instinct, loses itself in the “vapour”, which is the sweat on the dark bodies, soma, which in them have “inclination”, propensity, which “swerve”. The more  the abyss is seen in the Genetic Circle, in the movement of all that is not, in the technical sense raised by Nietzsche, “naïve”, to be “one with nature” in Schiller's sense.       

Nietzsche: Truth, the final notion of which is the perspectivalism, leaves the intellect, with its non-metaphysical physics, with physics of maths, aside. The standard of aisthesis, of sensorium, is set aside. Both are ειναι, for the abyss means that orexis, as Will to Will, becomes the Dionysian and the Apollonian. Let us move on with this observation: What is bodily, i.e., that when we move our feet, as the dawn when she smears pink along the Eastern sky,  the distinction between the invisible realm of the self or form, and the visible realm of things, looses itself in the play of the “ficta” (Cicero) or base fiction of the “swerving” of the material, as the moody will that is transfixed in the Apollonian, in what knows, and which is laid out in the Dionysian, of what “suffers”.    




The "why" is still given, as of Free Will, though not as a cause (simply as a "because"), or, even less as a determinism in the sense of mathematical objectified physics (e.g."forces").

An Explication of Narration as a path towards the narrating of Narration in the Phenomenology of the Leading Question in the work with the title Heidegger 

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Is the time-honored character of this equation in itself sufficient

indication of the lucidity of what is equated, or indeed an argument

for the legitimacy of speaking this way? The fact that we ordinarily

speak this way cannot be faulted. That we do so when expressly

inquiring about beings is, however, to say the least, peculiar. Or is the

question really not about beings at all? Yet Aristotle and the philosophers

preceding him certainly do ask expressly about this. Or is this

simple questioning not enough? Is it only an initial approach that

subsequently comes to a standstill? Being and beings-still to make a 
distinction here or even to want to raise a question, is this not unwarranted, 

futile quibbling? Beings and ways of being we know; they delight and distress us, 
they cause us no end of anguish and disappointment; and, of course, 
we are beings ourselves. Let us stick to beings. What use is being?

--

"Beings and ways of being we know; they delight and distress us, they cause us no end of anguish and disappointment; and, of course, we are beings ourselves. Let us stick to beings. What use is being?"

The possible varieties of answers to the question How to Live?, though they offer us no rest, are easy enough, or, at least, not the hardest of all, to understand. The question, as it were, is quickly done posing itself, and at once we move on to an answer. Or, to finding our way to an answer through setting out a proper model of working out such an answer, for instance, by working out what rationality as a method of moving along in a problem, is. Ergo, we have much on our hands, but, at least, we can manage a bit there, and something to busy ourselves with is ready for us, and not only something, but a great task. Still, it seems odd that we bypass the most basic question, in order to ask something else, and yet, it is not as though this were done in order to conceal being, not explicitly. In fact, no one sets out to conceal being, yet, it recedes of itself. How is it now, something of this problem has reached us, and seems to flash along our path, and to quicken the Methodos? On the other hand, this is a narration that talks around the question, and even sets us further away. 

It was first of all Husserl who discovered narration, rather than logos. When Husserl challenges, because he first sees, logos as a rule, he does not open a field for ten or fifty new logics to come in, as if he were Stephen Wolfram, posting this and that formal logic as something that is not inconsistent. Even within the realm of informal logic, and argument, speech that is meant to sway one in one's being, one finds no Narration. In the basic sense, when one practices rhetoric, one always says something that leads one to draw inferences, one argues after a fashion (even if in mere enthymeme, and in no proper sylogistic style), either in order to gain some advantage, or to critique oneself. Let us argue, let us have a chance to convince you, are you willing? Dialectic itself is the short speech as what is, in a manner, a matter of rhetoric. Narration, for its part, as a close relation to being. When logos is at work, it is keen to point out that narration is one thing, and its referent another, or, on the other hand, that perhaps it merely “refers” to itself, to the word. What gives narration its character is that it does not suggest something more than it says, such that one is meant to draw some sensible inference, but it says something, and then, as easily, something else. It does not insist that it is speaking about the same being, at the same time, but it only speaks. Its character is not like that of the mystical clarity of the great poet, it does not set out to being a suitable apportionment of light and shadow, "the thrones" do not return from "afar", to power thinking, its Macht is much more modest. It is not a caretaker of ipsissimosity, of visions of grand and mighty deeds, of what is racing through over heated brains, of some quiet but sultry path along which women walk in the township of Röcken. Whenever we speak of a great poet, invariably we discover a hidden cache of immense erudition behind the seemingly simple speech, yet, Narration? 

Someone sees an extremely aged trunk, of a large tree, its canopy, high above, thrust forward in a strong wind. The wind shivered the many yellow and green and brown leaves, the youth looked up, and he felt the late autumn chill pass through the field. There, the gnarled trunk of the Sycamore tree was darkened as the sun passed behind the clouds, falling leaves knocked down by the wind fluttered and mixed their shadows with the growing pool of shade. Narration doesn't say, here, just now, we speak of a being, of a situation, but it comes along first this way than that way. It doesn't demand that ousia must have its full say. However, this is so simple that we are done with it, and want to know about something else, at once. That is, if we can even stand to listen once. How much more does one wish to hear about something tangible, that will lead to a transformation of the lived environment, to a manipulation of the available materials, to expansion of the possibilities of human life, to a busied creative activity that creates new capabilities and long term enrichment of human society as a whole. Narration, does it not mean fiction? 

The question what “use” is being is indeed suggestive. It seems like a piece of prodding, yet, must one take it as rhetoric, does it not, in a way, simply speak what one thinks already about the matter? That is the distinction, in the way it delimits itself, over and against argument and rhetoric, and blank statement with a pretended neutrality. At bottom it is a way of thinking, it is a movement in the perpetual constancy of decision, it is Phenomenology itself. The statement says to itself, perhaps I never spoke, it doubts itself. It asks, as if someone else asked, did that really happen like that? And instead of taking up a defensive posture, and at once asserting the availability of its own content, of its referent, it pierces the phenomena by resting. 

When we ask “What use is being?”, we, therefore, must not take this as an argument, that is designed to impassion us, and fill us with the idealism requisite to the hunt for being. Rather, what this word says, “What use is being?”, is that one finds oneself speaking being in the manner of what is therein said. Even less are we asked to find in the sense of “use” a polemic with the Cybernetic mining of all things, with the extraordinary process of imposing the standard of an increase in efficiency to all things that exist and to the human being.