A Short Note on Being as the Unconditioned
In what follows we must say something about Being as the unconditioned, in order to let the signal word Aletheia, come into better sight in the continuation of the methodos.
Whoever still has the short-sighted eyes of a human being can not think this matter. The human being is always supposed to be one of the representations. Even in Daniel Dennett, the representation, Kantianism, is still the leading idea about the human being. So that is not a philosopher’s argument, but it is the view that is contrasted with naive realism on behalf of the sciences own intelligence. Whenever the theme of consciousness, or the notion of naive realism in, for example Searle, begin to think in the terms of two other views on the human being, they come to think in the same way because they are dealing with a view which holds the intelligibility of things to be unquestionable. The intuition, anschauung, which is contrasted with the discursive: the immediate, and not what is reflected, already tells them everything. But the question about the History of being, as what is flowing in thought, as the destiny of Being, always already starts with Kant. Yet, both these views start with Kant? Kant as the one who speaks of representations, and Kant as the one who speaks of the synthetic a priori. When the synthetic a priori is thought as transforming it is thought as the appropriation of thought past, by thought, as the Geschick of Being.
When we take the simple thought of what is learned, for instance that someone thinks in their long life they have learned to see things better, they have learned, not as learning, but as a place to see that the ground is changing, we begin to think in terms of Being. When the learning is learning of the synthetic a priori, not a wall, between the phenotype and the principle of the type, but in the same way Aristotle understood the form as the matter as two concepts (not realities), of the same, we begin to think Historialy. When we see, the actual intuitions of daily life, as changing, and can hold them over against what has been intuited in the past, we see the conditions which in time are most often regarded as learning, as wisdom. But if they are regarded, not as all men do, as a deepening of their being, but as the movement of the being of beings, as the movement of what is essential in all being of beings, we begin to sent the Historial as the ground of Being as the unconditioned.
Example in the Hegelian stage of Historical thinking: A lover is first intuited, one sees the person, and thinks them, as a person in the state of a ordinary person, then in the state of the lover, then in the state of the one who is no longer the lover. This sight of the being, in the immediacy, transforms the being. If the subjective parts of the transformation are put aside, and the elemental parts are brought to the for, we see the change in being. As the essence of the matter, as the kind of thing that is there, is lifted and destroyed in the change of the basic look of the kind of thing.
Tensions, pushing the human being out of shape, search for reality. When the looks, as the world, can be drawn away from the place of the change, the human is the thing that is part of all the things, but the thinking has to be what is both in the change and what is changed. This is the sense that the irreducibility of the immediate intelligibility of activities, and of situations, appears to Dilthey. Dilthey saw first that this, and not the human being, is the existence.