Wednesday, December 21, 2016







Aletheia too is (all too) Ontic: Asked and answered?



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How would one go about ingratiating oneself with this aletheia? As though the one in pursuit could lay a trap, or the one who was a friend of truth could coax something more out of this essence of beings? Essence of beings means that, whatever else one comes across in a given thought, there is this, this could be aletheia, it could be ratio as what the human being makes its home in, it could be causa as what always is the condition of any dealing with of any thing. Aletheia is supposed to be the being of beings as a specific part of the genus Fate. The word Fate means in the simple sense, Fate and not History. Since History includes in it the sense of a rational character, or, at least of a intelligible arrangement that is linked up, the one era to the other. Fate is a specific modification of the concept of History. But aletheia, like ratio, is not supposed to be a concept only, but also actuality itself. Actuality is supposed, under this thinking, as what these words say, as what, indeed, all saying says. The being of beings, as the actuality of the essential character, is always the condition for the possibility of any experince. Condition for possibility does not say, the subject has this character in the way it represents its object, but it says nothing other than, what is is always so. The being of beings does not say, the unconditioned, Being, it says, the way of being of the beings as some Da-sein, e.g., the Greek Da-sein or the Medieval Western Da-sein. 




What is difficult in this thinking, and is crucial, is the way the being of beings is being thought out of the region of its condition of possibility. It is being thought conceptually, rather than being as Da-sein. But at the same time this aletheia is supposed to be available for a leap. A leap can involve a conceptual transformation, or it can point to a leap in Da-sein itself, in the extreme case. If thinking is like the cloak that is carried, but not worn, it is already known, but yet not known. It is in hand, but not used properly. If the authentic had a high meaning, it would mean to use thinking, or, better, to think, just now. To think is always given in the language of das Man, to think, to be, is always coloured in the language of das Man, one repeats. Therefore, thinking, is not spoken in its authentic manner. In its non-human manner. Whenever one realises one is able to hold out the human being, and begin to hold it apart, and to take other looks into being, one is not only detached, as that would be the limit state of being human. The turning of the human being, might still allow one to see the ones who still live in the human. The living presence of being that live in a knowing, is always a disturbance to the ones who have gone away. So far we are not ready to see aletheia without the human being. Aletheia, one presupposes, is not the subject of Plato and Aristotle, it is the being of beings as the poetic, when the poetic glances back at the Greeks. It goes back to Hericlitus, but not to say, in the mode of the philologist or classist what Hericlitus said, but to talk to Hericlitus and to let his words talk back into the being of beings which is the thinking along with. Aletheia then: is a being of beings. But the poetic, also, is a being of beings. In all this talk of being of beings we move ontically. Being of beings says the exact same thing as “will to will”. Because will, as I make myself do it, is willed by the will to will, or what Nietzsche calls Rausch. “Exact” does not mean that we have a synonym in a scientific sense? What would a scientific synonym even be? How can one say that: Exact does not mean an = is placed between “being of beings” and “will to will”. Yet, in a certain sense this is an unnecessary word, the saving clause, since one must always think what is included in a word according to that word, to its very self if you like. What is included in the word Stuhl is not what is included in the word chair, though this words say exactly the same thing. Yet, since, in the modern period, everything converges, and since histographicly too, the English and the German word have come out of a lived history that is not chiefly alien, these words are hardly to be thought in different lights? One thinks in the light, and one thinks in the shadow of the houses, in order to think enigmatically.    





To be authentic is to let the maxim of one’s character speak out of itself. Yet what is one's own in this respect is in essential conflict with that to which one is exposed and cast upon. This means in plain English that each one has to deal with the world. The enigmatic phrase “the world” is at the same time a simple word that can be used in the most pressing circumstances, that is, in circumstance where subtle niceties are impossible. Even when an account is demanded of one, by mean force, one can yet speak of “the world” and how one must be in it. The water one must swim in, each one and each other is in the world. To be authentic means to love one’s own while what the world is, is to be like them: thus to surrender oneself. One might surrender oneself volitionally, and in a moment commit oneself to a path upon which one will be forever losing oneself as the authentic. The authentic is nothing to be prefered, it is not higher, it marks the bound of what such a meaning as Da-sein can be exposed to. Those beings that come to be authentic reach just as much into a ground that is floundering and radically dispensed from a stem that is never justified or like the true stars. Yet, between the stars and the sunken world, there is this look that offers itself to thought as the necessity and the play. 







It is strange that this diremption plays no serious roll in ancient thought. The character, which is nature, is exposed to education. Training as an animal training, and training as a  human training. The human training is towards what is unitary. Thus the genuine training of the individual is towards a being with the others who acquire the same genuine knowing. This idea, unhatched among the ancients, comes to be what is written here, only with the scholastics. The enigmatic character of the ancients is made intelligible through this bridge, but the bridge is itself enigmatical. Nobody, now, just now, thinks in any terms but the authentic and the inauthentic. Nobody thinks that there is a singular inner law that all natures strive for, in order to share the same character, that of the just. Rousseau still breathed the air that said, though no longer univocally: the mode of differentiation is the body. Today, all bodies are in the same lot. They are essentially homogeneous. Dostoevsky already only could dream, and knew nothing of, this world. He spoke more sharply, with greater clarity, of the isolation of the soul in modernity than the others, but he made clear his time. Later, a bit later, this became simply laudable: the creativity of the individual. The authentic is then the trivial notion: realize your potential. That which is only yours. 



The idea of the romantic is a strange thing, it is the pretense that someone else, rather than oneself, is the romantic. But the romantic is the same thing as the egotistical, that is only the difference between generous and rigorous passing of judgment. The egotist is not the selfish, or the crude, he is not Donald Trump. The egotist is the creative, the selfish, the one who is truly altruistic. Altruistic because what the genius, through selfish devotion to himself, brings forth, is the greatest bequest. The notion of the authentic, in the trivial idea of the potential of a man, is given in its lowest form (as though by das Man).




If what is authentic is supposed to speak to the being of the being of this one, this Da-sein, it would have to treat the existential category of thinking as a ontological essence. This is only given as a cognition, since the given thought is unknown to us. When it is said that knowing is invention, in context of Nietzsche, it is at the same time said: knowing is no creativity. Knowing is the category of the existence of the life-giving, Nietzsche remains ontic. Yet, Heidegger must remain pugnacious if what that work says is to ever be said, as over and against what can’t be said: that existence is a word. Nietzsche denies that existence is a word. One could say, in line with what is given schematically above, the death of God is a word for the being of beings. But the God never did die, it remained in abeyance to the spirit of the scientific object: so that the human being exists twice: as ubermensch [i.e., the positive formulation of “God is dead”] and as reas
on as the being of beings, as technicity.  

Monday, December 19, 2016


Ignorance Regarding the Greatest Thing: As Ignorance Regarding The Logos




Aletheia is supposed to be a statement about what is found out by thinking
(Thinking: as a specific modification of the dark concept: experience.), but not any thinking, ancient Greek thinking. The supposed description: ancient, gives us something to think, but it is not in the highest sense telling. Classical might mean Plato and Aristotle, and the Athenian scene, with each place known to that scene. The Egyptians were supposedly visited by Plato who studied the Pythagorean teaching at Alexandria, at least according to one source, Cicero. Archaic might refer even to the so-called “early Greek thinkers”. Heidegger seems to think Hericlitus, by example, as a thinker. A thinker is not: antilogokos, but prior to the time when the logos raised its head at the gate of the college professors: Plato and Aristotle.  









Ἀντιλογικός, this word appears in the Theaetetus with uncertain perplexities connecting to it. How does one unmask this thought without venturing something that could lead us into a shameful foolishness? Into philosophy in the contemporary sense? If something is not quite serious, but yet still has the force to make one ask about it, one speaks of philosophy. This appears in tandem with the old sense of the philosopher as someone who falls into wells, but indeed, it has nothing to do with that. The current sense indicates that a ridiculous practice, that is something like a game, has replaced the search for what is aletheia. In fact it was the wise, the scientists, those who had knowledge not quite useful to men, for example the stargazers with their science, who were thought likely to fall into wells. When was Socrates accused of such a blunder? Aletheia was supposed to concern the question about what the human world was, to in a peculiar case, of the klein nicety, of the subtle detail, to channel the whole meaning of the human world. But the human no longer exists, it has become ridiculous, in the face of the wisdom, of science which no longer needs the description “modern” to modify it. This wisdom, is, as always, empty. It is merely the so-called fact without the beautiful, the true, and the good.  

What does ἀντιλογικός say?

Socrates

Not at all, being the man I am; but I might if I were a real reasoner (ἀντιλογικός); if such a man were present at this moment he would tell us to refrain from these terms, and would criticize my talk scathingly. But since we are poor creatures, shall I venture to say what the nature of knowing is? For it seems to me that would be of some advantage.

Theaetetus

Venture it then, by Zeus. You shall have full pardon for not refraining from those terms.

Socrates

Have you heard what they say nowadays that knowing is?

Theaetetus

Perhaps; however, I don't remember just at this moment.





It is strange here that the translator gives “a real reasoner” with the sense of the ironical utterance of Socrative implied. Antilogikos is given here, in the translation, as “a real reasoner”, I repeat that. Irony means in the Platonic texts, I hide my superiority, I do it in each line, in each paragraph, in each logos, in the whole of the dialogue. What is logos? In the ordinary language it meant speach, but in Plato it already was a technical term. It meant also, commonly, a speach or something memorized. Socrates has a passion for every logos, and must hear every word. Even if it means going beyond the walls of Athens, which is something that, properly speaking, happened only once. But, as many as three times by another count. It’s strange that in the dialogues of the highest import, the Laws, the Republic, and in that fantastic discourse of the Phaedrus with its absolutly odd reference to the Platon tree, the dialogue takes place literally in the shade of Plato. But why is all this trivia introduced in connection to the subject of aletheia? The teaching of Plato does not concern alethiea directly, because the supposed subject of Heidegger is the feature of the Geschick of Being, as the thinking of Greek Da-sein. So that it was the, to use the Kantian phrase, condition for the possibility of philosophy at Athens. 




The condition for the possibility of science is ratio, the essence of the object, as it stands aside from the subject, is ratio. Ratio does not mean that in all experience, pushing aside what is accidental, there must be space and time, but rather, there must be causa as reason qua reason. Reason qua reason is like the phrase: truth as correctness. Thus the sciences debate within their peculiar penetralium whether mathematics are just mathamatics, or the reason as the stuff itself. This corresponds to the thesis of Leibnitz, nothing is without reason, carefully bathed in light, and as carefully placed in the shadow, by Heidegger in his book on Reason. 







Alethia is thought by Greek Da-sein without the notion of the Geschick of Being. Whatever notion says here must be thought by someone with the sense of thinking, and then the importance of the way of thinking everything that seems to carelessly permeate the air, like condensation, in a storm that would merely revive withered leaves, in order to emphasise the sun when it comes out of the cloud cover and the squall, must instead realise that the antilogikos has already been in play. It is the play of Being, as much as the House of Being, if one may move in that word while asking about it?









The continuation of the discussion, above, seems to ascend to something that removes the sight of the human being from the primary scene of the “knowing” (which was the subject of the antilogikos):







Socrates
They say it is having knowledge.
Theaetetus
True.
Socrates
Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge.
Theaetetus
Why, how will you claim that the one differs from the other?
Socrates
Perhaps it doesn't; but first hear how it seems to me to differ, and then help me to test my view.
Theaetetus
I will if I can.
Socrates
Well, then, having does not seem to me the same as possessing. For instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it, we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it.
Theaetetus
And rightly.




The ἀντιλογικός is not, one supposes, someone who doesn't speak: an animal without speach. Without ratio. Ratio say logos in Latin. But does logos say “I mark the relation”, in the way one sets down the relation between the radius and the circumference of a circle? There is a kind of sleepy logos, to use the word of Heraclitus, that those ones sleep away there lives, that they sleep while awake, but how are we supposed to think it? In one sense the sleepy logos, the pusillanimous (the logos of the small souled) logos, the lazy logos, and the citizens speech are the same. The citizen’s speech is the speech of the one who does not discriminate between genus and species (Socrates in the Phaedrus mentions this characteristic, of the one’s who love the logos). The citizen has a logos that is knowing, because it has not asked whether or not it knows. The citizens are the ones who killed Socrates because his irony became known. Because the megalegoria, the big logos, the unbearable big mouth which as Xenophon tells us was Socrates' reputation from his Trial, where he, Socrates, goes beyond any talking big ever known, saying, you, each one, know something, you labourers who make shoes, know all about shoes, and you diecasts know how to listen to testimony, but surely what I know, that I know that I don’t know the highest things, makes me the greatest knower of them all. Thus the death of Socrates, in the logos, is inescapable and not a suicide, due to the unconstrained boasting of Socrates and the envy of the Athenians.  




If logos can mean so many things, why not also the poetic, so-called, logos of Heidegger. This is a sense unknown to the Greeks. With Heidegger it means the same thing as truth as correctness, because this is the same as the saying: it is because it is. In this sense even the essence of causality, as what must connect one moment to another is not named. And the same as we said above about the mathamatical reification dispute. But what poetry says for the Greek Da-sein is the knowledge, the pseudo-knowledge, about the human world proper. Which one only has to go to philosophy proper to see was false and: pseudos. Philosophy, when it treats aletheia naively, finds it wants to know what the world is with the human beings. But without the Greek Da-sein, it seems to say: what one believes the world to be about. The believes becomes the ideal, and finally about the year 1915, degenerates into the value. The value is simply what remains on the other side of the correctness of the reification of the mathematical models as the arbiter of the being of beings, as what is essential and not accidental to science.   



Naturally we must contend with the provocative character of the projection of the Da-sein of the Greeks, as ancient Greeks. Its status, as what it is: as how it is to be thought, is the decisive question of Historial thought. We ask: is there past as Historial past? And this means, if we speak of past in the ordinary sense, e.g., what happened last week, how much money was in the bank last week?, we don’t make a Historial utterance. But what if we ask: what was the antebellum period like? And we mean, the historiographic period leading up (teleologically) to the American Civil War, how is it that the notional world is thought? As sheer academic fancy? However we think such matters we do not think the matter of Historail thought, because that already assumes a knowledge of what it actually means to have a sense of aletheia as the klein detail of the world of some Da-sein. In the posts that follow we must attempt to move in the region of these questions, which imply the abandonment of the possession of the current Da-sein.

Thursday, December 15, 2016








A Short Note on Being as the Unconditioned


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In what follows we must say something about Being as the unconditioned, in order to let the signal word Aletheia, come into better sight in the continuation of the methodos. 



Whoever still has the short-sighted eyes of a human being can not think this matter. The human being is always supposed to be one of the representations. Even in Daniel Dennett, the representation, Kantianism, is still the leading idea about the human being. So that is not a philosopher’s argument, but it is the view that is contrasted with naive realism on behalf of the sciences own intelligence. Whenever the theme of consciousness, or the notion of naive realism in, for example Searle, begin to think in the terms of two other views on the human being, they come to think in the same way because they are dealing with a view which holds the intelligibility of things to be unquestionable. The intuition, anschauung, which is contrasted with the discursive: the immediate, and not what is reflected, already tells them everything. But the question about the History of being, as what is flowing in thought, as the destiny of Being, always already starts with Kant. Yet, both these views start with Kant? Kant as the one who speaks of representations, and Kant as the one who speaks of the synthetic a priori. When the synthetic a priori is thought as transforming it is thought as the appropriation of  thought past, by thought, as the Geschick of Being. 



When we take the simple thought of what is learned, for instance that someone thinks in their long life they have learned to see things better, they have learned, not as learning, but as a place to see that the ground is changing, we begin to think in terms of Being. When the learning is learning of the synthetic a priori, not a wall, between the phenotype and the principle of the type, but in the same way Aristotle understood the form as the matter as two concepts (not realities), of the same, we begin to think Historialy. When we see, the actual intuitions of daily life, as changing, and can hold them over against what has been intuited in the past, we see the conditions which in time are most often regarded as learning, as wisdom. But if they are regarded, not as all men do, as a deepening of their being, but as the movement of the being of beings, as the movement of what is essential in all being of beings, we begin to sent the Historial as the ground of Being as the unconditioned.   



Example in the Hegelian stage of Historical thinking: A lover is first intuited, one sees the person, and thinks them, as a person in the state of a ordinary person, then in the state of the lover, then in the state of the one who is no longer the lover. This sight of the being, in the immediacy, transforms the being. If the subjective parts of the transformation are put aside, and the elemental parts are brought to the for, we see the change in being. As the essence of the matter, as the kind of thing that is there, is lifted and destroyed in the change of the basic look of the kind of thing.  



Tensions, pushing the human being out of shape, search for reality. When the looks, as the world, can be drawn away from the place of the change, the human is the thing that is part of all the things, but the thinking has to be what is both in the change and what is changed. This is the sense that the irreducibility of the immediate intelligibility of activities, and of situations, appears to Dilthey. Dilthey saw first that this, and not the human being, is the existence. 



As we continue to ask about our leading statement, in the way it now suggests itself: History imitates Aletheia. History is already related to philosophy, as the history of Being.   


Thursday, December 1, 2016



The Methodos continues the path: On the Ambition of Aletheia 

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To question, quaestiō, can mean a quest. This word is very like problema. Question suggests to us the modern dealing with everything: to question and answer. But the quest is already something that reminds us of a path, of a going forth. The problem, when it is “something that keeps us up at night”, something we “wrestle with” as Rabbi Abraham Heschel said it, is not a “question and answer” proposition. Now, in what follows, we are visiting, we visit this aletheia, ἀλήθεια, and that is supposed to mean the withdrawal of being. When beings show themselves, this is supposed to mean that Being has withdrawn. 



The certitude: pistis, perception, is ‘trust or reliance’. Ordinarily we put the greatest trust on what our senses perceive, on what we see, and perhaps also touch. This names daily life, Heidegger says that we must stay there at pains of becoming arid dreamers. We know however that our senses are not reliable, and that the common sense notion of causality is dubious. Erwin Schrödinger makes the peculiar remark, peculiar if we think of the thought experiment for which he is famous, that quantum physics is more intelligible than a “square circle”, but less than a “winged lion”. If something breaks the laws of thought, and is contradictory, it is thereby said to be less intelligible than the fundamental science of human beings. Whereas, that science is said to be less intelligible than something that does not exist, a fantastical beast.  



This makes almost no sense at all. Because if we can trust neither our vision nor our reason, where are we meant to check the potency of the fundamental science? There is no realm of reliance, no one even knows what the “paradigm case” of motion would be. Motion is not even a natural fact, a reliable subject of vision and sense. Yet, according to Schrödinger, what is worse is to break the laws of thought, the primitive rule about contradiction. In a vague sense we can understand, at least in thought, “square circle”, for the longest time serious attempts were made to find a formula for the relation between a circle and a square in terms of area. For squaring the circle. One can make something of such sayings as “Christian philosophy”, which is supposed to be an oxymoron, a contradiction, according to the view of Heidegger. How does it happen that we even establish what is contradictory? It’s obvious that in the case of “Christian philosophy” something more is needed if we are to make clear to ourselves that this actually is a contradiction. 



In the case of “square circle” we must make a pre-philisophic determination. In order to establish the scientific status of the contradiction. We must establish the premise that allows us to say objectively that there is a contradiction in this case. If someone under a Socratic questioning took the position that there was no contradiction, one would speak of an ad hominem argument. In the ordinary sense this phrase means almost the same as that someone argues rather than reasons. I.e., that they insult the man rather than argue with him, or, sometimes it is said, rather than argue with the statements as they would stand independent of the man. This is not what ad hominem means in philosophy. It means that a man vouches for a premise. And that in the Socratic manner we show him he does not actually hold the belief he claims to hold. Yet, belief is something over and above the sphere of reliance where scientific or philosophic facts are founded. However they must be founded by someone, and this activity is called pre-scientific, or pre-philisophic. Aletheia refers us to our formula: Play imitates the serious. In this case, Aletheia itself is the “play”, and the arrangement or order of things happens in the philosophy or science that sets up the facts, as scientific premises.



The basic claim of Dilthey was that this realm is underivable on the basis of anything else. It comes out of the blue, as though dropped. Husserl then discovered that it changes. Its transformation he claimed was the sight of knowledge as such. Heidegger said, the peculiar equipoise of aletheia and the saying of it in the scientific premise conceal Being. Aletheia is a name for philosophy in its primordial awakening, which is to say before it became a known practice. In this sense it is quaestiō and problema: it becomes Socrates' definition of the human being, as the being that investigates. He says, the being that does not investigate is no human being. This sense is lost in the sentimental translation of Jowett who passes off the definition as a kind of self reflection, about a being who is concerned with dear life. Definition in our own time is something arbitrary, but for the Greeks it was something that was only possible because something there to be discovered was found out so that reason had an actual existence just as vision does. 



We must pay attention to what has come to thought in history, when we return to aletheia. It is not unimportant to consider the momentous churning of History as we continue. Most of our reflections concern that matter, which may be thought as ourselves. And so the difficulty of sensing what is closest.