Tuesday, November 8, 2016


Some comments aimed at prosaic perplexions pertaining to the End of human Philosophy.

lwblog-zaha1-21










Supposing in their peregrinations, humans, when they wished to peregrinate the world, instead stumbled into a sunken world. Someone wanted to explain a car crash which resulted in the driver responsible for the accident handing over their car to the driver who was not responsible, but injured.  The reason the car was handed over was because the man wished to get his hands on the author of his misery, in something like the attitude of the captain of that ship in the book by Melville that claimed to lay bare more than nature. For the reason of vengeance, or retribution for an injustice. But when the jurists came out they thought that another principle would better serve as lesson for future cases, and said he rendered that car to the guiltless man as payment, in order to pay what was there, but to limit himself only to that. In like manner the jurists of the 19th century criticised the rationalizing tendency of the law saying it only rationalizes, i.e., makes ideological justifications for its doings as mere wallpapering over something more primitive and selfish. 







Again: In Virginia Colony there was a tripartite division of powers, long preceding the principles of Montesquieu which informed Hamilton and the other Framers. This was done because of the misuses and trespases of the executive, the Govonor and his men, but the principle handed over by Montesquieu was a protection against the misuses of the “rabble of the city” as Jefferson put it, such people who would “...debate for the senate, ... execute for the magistrate, and ... decide for the judges.” With the idea that the thunderous transfigurations of the volente general might overturn the state and its sound foundation if not checked by slow movement in the big animal of the gears of the machine of State.



Again: A Harvard Law Professor sees that men do not believe in the principles of their work, the notion that law is a kind of hard social science that discovers principles in its practise of reasoned development through cases. Then he explains the rise of “Theory” on the basis of the withering practice of precedents as a scientific or rational guidance. But the philosophers say, because reason wanes, because metaphysics ends, all belief, product of reason, becomes an embarrassment. Belief is confirmed opinion, which is confirmed through reasoning. For opinion to become opinion it must be noticed by deliberative thought, as opinion, and then it is either chosen or brought into question. If it is chosen it is confirmed and becomes belief. Not belief in this or that practice, but belief in reason itself is weak. And the belief issues from reason. When asked, how is it this professor still believes on belief, simply this, most are naive and have not thought through this matter. Here Nietzsche speaks of that star, that blooms gigantic in our sky, but already, in reality is full of the disillusionment and anxiety of its own death, for it has long since died, and only its appearance still reaches us here in our rustic isolation.  Reason appears as reason, but is no longer that wraith of the clouds, as the light showing diaphanously. As what could really guide men on the earth. 



One notices among what remains of living beliefs found among human beings, the belief in the causality as the “It works!”, or “success” view of the causal sciences, from which the current outlier faiths, such as the Brights movement and Atheism of the cheaper irrational, i.e. political, sort springs. These movements all announce themselves openly as not caring for truth. If their religion is true, if it is false, it makes no difference to them at all. What matters, as with the above mentioned Harvard professor, is only that a belief around the “It works” can be secured. It falls under the formula: “It works!, imitates magic.” Where magic alludes to the ethnos. Because without the measure of truth, of what always is, there is only what is kept in the world by the ethnos. Which ethnos, the English, where English means the global prosaic thought which does not want anything but a formula, such as “It works”, a formula which applies to everything that in anyway is. Only a reason, a talking about something, can make the particular taken from the stock of “everything that in any way is” into something worth the attention of the being that has successfully found it.  But the reason is already given in the causal concept, of the objectified object, which is the essence of the English thought.  The “It works” means everything, because everything has a cause. Not a priori, but according to nature, as the ground of that ethnos. 



What remains of ratio? It becomes only the matter of the object. As something which is not a matter of the discretion of a human being. But at first one thought the rationality, the reasons, were tending to reach one right answer even in the cases given above. Because the reason given by the parties involved should be more true than the one’s given afterwards, by the latecomers, who only tried to explain things without knowing. But were they really correct about what they thought? Strauss says there came a day “When the judge had to judge the judge, and the judge turned out not to be a wise judge.” When one can offer another, more powerful reason, so called determination by the causal structure. But then one must ask too about that. The first reason is not better than the rationalizations because it was the actual reason. For instance in the case where the tripartite division was actually because of the corruption of the executive in a colony of the Americas. Because at bottom that reason too was but something someone said or thought. The causal structure is then the replacement for the round of giving reasons or raising foolish flags and manifestos over the thing, that is not yet the object as objectified by the possession of the cause. 



The causal concept is the limit state of reason giving. No object is without a cause. So, when we speak of the prosaic, or the English thought, we think of that which lives within reasons as reasons, as philosophers. But their philosophy imitates their form of play, reason as natural cause. The form of “play” is a form of thinking. It is not like a choice between walking along a stone path, or through some bamboo grass, of the kind one might simply decide at this or that moment. It is not something handed over to the individual in their peculiarity like a self or an inner life. For the English thought, the saying reads: “Giving reasons imitates causal forces.” But only for the English thought. The English thought, the global thought, is what is most blind to the “only nothing”, which is according to Dugin, outside of the ethnos. In this case, one must say, if the English thought describes the ethnos, it is nothing as the irrational. The “only nothing” becomes a negation of a specific causal concept; the English thought of objectified objects. 




---

Other comments:

The threat of the methodos is that it lead us to this and that experimentum, and loose its guiding power. An experimentum is a going forth where one just looks around to see if anything worth one’s time shows up. But in a methodos, one is already guided by something like a path, and if one wants to let what the path has bring what is its own forward, and draw one to that, one can not follow just everything that is here or there of interest. The path describes something essential, and what is interesting, now, or for a while, is not what is essential. In the next post we will try to gather ourselves up more decisively on the subject of magic, but now we have various loose ends that still threaten to disturb the way in sight. 



For instance, why was it said that the question what is science is “without parallel”? This and not the question about being? It is because the oppositions of the age draw the thinker forward, but they have always the sense of bringing the ego, the subject, and not the thought to the fore front. Because in the ego, the remembrance of the self as a human being in the midst of the prosaic, which is already there as what each one is about, where the oppositions have a political force, but in the sight of thought this “without parallel” means technicity, as rationality, is the subject of aletheia, it  is what is unconcealed as the unconcealment of being, as what makes thought aware of being by following its movement. Because thought opens up when philosophy goes blind in the pure rationality of objective memory of the things as what is mastering and rendering to cognition something that is not only a resource, but also itself. Because the shimmering forth of the objective object leads into the being of the essence of the human being as ratio, as rationality, as cause. For the moment there is no time to go into that or to clarify what remains only a report. And perhaps it is not the main thing with this methodos, where what leads us is the proposition: “Seriousness imitates play.”  



We ask about cause, because we are asking about magic. For the ethnos, cause is not the main thing, as it is for the English thought. What one sees at first is more decisive and telling than any reflective knowledge of causes. By trying to think cause, rather than magic, by thinking cause in the place of magic as the thing the ethnos must conserve, in its genetic or cyclical being we touch on the deeper problem of the manner in which things look and come forward in speaking, in the “house of being”. It would be irresponsible to write a treatise on the subject, because only some very few people are actually competent to move in the region of magic. We let Eliade in as an authority supposing he had some competence in that region, some sense about that as a master writer has the sense of language, or as the physicist Steven Weinberg has a sense of the problem of gravity. As with Iki, we speak as the outsiders, only as it were, using the concept of magic to include and keep what we arrive at, and what we bring forth, through our reliance on others and along the way in what we come across in what follows here. 



Thought, we should remember, is neither suggestion, as of an argument, nor is it objectivity which shows things by standing them and measuring them against other things. It is a looking on, that even within the kind of formal exercise we make of the concept of magic under the universal proclamation “Seriousness imitates play” could still find something worthy of seeing as the sight where facts first are being made. As a seeking of the manifestation of facts as what gives to the ethnos its world.  



We remember that magic is a prop, as a formalism and a concept, but at the same time a real subject matter as studied by the ones with competence in those regions. What it suggests is that the regions of self interpretation of a being might be pushed back into something less visible, to whoever moves always in suggestion and formula, but does not look at what is there through basic thinking. We ask: What is the rational, when it is not taken naively according to its own self-reserved belief?    






No comments:

Post a Comment