Comments (along the way) on the ground on which Lopsidedness or a Balanced View occurs
Descartes and Leibniz, mathematicians of the first rank, were not scientists in the sense of Newton. Mathematics should be determined and distinguished form rationality in the region of this methodos. Mathematics is a creative, human, all-too human, activity and thus it reminds us of philosophy, and not of thinking. A human pursuit and so it is never strictly rational. The rational is posited as inaccessible to the human, because it is defined within the limit of the same dimension. It is measured out of the whole of things. And there is not enough room for both. Mathematics is the man yawning and pushing his arms out, describing shapes at the limit of his emotional grasp, out of pure law stating which ostensibly starts from the flat ground and not from the midst of a common sense. Philosophy was reason as giving reasons, but it was not the rational as the good. Mathematics, generally speaking, seeks not only to explain the universe, but it seeks beauty and pleasure in the achievement of the work. Thus it does not take the object as its measure, but casts its eyes over things according to its own fancy. As with the fascination of the subject of Symmetry. Science proper, as a physics which takes the object as its master, would have to tend to make either a rational statement, with the limitation on what it is able to measure, and so rationally represent, devoid of reason, only as duplicate or external memory towards a future cognition, or it would tend asymptotically in its methods to an elaboration of approximation towards a rational Law of Nature.
The bitter struggle over pervasive dogmas of thought in the sciences, the issue of disputing parties and advanced regions of the theory, only prolongs the question of the pure rationality. But in practice the sciences do, taking the other side, offer a view of the human and the rational. These two are not the subject of the thinking we call here the German thought. But the German thought, which was visited by inexorable enemies disappeared with the rise of politics starting in the 19th century. Externally evidence of this is the interest in Plato’s dealings in Syracuse, which were never of any moment prior to this age, here one should keep in mind the words of Hannah Arendt about philosophy and politics which we have mentioned already. “Sometimes I wonder which is more difficult: To instill an awareness of politics in the Germans or to convey to Americans even the slightest inkling of what philosophy is all about.” One thinks also of the school of Langdell at Harvard, where reasoning was taught as independent, thus running coeval with the announcement of the technocratic relativism. And the finish of thought in the vitiation of the knowledge of thinkers as the death of a teaching. But here we mention by the way a few pieces of atoms in a thunderstorm. There is no way to see the Fate in the way it is supposed to stand there as the subjectivity of the subject in its transfigurations and excrescences in a way as to let the rubric simply say, by bringing to language, the question about being rather than beings.
In order to follow the methodos, which suggests using the leading sentence about the seriousness, the imitation, and the play as a formal universal, and comparing in simple juxtaposition magic and rationality and aletheia, we risk becoming entirely thoughtless and only representative of the fixed stock of a logical system of language. It is necessary to see how a ground that is not a matter of one of two sides of an issue is thought at all, in order to think this matter of magic and ratio, without wholly giving ourselves over to the thought of comparandum as juxtaposition of two things alongside themselves. Things, like ideas, appear in the same guise, as measured by others of their like. So that the commonplace notion that one can always reach for another view, and strive for balance, limits all genuine thinking. And reminds us of the English thought where the ability to distinguish breadth of thought from a wealth of “sides” is lacking. The breadth thinks through everything, from the beginning of thought, and knows its way from start to end, and so does not easily become impressed by parochial claims about what is overcome in this or that matter of opposing viewpoints. But rather it knows that it is not unimportant to think what is not yet brought to view and so has its own independence from standing controversy.
This is true, for instance, of Kant's notion of critique. It does not take up one or the other side of the debate about what knowledge is better suited to man, the rational or the visible, but it thinks the question about what the being that judges this issue is. The so-called subjectivity of the subject comes into view. The question of lopsidedness and overcoming is not what is at issue here, but of letting the question bestow what is most its own on the thinking. The thinking then has to look and not represent. In looking it can take leaps in tonality that representation can not convey to the non thinker. Thus, for example, in the course of our previous sojourning “imitation” if at first representative of just some notion, was heard in the tonality of the weakness that lacks the power of the play or originality. In the sentence “Seriousness imitates play.” so that the tonality is not at one or the other side of a superficial debate about what the word manifests, but becomes thought as something worthy as a pole with no drag to one side or another. A leap in thought means that a new key comes before thought, almost involuntarily, or actually involuntarily, so that the belief in the new tonality is not only a polemical issue in a concrete debate about a position, but rather it is a meaning that is not to be outstripped by comparison and contrast but which like flower arrangement is a definite something, which might be compared to the art of writing textbooks on what belongs to a specific profession, there would never be a question of a essential comparison which threatened to declare one side or the other a contradiction. The contradiction itself, in things that seem to be essentially at war, is a feature of a logic that grasps its concerned measure of language under specific rigours. In thinking the measure is not any formal law, raised over the thought of what the words in some assertion say, but it remains with the thinker. Thus the added responsibility of the one who would be called a hidden sorcerer or mystic votive in the invisible which lies beyond suggestive logics of argumentation. Logics which suggest meaning under a formal compendium of mechanisms some group of humans has become possessed of here or there as they continue to be busied knowing things amidst the objectivity of a Nature.
Science is not a perfect expression of the logical thought, where the sentence taken as a universal reads: Seriousness imitates science. We don’t say something as strong as Seriousness imitates ratio (or rationality). Because in its methods science does not only represent facts, is not truly rational and silent about what it means, but is always asserting a meaning to what it repeats out of the fixed system of its object: Nature. One speaks, meaningfully, of Natural Law for instance. Yet, in looking at a subset, of the ground of science, and not of rational cognition as such, we can see something of the width of what magic would also have to say. If it is to be thought as a matter of the mode of the subjectivity of the subject, to think of Kant’s third way, besides from the rational and the skeptical--the critical. But in thinking this way we already know of what followed, which changed the thinking, of Husserl who was like someone who threw the cargo out of the ship, and took up the anchor, but yet wanted to watch the deep swell of the waves of the “subjectivity of the subject” which he called “pure subject”, after the thinking of its movement, of the Geschick of Being, primarily rolled into the place of the philosophy of the setting ball of the sun, of the West.
It is through the metaphor, only there, that the sciences express what is unthought, the sense of bottomless malaise about what the sciences actually are. No scientist understands this question, but the presence of the metaphors shows it, and brings it into view. For the scientist, there is only the direction towards what the science seeks, but for the metaphor, for the language that brings his work into being, there is the question that has no parallel about what the sciences actually are.