Monday, November 28, 2016

A Short Logos about the Essence of Thought 
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“Materialism is not itself a material.” 

“Dissolution of everything solid into a fluid, flexible, malleable state, into swimming and floundering; the unmeasured, without laws or boarders, clarity or definiteness; the boundless night of sheer submergence.”

All mediocre beings have been condemned not to know they are mediocre, but the great are only on the border of the magic and truculent region. The magic is the relentlessness of the forest, the cold wind and the strange tingle of being. The truculent is the sheet lightning, the shooting star that can’t be stopped; what happens on its own as in the Element. The mediocre know what is mediocre and they embrace it with an intrinsic enthusiasm, and seek more of it. They take their pride in it and confer the advantages of the society of the mediocre on their own. Outside the genius of the human citadel, where the unusual spirits finally come to rest after they have in some way become the measure of that spirit, and to some degree formed it and cast its shape, everything has a spirit which runs outside the basic direction of collective comprehension. The struggle for the genius of the citadel is not understood by those cheap rebels who seek to evade it without coming into a serious appreciation of its singular merits. The wild magic regions of the storm have seldom been purposively, independently chosen? What manner of being would step into that utter exile from collectivity freely? Only by reflecting do we come to doubt the sense of freedom of action that itself grows into one prior to specific talk of it in classrooms. Yet only in the specific discussion of the matter does it come to seem what had come prior to the specific determination in the education. The classroom can be in the discussion one has with one’s self, and not in some institution. The genesis of being is irreducible and insoluble like life. Life names nothing else but that that is missing in things grasped by the comprehension of the living. The dissolve of the genius of the citadel is only the talk of the members about the non-members. Only the insiders know about the outsiders, but the outsiders don’t enter into the life of the insiders because they have absolutely other symbols and not only other interpretations. Or, better, they haven't heard anything about the symbols or the sense of them. They have been touched by another hand.  

Tuesday, November 22, 2016

Some comments in preparation for the movement to the problema of Aletheia 

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Problema will be added to our stock of guiding patterns, ideas, or concepts, alongside the experimentum and the methodos. Problema means a subject matter, taken up or admitted skillfully, by someone competent to do so, and it does not name a difficulty as such. Problema: What is thrown before without leaving us apart from it. Problema is a thing cast as though it were a surprise run backwards. The thing that suddenly dawns on one in the surprise was already there, but then it flowed into the one who was overtaken by it in their thought and feeling. But with the artistic problema, the thought and feeling is almost the reverse of unaware, if anything it is too aware of what it is facing. It is the domain of its work as what is issuing form itself as the Element. But the Element is not noticed in ordinary cases. In an extraordinary case, van Gogh, there may be a entrance into the Element. The Element is a particular form of truth. Thus it is right to consider it when we prepare to approach the boundary of the Greek notion of Aletheia. Heidegger disavowed the “truth” of this Aletheia, because it is “misleading” to consider the central phenomenon of philosophy as a part of it, alongside the positivist notion of truth as correct memory of what stands there where no assumption is put forward in connection to the thing remembered. An hypothesis, as in Newton’s famous statement, I shape no hypothesis, is a kind of assumption as a clear and distinct saying something about what is to be demonstrated. 

It’s not that these two claims about truth differ, but rather, aletheia is not a claim about what always is as a law of nature. It is not rightly considered that way, because the theory of the idea in Plato plays that role. The idea is the pattern of a being thought as a feature of being, and not as a mental construct or human concept. The fact that, N.B., being is such that this kind of being can be is meant. Whereas aletheia does not really, when one plunges into it and sees what Heidegger finally did see, some kind of claim about something else. Which is to say what is closest by is the most difficult to think. It becomes senseless to speak of aletheia as truth, as though the true were some kind of help to human beings, and therefore something to seek. Plato did not "seek" truth, if seek implies a forethought path (as "cause" is forethought in the sciences even when it disappears into mathematical "function"), that is true, but he sought to, as it were, admire truth. Aletheia can not even be thought as essential. But one should traverse the methodos and bring the subject matter forward as something that can be inspected if one is to attempt to leap into it through the approach.   

The essence of the human being, could as readily be defined through the ability to determine the present cast of mind through considerations about the remote future. Every human being must consider the future now, and let it seep into their cast of continence, but as Gramsci said, all human beings are intellectual, but those who exercise this capacity more become the representatives of the others. They carry back what they learn and include it as an offering amongst what is given, es gibt, what is there. Amongst the things there, is the remote future. The study of this future sets inquiry into the realm where what is now, just now, determinative, and speaks the demand of the hour, can no longer be self absorbed and perfect. If rationality, the ability to discover the true system of government, as the realm in which human beings would truly live, as the laws that arange life, can discover only how to build a nest for this bird, just now, and not for the true bird, the true human being, this that is now is cast into falsity. The fact that such considerations, "bounded" as they are, touch only very few, and the rest are satisfied with some cheap answer, could always win out. Human beings may not be able to keep to the high level of what has been discovered by the few when they looked soberly on the remote. 

Health is the simplest model for the system where all the moving parts are put right, are rational. But if the being that is healthy is only this passing being, that will enjoy some other health, later on, this health is cast into dubitative distinction. In fact health is only the prerequisite for the problema of the human being. Problema means subject matter, as Monet took for a subject grainstacks in the light, grainstacks under different light at different times. It happened that his students, once they saw his technique, brought through awesome effort out of the abyss of things that have no being, proffered into the es gibt, given, that they too could bestow eyes upon the work that let it show what was most its own. And then they made the same problema their own, and their work was in many cases, the same as their master’s work. In such cases it is not the hardest thing, at least for someone with serious skill, to do what the extraordinary master has done, provided it is already brought out of the abyss. In the sciences the exact same thing is the case. The division between the sciences and everything else is illusory. 

Here we deal not with time in the sense that singularly captivated Nietzsche, Nietzsche is the name of the philosophy of Time par excellence. Husserl, and Heidegger, like their forerunner Dilthey, turned their back on this region. That is the way to understand German thought. It has withdrawn in the face of the “long run” as Strauss said it. This runs parallel, in its way, to the Athenian, the Classical Greek, refusal of the psychoanalytic dimension. To a psychology of hidden motivations, as in Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, the anti-Plato in this respect. In regard to Time, perhaps Nietzsche is even more of an anti-Plato. Nietzsche is frightening to the thinker. One should not wholly forget that when one considers the argument between Nietzsche and Heidegger.  

Heidegger finds what he calls time in being, being as time. But this time is the time of aletheia. What we will admit is the formula: seriousness imitates aletheia. What follows from that is that the seriousness in question is philosophy, the Early Greek Philosophy first of all. What was unknown to the Greeks, the future as radical future, nonetheless corresponds (it can be compared as something of similar importance) to the monumental thinking of space, as nous, when the thought of the whole, of all things, fills the Greek life or soul. What remains of that today is the concept of nature, not in the sense of Groys who says when nature must be defended it no longer exists, but in the sense of the sciences. Where there is talk of studying what is in the manner of natural research. This schism was not known to the Greeks, but their understanding of the whole was more profound and reflective than our own, though, or because, what they thought of as the whole was only the cave of the earth, of the disk and the vault of heaven as lighted by nous. The true sun, which showed men the true earth, under true stars as Kant, so much later, still would reach for. What is decisive according to the trajectory of the methodos, in this phase, is guidance towards, and concerning aletheia. We do not say the concept of aletheia. That should be clear, a concept is a human consideration. A pattern that could be useful. An ideal type or some other such device for political purposes.   

Friday, November 18, 2016

Some peculiar concerns about Ultimacy as over and against various ways and relations.

The prosaic thought is always thinking about some “advance”, some serious advance. Some evidence that its playspace is the world ground. Is the base from which everything can safely rise. Every advance is tacitly, often unconsciously, taken on as evidence of the world ground, the constant renascent assurance of a solid world ground. The attempt not to let the belief in the world ground “go away”. One must keep seeing it. In a tree, with its innumerable twisted branches at the ends, nude of leaves, stands there as a eerie part of nature. There is some of that nature. The advance is always world ground, the playspace, as a something, as some thing there. Like the winter tree. Whereas the Spielraum, but this means in the case of the prosaic thought nothing else but nature, is never quite there. Like nature, it is always hazily there, one seems to see it, but where is it? 

When one follows this Nature, what on earth is it?, back to its genetic domain one begins to think of reason. But nature is not a schema, laid out like a mathematical model. As a math that secures all scientific thinking, prior even to physics. And promising to open some Social Physics, as the securing of well being for the political being, through its objective structures. But even this math is "understood", so to say, is a thing lying there for our understanding. For natural reason. Nature is not the name of a representation apart from its object. Nature is the whole out of which one finds the detail. Even mathematics is such a detail. Every detail, as data, or information, is the answer as evidence to some kind of seeking, the natural kind. In what follows we will ask what the symbol world, of magic, has to do with nature, of the world ground of technicity. The ground of the "universal gravity", where objects disconnected in space, the result of Newton's thinking, stand in one law, as the "ghost" of nature, is still in nature. Because reason, the human essence, can not be explained. Notions of modern physics don't dispense with this appearance of the whole in the thing at hand at all.

Here, in a way, we only relate one thing to another. Magic as symbol to modern science and its ground in nature as such, as though to get a new vantage. But on the other hand these are supposed to be stages like youth and age. They are supposed to connect up one being. That of history, in its assimilation of its fate. One can not here sensibly object that history is not telogical--it is not like that! Because then we would make the mistake of not noticing that any serious objection to teleology happens already with us, and must not think youth, maturity and age. The way that History has its leaps, that is unfolding in thought, as of essences, as though youth was suddenly age, and that this is not a matter just of years but of a real change. Whatever echo or rhythm reaches us, in our reflections, it is what we have in this thinking, and can not be that thinking. Such is a presupposition of the historial thinking. Only someone who became competent in this manner of regarding the basic changes in thought would be able to say anything serious about that.

In an earlier post we noticed, almost in passing, along the methodos, that phronesis has a strange connection to technicity. They both concern memory, but in inverted relation. In phronesis, which is good sense, as for instance as exemplified in Plato’ presentation of Socrates, the phronimos par excellence, what counts is remembering the path that was followed. Not that the path itself was a memory, but that the one, who in the dialogic negotiation achieved some discovery, must not let it slip away. They must remember. They themselves must remember. But in techne the memory is outside, it is an external memory. Theche has no moral content, unlike phronesis, it does not prescribe. Yet, here one is not so sure what is happening. Doesn't someone have to know how to perform whatever instructions are remembered by the memory of techne? A book that is not understood manifests no knowledge, to be sure. Somehow the being that remembers moves, circulates, around this memory. First they are inside, then outside.

How does it stand with the magic world, which we interpret as the symbol world? The symbol is not inside. Though it remembers what the human being is, when one sees it. Someone enmeshed in a controversy about a normative, wracking the brain or torn by it, is constantly inside themselves. But the symbol world is not something that proffers something to someone in order that they might fabricate whatever they like out of it. It befalls them, and fascinates them. The memory here is in the perception of the things as the door into what life must be, what it must be about, what it proffers. The symbol world of magic reminds one of the Element. It is not oriented by the directions: inside, outside. Nor by the question: Is it to be changed, or is it necessary?

The serious activity in the symbol world is maintaining the possibility of its continuance. Of a keeping of the world in manifestation of being as such. Further from this, but closer to it than to ourselves, is the idea of the civilizing heroes. The first to introduce this or that which is essential. The first to live in a house, to scan the stars and read in their book, the one who rescued fire from the brute landscape. The holding staunchly in the world that befalls one, in the lighting of the symbol in what it tells the beings there for them and their lives, what is promised or what might be. This region of the magic no longer is part of the stock of doings among human beings. Yet does it remain a necessary part of what is assimilated, what is still here, as what is? This question is like the question whether the village is different in kind, essentially different, than the city, or whether the two are only different by their measure or degree. Does it disappear, and is it utterly vanished, in the assimilation of the History of being, as the history of the thinking that is kept in language?

Husserl discovered the Element because it became necessary to abandon the anthropomorphic understanding of the problem of perception. When perception was first thought it was a neutral matter, but it became the thinking of the relativity of different beings, and then of some structure, as of a brain, over and against some nature. But when it was seen that the snake that sees, and the belly of that same snake, must have one ground, the play of the movement became evident in the setting of the tone of thinking. In the History of being as the thinking of its movements. When movement, for example, says something about a thing, it might change tonality, and speak of a musical movement. In a certain respect, even such a change is a leap, but a real leap is simply much greater. As with the age of the Enlightenment, when it leaps into the Industrial thinking, and then into the computative thought. These “leaps” are largely arbitrary in their enumeration, but if they are thought they are not. But here, though the instructions of the methodos wanted us to make a comparison, that is not what we want to think most of all. What the leaps do is show us what now is, by raising a sense of the texture of any thinking. 

 From out of much vagueness something guiding can always appear, though, so far, things have become only so much less simple. Whereas daily thought is simple, and each leap is aimed at daily thought. But ultimacy as the "provenance of Being" is not this or that thinking of a destiny of a world.

Monday, November 14, 2016

Atempts to get closer to Magic

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We would like to get closer to what those beings, in that world, of the ethnos, we do not ask now if there is ever a "city" that rests on no enthnos, a world that is not rooted in an ethnos, experienced as magic, what was with them, in that time, magic? Mircea Eliade proffers us this example, in the course of his book where he gathered up selected texts according to his sense of the matters under consideration for students of religion, about the peoples who inhabited the South-East of Australia, derived from a discussion with a European, about the year 1904.  

“...go anywhere and do anything. He can be invisible; but when he makes himself visible it is in the form of an old man of the Australian race. He is evidently everlasting, for he existed from the beginning of all things, and he still lives. But in being so, he is merely in the state in which these aborigines believe everyone would be in if not prematurely killed by evil magic.”

Taken this way, the magic is a comprehensive efficaciousness. What is “evidently everlasting”, is vitiated by the “evil magic”. Obviously this magic names something very strong. One objects to the word “believe”, as prejudicial, and in order to simply avoid extenuating difficulties would say: With them, everyone is killed by evil magic. But it is clear that if we understand magic under this conception, it is only a general understanding as yet, like a definition or a general theory which brings orientation, we come into the sense of magic as something rather like causality, as the sphere in which the issue of the needs of men, in their dealings with what is already there will play out. In the search for a solution, through sorcery and the ways in which the Australian combated this magic. The thought of magic, taken like this, does not involve complex analytic activity, as with forms of divination and the logic of certain Mystical arts which attempt to see reality directly, to unveil it through knowledge as with the subject matter of the works of the scholarly studies of Gershom Shalom. Mystical vision does not involve, in itself, a science, but Kabbalah does. But we do not wish to go into these things that lead us affar. We presume without further ado the Shaman is not a Kabbalist, even if he “soars” through the spirit world, long before the drum has established its passionate rhythm, so the others may leap up like flames, and even if he in some way reminds of the mystic.

Perhaps this is insufficient and we must think magic as the implications of symbolic understanding, as understood by Eliade, Jung, and others. But first let us consider what we are doing. 

Here we do not attempt to speak about magic, or to add to the scholarly knowledge of that subject in the manner of a independent judgment. Rather we are only seeing what the methodos, with its leading sentence “Seriousness imitates play” can decisively dig up. And the materials here are part of the path that aims at leaping into something. A comment about the subject matter of a leap is in order. What is presented by examples that can be envisioned, such as a Witches' Sabbath, where the various features are described, a circle of toadstools, within a shadowy grove, out in the moist forest sward, a motley gathering of darkly hooded figures, and the nude body of a middle aged witch, with small breasts, a star filled sky spread infinitely open. Such, as we might call them, aesthetic descriptions, bringing to mind the hic et nunc or actual situation, has no noetic content. An interpretation about the Witches' Sabbath, about the why of it, would supply some noetic or essential content. The leap would never transport the thinker to the living content, the visual, or to the noetic, the natural principle, but it sets the key, or tonality in which they both sound. And the Macht, or power of the phrase is part of this minor or great key. E.g., the word Democracy has a great significance to political life today, even when it is only vague and not brought into example or explanation. The might in the tonality is like what Nietzsche called will to will, which is no will to power or political activity bent on lightening the world of human beings, rather it is what is like Rausch and Iki. It is not at the discretion of human beings, but tends to be involuntary. 

In order to suggest the tonality in which Heidegger conducted his research let us begin with an experiment. Let Gott ist Tot, read Gott ist Tod, or God is death. Then we can see the tonality of authenticity. The authentic is understood as the consideration of a man towards his death, as in the example of Tolstoy’s study of the dying Ivan Ilych. This is how Heidegger understands Christianity. As the light that answers the question about the authentic as death. God is this death consecrated and inverted into life. Here we think of the “evidently everlasting”. Is the authentic then the “evil magic”? Taken this way we can see how the order of men as such, is far from the authentic. Men do not live if the “evil magic” is constantly upon them, even if it is always stalking them. If we understand magic this way, we stay in the Life, in the visible constancy, in what Nietzsche called the Dionysian. The Dionysian ranges over both authentic and inauthentic, from one end of the world to the other.

Is magic a way of thinking what they are doing, when they use the powers of cognition to make nature nature in the ways a fixed system of nature, the field of activity as understood by the practitioners of the modern sciences, issues forth from whoever does scientific work? If so it is to be thought not in the mortal realm of the Dionysian. If we ask about technicity, what we have been calling rationality, in the era when the Catholicity, as Christendom, becomes the power of science, as the great authority which in a secondary way is flanked by politics in the form of business or economy, it might make us think of the question whether humans are in control, or the cognition of the science is moving on its own. For instance, in the work of Nick Bostrom who takes up the question long posed about the dangers of sudden annihilation by some scientific catastrophe which would stamp out all things on the earth, or even in some larger area. It is instructive here to consider that such difficulties bring us principally into political matters, about what might be changed. For instance if Bostrom were to fill some people with concern and then it was said, stop it all immediately. But that, it is not important how absurd such an example is, would not help the methodos in its way. That is not the kind of thing thinking belongs to, as the thinking that is guided by the methodos and wonders how the thought might involuntarily be brought to a new look.  

Let us consider what magic could look like as a symbol world. According to the prosaic thought, led as it is by the compulsion of modern education, into the practical attitude of absurdity, that holds (as though through a tacit necessity) that the world is caused by the activity of energy that undergoes a hundred-fold process in the optic system of the brain, and then becomes the world. Within this region of the English thought one finds the peculiar claim that we see memory, and never what is seen. So that perception is only perception for the brain, and aperception, or intellectual awareness of perception, is the selected presentation of memory. Now we are using the English thought, as we use the concept of magic, to help us along the way. If the symbol, like the poem, where the poem means that some, here and now, is taken as the occasion for showing what is wide and great in the human, and so goes into the memory, as it were, of the human as the world, each thing encountered is supposed to be an aperception only. Which is to say, the symbol is what comes forth, not the perceived individual, but the greater content. So far no suggestive shock braces us and tears us from our prosaic stupor. 

Let us review the misunderstood past in order to, prepare ourselves, in future to think into the questions. George Berkeley says “to be is to be perceived”. The English thought holds, the tragic thought that no longer cares if there is truth or meaning, and is never troubled, holds this to say that the thing is never independent of the human being, that there is no thing on its own, or in its self. The philosophers, on the contrary, prior to the end of their race (or genus, as in “the death of the race of Pompeii”, which in the Latin say genus after the pre-Darwinian notion of race, those buried by the Volcano), used to understand this in a totally different manner. What they thought was that perception was already an intuition of the essence of a thing. Thus nous, the perceiver of being or the whole, was already part of perception, rather than a feature of aperception. The debate in those years concerned whether or not essential difference were a feature of the human being or the world. The question of whether the things existed on their own was never raised, and would have been held absurd. Common sense teaches that they do, and common sense was held to be judicious by the race of philosophers. We must consider why does the English thought force the issue of memory, which is like a forced entry into the human world? A selection. Why, too, does the Symbol, which might be thought as a realm of magic, demand this feature in the things, in the direct contact with them, and not as something added on by the intellect. Why, too, did the philosophers hold that the distinction between orange and pear, sun and street lamp, was real, and a feature of the perception, so that perception was already apperception? 

Such reflections, though they bring us closer to the beginning of Dilthey’s work, that which vitaly stimulated Husserl, do not yield to the methodos the answer to the question about how magic stands. We wanted to bring magic alongside ratio, and in some way we did so. Ratio is what holds sway as the play in the English thought, with its serious activity of science. Where science becomes a synonym for reality, and looses all its original sense, being removed from any concrete tangible opposition. Thereby it enters the vagueness “that is still a fact”. But, looking into the open as in the situation where someone opens their eyes just after jumping off a building, we are also anticipating Aletheia as something more than comparandum. As the region taken for granted that could still surprise the path. In this post we have been muddled, and so we must be cautious and attempt to gather our forces anew it what follows.    

Saturday, November 12, 2016

Contributions to the raised question about Magic

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In what follows we will attempt to answer, or to take the first tentative and premonitory steps towards answering, the question: What is magic? One, who already knows something about modern thought, might ask, why we do not attempt to leap into the question, rather than merely answering it. The methodos itself, in the form of these sentences we now pass our eyes over, is asking that. Even when it does not ask that overtly. It seems necessary to make all kinds of ostensible comprimises with the desire for directness, but so far we can do no better.  

At first we ask a logical question, a question where one thing is set out beside another, and in that way determined or given a limit so that if it were to pass that limit it would become contradictory. If there is no magic in the modern thought, it means the same thing as what we say when we say, here, on this table, there is no spoon. It means something isn’t there. That is the way that nullification, as not being there, teaches us what it is. Through such cases of not being available. That is the way not being there teaches us empirically, roughly, what it says. But in the laws of thought, the Classical logic, wants to strictly forbid the calculation of the deprivation implied by knowing about the thing that is nullified. That we must know in some way what magic is if we enumerate its absence in this or that era of human life. Not all logics are the Greek logic, but all logics deal with something more than rough facts, thus with reflective activity. What we want to ask is if magic is a reflective activity, so first we need to know what that is.  

Heisenberg says: “ Immediate experience teaches that the earth is at rest and that the sun goes around it.” 

This is what we know prior to reflective activity.

“Only if we reflect upon the concepts of “motion” and “rest,” and realize that motion implies a statement about the relationship between at least two bodies, can we reverse the relationship, making the sun the still center of the planetary system, and thereby obtaining a far simpler and more unified picture of the solar system, whose explanatory power was later fully recognized by Newton.”

Here we learn of the result of a specific reflective act. Someone seeking “explanatory power” of a kind, namely Newton, crouches over this reflection due to the kind of seeking. The reflection is chosen because of a maner of seeking, and every manner of seeking implies, if it is thought through, a project. In this case mathematically modeling motion, in such a way that if the model is treated as part of the system of nature something like a Platonic, allowing that Plato is variously understood, naturalization of modern maths results. 

Hegel says:

“The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge of the immediate, of what is.“

Here we have not yet reflected, but only intuited. We have, e.g., seen. Hegel says of this kind of knowing:  

“ It merely says regarding what it knows: it is; and its truth contains solely the being of the fact it knows.”

This is the older meaning of the empirical. Plato calls this realm both reliable, and mere sight. For the Greeks, the mere sight of the night sky was the sight of the dome which literally made a cave of the flat disc earth. Modern humans see, immediately, something totally different, space. With the implication of bottomlessness. 

Hegel says: “we find in all cases the fundamental difference – viz. that in sense-experience pure being at once breaks up into the two “thises”, as we have called them, one this as I, and one as object. When we reflect on this distinction, it is seen that neither the one nor the other is merely immediate, merely is in sense-certainty, but is at the same time mediated: I have the certainty through the other, viz. through the actual fact; and this, again, exists in that certainty through an other, viz. through the I.”

The sense of one’s self, like that of a thing, is immediate. But in reflection, through reflection, it can be understood as an act of primordial reflection. Because the self in its limit, in the natural form of saying, I, myself, as in the sentence, I see an ornate pediment, full of delicate high-relief, is supposed to be determined by the pediment and its rather-fine workmanship. 

This analysis does not occur with the ethnos, what runs in the blood of all analysis is disenchantment. Analysis, reflection with a kind of scrutiny, is always a analysing away of what is imbued by what is there prior to the specific reflection. The distinction between a thing and a mind is highlighted so as to force the question about the human imagination and the discoveries of the whole, which is also called all things. This distinction is understood by all human beings, but it is seldom determined by preoccupied reflection in the manner of a philosophy, as a being led by the suggestion or captivation of debate with each other and with ourself. 

The magic is already a logic, because it reflects, but it is no Greek or Classical logic. In what tonality does the sentence, just prior to this one, speak? Does it allow us everything we have included in the methodos, and so take us in and out of a logic of strict inference which is either removed from the word, formal, or connected via the bridge of the premise? Is thinking, that of a thinker, always reflection? In the same way that the concrete reflection is supposed by Hegel, about the natural I, rather than the ego, and the thing there, as in the example of the pediment, thinking is supposed to exist back in the immediate. For example when we suppose the juxtaposition of the Greek darkling world, and the modern night that never parts company with the city lights and the interstellar space. 

It is not here the place to consider a discussion concerning a relativism, and whether one thinking is better than another. But instead what we are suggesting, in the argument, which is not a thinking, is that this which one is convinced of out of the immediate region of reliance emanates from specific cognition, and this is what Heidegger called religion, as in the religion of science, as the modern science.   

Is magic a religion? At first we want to determine religion by distancing ourselves from that thinking that has no nuance, the common political attitude. Always too much sophistication threatens thought, in each additional complexity, there is more care required, more strictness and exactitude, but what is simple is that some nuance must be brought to the work, rather than none, as is almost universal. Religion must not just say, everything that isn't science, that is an explanatory body of doctrine and a tradition. The incongruity of a judgment which senses the immediate experience of, e.g., the fourth century Manichean pilgrim, with the concept of the generic religion, is always absurd and has nothing to do with concrete reality. There is no generic religion except under the definition of the religion of science (not merely scientism, or something superficial), in its immediate faith. 

But the sense in which we ask, is magic a religion, is connected to the view, of the immediate experience of the thinkers, that all religion, such as science, is tied to a cognitive armament, which makes some form of nature nature, which brings forth some manner of being as the immediate as a “seriousness”. Being as the immediate is then a name from the thinking, when it asks about leaps, in the Lebensraum or “play”. The specific form of seriousness when the play is thought, is the path as the methodos. If one asks a Rabbi about Christ, they will say, that is someone who took the wrong path, or who went the wrong way. But how is the methodos different from a path where one is to take one's steps, in order to walk along with a certain way? As determined by a tradition which proscribes all the wrong ways?   

Dostoevsky, in his journalistic activity, which led nobody to the boredom of modern Journalism, mentions still, one
emphasizes, in the 19th century, a story about two men in a train car who argue whether or not the law includes everything that one can do, or whether it sums up what can not be done and leaves the rest open. So the Liberal view, of the openness beyond the prohibition of the path of Justice, which is so obvious in the West today, changes and takes on other dimensions in history. The liberal view sees the steps of the law as walls, where beyond them is openness. Whereas the older view, prior to the view of Rights and Social Contracts, proscribes what is outside the way. This is not unimportant to the thinking of the methodos, but the methodos itself, comes in by way of experimentum but begins to act as a tradition that trains the thinker to find leaps under a powerful tendentiousness that grinds, in this case, “seriousness imitates play” into the thinker of the methodos. But here we want to know how magic stands, and how we could begin thinking magic essentially, or better, magically. But since we don’t know the right tonality we can only hope to investigate the border regions, hoping to stumble into a point where a leap can occur. In this attitude we will take up a supposed hermeneutic circle, by giving an example out of Eliade in the next post. But we should remember that the example, and the manner that the noetical activity essences, so to say, around what is envisioned by the example, are not themselves the tonality. Only a leap brings thinking into another key. This was always so, according to the thinkers, but everything depends on knowing that, looking to it, bringing it forth, whereas before it so happened in the murk of everything that does not enter into the Fate of History.