Attempt to make the Spielraum more explicit in connection to the problem of the Destiny of Being
In the movement of the methodos we hope to deepen our thinking of what “Seriousness imitates play.” says. We continue to say more about play, and to move away from "seriousness", but we wonder if the "seriousness" is also standing before us in the notion of the Geschick or fate of Being which we shall attempt to say something about in what follows. The methodos attracted us to a notion that in what science promises, rationality as a specific interpretation of the Good, reason, or the Spielraum, that which in the sentence “Seriousness imitates play.” is called “play”, would be lost, in order to allow for pure rationality, or the vision of all things and all possibilities within the system of nature to become clear and unpolluted by what becomes the subjectivity, or the illusion of the human being with its irrationality or arbitrariness. What this means is that in a prescient imagining of the rationality, we are able to clarify to ourselves something about reason, or the human being as it has been classically understood by the Western thought or world. But at the same time, in our circle, we are able to bring another view in, from the thinking of the Japanese world, which lets us wonder if the essence of man, might be something other than reason. So that the result is that reason must be compared, if not at once to Iki, thought as the lost essence of a world, at least to magic and aletheia. Because these two are more available to the Western thinking, and to the English thinking that has now come to power everywhere. But keeping this in mind we still follow the methodos that wants to catch a more candid view of reason.
A kind of snapshot of the moment when technicity, as the possibility of the suicide of reason, will become clearer when we have compared a comment by the originator of the Quantum Theory, Heisenberg, to what we have already brought into view. We are looking at a specific text in order to increase the legibility of what Spielraum or "play" says. Heisenberg remarks:
Light and matter are both single entities, and the apparent duality arises in the limitations of our language. It is not surprising that our language should be incapable of describing the processes occurring within the atoms, for, as has been remarked, it was invented to describe the experiences of daily life, and these consist only of processes involving exceedingly large numbers of atoms. Furthermore, it is very difficult to modify our language so that it will be able to describe these atomic processes, for words can only describe things of which we can form mental pictures, and this ability, too, is a result of daily experience. Fortunately, mathematics is not subject to this limitation, and it has been possible to invent a mathematical scheme — the quantum theory — which seems entirely adequate for the treatment of atomic processes; for visualisation, however, we must content ourselves with two incomplete analogies — the wave picture and the corpuscular picture.
The talk of the “limitations of our language” refers us to human beings, and not to this or that language. Parenthetically, the global English, which is spoken by the elites of every country, brings a certain concreteness to the English thinking, which is also called the Problem of a Global State when it is interpreted according to a political philosophy. The “limitations”, are commonly thought to refer to some features of the discoveries of physics, in its deepening, and becoming more fundamental. What is left unnoticed is that this same “limitation” is visible in what we came across in our last post when we mentioned the claims of David Hume. Kant tells us that if Hume is right, the concept of causality can not be what it is meant to be. Thus he allows that it can be retained if it becomes an internal feature of the transcendental philosophy, but not simply. If we think the same matter without the transcendental philosophy, we come to the word causality, not to a lack in the language, but rather to the clarity of the phenomena in the way it floats apart, allows the space of Da-sein, to let in the creativity of the various manifestation of Being. The thing causality was supposed to mean, that we have been accepting, we humans, turns out not to be what it was casually. The causality is just like the features of the fundamental science of physics, in that it too can not get used to what it is supposed to say. Nothing can say what it was supposed to anymore. That is the light of the discovery of Being. So the various manifestation does not refer to things, entities, but to the protean arrogation of Being as History of Being.
If the Spielraum has to be seen by whoever looks, whereas before it couldn’t be, the suggestion of a ineluctable movement can't help but be noticed, though it need not be taken to be the case. The claim of the calling to Being has the look now of seeing what is there to see, for whoever thinks through what is already the case. But the sense in which it is “better” is lost, except that through a life-giving lie it be purposively accepted as a destiney. Strauss understood this tendency in Heidegger as the threat of Historicism. Where he has explicated this threat as a matter of blind acceptance of what comes. Yet, if the position of staunch acceptance of the destiny is rejected, the sight of Being is still forcible. Here is where Husserl ostensibly stands within pan-historial and versicolour phenomena as though he had relinquished all banners, and announced no secret manifesto. The position seems to be the limit state of reason, only looking. Whereas in Heidegger the position is like the full-throttle suicide as a overcoming of the human.
Parenthetically, if Humanism means anything like the view that pleasure and the good life should replace the subjugation of human beings to a god, the view popular among the philosophic rabble, of the English Professors, that there is a human being being “emphasised” in the text called Heidegger, loses its basis. Rather the human is supposed to be what is made impossible when the Spielraum comes into view in the light of the Rationality. The ongoing sociology, which everywhere brings forth a confused and sometimes unthought Utilitarianism as a Humanism, is the furthest thing from this thinking. It is then as though the Spielraum showed itself in its afterlife, in numerous thoughts. But here we are viewing, as we go on, mostly Husserl, Heidegger, and Nietzsche with respect to this future of Reason which is also called the human being. Their position is marked mainly by the decisive fact that they can no longer understand what the human being is, nor explain its situation. But they begin to be taken along on the terms of someone hostage to the History of Being which in some glances is a glittering Geschick.