The Element thought as a basic constituent of the Historial, and Da-Sein as Dasein
If philosophy and revelation are exhausted then the motivation of the choice seems desperation. And the views put forward as matters of investigation can be understood as artificial and deceptive. It is a kind of despair when the conglomerate of the former possibilities taken in massive generalities are thrown aside by the Western thought of destiny as history. But if the questions asked seriously propound sufficient answers to these and other objections a manner of investigation promotes itself to any who find in the low pursuits of life, gain, pleasure, etc., pleasantness and joy but insufficient ultimacy. Then when the childish things force it, one has to admit the possibility of various obscure passages which propound the risk obscured by Socrates, who held the path too susceptible of the invitation of the ridiculous. Such reflections abandon the highest things altogether, and so too conscience. Yet, in nobility there is a rigour which attaches itself like a kind of peculiar morality, of the hermeneutic or historial judgment of the higher and lower in regard to what is unconstrained in its power to draw forth thought. This eros of Heidegger is unmistakably accompanied by the judgment of the master of craft, of the musician in regard to the musical things, or the shoemaker. Many paths are then judged according to the daemon who guards against paths that don't lead to the condescension of the specific eros.
Is the human the only repository of nature natured, of the things that could happen again? Such a contrast does not reach historial time. When the outer, the irreal, is called the destiny, the eternal gathers in the human soul. And beside it sits the nature that has become natured. And whether the knowledge is to be used to make more destiny, for mastery, or whether the recluse will absolutise the soul, separates Utopia from Nirvana.
The obscurity of the concept of experience, that which knows and the outside, is sometimes grasped as the Element. The world being, i.e., consciousness without the ‘I’, is called Dasein, when it is understood to give no ground between the two. Husserl shows the movement of the body in this light, when the inner thinker is the outer action at the same time. Dilthey shows the irreducibility of the tropes of a world, a stone, a smile, hunger, wisdom, shoes, the sky, an alleyway.
The Element is not a thing, or a part, but it takes the definite article. Boredom in the example about the old Sunday wants to express the Element. The Element wants to signal Being, by drawing the thought towards Being. To think through the matter of the Element seems to have, as it were, called the thinker into being. Because when the thinker was still a philosopher, the concrete experience of the Element could not raise itself at the gate of thought. The philosopher has the identity of the knower and the thing known firmly in mind, and can not shake it off. The philosopher is not drawn to ask “Why does Being happen?”. The philosopher is the knower who wants knowledge to act on destiny.
Throughout the history of philosophy nobody despised Socrates so seriously as Heidegger. The “embarrassment” of dialectic, the “philosophical embarrassment” as Heidegger called it, was not due to the Nietzschean thesis, though this too has a role to play for Heidegger, about the theoretical man. But it is because every reflection in Socrates is about the destiny of man as man. But it never can dislodge man, anthropos is never cast into its own abyss. Everything in Socratic discussion moves away from the eros of Heidegger. This eros is neither Freudian nor that of Socrates and Plato. But what role does it play in the motivation of the leading question “Why does Being happen?”. We might suspect that it is homologous or at least that it belongs with this question. Is this eros, that which condescends to call forth, the same as this Being? This seems untenable, as it would promote the notion of an Ontotheology, of a first cause. This eros can not be thought under that approach, but it remains a difficulty of the enigma of historial thinking.
Generally speaking there is an arbitrariness in Heidegger’s insistence on the “point” of it all, i.e., the eros that gives the direction of the drawing forth, as if in the direction of the crown of a tree to the sun, and not in some other direction. Husserl’s agnosticism seems sounder, but this seeming is in the light or guidance of philosophy—recalling knowing from the regions of thought. It’s utterly obscure what the purpose of such a work is, if it can move as suggested not by what is prior or by the eros, the eros would have to fall aside as an ontotheology.