Heidegger (as though) over and against Husserl
Considerations on the course of future investigations are developed in the light of the question: Which thinking is more cogent, Husserl or Heidegger?
The student has an advantage over the teacher since the teacher is directed by their masterly skill par excellence, while the pupil has not yet any more than an inkling of their path, and is not wholly forced into compromises at once, more so if the student is Heidegger and the teacher the extraordinary master Husserl. We must ask, according to the essential possibilities of thought, and according to the direct path of the thought, if Heidegger can lay claim to more cogency for thought than Husserl in his fundamental directive thought, that of the End of Metaphysics. For Husserl no such end is expected, nor has it arrived, nor would it be beautiful if it did. Investigation wants to stay at the starting point, and look at what is moving under the glance of thought. But in Heidegger, it is as though those plunged into the action of thought, dealing with the activity of looking, break off and spectate, isolated from their action as thinkers, and recoil into the sphere of the interpretation or the hermeneutic peculiarity.
In Heidegger the grip on the movement of thought across the centuries is the most important exigency which everywhere quickens the pulse. If the rise of the principle of reason, out of the enigma of the unthought which is intimately operative in the non-presence of the West, of the history of metaphysics, if this is so broad and comes forth and holds sway infinitely over man as man, demanding what must be from what it renders to cognition as fundamental resource, as the cause and effect towards the perfection of fashioning or fulfilling unconstrained logistical power, if this is according to thought cogent, the spectation has grasped what the action of seeing alone, phenomenological looking, could not know.
Thus if we awaken to the strength of the thesis, as guiding strand, we can not treat it as mere arbitrary projection. Yet, Nietzsche speaks all the time of Ariadne and the maze. As soon as one allows that the concern of Strauss can be put aside, that the primary evidence is the guidance of all research, proper to philosophy, and that Nietzsche brings a defective hearsay in his premise, i.e., that one can throw thought open to the abyss, to the constant glance into the fertility of thought, to that that is between spirit and life, namely the abyss, this masterly and commanding thinker then glances into the return to the logical grasp of the emergence of the End of Metaphysics so scornfully as to wither philosophy. Philosophy becomes thinking, it can no longer be philosophy, but thinking is completion, it finds itself, it is not arbitrary, for it is the completion of that metaphysics as the end in the “steadfast resolution” towards the leap.
If one thinks of the discovery of, e.g., the axioms of Euclid, which the human race opened and discovered, this glittering activity, that of the inner vision over and against the brute nature, supplies the urspring of the historial movement in its root as a prime mover or God. If the God is cast down in the establishment of an ultimate refusal of gods, in the disbanding of the skeptical division between logos and physis, in the final contest, still alive amongst us, of nature naturing (natura naturans) and nature natured (natura naturata), the indication is the destiny in its ultimate movement of itself draws thought to think what is to be thought in the “end” of this metaphysics.
Some thoughts can not be solved by philosophy, since it is guided by the god or first cause of reason. And not the sight of thought simpliciter. Drawn directly and without fanciful impediments from the various schools of thought now prevalent one would bring thought to establish its path to the question of this “drawing forth” as possibility or weird fancy. Such is the thing legislated by historial thinking.