A Superficial Consideration of the Birth of Thought and, on the other hand, the Perennial Philosophy
If one sees a chair, then the sense is that one has knowledge of an actual chair. The split between the knowledge and the actual is due to the possibility of mistakes. The break without parallel as we call it, the start of the problem of the field of thought as perception that changes to the problem of the subjective and then to the epistemological and then to the British notion of consciousness. Someone who has an inkling of this development might become conscious of it properly. Thus, the levity of language loves to use the same words to say different things. All the more this is true when we use technical terms. They exist to make precision in thought, but often degenerate into confusion and formula.
The intuition of a chair, that one sees a blue chair, that has been maliciously laid in one’s way, by a malignant person, in order to make one’s way more difficult, is intuited as it is thought. In other words it is not considered as something actual and something known, but the thing is disclosed only in the narration of what is intuited. So language speaks the knowing, but the knowing is of the intuition and not of the supposed actual thing. The subsistence of the intuitional subject matter grows in the same sense that the voluntary movement of the hand is a thought and an actuality at the same time. The intuition is the intentionality when it comes into being alongside the narration. The chair intends to be an impediment, strewn along the way, bothersome to remove and set aside.
The perennial philosophy thinks the question: What is the reality? The reality is something behind the common opinion. The opinion is not supposed to be the reality. The reality is supposed to be the nature, i.e., the subject of empirical experience, that we see a chair, i.e., a certain species of thing, is the idealist thesis. Idealism means speciesism. The belief in speciation (in the peculiarity of each thing as its kind). Whereas the rationalist materialism claims that there are no ideas or species, but rather, in reality, there is relation [cause and effect], homogenous and expressible as law of the hidden nature tout court.
One must understand this thinking is not that of the “Two Tables”, the so called scientific and folk table. That concerns things, really viable, atoms, and so forth, which could as easily be, in reality, species or ideas. When Kant sees this dispute he is driven to push aside reality as such. He finds the claim of the thing behind the opinion unintelligible. Yet, hinc illae lacrimae? Not from here do all these tears come, but from the so-called “parasite” as one critic called the god of Kant. Kant wants to show that the opinion can come to justify itself, that it is not arbitrary. I.e., that the social ideas and morals, and prevailing laws are not arbitrary, that the are not irrational, that they are not based on human society but on this now vestigial philosophic problem of a reality.
In this sense Heidegger finds the talk of epistemology ridiculous. Because Kant does not set the dianoetic against the intuition of the species, but he says, rather, these both are irreducible and it is unintelligible to set one off against the other. For instance in the eminent remarks about the cinnabar. In the thought that has the name Kant the problem about the philosophic reality is not a question of speciesism or materialism (‘one stuff’ism as Dennett names it), but only about the Utopia or the Real. One can see it in Marx’s adaption of Feuerbach. The Real, as material, is not materialism (of a physics), it is rather, the suspended possibility of morality, of the so-called society without contradiction. It refers to the human social conditions (as the flip-side of the material reality), not to calculation or rationality in the terms of so-called scientific facts. It thinks dreamily, for it thinks, nature loves me, the human being. It does not think, this nature is mysterious, it does not think this is neutral matter.
Since a long series of reflections lead to the prowess which is made from the paidia (how is this concept to be thought, at this point in the thinking?) of the historical development, the thinker according to historial thought is better able to see the appropriate way to handle thought in any situation. The weird and ephemeral character of the thinking can only be justified by the End of Metaphysics, because the thinking of a reality is no longer tenable. If the thinking of reality, not opinion, is not tenable, then who to establish thought outside meaningless and fruitless drifting? If one, I speak superficially, thinks over what takes place in Deleuze and Guattari, one sees a kind of explosion of the final speculation about the reality, which is supposed to coincide with a kind of physical materialism, and not the philisophic materialism. So it is as though the human idea of morality, still in Feuerbach, which is not the philisophic rationalism, becomes physics. This thinking alongside the development of the psychologizing psychoanalytic, i.e., the ideology or search for what is under the appearances, presents itself as sturdier, whereas it has no serious consciousness of its own vapid movement. Thus one says, nothing can be done, just hanging on in the social-aesthetic realm, where thought is called subjective. It is thought subjective because science is the tacit authority. So this thought is through, without power, it is as defective as the British thought of the problem of consciousness over and against all things.