The Morbid Question about Various Difficulties of a Disgusting Kind (taken up briskly and without the pretension of more than simple sketching)
The word antisemitism is perhaps generally used to mean, are you stupid? I.e., it is less a request for an explanation about a holding or practical action than it is a rebuke. If the Dreyfus Affair indicates a certain political form of what, after the biological-scientific term is supposed to be anti-semitism, a confused term that is mostly to be understood as a species, alongside anti-judaism, a kind of antichrist activity, devoid of viciousness only as anticristianos, but not devoid of viciousness in its general history as a type of attack on Jews as such, we must ask if it also infects philosophy or if it is limited to politics.
The difficulty is that one does not know what the region is in which its essence would be located, and therefore what would stand outside. If it is permissible to be against an activity, why not the destiny of a people? It stands this way, there is a primacy of certain tendencies and ideas, intimate to groups. Then can they be legitimately opposed? Explicitly this: According to historicism the Greek logic understands techne and phronesis as diametrically opposed [sic]. Despite what is usually said those who have knowledge of this must see what Historicism has in mind, it is this: techne has no memory. The object at the peak of the growth of the logoi as phronesis becomes the mass production. The machine has no memory as such. The origin and destiny of phronesis, of the active normative making principle, is memory as conscience.
Thus the question, if the preliminary can be adequately bypassed, leads to a fundamental thesis, these both are to be left aside in the work of Husserl. Let it stand as a threadbare, but as possible typic, or exemplare of the “race”. Judith Butler quotes Benjamin to say, “I rather prefer remembrance”. These days, against for instance the instinct of someone like Feynman, who rejected such agglomerations, it is still common and inevitably acceptable to speak of Jewish intellectuals, and to cluster this thought as though it were a school. A school of intellectuals. If this has a certain practical reality, I say if, then does it not follow that a rejection of the Jews, as such, is not vicious but a matter of philosophic content? I.e., that is, that it could be thought so? If the motives propounded by the existence of the Dreyfus Affair are other than those of Husserl and his student, then is one compelled, by conscience, here there is not irony but difficulty, to challenge the thought? If the thought is held, if it is reached, if it is the thought of those thinkers, can they be made to give way to conscience, to the apprehensive attitude in the face of blood and danger.
It becomes ever more necessary to understand that there is a question. Why does Strauss write his essay on the continuance of Judaism, “Why We Remain Jews?” It is because the question of what is adequate in the core of the being of a people is not supplied by the culture concept, but by G-d only. But then if the meaning is reduced to race, to biological race, to base political calculation, the matter can no longer stand among the highest concerns and falls in the face of an inkling of the Historicism that becomes more essential than what is essential. Then it must be understood that the charge, antisemitism, must say Husserl and his student were not serious men. They did not wish to learn. They lied. Taken strictly, if religion is not reduced to a concept (to "routinization" as Strauss calls it), if there is no “religion”, no general notion, but rather there is G-d, and one can not even say it as Rabbi Heschel did (with expansion of the human wrestling and “ ecumenicalism”), but must find only the utter people, one must rebuke those who have “taken the wrong path”. The wrong way.
Therefore, whoever launches such accusations is outside the realm of “religion” and philosophy, but they must grant a certain secular consideration guides them, and a trepidatious activity proper to the secular reigns here. But whoever has the weight of their being placed in thought can not take such a view, because then they must see the primary demand that guided Husserl and his student as the overpassing of the conscience-normative and the technological. As a matter of the highest things, where a little knowledge is of more worth than knowing all of the lower. What guides even a prohibition of murder, if G-d is not utterly the highest reality that makes the people? Then , as Strauss insists, the considerations of Gershom Scholem come in, with respect to the searching of the mystics who are to answer the questions of the secular mob. If all this is insufficient, than Husserl and his student must not be disturbed in their activity, as the disturbance is lower, and less serious, than the peerless work.
These reflections are not adequate but I believe they give some considerations an opening, thus to be more thoroughly examined.