Monday, June 6, 2016

A Note on the Difficulty of Locating the Sense of the Being

It is peculiar that though it is quite obvious that speech changes what things are, many deny this. If something is pointed out, and thus what is said makes an impression, then there is a transformation. For instance, if one believes an astrolabe is a a kind of surveyor's tool, and then it is pointed out that, no, rather, it is an artifact, certainly there is a change. Yet, due to the constant hypothesis, concerning the nature or identity of things, it is, by some, maintained that, rather than a change in the object, what occurs is only that the object is seen to, like a receptacle full of possibilities, have revealed one more. 

The gem with many facets does not exist, but only the facet. This is the core of the perspectivalism view. But, at once, it assumes the “gem”. That x or nature or identity. That ‘same’ thing. What it impresses me that the thing is something other than what it was thought to be it than becomes that. Such is the nature of the essence of things. But, on the other hand, everything has its factual presence, as the fact that it is. The fact that it is seems to hang apart from what it is, the merely subjective. In fact, so often as this nice story has been seriously maintained the one speaking has simply refused to question. 

To move to the scientific view, is to posit a different nature. Instead of speaking of the essence of this and that peculiar thing, one simply projects a universal “stuff”. But this changes nothing, and it all starts again. The questioning remains commanded, as if by the law of obviousness, to remain shut up. All this Heidegger and Husserl regard as ontic, and here we do not arrive at language. Speach is an active agent that brings the thinking to, when it is impressed, take up some other being. But what about this thinking, as the field in which the beings change? It is foolish to think that Nietzsche believed in the mere subjectivity of this thinking, he asked, what is its law? And he answered power or Rausch. That is not a human power that moves in a wave. He speaks in the tones of Darwin, of the law of laws, by which the world moves. But this world, being the thing thought, is intelligible in every respect. By and through language. Unintelligibility, nothingness, these too are intelligible, constituents of the world.

It is wrong to say that Being is thought as time
(the mere word Zeit is used, and it is said, this is not meant to say, it stands still or that it moves). This conection to the older sense of time, brought into the Historial of, e.g., Dilthey, is utterly misleading. One must see this. In this sense the continual use of striking out words and applying peculiarly sophisticated grammatical elegancies, is not correct. In Adorno, we see a failure to think, derivative on the attempts of Heidegger to escape the obviousness of language. This too has to do with the problem of politics, which is the same as the problem of the Greek beginning in the logos of assertion.

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