Thursday, June 30, 2016

The Disadvantages of Rauch 

In Storm of Steel Ernst Jünger thinks of a time when he packed his lunch in a gasmask case, strapped to his belt. He hadn’t any conception of mustard gas. 

Clement Greenberg and Mies van der Rohe: I don’t want to be interesting I want to be good. This is the way of looking that avoids philosophy, it is not reactionary, but it is sub-philosophical. Good here does not mean that from all things I have rescued or recalled that which is best simply. I.e., the thing that the whole calls for, and can never exceedits veriest meaning. Rather, it means, of those things that people look at, in just the same way that the Rocky Mountains contain proper mountains, and not only hills, my work is one of those mountains. Like other mountains, one can still go about asking about the exact height, and which is taller, but no one can say with the slightest probity, that is no mountian. Leo Strauss, in a similar way, understood men like John Searle as public menaces. Because through their flight in the face of thought, they kicked up a storm of confusion about the world essence. All serious problems are regarded as bunk since the reflections necessary to draw them into consciousness, to fill them with cogency for thought, are blocked. But this action does not stop the end of metaphysics, rather it prevents human beings from facing it. 

The view of the world essence is not some opinion. It is not some sentence that states a proposition. It is not some orientation that one might learn if one got the right training. It is not some procedure or method. But when we find the thinking place of the Element we are close already to solipsism and to nihilism. It seems that a prescription is needed, so that to rescue the thought that is obscured a moral action must come first. In order to save face one can say, this reflection was possible in a window of history, not because it was sought, but since it so happened by some infinitely enigmatic dispensation, but that we now might go back to it, but only through digging back. In a certain way all this is obviated by the fact that those who are called, and will not stand sleepily beside the perpetual overpowering of thought, do not propose any activity as a task. It is only that it befalls them and is them. Thus it is not a moral prescription. These rationalizations can’t be outstripped, as there is no higher judge of them. Only the normative of the philosophy department can prescribe rules of how to move in thought and how not to move in thought. 

But it seems to me valuable, at least for the moment, to stay with the “shatter zones” on the historicist frontier which stand between Husserl (& co.) and Strauss. Can one continue the old projects or pursuits without degenerating into fundamentalism or the miasma of simpleminded and philistine evasions?

Tuesday, June 28, 2016

Monopolistic Reflections on Thought

Today philosophy is destroyed. It is not that in the universities there are no philosophers (but only those called so), but philosophy is destroyed. Philosophic sense is not something like a reflection in a window that can be blocked by a hand. Instead, the fact of the destruction of philosophy in the end of metaphysics is something which logically, i.e., through reasoned grounds or by the principle of identity, can not be said. Yet this loss is, indeed, somehow sought as a fact. It can not be demonstrated out of the phenomena. A reason for it in the chain of causes is not waiting to be found. It belongs to the knowledge or thinking which now lights the earth. Because the world essence is felt to move, as it were, here and now, we seem to have some warrant for searching for it. But there would be no direction for the search to move in. When it is sought, the first thing that we ineptly reach towards is a psychology of former beings. As though the same beings could be set up, to look at, for us here, as a kingdom within a kingdom. It is my conviction that this is not a problem of representation, of something which could be more or less accurate, and could be improved upon by degrees, but at the same time, thought into the past, into these matters, gives such impressions almost a soupçon of truth. What is necessary is the refusal of the logical overlay, which makes all attempts appear as matters of representation. Thus, from the millennial or thousands of years old history of thought, something wants to stir from sleep.

On Why the Normative Sense of the Destruction of Metaphysics is not Adequate

The loss of the belief in the eternality of principles in the face of the turn towards change in circumstance, arbitrariness, and expedience is empirically obvious. Technocratic jurists reject the common law tradition as the usurpation of the political by the judges. The field of political philosophy is removed for that of a political science which focuses on the transfigurations of society. Every project calling itself political philosophy is a caricature which must justify its existence in a reactionary or fundamentalist awareness of its own defects. The theory of evolution pushes reflection on the world essence into confusion. 

The denial of direct and literal creation leads to the belief in a world essence that is to be found through knowledge. The neutral god, or “natural world”, presents itself as waiting for human beings to complete the transformation of all the neutral things into the utopia. The sciences, if they did not suppose knowledge were of use, would not seek it. The problem of god is only concealed by this religion of knowledge. Even if the knowledge were zealously sought ‘for its own sake’ this would show the sense of a god that had its meaning and therefore its purpose, in this. 

Because the earth can never be maintained over and against the world, but the distinction is always only a kind of nonce clarifying principle, the thought of all gods, whether the neutral-towards earthly salvation and the imminent utopia, or any other, remain jailed with the logical tableau. The logical tableau is the way of covering, such that whoever would destroy the god can not truly destroy it. For instance in the name of maximum freedom, or scientific objectivity, i.e., as if no project followed on the logical annunciation which brings the things into logistical perch amidst life.  

The doctrine that denied truth would have been naive if it had truly denied truth. The meaning, and therefore the purpose of life can not be outlawed. Therefore Nietzsche speaks of the little bit of “knowing” that, roughly, continues to be a knowing, always in some other perspective. This is almost like a definition of an entity, similar to that of Kant’s rational beings, or Heidegger’s Dasein. Because Nietzsche is supposed to be “dancing” one is always ready to abscond with the principle, I mean with the law that makes clear what his philosophy says, and to throw up a phosphorescent scarab, that flies beautifully, its back lined with purplish red over gold and green, until we no longer ask, who is this Nietzsche. Thus the rubric itself absconds into the monstrous gulf of mud. Whereas with Heidegger, something more like the reverse is the case. The Rubric Heidegger tries to make language stand there, to hold fast, in such a way as to speak without being logical. But yet to be utterly reliable and to say what it says. He does this through trying to teach a way of thinking, that would think underneath the language, and not over it in the manner of validity and formal logic. The so-called ‘target phenomena’ itself is closer to what thinks that than is the logic or logos.

Plato already understood that words don’t always speak in the same way. Since that is the raison d'etre of the dialog over and against the dark words, speech or treatise, or any monopolistic form of modern essay. The apostrophe of Dostoevsky and Derrida might question the ground of the essay, in the way it stands over and against the polyphonousness of the work that speaks differently to different interlocutors and therefore to different readers, yet, it does not leave the principle of logos even when it attacks it with the most polemical probity. 

What is Being Destroyed?

If destruction meant wrecking and building it would be a technique suitable to design and the arts and perhaps to literary work. If destruction speaks to the earth and the world, it can not be said. But by saying that it can’t be said we can’t thereby sink into arbitrariness. It is then necessary to point to the work of thinking by which one can stop thinking of doing and thinking, in the sense of action and learning, but can see knowing as the lighting of the earth. Harriet Tubman says, I would have freed more slaves had “they known that they were slaves”. This can never be taken to mean, if only they were not so ill-informed, their actions should have been of a wholly different character. In the way the earth swallows up what it knows through the world, in the way copses and lakes stand under the sky and the wind, everything is thought logically in the divisions of discerning knowing. If we look at some of those who did not know that they were not philosophers, for instance those so-called philosophers of our own time, we notice that it is not as though this not knowing were something. 

It is quite possible that nothing is aimed at by this post, since the Utopia aimed at by the modern sciences, the exclusive right to sell the human life, may be tangibly reachable. The current reflection would still be thinking even in the Utopia (provided it was not made illegal and thereby removed as a disease), about the knowing in the sense that it can’t say through the logos.

Monday, June 20, 2016

Being Should be Thought Without the Thought of Change or Progress

Hölderlin was not Hölderlin for Goethe. He simply understood that a young student, who could speak with at least some competence on those philosophical matters of which he, the student, was acquainted, was recommended to his attention. But not in any serious way or for any special reason. But Heidegger says, will the poet be oustripped, will the poet be overthrown, and he answers, never. The difference recommends itself to our attention, but momentarily, for we sense it, it is intelligible to us, but what more can we do with the fact? Is it then one more “interesting” observation among others? There is something in this change, but even if we are not prone to call all such matters “subjective” and to, thereby, sweep them under the rug of thought, what more is left to be done? All of Historicism, of the study of what is irreversible, hangs upon this which approaches noninterest and something one can’t be bothered with.

In the primary phenomena, what follows from the most-awake look at daily experiences, at what one actually lives, not the abstract, there is no less an irreversibility which characterizes everything. All things do not know how they are supposed to show themselves. According to a supposed ‘slice’ or fragment of time, that blocks out all history and thus all change in the thing as it is shown? It is of no use to pretend that the latest view of modern science, a recent enough notion, of the science of observation, measurement, and test, is eternal, true, or neutral. The claim about the neutrality, an illusion, can easily be destroyed in the light of the history of the development of the conception of this neutrality. It is no metaphor to say that nature, nature’s mysterious laws, the physicists frequently call them so, could with no loss be called god’s laws. If the notion of the personal god, with its question of the salvation of the individual, and thus the concern with the sin of that individual, is not the conception of god. So far as god is essence, which the word always named prior to the seventeenth century, “nature’s god”, sans, the word god, only says the neutral god. But the neutrality is wholly without content except in the light of the notion of the benign god, of the wrathful god, and of the god concerned with personal salvation. (Its sustained or ongoing raison d'etre is political, and verbal, therefor it is a smokescreen and confusing.)

Just like Hölderlin the knowledge wants to show itself as this or that kind of fact. A stone, or a desk, a copy of the latest art-fair catalog, or the mild climate of California, do not know how long their moment is. How long do they stay what they are? When Husserl discovered the way observation, in literal fact, must involve a kind of narration, there is somehow implied the “sui generis” of interpretation. “Somehow implied” is too weak, simply one narrates the thing and watches it not remain what it is.

One must pay attention to the ground of deception, and the ground of the creative thought. It is always possible for someone to make a certain change in their account without changing the thing. But Nietzsche says, Goethe, Goethe the great poet, is not perfect as you thought. “Excuse me for the fact” (Beyond Good and Evil), that he does not remain. The reason he is to excuse the fact is because he saw the failures in such a way as to hold up Hölderlin (sic) in another light. Heidegger says the creative one is violent, but decisively he says, the creative one is not happy with his superiority or power. Nietzsche does not find the creativity in the will, or intention, of someone. In the sense that will to power speaks, it is not as a matter of an individual self-doing or of an intended action. It is called Rausch, it is a growing, the mental controls are not on. How is the growth of the concept like the growth of the being itself?

At first, biologically, it seems a mere signal that relays back from the “outside” to the living-drive is enough to speak of a living thing. A plant perhaps is living, but has no true inner life. But, certainly an animal has an “inner” life. Things stand before it. It feels and imagines and it is voracious and its life is in the peculiar animus, or intention, of the instinct. Instinct is a name for nothing other than the life of the living thing. But, in the Nietzschean sense, language is supposed to be a tool of this instinct. Just as a computer is a tool. Something about this brings us to the precise sense in which Heidegger does not stay with the merely “ontic” in Nietzsche. Likewise, even in so far as Kierkegaard understands the knight of faith, as the mystery of the Element as the personality, which is what can be utterly concealed from the profane glance, and lived only in its own knowledge, Kierkegaard does not say, this Element leads me to the thought of Being. Heidegger says, however, the Element is always a harbinger of Being, or, something that makes us think of Being. This argument occurs, for example, in the book on metaphysics where he speaks of the moments of great joy or sorrow in their connection to Being.   

So far as I know no one currently studying Heidegger understands this sense of Being. It is not “non-presence”. It is not, the impromptu or at-hand as the “authentic”. Those arguments which assume such things, stem from a fundamental lack of philosophic sense. What I mean is that they don’t sense, at all, what the purpose of the work is. Heidegger would say, that they don't sense what is "essential" in the work. It is decisive, as well, to notice that the dispute between Husserl and his student is over the matter of “the point” of history. Husserl simply refuses to “end” history. But without the ‘end of metaphysics’, there is no “point" to it all. Heidegger understands Aristotle to do the same thing as Descartes does with the absolute doubt, because that is a method for going to the phenomena and with great energy discarding everything else.

Thursday, June 16, 2016

Ancients and Moderns, Anxiety and Language

Socrates appears stupid in comparison to the moderns because he has no anxiety in the face of his work, which stands fearsomely before humanity. Homer knew the distinction between deception and falsehood. But the old Greek language does not seem to make it explicitly, in the sense of a lie, over and against an untruth. To say a falsehood is not always to lie. Homer had to go out of his way to speak of saying one thing to one’s heart, and another to someone else. Even if that weren't true one senses this movement even today. One has certain words at one’s disposal, but one’s dark conceptions see further. These dark conceptions deserve to be called language. Whereas the words are expressions. One gives expression and so makes the language show itself here and there. 

But if someone seriously contemplates handing themselves over to language, someone who is called and notices that it is possible, the result ought to be anxiety in the face of existence. In fact, it is perhaps anxiety in the face of language. And that would be deeper. Existence is expressed, but language is a dark conception. It is strange that Socrates was so dumb, almost like an animal, in the face of this huge wave that he moved in, that he crashed against existence. It is not the least adequate to speak in terms of the question of whether something is added or taken away, divided or built on top. When the language forces the lie to become a thing, and for the falsehood to be left behind, as if a child had got its own life, and were no longer an embryo, the basis of the world is now persuaded to be transfigured in a wondrous and fearful way. It is fearful then to stand at the threshold of this power. Therefore, one must be shocked to see Socrates only reflecting on the feeling of wonder, but not understanding that which is diabolical and fiendish in this dark power. It is plain that Nietzsche, though in his overcompensation and ridiculous pride he remained much too sanguine at his own wisdom and prophecy, he nonetheless saw the darker power of the abyss and was properly afraid. He perhaps grew even very afraid, and thus his compensation was at the same time increased and grew all-the-more ridiculous and over-puffed (Cf. Jung).

The sense that creativity refers to new things coming into existence, and the refusal of the closed system, is not affected by this movement of language. No thing is involved at all. The
Historial can not simply refer to the epistemological difference from age to age. And obviously not with a change in invented things. Husserl most of all understood this problem, that of the transfiguration of the obvious and the boring. Strauss stresses in his understanding of the ancients that truth was always beneficent and a kind of brilliant thing. Not only explicitly in the doctrine of Aristotle, but on the whole. Even if truth is denied, by an ancient, for the reason of scepticism, it is not held that the look into it, itself, would be fundamentally horrible. Only that the good thing does not exist, or can not be reached. It is ‘far off’. This fact of the change in outlook is worth reflection. Too often it is superficially connected to the great wars, as though it were a question on the same level as the French or Italian New Wave or Film Noir.

Monday, June 13, 2016

Variable Approaches to the Border of the Interpretation 

Kant is guilty of ‘unnecessary multiplication’, adding more presuppositions than one must have. This is proscribed as much by Occam as by Husserl. Husserl wants to refuse the basic datum be “multiplied”. The clumsy construction involving the negative, refuse, metaphorically expresses the bias of the tradition. ‘Naturally’, taken from the clarity of Husserl, one might simply say, the datum is sufficient. What is there is the basis or principle. What becomes at issue is the logic. The relation of the discussion to the datum. The way of observing, and of describing, is not straightforward but variable. The datum is radically open to the description. The datum is only known through the way it is uncovered by the observation. But, the “knowing” is so much a part of the manifestation of the datum as not to stand away from it in the manner of a ‘world picture’ or of a representation. 

In Kant one may speak of epistemology by cause of the doctrine of consciousness. Consciousness is the legislation of beings. Kant says, the rational legislates the laws of reality. Both body, and reason as cause. These vestigial features of the transcendental “legislation” refer, ultimately, to the presupposition which called forth philosophy in the West. To the principle of natural law. The dividual conceptions nomos and phusis are combined and begin to ‘multiply’. 

The Historial is called ‘mystical’ and in the technical sense this would be correct. Or almost correct. If mystical says, unlike opinion, this ‘showing of the things’ is true, i.e., it doesn't come from confusion or from a smoke screen, then the primordial datum wants to be ‘mystical’. It is not natural, and it is not lawlike. The natural is a concept of what happens on its own. Whereas the lawlike wants to say, through convention or by the disciplining of the human will. The natural in this sense is not the genuinely philosophical view. It is not the human being as the first beginning. The Greeks understand themselves better, because they find the human as the first one who ‘raises their eyes’, after the Darwinian doctrine attempts to found the human prior to itself. The sense of the primordial is heightened by what the modern doctrine of genetics says. Genetics as the claim about the principle, the first step.

The thinker is not the intellectual but the one who describes the impromptu. The description of the impromptu must decide whether there is a “close reading”. Is there the possibility of reading out of what is there, or is, as Strauss says, the interpretation always the “sui generis”
? The interpretation is something that is supposed to happen when there is nothing there. Otherwise, according to the doctrine of “close reading” one should speak out from the evidence. But in the case that the speaking out is itself the “what’s there’, or at least a part of it, there is a challenge mounted by the datum. Is the challenge from the datum or is it willfully brought to the datum? Literally, the datum, is only what it is through the disclosure by some ‘observing speech’.

Monday, June 6, 2016

A Note on the Difficulty of Locating the Sense of the Being

It is peculiar that though it is quite obvious that speech changes what things are, many deny this. If something is pointed out, and thus what is said makes an impression, then there is a transformation. For instance, if one believes an astrolabe is a a kind of surveyor's tool, and then it is pointed out that, no, rather, it is an artifact, certainly there is a change. Yet, due to the constant hypothesis, concerning the nature or identity of things, it is, by some, maintained that, rather than a change in the object, what occurs is only that the object is seen to, like a receptacle full of possibilities, have revealed one more. 

The gem with many facets does not exist, but only the facet. This is the core of the perspectivalism view. But, at once, it assumes the “gem”. That x or nature or identity. That ‘same’ thing. What it impresses me that the thing is something other than what it was thought to be it than becomes that. Such is the nature of the essence of things. But, on the other hand, everything has its factual presence, as the fact that it is. The fact that it is seems to hang apart from what it is, the merely subjective. In fact, so often as this nice story has been seriously maintained the one speaking has simply refused to question. 

To move to the scientific view, is to posit a different nature. Instead of speaking of the essence of this and that peculiar thing, one simply projects a universal “stuff”. But this changes nothing, and it all starts again. The questioning remains commanded, as if by the law of obviousness, to remain shut up. All this Heidegger and Husserl regard as ontic, and here we do not arrive at language. Speach is an active agent that brings the thinking to, when it is impressed, take up some other being. But what about this thinking, as the field in which the beings change? It is foolish to think that Nietzsche believed in the mere subjectivity of this thinking, he asked, what is its law? And he answered power or Rausch. That is not a human power that moves in a wave. He speaks in the tones of Darwin, of the law of laws, by which the world moves. But this world, being the thing thought, is intelligible in every respect. By and through language. Unintelligibility, nothingness, these too are intelligible, constituents of the world.

It is wrong to say that Being is thought as time
(the mere word Zeit is used, and it is said, this is not meant to say, it stands still or that it moves). This conection to the older sense of time, brought into the Historial of, e.g., Dilthey, is utterly misleading. One must see this. In this sense the continual use of striking out words and applying peculiarly sophisticated grammatical elegancies, is not correct. In Adorno, we see a failure to think, derivative on the attempts of Heidegger to escape the obviousness of language. This too has to do with the problem of politics, which is the same as the problem of the Greek beginning in the logos of assertion.

Wednesday, June 1, 2016

Exercise in Seeing

Exercise in Seeing

The basic datum according to Heidegger and Husserl is given prior to reflection. Through reflection comes the ‘I’ and the there (as an inferential doctrine, e.g., that in Hegel). So, it is not ‘given’ prior to reflection, but is prior to reflection. There is nothing ‘there’ or ‘given’. Descartes is taken from the start of his reflection, ignoring the second part: think, but not, therefore ‘I’. The thinking means: “The tear rolls down her pallid cheek.” or, “His face was lit up with cheer.”, or, “The crowns of the trees surrender themselves to sky and night.” Only that language, through its discernment, has disclosed something. In this sense the language is prior to the ‘I’ or the ‘there’. It is called, by Heidegger, the house of Being. It is not Being, but the house of Being.

In order to train thinking, as ‘seeing’, Heidegger says: “How does consciousness, knowledge as representation, relate to Dasein? In this you must not reflect, but rather see.” 

The ‘world frame’, the picturing, the imagining. The thing pictured is the imagined. The imaged. The image, as something done. Descartes: We no longer accept the ground of knowledge in Socrates. We no longer accept craft, e.g., the shoemaker, as a knower. This is no knowledge as certainty. But it is knowing as pistis. It is the knowledge in the sphere of average reliability. It is the reliance on the simple and the everyday. As what is known, we don’t accept it as the certain ground. Descartes wants something grounding, more principled, than what is reliable. The certain is more perfect. What is certain is that, when the face is lit with cheer, it is so. The “it is so”, means, in combat with the notion, we must check, and see if what seems to be, really is, “it is so”, or, better, the archaic English, so 'beest'. 

Descartes, with his certainty, begins to build. But Husserl and Heidegger, do not build “minarets in Switzerland”. Their claim is that, unlike the religionists, the objectivists, we set out on no project. We limit ourselves to the strict datum as such. Descartes, instead of philosophizing, founds the ‘I’. He does this because it is the ‘I’ who will know. No other will know, except this “I’. Descartes wants to construct knowledge, he already wanted to do that before he doubted, before the ultimate and primordial doubt. 

“How does consciousness, knowledge as representation, relate to Dasein? In this you must not reflect, but rather see.” 

The consciousness names the one who knows. They might know not just things, but also intentions, also anger, also wishes. The consciousness has only the limit in that it knows, and that what knows must not be all. For in knowing it has its object. It knows all, in so far as the extended substance is all. But, it does not know all. For the second substance is posited. 

Consciousness, then, is the counter concept of representation. The representation is the same as the idea of the objectivist world. As soon as the Cartesian dualism is destroyed, through the objectivist religion, what is left over is only the extended substance. It is disputed by its counter concept, the consciousness as the reflection. Both are part of the things that flow from the human discussion, as a faith. 

Dasein then names neither the representation or the consciousness. Yet, we are asked: “How does consciousness, knowledge as representation, relate to Dasein?”

It is strange that the statement is given as a paraphrase: consciousness is determined, as though in advance, as knowledge. Specificly, knowledge as representation.

Is consciousness knowledge? Is knowledge consciousness? These are the questions that in th
eir obviousness, went unquestioned for the longest time. But Dasein, as what is to be “seen”, in relation, to these two, is concretely to be thought in the dubitative envisaging. However, this means the language disclosing is part of what is to be seen. In the reflection-knowledge the language is not noticed.