Objectivist religion, objectivism: beings-searching-for-a-railing.

All religion flows from beings, in some way. It emanates from beings, but proposes to speak of reality. Reality, the concept of reality, must be the same thing as religion. It is what rises for a season, blooms in a fabulous way, becomes at issue, goes to war in polemics, dies. The logos is the mother of beings, in so far as the beings establish their reality with it. The reality is spoken of and is true. Because the true is the logos, and more there is not. Yet, is there anything but religion? The whole of Heidegger treats this question. Yet, the whole of Heidegger, too, is a logos. At this point the divide between perspectives, between regions, between realities, and the something that would be a leap, is not the kind of dispute to be handled by beings. The suggestion that arises, that it is to be handled by something higher, something deeper, something greater, is the reality and the religion again. 

The concept of "world" is not necessary to beings as being, to man as man. It is absent in many languages. Presumably this means that the things as found are not taken up religiously. The work called Heidegger seeks to go back prior to the religiosity (taken, of course, in the sense given above). In Heraclitus for instance. Yet, the necessity of the “is”, as the language announcing the Being problem, is, like the world, not a part of every language. Ancient Hebrew, for instance, has no ‘is’. The is, as such, indicates that language knows Being. Does it “know" Being? Not at all. But, yet, language says, discloses, Being. Does it? If Heraclitus, unlike Plato, does not think of the whole, of the world, hen, and the parts, ta panta, but only of Being, is this really the problem of Being as taken from the religion argument above? Is it an argument? Not at all, it is the task as it calls those who are called to it, as it draws the few forth throughout their life, as their life. For the rest it is an argument. It is not the problem of Being, as taken form above. It is not, either, the preoccupation, or the one who is drawn forth. It is something Heraclitus never asked, nor did its presence come close to Heraclitus at all. Yet, in Heidegger, it is possible to talk to Heraclitus in such a way as to take up the task named above.    

General Considerations of the Removal of the Identity Logos and the Philosophy of the Greeks

Apophansis: determination, determining judgment.

Apophansis, assertion, we understand as predication. It is presupposed that something, over there, is determined as something. That is a word, the thing typed on the screen. That is the “cursor”, i.e., the thing blinking on the screen, in the wordprossesor. This is the simplest form of logic, of logical judgment, as understood from the beginnings of Greek philosophy. The doctrine of logos. Kant says, one can also, in the  extreme case, determine the thing as itself. So that the “synthesising” of the screen and typing, the  “typed screen” (i.e., the screen with writing on it) can become the synthesis of the thing with itself, for instance, the screen is a screen. Heidegger says, the law of thought called identity, reads, a is a. It doesn't read, Heidegger constantly stresses, a = a. 

Then the question of the judgment somehow involves the presupposition of the is. Or, better, language says that the is comes prior to the judgment. We do not presuppose it, but rather language says it is so. We find it there, in what is said: a is a. (The) screen is (a) screen. 

It is in this way that identity, as nature, or the truth is supposed to be uncut, not by man as man, but by language as episteme, as nous or the knower. The knower corresponds in a peculiar way to the “ends” or “goal”, but in the manner that it does not, that it is something beside ends, it has its real and important determination. Ends corresponds to value, value as the polemical contrast with fact. The fact has to be understood empirically, within the lived situation. Descartes was a man concerned with dissecting animals, and with the problem of perception. He was thus concerned with what today we can call scientific concerns. Later, when the modern sense of fact was established, it was in accord with the split in the German universities affected about 1850, between what now is called the sciences and the humanities. (It should be noted that in other centers of thought this happened much later, although there where people concerned with what is now called science, modern science, and established schools and buildings and clubs devoted to these problems, they were not totalizing. They did not have the same consequential power to awaken the concern of the whole intellectual community.)

The ancient distinction, we must not forget, did not concern any such situation or activity. The identity of the thing determined was concerned with saying what each item was to man as man, or the citizen of the community, with the aim of learning the right understanding of the thing. Not at all with the business of the scientist in the modern sense, who is concerned with finding out more and more information, thought as neutral fact. And then, derivatively, applying that that is learned to the life of the people in order to ease the human condition. 

Husserl determines the Cartesian determination in the opposite direction, as does the scientific project and activity. Everything is thought by the doubt, without concern for truth. If all this is a lie, no matter, it is as it is. One, in the phenomenological vision, appeals to no reason. Only to the destiny, or to the history, of the inquiry. History, natural history, was in the beginning of philosophy, thought in opposition to natural philosophy. History meant true inquiry. I go look at something, I look at it right there as it stands before me, and describe what I see. That is true inquiry. Eventually this became what is now called life science, or biology. The description of living things, organisms, cells. If the life sciences are stripped of the Darwinian teleology they lose their sense entirely. They must have an understanding of the healthy and the unhealthy at all levels. The normal and the abnormal, the successful and the unsuccessful. But, in destinal history, there is not judgement. It can never be a science, except in the sense of making true descriptions. But the description is entirely devoid of a larger aim which would explain why it was worth doing. It is not for salvation, either in the secular sense of improving human life, through learning about, e.g., health and its reverse, or in any other sense. 

In speaking of the screen, I only say what now occurs to me, without removing to a theory about what will always be. Knowledge is always understood as what is always true. Truth is what is true, and the truth is what always is. In Husserl's sense, the truth is only of the ground of grounds, in the possibility of observation of what now is. 

The principle of identity is denied, or, better, it is not reached. One does not go so far as to require it. The law of thought called identity is a feature of philosophical logic, of Greek logic, produced in the specific project of the ancient Greeks. But it can’t be denied that it was guiding for over two thousand years, from the time of the first beginning. And in that sense it is there. It is there in the stronger sense of the fact of its part in the whole of the life of the, I say arbitrarily, Greek-American civilization (one could as readily say, Roman-German civilization). It is part of the past means the same thing as it is part of what is here now. Of what this world is. Something like this, whatever else is meant, is in Heidegger, when the text says,  we, the current world, are our history. The primary vagueness of the account is part of the determination of this thinking. This is what Heidegger says, when that text reads: the end of metaphysics. I.e., that text indicates, this world, this one, here, is the end of metaphysics. 

Then, the end of metaphysics still involves reason. It should be noted that the main point, outside philosophy, that offers a contrast, is the received text. The one who has an experience not given to others, who receives the prophetic text, still uses reason to grasp the truth of the text. For instance in the case of a difficult passage, that requires interpretation, and authority differs, one wants to, through exegesis of some manner, get to the truth. The contrast between reason, and faith, for philosophy is not at issue. Philosophy accepts natural and divine reception of texts, but it is concerned with understanding those laws or texts. Human beings find what is received, intelligible. What is spoken of in the sense of reason, in the sense of reason simpliciter, is intelligibility or what is guiding for human beings as human beings. But, in the modern question of epistemology, what is in question is what is as such. Because rationality, unlike the higher notion of antiquity, when it becomes episteme, refers to the bare intelligibility of everything, a stone, the sky, smiling people, a difficult passage in Plato. 

The epistemological question is the question of the historicist. That of pure reason. I.e., of bare intelligibility of the world. When what is behind the Kantian representation is dropped, the pure reason becomes being. And that means the thing in itself, the identity, is no longer a hypothesis. The work no longer places itself on the very substance of the truth. For there is not the eternal, or what always is, the true. 

The great earthquake at Lisbon in 1755 can be understood as a fact, a natural fact. It is not brought about by nous. For nous is the human. It is brought about by nature which is understood as part of the whole, part of the god. The god, with its teleology, must have made that earthquake for some purpose connected to human beings and mainly to their behavior. In this sense the earthquake, is understood, as something in the world. It is a detail of the world that is the world of that god, who is concerned with human beings and their behaviour. It is not that, it must be noted, this is the chief thing, the earthquake was explained in order to say, what natural forces are at work, and then the wrong answer came back. That due to our wrong behaviour, wrong human behaviour, the earthquake happened. The attempt was not to explain the earthquake. Rather people concerned with the education of human beings to the right way of living, subordinated the fact of the earthquake, to themselves. Today the world sense wants to think the character of human beings unimportant. It attempts to subordinate human action to economic events. And it considers earthquakes as unedifying and of interest chiefly for specialists. Earthquakes are of no serious interest to human beings these days, they are simply natural, i.e., neutral events. 

If nous becomes the bare intelligibility of things, it must become the world itself. Therefore it ceases to be human intelligence that is in question, but that of the world. Husserl uses the peculiar formula, the objective subjective. The thinking, bare intelligibility, of the world. 

The question is not of the use of the object. That this object is used ‘as a computer’, it is of the object taken as a detail of a world, under the world animus, the objective subjective, in the way it has its excursus in passing and private human dealings. The object or thing can be used differently according to various authoritative prescriptions. At the same time things unnoticed by the public about the object might come evident to certain circles of the population. But the way in which this power struggle over what the thing is, and how it should be perceived, rests on the thinking of it by the world. The world understood as the end of metaphysics is increasingly the whole physical globe, since almost all leaders and therefore all significant policies, stem from ten or so universities. The transition into global identity, now in its last stage, means also the globalization of the destiney begun at Athens. And thus the end of metaphysics is what all infants, as they become truly human, grow into. Soon there will be only such beings.

PREPARATORY PRECIS TO A CLOSE INVESTIGATION OF THE APOPHANTIC LOGIC OF THE GREEKS ACCORDING TO THE ESSENTIAL IDEA OF HUSSERL 


 

Phenomenological intuition isn’t concerned with the problem of perception, but with speaking what is there into disclosure. The things are thought in the Cartesian manner, as what is. The ego or ‘I’ is not considered at all. The “is” is not Being or the Element, but it is what “is” as something. The apophatic approach, or the something as something, “that” is a chair, “that” is the sky, “that” is boredom. Boredom too, can be “distinct and clear”. Distinct means that it is analytically available, as something contrasted with something else in what is there. Clear means that the essence is intuited, such that it is something, i.e., it has an incomparable peculiarity, what in logic becomes a differentia.

The Element is Being in the early Heidegger. But in the latter Heidegger the Element ceases to be thought as Being. Heidegger attempts to give expression to the Element in the example of the old-fashioned Sunday. There are three stories: The railstation, the superficial party, and the old-fashioned Sunday. Let us examine each point:

1.The railstation is the truth of boredom, it shows how the things “separated” and analytically available as what contrasts with the other things, allows the proposition of boredom to become “distinct”. The situation of the waiting is concrete, the train will arrive. One only needs to wait for the ‘long while’ to pass. The “distinct” situation, taken in aggregate, is an instance of the boredom. The concrete situation as a whole, waiting for the train, is in essence, boring. 

2.The superficial party is the essence of boredom, it concerns the thing “gathered” as opposed to what is “separated”. The gathering is not of the people at the party, but of the boredom, of what sprints by but is a “waste of time”. The conversation was not necessarily ‘tedious’ but it was boring for the reason that it was a waste. In this example, the peculiarity permeates everything, and this one quality can not be analyzed or contrasted. Only as a whole does the superficial party present itself, in the way Heidegger observes it, as something ‘out there’ that stands before one. It is not something before one that the example speaks about, but the waste of time. This peculiar form of “waste” is the essence of boredom. 

3.The old-fashioned Sunday is the Element of boredom. I.e., the Being. In this example we must not suppose, like the railstation, that the end of that day will bring the end of that boredom. The example is an attempt to express the Element, it is not to be thought as a “long while”. What we think of is neither truth, the things there, the train coming to the station, the one walking about with nothing to do, or, the inner state of the one who has been enchanted by the corruption of the superficial party. The party pervaded everything, it gathered and pervaded everything, but it was experienced psychologically, by some ‘I’, who, later, only after, realised the ‘wasted’ character of those tedious hours, who only after saw them for what they were. The old-fashioned Sunday, is the day itself, the beings there. The Element itself is brought open as the matter to be noticed. 

How, in the phenomenological vision, can the Element ever come to be observed? The difference in the texture of the envisaging has to be considered as ‘behind’ the phenomenological intuition. In something like the way that the substrate of the things, seen as something, in the logical judgment, are, left behind, in the phenomenological intuition through the Cartesian removal of the ‘I’. What is removed in the Elemental vision? Heidegger is in a difficulty, because the world is not removed. Boredom, a being in this or that human world, might not be necessary to human beings as human beings. So one might reach the Element of boredom, the Being of boredom, but not come to Being. We can not say that the world is removed, what is supposed to be removed is the thinking of the world. The thinking of the world (the animus) rolls back, and the Being of the world is envisaged.

Other ways of envisaging, taken in the widest sense of seeing or intuiting, but not in the objectivist sense, or in the sense of the problem of perception involving, e.g., an optic loop etc., lead to the Element, in the sense of the envisaging of the world, rather than the relations of interesting things, on the one hand, or the peculiarity of the ‘I’ with its withdrawal or inclusion in the assimilation of the world project as it is brought forth by rubric or with statements and speach. Glossa is language, whereas logos is speech. Written things, likewise, are not language. Language, schematic-abstractedly, also names this Element. Abstractedly thinking, is the thinking of the social projection, that doesn't ‘force’ back the thinking to the world Element. In the latter Heidegger this concrete possibility of envisaging the Element no longer serves to name Being, for the reason that Being is then thought as the unity of the fourfold in various senses. The analysis of the Element is by no means cast aside, but the sense of what is to be thought through is modified through the education of the thinking towards the task that draws it forth. The Element may also be thought in connection to the leading concept of Nietzsche, Rausch. The Rausch would then be thought as time, as the world time, and not either the inner or the being-analytic time.

Some Patched or Dowdy Comments on Our Approach

Menschenkenner rising

From the dancing place of
Morgen-rote-toes
Pink toes of the goddess of the sun
This dance is on the disk of the sun
The sun is Being
History(destiny)-bright

How is Being to be reached at all? Plato’s concept of emotion, as the impromptu, or ready-to-hand, is not Being. Though that notion is embedded in the silly academy notion of Heidegger (whereas, of course, it merely shows the range of the way things or beings are received by episteme or knowing, in discernement, the other half, the present consideration in the explication and classical dialectic or dialogic). The concept of Being, if we take it that way, illicitly (because it must be grasped in the “seeing” and so not as a knowing-conception) is a widening of the concept of culture. The concept of culture is the result of going beyond the concept of politics. As a result of the notion of the state of nature this became thematic. When the culture itself was expanded it become existence, as in Jaspers. Existence says: there is a reason or episteme of the culture, a "knowing" of the beings or things of the earth. A world and an earth. When the cultures, in toto, are given as the mere instances, then we must go to Being. The unity of the earth and the world in "seeing" is Being. 

The cogent question, then, is, how does one "see" that? (One can say that the 'eyes of the soul', as in Aristotle, the seeing of the thing intuited, as seen, that is what the word says, of the accidental perception of the soul, is not sufficient as a concept, to take one to Being, we must know, why this is cogent: i.e., the claim that this method is developed by the few, but simple and teachable, why is it cogent that it is for Being, and not something else?) It is not adequate merely to assert it. But we must show, from the things nearby and available to all, what is Being. But, Heidegger says, can we ever go beyond the rubric? Thereby he admits that he remains at a level of somebody who does not reach Being. He resolutely stands in readiness to make the leap. But why would that be at all justified?  

Such struggle is always only of those called to the task, and does not belong to the innumerable professors, satisfied to make, and counseled by, their simple schematic understanding of the great philosophers. These charming people, not devoid of passion for their work (Heideger, though,it must be said, often ridiculed such people, pointing out their passion, their emotion, and so, their lack of the entelechy, the telos, of Being: the abuse was not idle, even if it was not devoid of ego, it was at its basis, born of the deepest conviction, that conviction, did not have the charterer of devoltion, but rather of an essential necessity), comprise the population of professors in all universities these days. 

But the great philosophers, who speak all the time only for the great philosophers, can only in ruse be students. They are students, but they are not anything one calls students in ordinary terms, because of the deadly seriousness of their work. It is not merely deadly, because it lives beyond the death of the one who thinks. So it is more serious than the deadly. This, again, I constantly emphasis, was the meaning of the old Socrates, for he spoke of the entelechy of the philosopher, of its form which is not destroyed with the death of the great philosopher. What is this community, some aggregation? It is living entelechy, the life of the philosopher as the great philosopher who does not succumb.

I only make these very sparse notes, immersed in this consideration: what is the Historicity of the philosopher? Is this something one is obliged to deal with, or is there true independence? That could not be treated as any matter of genius, but it would be something requiring almost that something befall the earth, so that the obvious would come into question and be reflected in utter understanding. By “the obvious” I mean the residue of History.

Is Being a Knowing? 

The work, or, better, the rigour of philosophy, is to see what discernment already forces on us. The gauge or measure is available only to the philosopher who becomes worthy of philosophy through the other philosophers, and for them. Such is the millennial horizon of philosophy from which we must ask about our presuppositions:  

1. We are not presupposing the thesis: (That the question,) “Whither Being?”, is not a question pertaining to the alteration of things.
2. We, now, do not presuppose ““Whither Being?” is not a question pertaining to the alteration of things.
3. Whereas we question what we, now, know.

If we question what we know we at the same time question the supposed knowledge of being. Being is supposed to be something other than knowing. Knowing has its limit in that it must know something. It has its limit, also, in that it must be for something. One knows trees and stars and human beings. One knows how to take a stroll, to ski, and to read. It could be that something brewing in history, that we are, is already known, but not yet expressed. We don’t assume it, we only investigate the possibility. 

“The history that we are” does not refer to history as it is laid down by statement and artifact. It refers to the history of Being. But how would one “know” at all about that? A preliminary investigation into the foundations of this ‘position’ in thought is necessary. It has its origins in modernity, and was wholly unknown to antiquity. It was “wholly unknown”, but perhaps for that reason it was lived, or, better, it was. Cf. the German conclusion that in Kant, what was to come to utter clarity, knowledge as representation, was completed. Knowledge as representation (not in the Kantian sense, but in the sense of bringing to absolute clarity in the logos, in the Critique of Pure Reason as explication) is clarity about what is foggy, but it is not insight purely. I put that down as a schema. Anyone who thinks it must gauge the reality of the schema. The phenomenological intuition, as the animus of the individual being, as the substance that is something, as thought by Husserl, who, in his turn, credits Descartes with this ‘pure insight’, is to the Apollonian clarity, known to Holderlin as the the proper and true German characteristic, of what was most theirs, is philosophy as insight, over and above the haze of the anima, of pre-philosophy, and the history of the coming to clarity. 

What we are looking at is whether this is a doctrine about being, which would be a knowledge, or if the claim in Heidegger, that philosophy is not a science, can be reached at all. It has to be reached and not known. Heidegger says, this way of thinking, reached by the work of a few, can be taught to many. He says this is like the modern technologies that are themselves based on principles of physics that are properly understood by only a small group of philosophically-minded physicists, such as Einstein, Niels Bohr and Heisenberg. 

The philosophical attitude is that of discernment. The emotional envelopment in the state of pure doing, the platonic notion of the ready-to-hand, as what is impromptu in being is discerning in so far as, there, too, as in the light of a logical inspection of the beings, according to philosophical discussion, as in the Socratic dialogs, a sense of the separation of all beings is somehow given. It is in this sense that Heidegger says, the animal is “poor in Being”. The animal participates in the discernment, but not in the dialogic thought. This kind of diremption is supposed to be the primary problem named in the quandary: Is it ever pausable to say Being without some kind of rubric? It is named again in the question: How did it happen that Being, the Greek ‘on’, became the one and the many (hen and ta panta)? Heidegger says, that, I freely admit, I have “not gotten to the bottom of”. 

Someone who wants to, apart from this investigation, look into the problem of Being, might take this path: Through the intense literary vividness of Dilthey, in what he discloses of the ‘possibility of existence’ called the historial, come to better understand the serious philosophical work of Husserl, which is totally misunderstood everywhere. I will not pursue that path here, but look at another way. Let us take up the rubric lebensraum, which is a concept of Friedrich Ratzel. I don’t intend to say anything about Ratzel or his concept, but rather to use this concept apart from Ratzel, for the purpose of approaching the thinking of Being, first in counterpoint to the knowing of being, but then as an approach to the understanding of Heidegger’s way of producing Being as Time (i.e., the time of the animus or intention of the world). 

Lebensraum does not say, what is for the English language speaker quite similar sounding, Grossraum. That is a concept of political policy or doctrine. Lebensraum says, this is a living space. The life-space is then a “development space”. The body is not something that, at some time, gets as an addition, some life. It is not a receptacle into which life is poured, rather, as Dilthey called it, it is a lived-body. Leben-drive, i.e., instinct, is not something that resides in a lived-body. If we want to ask why this view, concerning the duality of substance had such a millennial power over intelligent human beings, it is because in death something remains. Like Aristotle, one must observe, the change is absolute and not a matter of the subtraction of some entity called “life”.
     

The ‘doctrine’ of Being wants to bring this suggestive development of our thinking to the point of insight. To be convinced of an argument is to know something. But the doctrine of Being wants to ‘see’, as it were, in “time”. But “time” doesn't mean in the alteration of things. It means in Being as time. In the alteration of things resides both psychological quality, as time, and time as the analysis of things contrasted with things. Being as time says “time”, but it in no way names what anyone has ever meant by time. It names the Historial. All we have done is somehow present an equivalence of terms. But, we would have to be able to ‘see’ it, which would be the same as, thinking it in the way Heidegger says can be taught widely. If it can be taught widely, this method must be readily available to the reader of Heidegger. Or at least to the specialists who study Heidegger. In fact something closer to the reverse is true, they do not even look for it. 

The concept of lebensraum tells us nothing about the millennial power of the Greek doctrine of logos, as the constituting judgment, and the assertion. Nietzsche spoke of the corruption of tradition, and his critique was, and is, as Spengler tells us, “unanswerable”. But if the doctrine of logos was supposed to assure the fruitful participation of the philosophers in the search for truth, what are they doing know amidst the decay? Nietzsche held that the constituting judgment, as the ground of the world, was ‘becoming’. He spoke of the “sovereignty of becoming”. If I come to apprehend a thing, in the constituting judgment, I by no means reach the “truth” or the thing in itself. But, says Nietzsche, so long as what I assert is according to the constituting judgment, I speak the world (as it is). More there is not. 

Everything in the project of historial being recoils form the loss of the fruitful participation in the millennial, teleological, animus of the philosophers. This suggests that through some deep need a project was invented. So Nietzsche himself believed. That would be his “life-giving lie”. But, Husserl, least of all, seemed susceptible of such a motive. There had never been a more sober and, if we may say so, dry, mind in all of philosophical life. Such a mind has not an ounce of Rausch, or the rushing feeling that carries one away, in it. If Heidegger, in following his master has everything of the fanatic in his gaze, Descartes, nonetheless, who Husserl places the beginning of the historial, can not have been guilty of Nietzsche's “lie”. Since, he was working towards the project of objectivism, as the securing of the ground of thought in apodictic splendour, as the transfer of the certainty of basic maths to the region of a physical nature concept (according to the essential interest in motion laid down by Galileo). 

What ‘tears it’ between the aging Husserl, and the young turk, if we may put it that way, Heidegger, is the question of the end of the animus of philosophy. It seems that only if the whole of the history of the project, of the Western world from Plato to the end, were laid down, could the, as Husserl himself put it, “point” of the matter be grasped. Then there is some reason to suspect Heidegger of going too far in this, but that is superficial evidence. One needs to ‘see’ it all. “A wild animal reduced to possession” has got in it the animus of the ‘house broken’ thing. If it goes free, straying according to Artemis (who is the barbaric one, and the butcher) and then returns, we know that it is not able to abandon its teleology. The philosopher, too, has strayed, so that one asks, is this one a philosopher, and that one? Or have they begun to do “something else”? For the most part it is obvious that those who are supposed to be doing “something else” are simply vacuous epigones, who merely fidget about in confusion. One could only know this, however, if one could come into the animus of the historial and see whether or not it has pooled up in an “end” or, whether, by counterpoint, it is in Nietzsche's sense, a corruption and a “lie”.

The approach to the things presupposes, and actively offsets itself, from the traditional avenue. It continues in its own way. The question is whether the realization of the end of the seeking for the ground, itself amounts to having found the foundation. Philosophy was episteme ratio, the search for the truth or fact itself for the sake of reasoning beings. The search always meant the search for the agreement of those who know, the compulsion to agree because if one looked in a very serious way, and checked everything out, one would find no flaw. It was assumed that reason was not part of the “muddle” of the senses. The doctrine of Being doesn’t continue to contemplate the problems of philosophy in this sense. It does not consider the “muddle” of the Hericliteans as the ‘irrational’, as the opposite of the securing of the truth of the thing known. It doesn't deal with the question it now ‘sees’ to be artificial, and wrongheaded (as taken abstractly, by the current philosophers and thinkers, but not as the necessary historial growth). At first philosophy is faced, at the first beginning, with the logos as the gravity of man as man, over and against the nature of the things. This distinctive diremption belongs to a season of Western thought. To Western being as a Historial flowering. It is more simply expressed as the contrast of the traditional things, with the human will. Therefore, it is no great surprise that, for all the positivist fuss about the object, and the ideal, those who know the tradition know also that this problem too is presupposed, and can not become forcible from the phenomena, as something evinced. It has power only for those hypnotized by the thoughtlessness of what approaches divine revelation, i.e, as Strauss used to say, the things we got from parents and teachers when we were young.  

Being, is not supposed to be grasped in the ‘seeing’, but it is suggested by the fact that when we see the necessity of the beings, as individuals that through their intentionality, their mind or animus, open a world, one can then see further, and open up the insight into Being through the grasping of all that is thought. The concepts, like windows, can be ‘seen’, but the concept of concept can not be seen. So it is at the end of thinking. Concept means, for example, that a tree and a cat can be enumerated. The world is such that numbering is there. It is thought as a opening in the world, and not as some doctrine or ability. It is not episteme, it is a animus of the anima, or a way of thinking of the being that is there. All the thinking in the historial thinkers, presupposes the opening out from the substance onto the psychological being of man, and the objectivist vision of the beings or things. When Heidegger, for example, speaks of humans, he does not mean anything that anyone normally means when they say that word. The time named, in the sense of Being as time, is the conceptions, such as the math conception, in their world constituting animus. Which is, of course, not a knowable thing, because it lies at the singular foundation, prior to what is knowable.