Thursday, April 4, 2019

On Economics Considered as a Metaphysics

Related image

Something “produced” is “supplied” to meet the “demand” for “consumption”, and this is a “market”.   
What the sentence before this one says stands as a philosophy of economics which treats the vague   
every-day words, those said in scare quotes, as the “why” or “cause” in the opinion of the many for their  
existence in the decisive respect. One exists, then, so far as commodities exist, and one is such a being  
as to have commodities available to it in the widest sense. One lives in “the market”, such is   
the marching order, and there it seeks according to the truth which is unconcealed 
according to the being of Dasein. Only in a mythical sense can one say that “once upon a time” the word  
economics was a word that named the household of a Greek, and pointed to the subject matter of  
it management as in the work by Xenophon, Οἰκονομικός.
Looking forward, into memory, Hobbes appears as one who groped, half-way in every respect, towards 
reality. He was, by mythos, “the first economist”, yet, needless to say, he missed the mark in every 
serious sense and never grasped the nature of commodity properly. For in Hobbes, the life of man is
still higher and more serious than commodity itself, as what stands alongside commodities in the market 

An episteme proper to the truth of Dasein was not available to Hobbes. He fundamentally 
misunderstood truth. For Hobbes, truth was a matter of “self preservation”. Power, in Hobbes, still had a
mythical and fairytale like unclarity. Power, and that meant, man’s ability to think possibilities. The, I take
pride in my ability to generate new possibilities. In Locke, a step towards reality is achieved when he

 modifies the notion of self preservation as the essence of man’s telos and speaks of “comfortable self 

preservation”. Power, in Locke, is now achieving a kind of reality, for Locke takes over the possibility 

and endows it with reality when he says: happiness is to have the ability to command the things that 

bring happiness rather than the enjoyment of them. In this, he begins to set aside the mythical “self 
preservation”, for, to be sure, no one ever did calculate on the basis of the belief in their own death. 
Momentous he prepares to set aside the possibility as human, and lets power be ability to move 
commodity as such. Here we begin to understand the market as the situation of Dasein. The truth 
that is uncovered is the ground and source of Dasein itself.

Truth means what is forever, what is always available to found a science on, it is what “everything relies
 on”. Economics regarded metaphysically points to a philosophic wisdom. At first, one thinks of a
 dialogical arrived at orientation towards the market. Does the market belong to force called “the
 invisible hand”? Or to a “spontaneous” dispensation? To be sure, in a sense, everything is set loose,
 the producers, the supply side, with their hopes to capture some part of the demand of the average
 Dasein in its essence as consumer who looks about shrewdly with eyes clear for some clearance sale
 at a Walmart. Everything comes forth as it does and can never be set down as a orderly rule. And yet,
 on the other hand, a very few individuals, according to a special hexis, an ethos, which is the essence
 of their being, deal with themselves to produce the core of the supply and all serious innovation. If this
 ethos is a phronesis, for instance, in that of Wall Street, or of the modified and differing ethos of Silicon
 Valley, takes hold of capital flows, interjected the university and its research laboratories, and its link to 
the market, of all capital gains as a running ahead of all beings including those of university endowments,
 of a constant whirl of capital pointing obliquely towards massive military requirements, whereby all 
value gravitates and accumulates in armed core stores of value, for instance in offshore ventures 
which are bought back by the core managers after an initial offering, then we see the ragging 
of power in its real and no longer mythical form (one should note: the ability to obliterate from the 
face of the planet obstacles to the flow is not the reality of the commodity, for it is assured by the 
human being itself and only visible what the human is no longer seen a "subject" alongside its 
"commodity", but as what allows commodity to come forth at all in a market world: this sense of 
the form of truth moves in a fundamentally different way than the Marxist notion that capital was 
overemphasis at the expense of other forces due to polemical extremes between Marx and his 
contemporaries, rather, here, what is at stake is thinking phenomenologically in the proper sense of 
a "phenomenology of the inapparent"). 

So far as this power sets aside all possibility of confusing itself with nineteenth century mythical notions
 of natural value, and becomes “air”, set loose from all benchmarks, from all reserves, from gold, from
 the “real economy”, moving according to the last airy myth of its positive externality and its visibility as a
 gigantic planetary ponzi scheme, one begins, at length, to see the arche or origin of economics, the
 primordial “why”. This why is being itself. So far as Descartes speaks of the cogito ergo sum, such that
 in each experience there is the cognition of the universal, of commodity, in each commodity that sits
beside other commodities, the sum, the consumer, is supposed to be the ground that essentially allows
 the market to come forward. And yet, phenomenologically, is the consumer even any more necessary?
 “Logically” the consumer is the one who may be deceived by the notion that they have there something
 they might conceivably demand. The very fact that they could be mistaken in the belief that they 
demand something proves that they are consumers. This is not only a epistemological truth, a truth
 stable as a syllogism which might be discussed in the shadow of the houses apart form “actual life”,
 but, rather, at first, the contradiction, is alive in common dealings, in life. The contradiction in ordinary
 life is the mistake or lie. I don’t demand this thing, but I am such to know that I don’t demand it. I believe
 myself to demand it, but I'm such to be confused or mistaken about this belief. And, therefore, I am a 
consumer, one who has been mistaken in what I am to demand. Yet, did Husserl really make this 
mistake? Perhaps so. It is so in Husserl that something mysterious and worthy of our consideration 
occurred. Husserl produced outstanding students which later in turn influenced his own thinking. In his 
final works he showed the fruit of this influence, having gleaned the essence of his great student 
Heidegger. Thus, again, in Husserl, there is a consideration of the: it can not be a “mistake”: the 
Cartesian formula, I doubt, but, by this, am such to doubt, I am such to be fooled, and so am. A genuine
 phenomenology, it comes clear, through Heidegger, can not be bound by the ”mistake”. It outstrips the
 possibility of any science. Thus, its truth is not forever. In thinking over the essence of the uberhaupt, 
of the philosophy of uberhaupt, of overhead, of everything, of the “framing”, Heidegger lets being be, 
not by refusing the noumenal , but, rather, by letting the noumenal be as what is untouched by pathos, 
by pathe, by the cycles that move the moon and the emotions that are, for man, interest, the interest of 
a mother in her children, of a man in his country, of the philosopher in, what?--at length, the letting be 
of any philosophy. 

It is a strange thing that the word “bitte”, translated in English as “please”, has for its essence 
something like command. At bottom it is a command, and is felt often as simple rudeness. Where the
 word please is essential an extension of the region of courtesy holds sway. It may, at times, be felt as something
 formal, something that enforces a removal from the other, but it is rarely felt as rude, the very opposite
 of its essential meaning. If the German language has no word for please, is this simply explainable by
 means of “action”, of behaviour? Isn’t it that behaviour already names a mode of Dasein? Is
 financialization to be set aside in different languages, and shown not to exactly hold, in this or that
 “culture”? Or, does it already point to a concern with truth? What kind of truth? A truth that is eternal,
 and that all humans should seek to grasp in their hexis, in their ethos, in their being? But, is this at all
 what is at stake for a being thought in the sense of a phenomenology which is without the possibility of
 a mistake? Here we are drawn to consider how thinking differs from knowing, and come to the translucent
 crystal of the saying that “we are not yet thinking”--indeed!, we still want to know! 

Thursday, March 28, 2019

The Methodos as Path in decision and fate

The "when" is given as: the age of "science" by the authority of the sciences, tacitly and for the most part.
The unconscious: "higher nobility" (this is yet still quite true, one need only consider the banking center 
of London in its clubs which all but worship the "royals", and the surviving names, by curiosity, 
for instance, of the Bismarks and so on), wealthy billionaire or industrialists (still, there is conservatism 
remaining in the face of the account of elite universities which always attempts to put the professional 
class, including, of course, the porffesorite in the sham-highest tier, as though they too were Krupps, 
Rothschilds, and so on), poet or artist, as a "what do they do?" by way of a "world" valuing, sits strangely before the: age of 
"science" in its "when", the world is in its "when". The "when" of Christian time, the "anno dommini", has 
"decided" to be another time, the secular, the inverted time, yet, even more deep in the night, it decides, 
fatefully, "not to be" (cf. Dugin). The "when", however, against the reading of Dugin, one must say, has also 
its "here", its earth. The earth, the where does being happen, is also in the "being as time". Being as time, to 
be sure, does not only name the thinking as the opening, of technology, of time as the age of science 
(its authority never dies), when each one, still forgetting, the today or yesterday, makes themselves capable of political opinions 
(facts as phenomena) that point back to scientific "facts" (facts as phenomena that are repeatable) 
but see the nihilism everywhere else, the other is mere political scientist, I am the age of science as fact 
(so much for the commonplace nihilism which is half way, and half a headache to itself, half a sword of 
Damocles threatening to awake from its unconscious and dishonest sleep: the, I lie on this side, turn 
over and lie on the other). The commercial order comes over the world, the commercial military complex, 
and in the world that is "when": secular time, the age of science, it requires of the "when" its  
empowerment and its "sea lanes".

Whoever knows only today, does not know the being of today. Only by knowing also yesterday, does one  
know today. The thing that “flows”, as green dot, flows only if on a background, a darkness. In this way in 
Heidegger the “phenomenology of the inapparent” finds in the Early Greeks (it is interesting to note that  
this formula avoids the tournament which might result in a sensitive student of the tradition over the 
the question: pre-Socratics or pre-Platonics) a place to ask: Where is it? Where is the day that we know? 
 The question, where does the day grow into night? Where does yesterday become tomorrow, is already  
a questioning in the proper Heideggerian manner unknown to the early Greeks. Where is the being?
This knowing as being, arete is a habit, to know is to be, the excellent pole vaulter is what the name says,
does not merely know of his skill. This knowing, close to “possibility” as dunamis, is a remembering as a
constant remembering. Heidegger says, in remembering, it remembers something, thereby it is not the
being which I name. This remembering, is another thinking of thinking as Opening. The Opening is a
name for anything being there at all.

The “where does it happen” makes one wonder if being is a “there”. But, being is surely at least a “now”.

 So long as the “it flows” does not ask about the being of the “it flows”, it names phusis, the primordial

 Greek thinking first raises this nature. Nature is not known in any other human group but the Greek.

 The, “it flows” as the “it comes forth of itself”. This, it comes forth is at once bounded in Greek thought, it

 is bound to the possibility of art, of the teachable skill and the making of artifact or equipment, and to
 the nomos or law. The Promethean is already thinking itself out. Most of all Prometheus is the one who
 first brings the being of nature, because he sets nature alongside regularity, the moon, the stars, and as
 Goethe says “anderes Gottes”. Muthos speaks to being. Let muthos speak to us. The Greeks speak of the
 ippos (hippos), and of the alogos, meaning qudrapeds, horses and hippos. Since the horse is very much
 human, and seems to understand us, the early Greeks called it the one who doesn't speak (a-privative).
 Likewise, the lumbering hippopotamus, striking the early Greek with its swift running, is called the swift
 one.  This means that the word does not name a noun. A “person place or thing”. The language put
 certain words after the article, “hoi polloi”, it allows however also the verbal “nouns”. The notion of a
 stable thing, the being of the animal, is not part of the language and what it says when it first speaks.
 Aristotle says, the verbs add motion. Aristotle is unaware of what is primordial and already comes late.

Here, we can not think: the verbal noun came first (or, perhaps, the saying of a verb voicing emotion
 for a noun). Then the fixed idea of a physical body, then the animal, the being alongside being as a eidos,
as what has a nature. Or some such. Rather, we reflect here that the use the words make of us is historial
 in the full sense of the “radically mysterious dispensation of fate”, Strauss’ formula leaves out the human
 decision which is what Heidegger insists on. Decision and fate: the Heideggerian formula. The
 relinquishing of being, therefore, in the essence of technology, is decision and fate. These matters which
 are out of the reach of our understanding so far as they are primordial, are, nonetheless not past or
 future, but being (the addiction to thinking direction in time is powerful, Simmel has sensed this; 
his decisive investigations which keeps utterly close to the "subject matter" are invaluable). 
The muthos of Prometheus, the end of the cosmic Gods, the rise of the Olympian gods,
still speaks to us. The muthos is not merely a dichtung, a singing near to truth, rather, it is floating out at
 the same time as the “it flows” and the “what comes forth of itself”. It then shows what is at the same
 time the fate and decision of the Early Greeks. We must, from here on, endeavor to make concrete use of
language. Language, uses us, yet, there is in it decision. This belongs to the region of the question: What
 is Thinking? One could say, with as much justice: the most audible thing in this silence is that we are not
 yet hearing. 

Tuesday, March 19, 2019

Howsofar is the Thinking Justified which thinks the “ontological difference” as a modification of Husserl's Phenomenology?

Being is. Beings are. Is and are are forms of the same word, fitted to plural and singular. 
The designations plural and singular make no distinction between absolute plural and 
absolute singular. Being “is one” in the sense said by Parmenides is no different from 
saying that a clod of dirt in a field is one (clod, among others). The thing pointed to, so 
far as language speaks naturally (n.b.!), never reaches being in the sense of the “is”. If being is 
one, it names what “is”. Hen, one, and ta panta, the many, both “are”. The are and the is 
are separated in a way that does not touch on being in the way it is spoken by the 
ergon with the name Heidegger. 

Being is. Beings are. Howsofar is this thought as a “difference” at all? Rather, in Heidegger, 
these sayings name the thinking rather than knowing which is in question as the subject 
matter. Beings, are never without, being. But a being, the grammatical referent, the clod, 
the thing that “primary substance” is attributed to according to the Greek theoria of phusis 
(idea, idos) as morphe (form), is. One thing that can be pointed to by a finger on a human 
hand is. Ergo: one (thing) is. But, also, one, as Hen, is. The Parmenidean on, also, is.

It is in just this sense that we hold that the Heideggerian ontological difference names 
a modification of phenomenological research. This has its counterpart in the claim that 
“clock time” already had a prefigured past prior to its theorization in the day and the night. 
This goes further. The Promethean is also to be set aside in this thinking of being as the 
“is” which is many and is one. The Promethean moves in the sphere of the attempt to 
establish the concept of regularity as a truth. Ergo, that the cosmic gods were set aside 
because human beings discovered the nomos of phusis, much prior to any theoria of 
this finding. That the seasons followed each other, for example, was not known to early 
beings. Instead, the hot and the cold seasons came when they did, without order. 
On the other hand, the Promethean, in modern times, means the attempt to think the 
human without the embarrassment of the animal nature. Ergo: the “animal is a human 
without ratio”, read as an absurdity to embarrass the Aristotelian differentia or definition 
out of truth or intellect which appeals to the truth. The Promethean then is a name, in 
modernity, in some sense: for the radical conversion to the transcendental imagination 
which is then set aside as though it were only a matter of removing Aristotelian naiveté. 

For Phenomenology this is tacitly settled by the naked refusal of nature, and the 
acceptance only of essences, of the phenomenological as what is “holding sway” 
as what it is = understood clearly to be this or that, whether of an entity or of the 
content of a sentence. Ergo, the distinction between history, the region of direct 
data, and, on the other hand, reason, what is brought out by discussing the data 
under the shadow of the houses, as it were, is essentially possible, but not true by 
nature. It belongs only to intelligibility, which, on the whole, is kept in abeyance. 
No knowing is here possible so far as knowing belongs to nature. However, this 
is all, in Heidegger, already subject to the prefiguring of “day and night”, of “clock time”, 
of what was already there for humans before the “break down” of theoretical presence. 
We here notice, that in Dreyfus presence is misunderstood to mean something like 
a man in an armchair. Rather, on the whole, presence means the same thing as the 
technological essence. For us, all is presence, all is moglichkeit as a drunkenness 
and Hobbsein (Hobbes, the translator of Gallean method into the philisophic sphere: 
into the lawmaker's art, political philosophy) pride. A recent book is titled: 
“the Cult of the Irrelevant” (which, however, concerns the related sphere of policy 
rather than law), which signals that this Nietzschean truth, as it were, 
is still being announced, as if it were not quite rightly known, in our own time.

The ontological difference at the same time means: philosophy no longer exists. 
Philosophy is the name for the highest use of reason. Reason has no essential 
part in the European science, but only in the accident of imagining working assumptions. 
The European Science is vert-frei. However, the theory of the value free fact is not 
scientifically establishable. The abiotic region of wind and storm, or of the cosmic 
gods is at play. Reason then, can not longer do but to attempt to think being. 
This being is first a modification of the phenomenology of Husserl as the: 
failure of reason, of the essence of man. In this sense, it is meant, in Heidegger, 
to declare itself without belonging to the history which has its center in time with the 
Greek positing of nature. The theoria of nature has failed. But, only when thought 
by the Promethean drive which seeks to raise the ant, the man in the cave, 
to the sure regular knowledge of phusis as an absolute pleasure. This “mission” 
(to use an expression favoured by Alexander Dugin) then is obstruction in being.