Friday, October 4, 2019

  1. What is “Intentionality” properly?




Image result for husserl

This is connected to the section of Husserl with which Heidegger took great interest, where the description of a sentence is given. Something along the lines of what follows is in question. The sentence says, for instance, the bird flies. But, then, it says, look there, at the opening of the wings. Look at how the air flows beneath the wings. The bird soars. There! There! He reaches the heavens! And so on. 

So far as the sentence, which speaks, is the source of the great thing, of reason, it is of interest. But, but that way, we follow the path recommended of old. We start with what we know, and go towards what is more unclear. 

What matters in Intention is this: It is said in the world (Speech happens in the world). Thus, what matters is, it is not a question of language understood as a matter of significance or semantics. Language is a matter of an event in the world. Language is like the animal’s call. It simply moves the things there. What “things?” Even when we speak of animals, we already run with something that is told to us. Told to us by language. In this sense, one must consider that language is primary. Why? Because it is not something inside, that tells about something “physical.” It is already the sound that draws all things into possibility. It is already something out there. 


Intentionality, though, only poses for us a question. It says, noise is out there, the animal signal is out there. It is no mere talking to ourselves in the head. 

Everything, then, hangs on this, in the way Language speaks, can it bring us to something more than mere talk? Here everything hangs on entering language. Otherwise, after all, language would remain only mere “talk.” 

Our first attempt should be this: To bring Cassirer and Husserl. For Cassirer is where language has been grasped most solidly out of the primordial, or, better, from what pushes back to the primordial. Husserl, however, sees something more simple. Speech is phenomena. 


Intentionality is prior to “nature.”
Speech as language is prior to “nature.”

The first hint is this: Nature is what comes forth of itself. It poses a contrast to what holds still in metaphysic. What is "prior" is still floating prior to the question of Augustine, to the observation of Augustine!

In all such thinking the question whether the thing is even intelligible comes in. As in the question about the Kantian “noumenal.” Is the noumenal even intelligible? Is it intelligible to speak of something that is not even a possibility? Namely, the event. If the event were only a possibility, it would be a development out of what is already gripping us. 

Why does time remain only thinkable in a direction if time itself is nowhere given? Time is no more clearly given than is this “noumenal” which is not even thinkable, not even intelligible. [One must object, but isn't time thinkable and intelligible, and so to the possibility of what is thought in the thinking of "event?"] The very intelligibility of the intelligible comes into question. Everyone knows so many things that they don’t know. That is how it looks. A notion already noticed, of course, by Augustine. Totalized by Kant with his Categorical Imperative because he assumes all acts, everything caused by human choice, can be raised to clarity in principles. One acts, but doesn't raise it to consciousness. But, it would come into the regions of metaphysics if one did. You merely think, but you don’t yet think “onticly.” 

Tuesday, October 1, 2019

A Review of the Difficulties out of the Ground of Common Sense 

The question about how to represent history, so called history, is superficial when compared to the question of how we are to grasp time in its essence. History means primarily the history of the nation, its battles and the transformation of economic arrangements, its conception of rights, of the meaning of the legal person, of citizens and subjects, duties, self-sacrifice, the place of liberty, and various other metaphysical issues of knowledge which always become stale when divorced from the living interest of the people. The history of a country, in our own time, is at war with the history of the world. The consideration, known for 24 centuries, thought through constantly by a few, of the distinction between the country and the world, between the interests of the country and the universal law of reason, of nature’s logos, raged for the longest time within hidden minds, hovering at the cusp of public attention. Often men were suppressed or burned from speaking too nosily on this score, or ,too rashly. Considering that even Millennia ago a hundred years was felt as a long time (as still now despite all the clamor about the transformation of the mental effects of our lived time experiences among those who regard themselves a mental aristocracy), it has been a ponderously huge span of time since these things have been present to the most thoughtful. And yet, since the dawning of cosmic nihilism, since the beginning of the scientific age, where science means not the product of reason, but rather technique, external experiment, the region that excludes moral investigation, such discussions can only be considered from a sub-rational, and, increasingly, an irrational vantage (which was to some extent always true in the political sphere, but not in the University. Not in the highest intellectual authority; however little its force was felt in actual affairs). That which was to be universal, the reason in nature, faded out.    

Husserl who was a mathematician of the first rank, and schooled in physics, diagnosed the difficulty under the word, natural science has become a science of nature. The science of nature is one meaning of the sense in which, after the longest spell of propagandizing, the Enlightenment was compelled to admit that its premises were not self evident. The question went away, because it was impossible to turn back to reason, to philosophy and rational religion, and de facto it was settled that no moral standards were possible (said in the sense of the theoretical discussions which much later on became the Hart Fuller debates and such-like, ergo the turn to the so-called Positive law [which, true, had always been the great power in practice, but in the minds of human being's was constantly weighed against a rigorously developed, and not merely anarchical and insane, conception of Justice). The most intelligent people grasped this in Germany, the full force of the crises, already around the year 1900. Thus WWI was followed by the greatest period of freedom ever known to human beings during the Weimar, the doctrines of Hegel, still rational, were replaced with those of von Gierke and the like, a theory of the people and their "natural law" was adduced, since sheer desperate moral chaos was only confounded by a strange sense of teetering on the creative zenith the collapse of 29' was all the more a shock. (After the Second War, as with the question of cancer caused by tobacco, long raised in Germany, the issue was suppressed by the non-rational, non-deliberative, non-Liberal in any serious sense, American political-corporate forces (as described in Schmitt), and partly by American stupidity and unconsciousness, partly because the war was understood sensibly as an economic catastrophe. Yet, conscious understanding of a matter never destroys its essence or reality which remains no matter what view is taken of it, as with the cancer question. [This implies that the datum of the intellect have a real status in a new and as yet at the time unthought way, this was thought through by Nietzsche, but long partly hidden behind the works of Weber, the great Simmel, and the like.]) The so called axioms of the Science of Nature were at least two-fold. On the one side, the ultimate theory of inertia. Stemming from Galileo, and still in control of the field of physics, places an imaginary vacuum, something that one has never encountered, at the center of a theoretical grasping of the universe. Because this requires many breaks with reasonableness, for instance the claim that “nothing is faster than the speed of light,” which plays on the distinction between the inertial frame of reference, the calculable field of matter which resists or moves freely, and a conceptual nothing, which nonetheless seems necessary in the light of the theory of the "heat event’s" ("Big Bang") expansion. Necessary not to the science of physics, because there whatever can not be measured does not exist, but to human reason. Because there, with reason, it is inconceivable that the universe could have expanded to the size it has, within the limits of the speed of energy moving through the vacuum. All this posits a fictionalism. 

On the other hand, there is a deeper objection, which is not everywhere understood. It stems from Kant’s synthesis of the problems raised by Hume concerning causality and the traditional view of the intellect. This view was taken up by Schopenhauer, who replaced causality with his famous world “Will”. For 22 centuries the discussion of the human soul, with its senses (actions/capacities of the eyes, ears, etc.), its urges, and its intellect, with all the happenings which go under the name “anthropology,” which meant the logos, the reason, or the serious discussion of Anthropos, the human being, and psychology, the careful study of the soul, with words or with reason, reason being a specific feature of speech, that which grasps ideas or kinds of things, trees, iron ore, wolves, thoughts, continues unabated. Sometime after the year 1800, as the technological “science,” tecnhe, in contradistinction to the “queen of the sciences,” Philosophy, and to Theology, the science from which the moral law must ultimately be derived, there arises an empty concept (when understood in its technical meaning, which, is never for the most part grasped in any precision, such that Chalmers often gives some older, say Descartes, thinker, utterly absurdly, as its origin.), consciousness. One can speak about all manner of problems with respect to the soul, but with respect to consciousness nothing can be said with respect to its content. Theoretically it is the sin qua non of experience. There can be an experience without push carts, without clouds, without the sea, without vision, without any thing which might follow the definite article, and so forth. There can be no experience that doesn't also have consciousness. [What is "also" supposed to mean here?]

Because Kant works from what is reasonable, from reason, he never posits this empty so-called epistemological condition. He speaks of space, and he speaks of time. He says, also, though in theory the question of causality is difficult to maintain, it is unreasonable to give the issue a great weight. Since, though, there is the bare logical consistency of the denial of causality, an event need not have a cause, nothing is inconsistent in an event, which would otherwise by an effect, which were spontaneous and came out of nothing. In creativity properly so-being. So far as consciousness is taken in the experimental sense of techne, of what everyone calls science, it names something that exists so far as it is effective. Therefore it is worth observing that such a concept excludes the grasping of creativity. Creativity is not a matter of the law of reactions, of things that either exert force, or move in the vacuum according to the ideal thinking of the concept of inertia. Talk of consciousness, as an abiotic being, remains within the region of Techne. It has no moral content. Which means, at the same time, no human content. So far as the human is not understood as measurable quantity of mass or a system of entropic energy. If the human is supposed to mean an animal with speech, reason/logic, it is excluded from the region in which the consciousness concept moves. Therefore, the discussion of the analytical philosophers, Chalmers on the one side, Dennnett on the other, remains sterile with respect to philosophy in any serious sense. On the other hand, if philosophy is genuinely over, and has become “science,” e.g., the unhuman, techne, the alien, it is worth noting that the doctrine of creativity must be regarded as a subjective fiction. So far as the human being is subjective, all its experiences are fictions. Or, merely subjective. It might be asked, how can such a being have a science at all? It is because, of the one hand, logic in the sense of Frege and Russel, where it means not reason, but mathematical logic, is simply taken on faith. Thus, again, the problem of authority of the so-called axioms. 

Mathematical perfection is no different at all in the most complex mathematical effort, in that which only through the most lengthy and superhuman study one might grasp, than in the simplest. So far as bare arithmetic, the number one, is grasped as perfectly equal to another one, in the intellect, we have the basis of all mathematical thinking. The perfection of the objects of the intellect. A triangle, in this sense, is never perfectly manifest. This means that the human intellect is made the standard of the science. Thus, human subjectivity is made the standard. The inner human workings. Once the doctrine of the soul is knocked down, the justification for holding this region, where imagination, envisaging a triangle, and conception, thinking of the three sided object as such, must come from its efficacy in estimation of happenings. Estimation means prediction in the modern sense. So far as the intellect, a subjective field, generates efficacious imaginings and concepts, it is deemed useful. It is useful, though merely subjective. What counts as objective is the sense data. Howsofar is a conception of sense data theoretically valid once there is no contrast with urges and intellect? A bare empiricism differs from Philosophic empiricism, as was know to the tradition for 22 centuries. A bare empiricism has no logical meaning (logical, that is, for reason which has layed down to itself certain limiting determinations as rules). Because each object is unique as given in experience. No oak is exactly as an other oak. Nothing can be “built up” scientifically. The meaning of the logical induction from the tradition was that the thing pointed to, the “singular” being, was the object of the intellect which discovered in the singular patterns. That I find that of all the Redwoods I see, they each grow toward die Himmel, towards the sky or heavens. The crowns of the trees become, then, part of a structure of “particulars,” that is, particulars under universals. The tree I can point to is the thing of the senses only, but it is subsumed under the scientific datum of the intellect in its pattern finding capacity. Thus something that is true in the past, now, and in the future is rescued from the destructive decay of time. The river of time soaks into its body and melts all the Redwoods, all the stuff of the senses, but the intellect has saved something for its Metaphysics. It’s as simple as that. 

When Russel says, Heidegger has confused his logical “nothing,” with a psychological “nothing.” He makes one of his typical thoughtless remarks. Russel, who was an intelligent man and thought through many problems with quite exemplary clarity, never thought through the basic foundation of the modern technical scientific development. He rejected Kant already before the turn of the century just when the Marburg school had raised him to his new glory! Russel simply ignores the difficulties in the English style, as denoted by Macaulay, who, in another connection says that the English always ignore “asymmetries” when it is covenant so to do. This attitude, it must be said, for good or ill, is impossible for the German. One may think, true, of Pushkin's Hermann, and pity the German his agitation over mere trifles, which, from the perspective of daily life have little meaning, or, seemingly little meaning. Yet, is nihilism a trifle? Is the inability, self confessed, by all quarters, of the leading power in the whole of human life, namely science to distinguish good from evil, a trifle? It is, rather, a crisis unparalleled in the human development. It is nearly impossible to credit Dugin with such foolish utopianism with respect to the overcoming of the spirit of cosmic nihilism. Yet, on the other hand, a choice had to be taken to enter the contest. 

Heidegger says that what is lacking is the spirit that can see the crisis for crisis, that is, can even admit the existence of a crisis. It is true that Heidegger himself, his teacher Husserl, Leo Strauss, and quite a few others did admit this crisis, but who today does? One might suppose Dugin himself. However, his powers of philosophy are less than his powers of faith, if one might say so, if this is so. Here we must again attempt the path that was taken by Husserl. The crucial decay in the time of Husserl is that of psychology. Psychology becomes, at length, after passing through the stage of Associationalism, into mere experimental, thus, “scientific,” what, study of the soul? A ridiculous absurdity. A study of the rational animal carried out without rationality. Or, as it is said, with the so-called notorious “instrumental rationality.” Instrumental might as well read nihilistic. 

From the point of view of Nietsche where does the doctrine of the overcoming of nihilism come in? For Nietzsche Nihilism is said in another manner. His sense is that though man’s essence, his reason, is still intact, its datum is arising out of the abyss of the will. And this abyss of the will is but one logos among 1001. There is no so-called subjectivity, because Nietzsche begins with the critique of causality. With the ground of rejection of the specific ordering of the causal things, for instance that one can not merely say because day follows night that night caused day, an investigation of causality, confusing to common sense, opens up. It is solved by the standard of predictability (estimation of the changing things, in a non-theoretical sense, ergo not under the strict "science"). This standard, while powerful, is never satisfying to the most intelligent investigators, most of all to Schopenhauer who demolishes it as if in his sleep. So far as what counts is prediction, prediction of the repeatable “fact,” the factical means that the will to repeat a given experiment is the “cause” of the so-called fact. Since whatever is not yet a fact of technological art is merely a historical “singular.” Whatever is singular can not be the feature of a science. Because it is unfolded in past, in the present, in future. It is what according to Thomas, and, to Agathon before him, what marks the limits of God’s power. Even God can not make something once produced, produced in the past, unproduced. This doctrine, in accord with reason, nonetheless, from the point of view of bare intelligibility is imperfect. It is intelligible, as many common entertainments demonstrate hourly, to consider the erasure of some person born in the past through making them not born. The so-called “Mandela effect” conceptualizes an intermediary case, of something partially or imperfectly unproduced. 

The region of intelligibility is more comprehensive than the region of what is reasonable. One can think the reproduction of a past being being caused by the omnipotent God, but the God limited by rationality, can not accomplish this. The Catholic God (ratio ordinata), thus, is the same as the Secular God, so far as the Secular God is said in the phrase “the regularity of nature.” It is a God that is limited by the reasonable. Thus reality and the thinkable differ. However, the analytic philosophical tradition, which is the water bearer of the nihilistic science, in positing such conditions does not speak from reason but from subjectivity. This is so so far as we think theoretically. On the other hand, it is not so that in our ordinary thinking, someone who announces themselves to be an Orthodox Jew, or a holder on the Progressive faith of an inchoate and unthought through Enlightenment “Humanism,” somehow avoided the authority of the sciences. Here, the second meaning of authority is invoked. It is what draws the being of the human being to it of the human’s own accord. It is authority because it makes sense, because it is trusted, because it accords with the human soul. In this sense we come towards the region of Technological Essence. Of what fires within the human, and, is the human. Thus, Dasein is alien to itself, and dismisses itself in its core. What brews in the soul of Dasein is self alienation, in the repudiation of its own essence. Of reason. However, since reason is long forgotten, what thinks? 

In this connection, in connection to the “soul of Dasein,” which can not be said in the manner of a Platonic psychology, or, indeed, of the tradition as the tradition understood itself, must be said in the manner of the Historical Consciousness. Consciousness means awareness. But, there is bare awareness which merely repeats certain catch phrases, and there is again and again approaching the essence of the manner of being in which this awareness comes to hold sway. Even the sense in which everyone knows that certain matters become moss grown, and merely are said, and no longer grasped, is itself a trope that may be in error.

We must then approach the question of what is to be understood by the soul after Phenomenology is born out of the repudiation of any possible psychology. We must regain the possibility to follow the footsteps of Husserl and his student from the exact historical motivation. To again see in Plato Phenomenology, which is an overlay on recollected memory as a speaking to the ancients. 

The questions to be raised are: What is “Intentionality” properly? 

How does the issue of the sequence of approach in the grasp of being, allegedly grasped on an “analogy” with the senses, come to the thinking of the “Truth of Being?”

Howsofar does the Technological Essence hold sway in the Sophia of the soul of Dasein? 


Where there can be no soul of Dasein in the sense of a thing apart from beings, of the bodily being, the bodily being is no longer thought as “accident” over and against essence. Since the “eyes of the soul” of Dasein do not snatch things up from the region of the accidents. Therefore, what is induction become in this region of being? Is Being a region, or are regions only said in connection to Metaphysics of availability? 

Friday, September 27, 2019

       Notes in Passing, Husserl/Heidegger and Dugin


The question raised in the Phenomenology of Time, in the section after Brentano is deemed to have failed, brings out that the modes of time are nowhere given. This is raised in Heidegger in Basic Concepts, showing the connection of the issues. In the latter text, the issue is the discovery of possibility in what is supposed to be available presence or what is now (distinguished from what could be, and what is already gone). These all come under the head, the truth of being. Ergo, the truth of time. 


Editorial comments on the appearances of Dugin’s Culture Project (which don’t presume to be a close philosophic confrontation)
Dugin’s multiculturalism is absurd on the face of it, because it simply ignores the question of the tradition as what is the decay. The tradition as planetary science. Tradition is supposed to be what is no longer, because one has come into a period of decay. Thus, the call to rescue the tradition for human beings. However, from what is more advanced, the new order, traditional names something undeveloped. Aristotelian physics becomes Galilean and mathematical physics. From the point of view of the tradition, the latter is decay. The Western tradition becomes the authority of the sciences. The Catholics expose this by going on as if they were still in charge. They speak of the sciences as something that could help human beings as a part of the rationality or nous of human beings as made present in the Catholic teaching. Catholicism, from the point of view of the highest authority in intellectual life, modern science, is what was sloughed off through Protestantism and Enlightenment. The Thomistic synthesis, becomes the Secular university teaching. This teaching takes over the world as the most powerful intellectual authority. Thus, Dugin must show why the tradition is not still alive in the current most powerful intellectual authority. What else is the tradition supposed to name? 
In one sense, the tradition can not be destroyed, it is whatever now holds sway. In another sense, it names the raising up of the intellectual ground of nous, overthrown by epsteme (as in René Guénon). It’s absurd to speak of a raising up which ignores the History of Being. As though the ground of being could return to a former position. So far as the question is of an overcoming (which is a vague expression which could be, with latitude, translated, synthizing with) of universal European Science, this is a question not only of intellectual authority, but of the holding sway of Technological Essence. Of the taking of being to be a presence that is infinitely alien and must be constantly fought by human beings (even to the point of the use of aloneness, as set aside from environmental or external natural suppression), routinized by the art of experiment, and in this manner brought into service of the abyssal will. 
The position of nous as the reason of nature means that reason is what can not be persuaded, what does not allow itself to be persuaded, because it is eternal logos. Nous, in the Chritological sense of eternal logos, of divine reason, chills all flesh. The rain wind of eternal nous, as Christ, is never to be persuaded by circumstances. It is the necessity of a mode of time which stands as a meaning of being. The rationalistic grasp of nature’s reason, becomes anous as a demiurge. Thus, it can never be said that each one has their tradition. Since each would only be a demi-being. What the supra-rational points to can’t stand in the multiculturalism. The whole scheme has about it the odor of practicality, of what is good because it is accomplishment. What is an accomplishment is good, and, thereby practical. The holy is not visible in the good, in nous. In speaking from a secret sense of the holy, a motivation, the multiculturalism of Dugin is a whole, it is comprehensive. It is not true multiculturalism. It is Spenglerism.

Tuesday, September 24, 2019

Formal Clarifications Concerning Truth & Editorial Comments on the Current Situation 



Alethea is the technical term which separates accidents from appearances. Behind or beneath the appearance, which itself conceals, there is truth or knowledge of the essence.  

Alethea is the envisaging of available beings. Life has beings available to it. 

Alethea is the term found in the ancient texts, which, among the classicists, is translated to mean unconcealment. Truth as correctness thinks former times, from what is now available, according to available recollected memory. 


Truth as uncovering of essences comes down to Nietzsche. It implies an underlying unity: availability is spilt by the early Greeks. Phenomena become accidents. “Keine moralischen phänomene; sondern nur eine moralische Interpretation gewisser 

Phenomena (eine Irrtümliche Interpretation!) “ There are no moral accidents, but only a moral significance of the available beings (a false significance).  


You took health (which transfers its meaning to "the good") to be your guideline. The availability of the theoria, the pure presence of health. Which allowed you to build the practical knowledge of the physician. But, health was never really your purpose, the proof is that the whole has no purpose. The theoretical binding of all species is a myth, available in the meaning of being or common sense. Common sense is a historical concept. And, so, accidental.


Nietzsche says: You were preoccupied with accidents and subordinating them to your uses, and thereby you utterly forgot that the meaning of your aloneness was that it has no meaning. The tacit belief in the future of the idea, of the species, reigns in everything. As a metaphysical binding, a truth not of being, but of the saying of what beings are :more being or less being beings.


Heidegger says, however, this takes being to be something available. To be life. 


The question here is this: Is the word “the Truth of Being” not in the service of life? Not something manifestly available? Life asks, in the Theaetetus, which of the available beings is the most being (the question which reaches its apotheosis in Thomas, the Good is full being, the Sacred Heart, and eros draws to it, and it is surrounded by mere shadow), and excludes the dream from the upper ranks. The intellect is the most real so far as it becomes nous. Episteme and nous are vaguely given by Plato and Aristotle. They are the upper parts of the phuske. Maths (the young must have them to enter the academy as the lowest prerequisite) are the lower part, episteme, given more simply and available even to the young. Maturity belongs to nous, to reasonableness of which maths are utterly excluded. The modern development, through three hundred years of propaganda, succeeded in overthrowing nous in favour of episteme. 


Husserl gives, however, lets availability take full and open ground on significance. All is available, none is more significant. What is the status of the addition of the claim that availability can be dispensed with? and where is it supposed to come from? If a technical meaning is given to the distinction between being as availability, and being simple, it drives us into the concept. From out of what is correct we are supposed to sense being as what is only this time or unrepeatable. However, this is just as much, this sense or “play,” the play which is more than the mere seriousness of investigation into what is, a part of the availability. Thusly the difficulty becomes a question which takes its reasonableness form an appeal to the special genius for the pursuit. This, however, is clearly reasonable, in every human pursuit, there are better and worse people at it. 


What is given in Zizek is false. The ontological difference is not maintained on the basis that the meaning of being in the world in the sense of the tacit meaning of being, the holy, is always already there. This is even the whole sense of Husserl’s waiting to see the changes in common sense. The question is rather, how does it happen? How is it thought or maintained.

Zizek's account (Less Than Nothing), basically picked up out of a text book, is not even really correct, let alone does it see the difficulty. It doesn't bring out the range between vague formal saying and thinking at all.

Lack of philosophic sense which simply jams everything together without considering the most exactness which is appropriate to the matter. In the vague sense, there is no difference between the Husserlian position, which speaks of the change at the level of common sense, and the Heideggerian, which speaks of “the meaning of being.”


We have a truth of phenomenological envisaging, which goes with availability or presence. In this sense the text with the name Heidegger implies that Husserl should be classed with Max Scheler and even with von Hildebrand as a seeker after the moral datum. In any case, a metaphysician, as a builder of the true science of being however understood. (All the questions
of being, whether it is whole or whether nothing is, whether it is many, or alone, are about being as availability, the question of how such a formula as “being as availability” is to be grasped has no bearing, it will always be as something present or available to life.) Thus, the question rages, how is phenomenology itself confused with Life? As though Husserl were Nietzsche? 


The question must be shown in pressure. And therefore as philosophical work, which Zizek was never capable of. And not as a literature of rehearsing positions. The difference is given in looking at a page of Zizek, and looking at a page of Heidegger. Any page will do. 


It’s not that, from outside Heidegger, we use words that critique Heidegger, but instead, we critique ourselves, as belonging to the teaching. It shows our attitude that we say, perhaps we only boast to belong. That this could be a boast implies our view of the teaching. We believe ourselves to belong to it. If words from outside a teaching are used, that understand that teaching as something to be discredited and exposed, for instance, this is our attitude toward Zizek, generally speaking, then the teaching must appear an alien mediocrity and irritant. However, when there is critique from within, as for a thousand years we find amidst the theologians, the most serious questions become possible, from within the charmed circle of toadstools, so to say. The table d'hôte of the Scholastics, now seemingly narrow, however offered a vast world of the so-called informal fallacies, which are now everywhere become meaningless and a nuisance destructive of the public ability to think, to those who belonged to that world and had a real use and almost were necessary to them. What is destructive to one regime is necessary to another. The ability to reach being, rather than the spell of the worlds, in the modern and well-known historical awareness. It can never be settled on the basis of a metaphysical approach. On the other hand, the political approach, which appeals to the black logos, of the sciences, is best given by Searle, who says simply, these and these problems come to be forgotten utterly at a given moment, and no one bothers with them anymore. This realist attitude is the most powerful, and corresponds to the belief that the sciences are the measure of intelligence and to nihilism. The thinkers come into war with the old guard, the philosophers of metaphysics, with one foot in the middle ages though Kant.  I conclude that therefore Dugin must be understood as the most radical of Leftists. Since the others are playing a backward and rump action.