Tuesday, February 5, 2019

Questions 4 Preparation for the abandonment of considerations suspect of being mere commentary on
philosophy, in preparation to learn investigation through searching

Image result for murgab ruins Merv

Q. Can there be a fundamental clarification which is not a Weltanschauung? In other words, the sciences,
when the word polymath no longer means anything, since math becomes a word for geometry, arithmetic
algebra and so on, rather than for the truly learnable, of which what we call math is only one example,
each of the so-called sciences are a piece of understanding, and the whole understanding is ideology as
a taking here and there from the datum of the sciences as a whole statement of “the good, the true, and
the beautiful” or the concealed value hiding invisible in the facts. How does Phenomenology, as master
science, first become being without being a mere key idea? Such reflection, we presuppose, are an
analogy which give language the possibility of bare genuine understanding of being. The analogy runs:
the confusion of the thinking is like all the clear thinking that, one after the other, is cast aside as no longer
cogent in history. Ergo, it too braces us like a cold wind which brings relief: aiming to uncover the a priority
or obviousness as the door to being, alongside the syncing together of the basic and clear datum of the
obvious or readily understood datum of life as the science of being.

Summary Statement as an inveigling trick or “Schlüsselattitüden” (key idea):  

The subject matter of culture is possible only if the subject matter of truth denies itself and is forsaken.
This never means that here and there in a studious person’s pondering something is envisaged, but rather that somewhere what is so is given clear voice. Philosophy is only genuine so far as it speaks from what is, but then every speaking is along with what is in such a way as to never be a representation but something with what is as what is. In clarifying certain basic subject matter of this kind we never become clearer in adding saving clauses such as: the speaking here alters what is, as though to say, this and this philosopher alters it. It is more so that we are denied being in such reflections. Only in the Element, which is in Catholic teaching sometimes named a “sober intoxication of the spirit”, is one moved in experience towards grasping the way play and seriousness are. Play means roughly what is called in Marx superstructure, it is what is unnecessary as the noble and the glorious which relativize and subordinate all the shameful things and ways of life. The serious, when it is understood in the Marxist sense, is the material in something like an Aristotelian sense, the props, factories, storefronts, human
beings, places, that play in the death drama which vies with what is genuinely serious through the conscious seriousness (‘second nature’ or the seriousness of play) of the despising of mere life and death which is the ruling power of all history. History means, always (thereby, paradoxically, truly), political history, and therefore a certain sense of time and sequence of what is as “posterity”.   

When there is truth history is not chiefly at issue, because history is always of a people and a country, a national, volkisch, with a geographical place has a history, but truth has no history. Truth has no time when thought philosophically. It is the possession of the sage who knows what to do in each situation not by emotion (as with the “beautiful soul”), but through angelic vision and direct prophecy (these being technical terms). Angelic vision means that the difficulty of “bounded rationality” is overcome because whatever is not trivial is known, which is to say, not that all “information” or “facts” have been gathered, but that what matters most is known. This direct prophesy means that the law-like power of rationality is grasped perfectly rather than through art as in recta ratio, or through accumulation of the tradition to
“working the law pure” in a thousands of years old fined and refined tradition. It’s never that here or there someone unable to think such subject matter as other than “ideal types” or some sort of defective
‘formal’ manner of taking bearings is the main issue. Rather, what is denies them such that
their fragrance no longer envelopes human beings, as what is a spontaneous support of their being, as
offer advantage from this gratuitous source.

Truth: mere superstructure. Truth, notion of worldview, “interpellation”. Truth: what burns all thinkers of the
absolute: those who want to become a “hive of bees” and to be done with all truths in sheer practical life
= commodity. Truth ends in the thinking of commodity. Commodity, modus, the convenient and the
comodius. Superstructure = it is noble to destroy the teaching of the “truth”, of what is higher than
commodity, all is commodity, man is commodity to himself. It is shameful to turn form the political, from
this country which is all countries. Commodity = the whole world is a carburetor, and we will all now
become a fuel injection system. The world is an engine that needs air for combustion, but now it will take
electricity and drive itself. The “bees” forget themselves in this practicality or commodity “comfortable self
preservation” as what is “sorge” or sorrow = sorrow is what is real. Ergo, in Marxism, in Classical
Libertarianism, these two being the same, there is no science, whether in the sense that survives in the
word polymath, the sense that still was alive until the year 1900, or in the sense of technology, the current
meaning of physics as fundamental or “key” science. There is no science, but there is the glory of the
commodity as = “bee” which on the sly drinks in the “sober intoxication”, “An elite is tempted by Russian
neo-Marxism not so much because of its humanitarian gospel as because of its vision of a
totalitarian civilization linked to the cosmic powers of matter.” gives the interpretation of the
intoxication, of the “they are drunk but not in the way you imagine” of the absolute ones who no
longer can have a science. Here, we should find our analogy much more fruitful, as the clearing to
think Heidegger, as we do, with Strauss. This is because what is creative is alongside what is still
able to think common sense. We thus think this way: The most essential thing in our time is the
inability to understand what common sense means. Common sense as what would be perfected in
wisdom, and so as what is, to use Schmitt’s manner of thinking, a polemical concept which we first
understand through the contrast and only while it is alive. Common sense is not thinkable without
wisdom, and only so far as we think science and the commodity in the place of wisdom do we grasp
the old meaning of common sense. Common sense, sleep when tired, eat when hungry, follow the
laws when living in a country with somewhat effective police, and so on. Such simple things are no
longer rebelled against by a few philosophers, but one is by instinct and habit always in revolt or
turning in revolutions of thought.

This should inform us, as question, as what might be only phenomenon, which means only true in a
way that we don’t know what it has to do with us or our needs or what is not needed (as with dying
for the world that will go on without us so far as we are not deceived by projecting ourselves into our
children as though it were really us living on).


Note about a silly publicly powerful or vulgar prejudice to be dispensed with by the thoughtful: the whole
of Hume is systematic forgetting of the "brain" itself, as what is able to take in from the so-called senses
at all (Daniel Dennett is at least able to see and so answer for this in his own way unlike the many thoughtless
followers of the mere name Hume). Ergo, a freak or naive faith in this organ and its standard of
correctness of reality against which all error is then naively measured as though humans were created for this world and reality itself.
Such childishness is no folly, but for this sober thinker (Hume) the result of being before Evolution.
Leibniz, true, did not suffer this mistake. One must remember that even Kant, when thinking of the new
discoveries concerning remote planets, thought only of the moral development of remote rational beings,
which he naturally assumed as humans. No excuse can be given the present day subscribers to Hume
except simple-mindedness and lack of freedom of thought which they, in utterly pitiful foolishness,
demand as though it where a matter of government or external assaults. Only so far as one speaks of
the education of children can this "freedom of thought" be counted as a matter of government
policy and law.

Tuesday, January 22, 2019

Questions III

Is Mood ever to be brought to Being in the sense that Phenomenology lets it be utterly doubted? An expressionistic look.

 Image result for armenian grave northern iran

The “mood” in Heidegger is the “mores” at its primordial font. It lacks “morality”. Morality is a word we have from
Cicero, by way of a translation of ethikos, and from there it flows into the tradition and returns with Hobbes
(“Aristotle controls the university”). Ethikos was meant to be a scientific, thus not an emotional derivation of
character such that this science rises to sophos, to wisdom (the round circle). Quite unlike the blind groping of 
Euthyphro, he who followed the conscience, or his gods, in order to avoid becoming polluted (miasma) by faul
acts. Wisdom and science are approached by Aristotle, yet it is Hobbes who brings them to the ground of nature, as
a rational natural law (Here we don’t go into the “square circle” of the binding of nature and convention or law into
a confused thinking which almost lets man become indistinguishable from animal, and so almost comes to
nihilism proper. A small comment. Summa ratio itself is the termination of nature into divine “convention” or
positive law in the Catholic thinking. The entire natural law hangs on holding back the coming of the “positive”, by
observing in the ontological, in the series of cases observed, the “pattern” of Justice. Such that one is moved to the
genuine character, of hexis, of this “right reason”. So far as a potentia ordinata is sustaining as what doesn’t give
way to a potentia absoluta = “the gods philosophize” = Dionysies. The play of the absolute and the seriousness of 
the ordinata are but a “mood” in its horizon, in its determination or bounding.). The “Justice is giving each one
what is their own” is the apex of this morality when it becomes English. What is most one’s “own”, says Hobbes, is
dear life. Ergo the formula, each one has the right to preserve their life against society, against those who “assault”
that one, for instance in leading them to prison or to death. Ergo, a right that outstrippes society, that vouchsafes the
so-called contract. The mood then stand in the place of the question: “What regime of contract law did hold sway
at the time of the contracting?”. Such a contract, is taken as a “legal fiction”, and yet it is determinative of a thousand 
times said “rights”, of what is said in law or constitution. The mood that upholds a right most of all brings
the modern “Ich” to hold sway over the “Du”, and whatever advantages “life” is felt as a sort of Rausch like the
sudden wind which brings out all things at the horizon, the sound of the wind is the promise of power. Because 
power alone will be sufficient to keep life secured against the ones who would “assault” it. But, In this, Heidegger 
asks, what is this mood? What is it we have long called the character? The character of the “it works”, of the
technological “all of us”, as man or what “one” does, bubbles over what is a'brew in the “if it were only a matter 
of life and death it would not be serious”. Ergo, the “Ich” steps out over what is a'brewing in the world 
as it does not only concern the mortal, but as with Berkeley, “the horse is in the barn”, the world, thus, is 
supposed to go on beyond the mortal in its character.

The “it works” in the undecided (befallen without being noticed as decision) essence that gives the peculiar mood
or character of the Technological Dasein says that kinship is an “inclusive fitness” and is advantageous. All human
selflessness becomes the “it is to their advantage”, the overcoming of doing good for near and dear in the “it
works” as what explains the why of this kin behavior, which extends to the “friends and family” which one, by
sacrificing oneself to, advantages oneself. Ergo, the anti-social forces of family and friends, or “tribalism”, as
against the society on the whole, are saved for the “it works” as valid. In this we have the sense that Strauss
observes a “human nature” which in the Hegelian manner cynically refuses the true morality of Kant. Kant’s
morality requires the complete extinction of empirical human nature, of what has been, merely, until now. Of the
scandalous and defective rumer of mere empirical knowing. While these forces, the positive power of society, and
the old habits of “human nature”, socialization and the murky resonance of the remaining forces, the basic force of
nihilism lets its turbulent cyclone boom clearly over all the beings. Here, Heidegger sees the failure to overcome
the absorption in being as the flight from the attempt to overcome nihilism in the denial of nihilism (or, better, 
in the not seeing of nihilism in the extended region of brilliant light). Thus, the decision to
the decision, to take the fundamental decision, is missed. Even Nietzsche was still absorbed in the war to let something
artificially dominate the future as a mood.

Friday, January 18, 2019

Questions II

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Does “Nietzsche hat mich kaputt gemacht” mean that the ontological difference can not stand? 
(Or, that it might but as a "life-giving lie".) The ontological difference means that Historicism 
is stood alongside Phenomenology. Common sense, as the common sense of a people, 
local in time and geography, is set off against “the eyes of the soul” as what can merely “look”.

No attempt will be made to justify this understanding against the various confused interpretations of the
ontological difference. Phenomonolgy is the ultimate science-wisdom (the round circle par excellence), 
rather than mere Greek-Sceince become "science". In this sense, in Heidegger, the question about 
the European Science is indefatigably spelled out (which, for us, going on in the investigation as we 
are, is not clear), it is thought as not great and fatiguing amidst the End of Metaphysics.

What Phenomenology is is a matter of a building up from common sense towards wisdom when it is
regarded not as itself, but as something to be interpreted. So, for instance, Husserl says, this doubt of
Descartes can not be wrong, this doubt as, I, Husserl, grasp it, as what is doubt and only doubt, the
so-called “bracketing”. The bracketing aims at thinking the Element. The Element is the overcoming of
the “in between”, when seen from a Platonic perspective. One is no longer between the eidos and
wisdom, or, the same thing, doxa and the summa ratio. The Element is the flash that withdraws man
from his “place”. The, organic, or sense-direct, the I see and hear but do not know. Presumably the “I
do not know it”, which when interpreted is the method of saying, “Maybe it was not like that at all”, a self
doubting, is the Time as genuine. Rather than as overlaid with the obstruction of the “cause” and the
“reason”. Of the something as something as the order of intelligibility and the order of existence, the
there and the showing as the what. So the question is not how Phenomenology is explained by a given
phenomenologist, a Descartes, who builds up at once, or, a Husserl, who doubts even the question of
the philisophic Optimism, the “best world”, or, an Aristotle, nor a Heidegger. Instead, it is said as a
basic, or inexplicable, condition.

Common sense does not know that “where” it happens is in question. The “where” is the where of the
anxiety of one who has a plight to deal with. Of anxiety as mortal. But, there are always mortals. To say,
“as mortal” already says, ontic-ontological. So where does the pure anxiety, that is not concerned with
the tiger’s shoulders raised above the jungle grass at the foot of the path, happen? Only in the ontic-
ontological, whereby the ontic pleny is Element. Phenomenology is always already chosen and drawn
far-off, its concern is not built up out of experience, yet it is not concerned with the childish things,
mathamatics, political science, nor even science as wisdom, rather, it is in the essence of science, in
what is interpreted as the always-living in the simplict science, in geometry, that it shows its Element.
Even if in Aristotle it never reaches beyond phusis, and always lets ousia become shut in by the
thinking of phusis as against wisdom, Phenomenology sees the Element, but interprets it this way or
that way according to common sense. 

The Element is never Being, since it is Open ontic look. Impossible, so it seems, to endure.
A Phenomenology, a thing learned, is never Element, but a way of coming towards the Element full of
what is never Open to Time or Being proper. 

It is clear that Nietzsche thinks all this under the aspect of Lessing, as the chess player who enjoys the
game, and puts the outcome aside as what is of less value.

Wednesday, January 16, 2019

The Spirit of Anatole France, and the Spirit of Lenin, or, a Hamlet in the Material Order

Image result for blue mosque tabriz

A prospectus in Mini of the notion of Seriousness, taken from the ground of Fire. Fire means in 
the Heideggerian thinking, the End, and is set off against the Beginning in the pre-philosophers. 
At the same time the pre-philosophers, Hericlitus, are sought in the End, which is the only place, 
so far as one is aware, they might be sought.


The Spirit of Anatole France, and the Spirit of Lenin, or, a Hamlet in the Material Order

La majestueuse égalité des lois, qui interdit au riche comme au pauvre de coucher sous les ponts, 
de mendier dans les rues et de voler du pain.

In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, 
beg in the streets and steal loaves of bread.

The Spirit of Lenin (in our own words): There is a real value in labour, each one should have 
it according to the days they work. This rule is the essence of Government, ergo, it is summa ratio.

Insofar as we deny the thinking of Descartes, as it is brought out in Husserl and Heidegger, 
as the mirror of πῦρ ἀείζωον, of everliving fire, as kosmos which is there and shows itself, as a 
Da-sein or a cogito esse, a knowing (which is called a thinking because it is dubitative) 
that has what is not-known or concealed there as the divined or barely intuited empirical 
accidental things, as the panta, or many accidents which fall to questioning as to their origin 
and meaning, we speak from the Essence of Technology. 

The Essence of Technology names the knowledge of how to move forward in any situation, 
such that whatever someone does during any moment, for instance the time it takes to cross 
the street, a moment, is according to the knowledge. Interpreted into the Nietzschean thinking 
this would read: the world, embodied knowing. Will as Kantian Zweck, becomes Weg or path. 
Someone knows how to tie a shoe, the knowledge is never available, and even when they don’t 
consciously think through it, they do it according to the knowing. But technological knowing is 
not a partial knowing, but knowing of the world. 

The Hamlet in the material means that the “intelectual” which Bertrand Russell names, we paraphrase

as follows: “The world problem consists of doubt in the wise and confidence among the insane.” In the

material means that the issue is not here or there that there is a diffident Hamlet, but rather that the

question of the Sovereign who controls the interpretation of the armed laws or rules has fallen prey to

the abyssus in a peculiar manner. Not at all in the sense of a “Is there truth in interpretation”, or not
mainly, but in the sense of a nightmare-like terribleness whereby reason becomes available to the
human being. Which means the ability to manipulate the essence of the human being becomes a
problem like the phase change: carburetor to fuel injection system.

The Liberal Order wants a rule of law. The order of a Utopian Conscience wants Equality. The rule of 
law means that the law about sleeping under bridges will be applied equally, without consideration to
the result. The result is a reaction norm, more-or-less calculable in advance, between circumstance 
and law. The poor will be more guilty of violations than the rich. The Utopian Conscience, in the strict 
sense, is not present in Lenin. Lenin however leads into the abyssus, or bottomless pit, which we here
call the Hamlet in the Material. For the well-known reason that there is no natural value, and therefore a
law that wants to apply equally to each labourer, so that a days work leads to the same enjoyment of 
the fruits of that work in each one, falls prey, not to an interpretation of the laws, in the sense that the 
Sovereign is the interpreter, but to the Essence of Being in its failure to know in such a way as to allow 
for a law that can treat equally. Rightly speaking we derive the sense of a rule of law only from the
sequence which brings about the American and French Revolutions, although with some spuriousness
the Republic of Geneva is also mentioned in this connection, and, at length, the ancient citizen-states
and the world of Cicero. However, it is only the collapse of the Estates-General which makes the claim obvious.
Each one has the same right to fall prey to the law about sleeping under bridges as each other with no
exception for the high clergy or the nobles. 

The order of Lenin (for this is the clearest case of the demand for a nation of laws, or “equality of 
opportunity, not outcome”, whereas the Capitalist allows for inheritance and the rule of families which 
is the problem of Socrates, the inordinate claim to the need of power to protect one’s own follows, and 
reaches Hobbes), the Liberal or Libertarian order, falls prey to the commercial order, and no longer to 
the magisterial sovereign. The question of “government capture” is not the main issue here, 
Government capture, that would mean that business would become sovereign, as is often claimed 
already to be the case. This Takeover, as such, is not a violation of rule of Law. Any interpretation 
can be meted out to each one and each other in the Liberal fashion. It is only when it is supposed 
to happen through “cheating” or corruption that it can be, mostly on the part of negative and 
vindictive persons, and also on the part of Utopians who would have utter equality even prior to rule of 
law, claimed to be. 

The system of knowing, which has a underlying basis in the theory of “Labour before Philosophy”, 
the Lockean and Hobbesian school, at bottom refers back to the Galilean break with Aristotle’s 
physics, the teaching which accords with the Scholastic Aristotle, the “square circle” as Heidegger 
names it, that is the Christian Philosophy. This is said in order that anyone who would take their 
bearing in German thinking may have an entry into the seriousness of the study, and not be 
out at sea with the Anglo-American teaching that thinking hangs apart from the world and the 
world situation. 


Expressionistic investigation:  

What and There
Essence, Existence
Doubt as Existence
Subject, Object 
Music as exsistence
Knowing as Solipsism

An abyssus-voro, hungry abyss, and an abyssus in which one finds oneself, as in Nietzsche, 
a starring back of the abyss, stand linked at the point of the eidos. The eidos is a particular 
showing of the god in the sense Berkeley says "the horse is in the barn", which means that a 
tree that falls in the forest, with no one there, makes a sound for common sense. Or, for God. 
The reality of common sense, in Kant and Berkely, remains secure in the human beings all are 
set off against what remains. In Berkley the sense of idealism is said against Leibniz and those 
who think reality as Aristotelian "philosophic material" where a "extension" unseen to the eye, 
can be grasped by the intelligence. In Kant it is the moral sphere. Reason and cause are 
thought into the third abyss in Husserl and so in his student. One can say, to the students 
of Dreyfus, that it is obvious that the talk of an "understanding of being" implies the structure 
of subject and object in the sense still retained by Heidegger, but, of course, not in the 
sense of Locke of what is now the remaining part of philosophy, that is, so called science. 
The distinction between the place of the thinking in Husserl and Heidegger is touched 
on in the book about the Four Seminars. But it is said absurdly in Dreyfus because it is 
not thought genuinely. 

An abyss: the eidos as common sense, the modern conception of natural law as what is 
essential to an age. The voracious abyss: The cosmos as the lighting flash that changes 
the place of what is serious. The place of the serious and the place of the play: The 
fantastically serious movement of a wildebeest forging a river swarming with crocodile. 
Although there is something genuinely called play in animal life, animals never pretend. 
 To be animal is to never wish. There is no 'I would like to, aber perhaps can not." for the animal. 
There is no "Reality is better than dreams." Philosophy is serious only because it is not merely 
a matter of life and death. Ergo, the realism in Berkeley and Kant. "The horse is in the barn," 
the cosmos remains apart from the mortals. Kant is no solipsisist. Neither Husserl. Da-sein 
is not the human, but is the human. It is the seriousness as the human. The play is then 
abyss as apeiron, which means, as availability and knowing as origin.